home

RTG: prosaic heat and electricity for space vehicles.

Radioisotope thermoelectric generators

RITEG (radioisotope thermoelectric generator) - a source of electricity, using thermal energy radioactive decay. Strontium-90 is used as fuel for RTGs, and plutonium-238 is used for high-energy generators.

Abandoned Soviet RTGs

What is RITEG

RTGs are sources of autonomous power supply with a constant voltage of 7 to 30 V for various autonomous equipment with power from a few watts to 80 watts. Together with RTGs, various electrical devices are used to ensure the accumulation and conversion of electrical energy generated by the generator. RTGs are most widely used as power sources for navigation signs, beacons and light signs. RTGs are also used as power sources for radio beacons and weather stations.

RTGs are a potential hazard because they are located in a deserted area and can be stolen by terrorists and then used as a dirty bomb. The danger is quite real, since there have already been recorded cases of disassembly of RTGs by hunters for non-ferrous metals.

radioactive element

RTGs use heat sources based on the strontium-90 radionuclide (RHS-90). RHS-90 is a sealed radiation source in which the fuel composition, usually in the form of ceramic strontium-90 titanate (SrTiO3), is sealed twice by argon-arc welding in a capsule. Some rigs use strontium in the form of strontium borosilicate glass. The capsule is protected from external influences by a thick RTG shell made of of stainless steel, aluminum and lead. Biological protection is made in such a way that the radiation dose on the surface of the devices does not exceed 200 mR / h, and at a distance of a meter - 10 mR / h

The radioactive half-life of strontium-90 (90Sr) is 29 years. At the time of manufacture RHS-90 contain from 30 to 180 kKi and 90Sr. The decay of strontium produces a daughter isotope, a beta emitter, yttrium-90 with a half-life of 64 hours. The dose rate of gamma radiation RIT-90 by itself, without metal protection, reaches 400-800 R/h at a distance of 0.5 m and 100-200 R/h at 1 m from RIT-90.

Radioactive element RIT-90

Safe activity of RIT-90 is reached only after 900 - 1000 years. According to Gosatomnadzor (now the Federal Service for Nuclear Supervision), “the current system for handling RTGs does not allow for the physical protection of these devices, and the situation with them may well be classified as an incident, expressed in unsupervised storage of hazardous sources. Therefore, generators require immediate evacuation.

According to the website of the developer of RTGs, the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation (VNIITFA), plutonium-238 is used as fuel for high-energy radionuclide power plants. However, the use of heat sources based on plutonium-238 in RTGs along with some technical advantages requires significant financial outlays, therefore, in the last 10-15 years, VNIITFA has not supplied such RTGs to domestic consumers for ground purposes.

The US also used RTGs, mostly for space purposes, but at least 10 RTGs were installed at remote military sites in Alaska in the 1970s. However, after a wildfire threatened one of the RTGs in 1992, the US Air Force began to replace them with diesel generators. According to the IAEA classification, RTGs belong to hazard class 1 (strongest sources, strongest emitters).

Security issues

According to the developers of RTGs, even if RHS-90 gets into the environment during an accident or unauthorized removal from the RTG, the integrity of the source can be violated only as a result of its deliberate, forced destruction.

“Perhaps it would be better to bury them so that no one finds them. But they were installed 30 years ago, when they did not think about the threat of terrorism, moreover, the RTGs were not vandal-protected,” said Alexander Agapov, head of the Department of Security and Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation.

Minatom admits that "there are RTGs in a state of abandonment." According to Agapov, “the fact is that organizations that are responsible for the operation of RTGs do not want to pay for their decommissioning. This is the same problem as with states formed on the territory former USSR- "take away all the bad, we will keep all the good for ourselves."

However, according to CEO VNIITFA Nikolai Kuzelev, "there is no problem of radioactive contamination of the environment surrounding the RTG." At the same time, N. Kuzelev admits that “most RTG operation sites do not meet the requirements of the current normative documents which is known to the management of operating organizations. “In fact, there is a problem of vulnerability of the RTG in relation to terrorist acts, which consist in the targeted use of the radioactive material contained in the RTG”

Output of strontium-90

According to specialists of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, “only sources of radiation pose a fundamental radiation hazard. ionizing radiation based on strontium-90 RIT-90”. As long as the RTG case (which is the transport package of RIT-90) is intact, it is not considered radioactive waste. “RIT-90, which is outside the radiation protection, will pose a serious local danger to people who find themselves in close proximity to it. radiation pollution environment ruled out". This has not happened until now. An experimental explosion of a powerful anti-ship explosive device docked to the RTG destroyed the small RTG (57IK), but the RIT-90 included in it was undamaged.

As representatives of VNIITFA stated in 2003, “so far there has not been a single case of violation of the tightness of the RIT-90 capsule, although there have been a number of serious emergencies with RTGs. At the same time, commenting on the incidents with RTGs, official representatives of Gosatomnadzor and the IAEA repeatedly admitted the possibility of natural destruction of the RHS capsule. However, a survey in July 2004 recorded the release of Sr-90 into the environment from an RTG of the IEU-1 type, located at Cape Navarin, Beringovsky District, Chukotsky autonomous region. As stated in the statement Federal Service for Nuclear Supervision (FSAN), this "speaks of the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, the thermal protection unit, the protective housing and the sockets of the sleeves."

There are about 1,000 RTGs on the territory of Russia (according to the head of the Department of Security and Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Alexander Agapov as of September 2003 - 998 units), on the territory of other countries - about 30 units. According to Rosatom data for March 2005, there are "approximately 720 RTGs" in operation, and about 200 have been decommissioned and disposed of with international assistance.

Presumably, about 1,500 RTGs were created in the USSR. The service life of all types of RTGs is 10 years. Currently, all RTGs in operation have exhausted their service life and must be disposed of.

Owners and Licensing

RTGs are owned by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, and Roshydromet. The Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation has about 380 RTGs, their records are maintained by the Hydrographic state enterprise. There are 535 of them in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, including 415 in the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanology.

Gosatomnadzor controls RTGs owned by the Ministry of Transport. Also, in accordance with government decree 1007 and directive D-3 of the Ministry of Defense of 01/20/2003, Gosatomnadzor licenses and controls the RTGs of the Ministry of Defense as nuclear installations that are not related to nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, in general, since 1995, oversight of radiation and nuclear safety in military units has been entrusted to the Ministry of Defense. It turns out that the controller government agency- Gosatomnadzor of the Russian Federation - often does not really have access to these RTGs. According to representatives of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, in order to ensure the safety of RTG operation along the Northern Sea Route, including taking into account the likelihood of “vandalism” and “terrorism”, it is enough to organize periodic (from several to once a year) control over their the physical state and the state of the radiation situation on the surface and near the RTGs.

However, Gosatomnadzor criticizes the Hydrographic Enterprise's approach, including for the extreme slowness of the decommissioning of end-of-life RTGs. The issues of storage, provision of physical protection of RTGs and radiation safety of the population in their locations still remain problematic. Gosatomnadzor notes that in the current situation, the hydrographic services of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense are actually violating Article 34 of the Law "On the Use of Atomic Energy", according to which the operating organization must have the necessary material and other resources for the operation of nuclear power facilities. In addition, according to Gosatomnadzor, structural subdivisions of the Hydrographic Enterprise "lack of trained specialists for the timely inspection and maintenance of RTGs."

RTG models

According to the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, 381 RTGs of the Beta-M, Efir-MA, Gorn and Gong types are in operation along the Northern Sea Route.

According to the official reports of the State Committee for Ecology, “ existing system dealing with RTGs is contrary to the provisions federal laws“On the Use of Atomic Energy” and “On the Radiation Safety of the Population”, since the physical protection of these installations is not provided. When placing RTGs, the possibility of damaging effects of natural and anthropogenic factors on them was not taken into account.

Due to shortcomings in the practice of accounting and control of these installations by operating organizations, individual RTGs may be “lost” or “forgotten”. In fact, RTG locations can be considered as places for temporary storage of high-level waste.” “Particularly alarming are the possible Negative consequences loss of control over RTGs under the jurisdiction of the State Hydrographic Enterprise and the Russian Ministry of Defense. In the 60s - 80s of the last century, VNIITFA developed about ten types (standard sizes) of RTGs based on sources of the RIT-90 type.

RTGs differ in various parameters in terms of output voltage, output electric power, weight, dimensions, etc. The most widely used RTG is the Beta-M type, which was one of the first products developed in the late 60s of the last century. About 700 RTGs of this type are currently in operation. This type of RTG, unfortunately, does not have welded joints and, as the practice of the last 10 years has shown, can be dismantled on site using conventional metalwork tool. In the last 10 - 15 years, VNIITFA has not been working on the development of new RTGs.

Types and main characteristics of Soviet-made RTGs

Type	RHS thermal power, W	RHS initial nominal activity, thousand Curies	Electric power of RITEG, W	RTG output voltage, V	Mass of RTG, kgm	Start of production
Ether-MA	720	111	30	35	1250	1976
IEU-1	2200	49	80	24	2500	1976
IEU-2	580	89	14	6	600	1977
Beta-M	230	35	10	-	560	1978
Gong	345	49	48	14	600	1983
Horn	1100	170	60	7 (14)	1050 (3 RIT)	1983
IEU-2M	690	106	20	14	600	1985
Senostav	1870	288	-	-	1250	1989
IEU-1M	2200 (3300)	340 (510)	120 (180)	28	2 (3) * 1050	1990

Accounting for RTGs

The developer of design documentation for RTGs was VNIITFA (All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation) in Moscow. The documentation was handed over to the manufacturer. The main RTG customers were the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transport, the State Committee for Hydrometeorology (now Roshydromet) and the Mingeo (the former Ministry of Geology, whose functions were transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources).

During the development of RTGs, VNIITFA produced small quantities of prototypes. The serial manufacturer of RTGs in the USSR was the Baltiets plant in the city of Narva, Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. This plant was redesigned in the early 1990s and is currently not related to RTGs. Balti ES (this is how the company is now called) confirmed to Bellone that they did not keep any information about where the RTGs were supplied. Nevertheless, the plant's specialists participated in the replacement of RTGs with other energy sources at lighthouses in Estonia.

Commissioning of RTGs in the 1960s was carried out by a specialized organization of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, which was liquidated long ago, or by the operating organizations themselves.

Where are the RTGs located?

About 80% of all manufactured RTGs were sent to hydrographic military units of the Ministry of Defense and civilian hydrographic bases along the Northern Sea Route.

According to VNIITFA, today the institute does not have complete information on the number of all manufactured RTGs and on all organizations owning RTGs currently in operation. Considering the current situation in the country regarding RTG accounting, VNIITFA has been collecting information on RTGs in operation in Russia and other countries of the former USSR for a number of years. To date, it has been established that there are about 1,000 RTGs in Russia. All of them have worked out their service life and are subject to disposal at specialized enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation.

Under agreements with the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, VNIITFA annually sends its specialists to inspect RTGs at their operating sites. In 2001-2002, 104 RTGs of the RF Ministry of Transport were inspected.

In the report of Gosatomnadzor for 2003, the state of RTGs in the Far Eastern District was recognized as unsatisfactory. In 2004, it was noted that the most “unfavorable” organizations that operate RTGs with serious violations of safety requirements remain the Tiksinskaya, Providenskaya hydrographic bases and the Pevek Pilot and Hydrographic Detachment of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Federal Agency for Sea and River Transport. It was noted that “the condition of the RTG physical protection is at an extremely low level. Inspection of RTGs by specialists of structural subdivisions of the above-mentioned enterprise is carried out rarely and mostly located near the locations of these subdivisions; a number of RTGs have not been examined for more than 10 years (there are not enough trained specialists in the Pevek LGO detachment and the Providenskaya hydrographic base).

According to various sources, about 40 lighthouses with RTGs are located along the coasts of Sakhalin, 30 - near the Kuril Islands. In Chukotka, according to official figures, 150 RTGs have accumulated, many of which are ownerless. For example, RTGs belonging to Kolymgidromet were abandoned on the shores of Shelting Bay and at Cape Evreinov in connection with the collapse of the observation service. Of these, 58 are of the Beta-M type, 13 are of the Efir type, 8 are of the Gorn type, and 6 are of the Gong type. Some RTGs are simply lost: for example, in September 2003, the inspection did not find a Beta-M type RTG No. 57 at the Kuvekvyn checkpoint, and there were official suggestions that the RTG might have been washed into the sand as a result of a strong storm or stolen by unknown people.

It is possible that there are lost generators in the Arctic region. According to official data, in the late 1990s, at least six of them were in emergency condition. According to the conclusion of the official commission with the participation of Gosatomnadzor specialists, “the state of safety of RTGs is extremely unsatisfactory and poses a real danger to the flora, fauna and water area of the Arctic seas. Their improper placement may expose part of the indigenous population of the Arctic to unreasonable exposure.”

There are about 75 RTGs in the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia. In 2002, the federal target program "National Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Anthropogenic Pollution in the Arctic Region" was approved. Russian Federation". One of the points of the action plan for the protection of the marine environment was the inventory of RTGs. In Yakutia, it was decided to conduct a complete inventory in 2002-2003. According to Tamara Argunova, head of the radiation safety department of the Ministry of Nature Protection of Yakutia, due to the fact that the route of sea vessels is controlled by space satellites, the need to use RTGs has disappeared, and their prompt disposal should be carried out.

Generators located on the islands of the Laptev, East Siberian and Arctic coasts of the territories of the Anabar, Bulunsky, Ust-Yansky, Nizhnekolymsky uluses belong to the area of responsibility of the Khatanga, Tiksinskaya, Kolyma hydrobases and the Pevek pilot detachment only on paper. Radiation safety requirements for the operation of RTGs along the Northern Sea Route remain violated. For 25 such installations, control is lost. There are more than 100 RTGs in the Siberian Federal District, mainly in Taimyr.

On the coast of the Barents and White Seas there are about 153 RTGs, including 17 in the area of Kandalaksha Bay. According to VNIITFA director Nikolai Kuzelev, “100% of RTGs on the coast Baltic Sea are subject to annual inspections. At the same time, it should be recognized that the inspection of RTGs by the specialists of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise VNIITFA on the Arctic coast of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug was not carried out due to the lack of contracts.”

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

According to the Far Eastern Interregional Territorial District of Gosatomnadzor of Russia, on August 16, 2003, during the examination by the commission of RTGs located on the Arctic coast of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, an emergency RTG of the IEU-1 type was discovered at Cape Navarin in the Bering District. The exposure dose rate on the generator surface was up to 15 R/h.

As the commission established, the generator "self-destructed as a result of some, not yet precisely established in nature, internal impact". Radioactive contamination of the RTG body and the soil around it was revealed. This was reported in letter No. 04-05 \ 1603, sent to the leadership of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation on August 20, 2003, by the General Director of VNIITFA of Minatom N. R. Kuzelev and the responsible official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation A. N. Kunakov.

In July 2004, a second inspection of the emergency RTG at Cape Navarin was carried out. As a result of the survey, it was established: the radiation situation has deteriorated sharply, the level of DER of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h; launch of Sr-90 began in external environment, which indicates the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, the thermal protection unit, the protective housing and the sockets of the cartridge cases (previously, VNIITFA experts repeatedly stated that strontium could not be released into the environment).

Presumably, this RTG was shot down by an all-terrain vehicle by reindeer herders of the brigade stationed on Navarino in 1999. The generator has heated up to 800 °C inside. The metal plates blocking the path of radiation burst. While the situation saves concrete slab weighing 6 tons, which closed the generator last year. However, the radiation is thousands of times greater than allowable norms. On the southernmost cape of Chukotka, Navarin, herds of reindeer herders graze. Animals, and even people, are not stopped by warning signs - they come close to the source of radiation.

As mentioned in the FSAN report for 2004, "the technical condition of the RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG does not exclude its complete destruction", moreover, thermophysical processes ("bursting" by internal pressure) remain "unknown". At present, the Russian Ministry of Defense is solving the issue of its removal and disposal in July 2005.

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

Abandoned RTGs in Chukotka

Shalaur Island	Exceeding the permissible dose limit by 30 times. The RTG is in an ownerless, abandoned condition.
Cape Okhotnichiy	Has severe external damage. It was established without taking into account the influence of natural hazards in the immediate vicinity of the thermokarst depression. The service personnel covered up a transport accident that happened to the RTG in March 1983.
Cape Heart-Stone	Installed 3 meters from the edge of a cliff up to 100 meters high. A cleavage crack passes through the site, which makes it possible for the RTG to fall along with a large mass rock. The installation of the RTG was carried out without taking into account the influence of natural hazards (marine abrasion). Stored there illegally.
Nuneangan Island	The external radiation of the RTG exceeds the established limits by 5 times. The reason is a design flaw. Transportation is possible only by special flight.
Cape Chaplin	Exceeding the permissible dose limit in the lower part of the body by 25 times. The technological plug is turned out from the lower part of the body. The RTG is located on the territory of the military unit. The cause of the accident is a design flaw of this type of generator and concealment by the personnel of a radiation accident with this RTG.
Chekkul island	Exceeding the established dose limits by 35% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.
Cape Shalaurova hut	Exceeding the established dose limits by 80% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.

It is recognized that another 15 RTGs from the Tiksinskaya hydrobase are subject to removal due to the lack of need for use.

RTG incidents

Several incidents are detailed below; you can read about the latest incidents that took place at the end of 2003-2004 in the table at the end of this subsection.

On November 12, 2003, the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet, during a scheduled inspection of navigational aids, discovered a completely disassembled Beta-M type RTG in the Olenya Bay of the Kola Bay (on the northern shore opposite the entrance to Ekaterininskaya Harbor), near the town of Polyarny. The RTG is completely destroyed, and all of its parts, including the depleted uranium shield, are stolen by unknown thieves. A radioisotope heat source - a capsule with strontium - was found in the water near the shore at a depth of 1.5 - 3 meters.

On November 13, 2003, the same inspection, also in the area of the city of Polyarny, discovered a completely dismantled RTG of the same type Beta-M, which provides power to navigational sign No. 437 on Yuzhny Goryachinsky Island in the Kola Bay (opposite the former village of Goryachiye Ruchi). Like the previous one, the RTG was completely destroyed, and all its parts, including the depleted uranium shield, were stolen. RIT was found on land near the coastline in the northern part of the island.

The administration of the Murmansk region qualifies the incident as a radiation accident. According to the administration, “RIT is a source of increased radiation hazard with a radiation power on the surface of about 1,000 roentgens per hour. The presence of people and animals near the source (closer than 500 meters) is a danger to health and life. It must be assumed that the people who dismantled the RTGs received lethal doses of radiation. Currently, the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are searching for the thieves and parts of the RTGs at the scrap metal acceptance points.”

The exact date when the RTGs were looted has not been established. Apparently, the previous inspection of these RTGs was carried out no later than the spring of 2003. As Bellona learned, the area where the RTGs were located and where the capsules with strontium were scattered is not closed and access there was not limited. Thus, for a long time it was possible to irradiate people.

On March 12, 2003 (the same day that Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev shared his concerns about the safety of nuclear materials at a conference in Vienna), the military of the Leningrad Naval Base discovered that one of the lighthouses on the shores of the Baltic Sea (Pikhlisaar Cape Kurgalsky) had been looted peninsula in Leningrad region).

Prior to the discovery of the loss, the last scheduled inspection of this beacon with a Beta-M type generator was carried out in June 2002. Non-ferrous metal hunters carried away about 500 kg of stainless steel, aluminum and lead, and a radioactive element (RIT-90) was thrown into the sea 200 meters from the lighthouse. The hot capsule with strontium melted through the ice and went to the bottom of the Baltic Sea. At the same time, the exposure dose rate of gamma radiation on the surface of an almost meter thick ice above the source was more than 30 R/h.

Since the services of the border guards in charge of the lighthouse are not sufficiently equipped, on March 23 they turned to the Lenspetskombinat "Radon" (Sosnovy Bor) with a request to find and isolate the radioactive cylinder. LSK "Radon" does not have a license for this species activities (the plant specializes in the disposal of radioactive waste), and therefore specifically coordinated the extraction of a strontium battery from under the ice with Gosatomnadzor. On March 28, the radioactive element was removed using an ordinary shovel and long-handled pitchfork and delivered to the road several kilometers away on ordinary sleds, where it was loaded into a lead container. The shell containing the strontium was not damaged. After temporary storage at LSK Radon, the cylinder was transported to VNIITFA.

A similar lighthouse in the Leningrad region was looted in 1999. Then the radioactive element was found at a bus stop in the city of Kingisepp, 50 km from the scene. At least three people who stole the source have died. The liquidation of the incident was then also carried out by the specialists of the LSK Radon.

Looted in March 2003, the lighthouse was located near the village of Kurgolovo, Kingisep district, not far from the borders with Estonia and Finland, on the territory of a nature reserve and a wetland of international importance. The reserve was created in 2000 by a decree of the governor of the Leningrad region in order to protect rare species flora and fauna, protection of the shallow area of the bay, where commercial fish species spawn, as well as the habitats of gray seals and ringed seals. On the territory of the reserve there are nesting colonies and migratory sites of rare waterfowl. When creating the reserve, it was planned to develop tourism. A system of "ecological" trails and routes was developed: the nature of the peninsula could attract tourists. However, after already two incidents involving the loss of a radioactive source, it is doubtful that tourists will want to come to these places.

In May 2001, three radioisotope source from the lighthouses of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, located on an island in the White Sea near the Kandalaksha Reserve in the Murmansk Region. This reserve is also one of the centers of ecological tourism. Two hunters for non-ferrous metals received strong doses of radiation, and the stolen RTGs were found and sent to VNIITFA in June 2001. From there they were transported to the Mayak plant in the Chelyabinsk region. The work was financed by the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark under an agreement with the administration of the Murmansk region under the program for the disposal of RTGs and the installation of solar panels on lighthouses.

In 1987, the MI-8 helicopter of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration, at the request of military unit 13148 of the Russian Ministry of Defense, transported an IEU-1 type RTG weighing two and a half tons to the area of Cape Nizkiy on the eastern coast of Sakhalin (Okhinsky district). As the pilots explained, the weather was windy and the helicopter was so loose that they were forced to drop the cargo into the sea to prevent a fall.

In August 1997, another RTG of the same type crashed from a helicopter into the sea near Cape Maria in the north of Sakhalin Island (Smirnykhovsky District). The installation fell into the water at a distance of 200-400 meters from the shore and lies at a depth of 25 - 30 meters. The reason, according to the military, was the opening of the external suspension lock on the helicopter due to incorrect actions of the crew commander. Despite the fault of civil aviators who transported RTGs on the external sling of helicopters, all responsibility lies with the owner of the RTGs - the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Defense Ministry. The military were obliged to develop measures to prevent emergencies, as well as conduct special briefings for helicopter crews, but nothing was done.

The search operation that discovered one of the RTGs (flooded in 1997) in the Sea of Okhotsk took place only in 2004. It is planned that the RTG will be raised no earlier than summer 2005. An expedition to search for another RTG has not yet been carried out.

Currently, both RTGs lie on the seabed. So far, there is no high content of strontium-90 in sea water samples in these places, but the marine environment is quite aggressive. It is a chemically active medium, moreover, RTGs are under pressure of several atmospheres. And in the cases of RTGs there are technological connectors and channels through which sea water will surely seep inside. Then the strontium-90 radionuclide will get into the sea and through the food chain "bottom microorganisms, algae, fish" - into human food. In favor of the likelihood of such a scenario, representatives of the Magadan Department of Radiation Safety Inspection speak out, representatives of local departments of Gosatomnadzor demand the rise of RTGs, while pointing out that the developers of RTGs from VNIITFA did not test them for the effects of a chemically aggressive marine environment. The possibility of release of radionuclides from RTGs near Capes Nizkoye and Maria is officially confirmed by IAEA experts. In addition, the release of strontium-90 into the environment began to be assessed by experts as a likely scenario after the release of strontium from an emergency RTG at Cape Navarin in Chukotka was recorded in July 2004. According to the calculations of the Norwegian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRPA), in the worst case scenario, the release of radioactivity into sea water could be up to 500 MBq of Sr-90 daily; despite this figure, the NRPA believes that the risk of strontium entering the human body through the food chain is negligible.

VNIITF specialists also participated in the liquidation of an emergency caused by the unauthorized dismantling of six Beta-M RTGs in Kazakhstan near the town of Priozersk.

In 1998, in the village of Vankarem in Chukotka, a two-year-old girl died of leukemia. Two more children were in the district hospital to confirm the same diagnosis. According to some reports, the cause of the exposure was an abandoned RTG, which was lying near the village.

So far, the fact of exposure of the head of the Plastun navigation support station at Cape Yakubovsky in the Primorsky Territory, Vladimir Svyatets, remains officially unconfirmed. In March 2000, a damaged RTG from the Olginsky section of the hydrographic service of the Pacific Fleet, which had an increased radiation background, was unloaded near the lighthouse near the lighthouse. As a result of being near the damaged RTG, V. Svyatets developed chronic radiation sickness, but this diagnosis of civilian doctors is disputed by the leadership and doctors of the Pacific Fleet.

RTG incidents in Russia and the CIS

1978	Pulkovo Airport, Leningrad	The case of transporting a spent RTG without a transport container.
1983 March	Cape Nutevgi, Chukotka	On the way to the installation site, the RTG got into a transport accident and was badly damaged. The fact of the accident, hidden by the personnel, was discovered by a commission with the participation of specialists from Gosatomnadzor in 1997.
1987	Cape Low, Sakhalin Region	During transportation, the helicopter dropped a RTG of the IEU-1 type weighing 2.5 tons into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk.
1997	Tajikistan, Dushanbe	An increased gamma background was registered on the territory of Tajikhydromet. Three expired RTGs were stored at the company's coal storage in the center of Dushanbe (because there were problems with sending RTGs to VNIITFA) and were dismantled by unknown persons.
1997 August	Cape Maria, Sakhalin Region	A repetition of the events of a decade ago: during transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 type RTG into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk at a depth of 25-30 meters. The RTG was found as a result of an expedition in the fall of 2004, and its recovery is scheduled for the summer of 2005.
1998 July	Korsakov port, Sakhalin region	A disassembled RTG was found at a scrap metal collection point. The stolen RTG belonged to the Russian Defense Ministry.
1999	Leningrad region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found at a bus stop in Kingisepp. Taken to LSK "Radon".
2000	Cape Malaya Baranikha, Chukotka	Access to the RTG located near the village is not limited. In 2000, it was found that the radiation background of the source exceeds the natural one by several times. Due to lack of funds was not evacuated.
May 2001	Kandalaksha Bay, Murmansk Region	3 radioisotope sources were stolen from lighthouses on the island. All three sources were discovered and sent to Moscow by VNIITFA specialists.
February 2002	Western Georgia	Residents of the village of Liya, Tsalenjikha district, received high doses of radiation after finding RTGs in the forest. Shortly after the incident, the IAEA commission working in Georgia established that in total from the Baltiets plant in Georgia Soviet time 8 generators were delivered.
March 2003	Cape Pikhlisaar, near the village of Kurgolovo, Leningrad Region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found 200 m from the lighthouse, in the water of the Baltic Sea. Extracted by specialists of LSK "Radon".
2003, August-September	Chaunsky district, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	The inspection did not find a RTG of the type<Бета-М>No. 57 on paragraph<Кувэквын>, there were official speculations about the possible washing of the RTG into the sand as a result of a strong storm or its theft by unknown persons.
2003 September	Golets Island, White Sea	The staff of the Northern Fleet discovered the theft of metal biological protection RTG on Golets Island. The door to the lighthouse was also broken into. This beacon contained one of the most powerful RTGs with six RIT-90 elements that were not stolen. The radiation on the RTG surface was 100 R/h.
November 2003	Kola Bay, Olenya Bay and South Goryachinsky Island	Two RTGs belonging to the Northern Fleet were looted by hunters for non-ferrous metals, and their RIT-90 elements were found nearby.
March 2004	Lazovsky district of Primorsky Krai, near the village of Valentin	A RTG belonging to the Pacific Fleet was found dismantled, apparently by hunters for non-ferrous metals. RIT-90 found nearby.
July 2004	Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai	Three RTGs were found on the territory of military unit 40919. According to the commander of the unit, these RTGs were left over from another military unit previously stationed at this site. According to the Krasnoyarsk inspection department of Gosatomnadzor, the dose rate at a distance of about 1 m from the RTG body is 155 times higher than the natural background. Instead of solving this problem within the Ministry of Defense, the military unit in which the RTGs were found sent a letter to OOO<Квант>to Krasnoyarsk, which is engaged in the installation and adjustment of radiation equipment, with a request to take the RTGs to their disposal.
July, 2004	Cape Navarin, Beringovsky District, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	A re-examination of the emergency RTG type IEU-1 revealed that strontium-90 began to escape from the RTG into the environment as a result of<неизвестных теплофизических процессов>. This refutes the thesis supported by VNIITFA for a long time about the invulnerability of capsules with strontium. Technical condition RITEG and dynamics of development of thermophysical processes in RTG does not exclude its complete destruction. The level of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h.
September, 2004	Bunge Land Island, New Siberian Islands, Yakutia	Carried out the transportation of two RTGs of the type<Эфир-МА>No. 04, 05 issue of 1982, owned by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Hydrographic Enterprise" of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, the MI-8 mt helicopter made an emergency drop of cargo from a height of 50 meters onto the sandy surface of the tundra of Bunge Island. According to the FSAN, as a result of the impact on the ground, the integrity of the external radiation protection of the RTG cases was violated, at a height of 10 meters above the RTG fall site, the dose rate of gamma radiation is 4 mSv/h. The cause of the incident is a violation<Гидрографическим предприятием>RTG transportation conditions (they were transported without transport packaging containers, which are required by the IAEA standards). The rise of RTGs is expected in the summer of 2005.

In addition to the above cases, it should be mentioned that in August 1998, the Hydrographic Enterprise established the fact of theft of batteries from two Beta-M RTGs at Cape Otmeliy of the Khatanga Bay of the Taimyr Peninsula. In August 2002, an inspection by the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport discovered the disappearance of two RTGs of the Gong type at the Cape of the Kondratiev Strait of Dmitry Laptev. According to the hypothesis of the scientific enterprise Rudgeofizika, RTGs are located in the ground at a depth of 3-5 meters, but no actions have been taken to detect RTGs and extract them from the ground.

Threat of terrorism

A US Congressional program since 1991 known as the CTR, Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar Program, views RTGs as a threat to the spread of radioactive materials that could be used to build a "dirty bomb".

The program website notes that the Russian government does not have sufficient data on the location of all RTGs. The goal of the program is to find them and free them from dangerous material.

On March 12, 2003, at the IAEA conference "Safety of Radioactive Sources", Minister for Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev acknowledged the existence of the problem. The facts complicating the situation, according to Rumyantsev, “are the activation various kinds terrorist groups in the world, and the disintegration of the former Soviet space, which led to the loss of control over the sources, and sometimes even to the loss of the sources themselves. An example of this is the cases of unauthorized opening of RTGs by local residents in Kazakhstan and Georgia in order to use the non-ferrous metals contained in them. And the dose received as a result of such actions for some of them turned out to be extremely high.

Rumyantsev admitted that “after the collapse of the USSR, the once integral state system control over the location and movement of radioactive, nuclear materials was re-created in separate independent states which gave rise to an unprecedented surge of hitherto uncharacteristic crimes related, in particular, to radioactive sources.

According to the IAEA, “High-risk radioactive sources that are not under reliable and regulated control, including so-called “orphan” sources, pose serious security and safety issues. Therefore, under the auspices of the IAEA, there should be an international initiative aimed at facilitating the location, recovery and security of such radioactive sources throughout the world.”

RTG recycling programs

Since RTGs, which are used in the navigation equipment of the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet, have reached their end of life and pose a potential threat of radioactive contamination of the environment, the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark finances their disposal and partial replacement solar batteries. Civilian RTGs are not included in this project. There are a number of agreements about this between the administration of Finnmark and the government of the Murmansk region. When dismantled, the RTGs of the Northern Fleet are transported to Murmansk for temporary storage at the RTP Atomflot, then they are delivered to the Izotop Military District in Moscow, from there to VNIITFA, where they are dismantled in a special chamber, after which the RIT-90 is sent for burial at the Mayak Production Association . At the first stage of the program, 5 RTGs were replaced with Western-made solar cells. In 1998, they were the first to replace an RTG at a lighthouse on Bolshoy Ainov Island in the Kandalaksha Nature Reserve, this work cost $35,400. According to the 1998 agreement, it was planned to replace 4 more RTGs (two were replaced in 1999, one in 2000 and one more in 2002 at the Laush navigation sign on the Rybachy Peninsula). In 2001, 15 RTGs were disposed of (12 in the usual way, as well as three RTGs dismantled by non-ferrous metal hunters in the Kandalaksha region). In June 2002, an agreement was signed for the disposal of another 10 RTGs, and another $200,000 was allocated for this purpose. In August 2002, Bellona, together with experts from the US Congress, inspected a Norwegian solar-powered lighthouse near the Russian border. Bellona announced the need to replace Russian radioactive beacons. On April 8, 2003, the governors of Finnmark and the Murmansk region signed two contracts: for the disposal of spent RTGs and for testing Russian solar panels. A new stage of RTG disposal, undertaken in 2004, costs about $600,000. As of September 2004, 45 RTGs had been decommissioned under the joint project, while it was planned to decommission 60 RTGs by the end of 2004, 34 of them with solar panels. As of September 2004, the Norwegian province of Finnmark had already invested about $3.5 million in this project, but how much the program will cost in the future depends largely on the efforts made by other potential donor countries. The cost of the project to replace RTGs with solar panels is $ 36,000, but these panels - Russian production, they are cheaper than Western counterparts. The cost of each panel is about 1 million rubles. The solar battery is designed in such a way that it will accumulate electricity during the daytime, and give it away during the dark. The Krasnodar Saturn plant, owned by Rosaviakosmos, is participating in the work. Batteries were tested at one of the Murmansk lighthouses and at the lighthouse in Finnmark.

In August 2004, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) completed its independent report on the disposal of Russian RTGs.

At the next Russian-Norwegian meeting in February 2005, it was decided to finance the disposal of the remaining 110 lighthouses (about 150 RHS, since some RTGs have several RHSs) in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions until 2009, replacing them with solar cells. The cost of the program is estimated at about $3.5 million.

US efforts

After September 11, 2001, the United States recognized the danger of RTGs, which could be used by terrorists to create a "dirty bomb". In September 2003, Minatom signed terms of reference with the US Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposal of a number of RTGs. According to the agreement, up to 100 RTGs per year will be disposed of at Mayak. According to the existing procedure, during disposal, the RTG body is disassembled in a special VNIITFA chamber. The RIT-90 contained inside can be used for energy purposes or converted into radioactive waste and sent for disposal in a special container to the city of Chelyabinsk at the Mayak plant, where it undergoes vitrification. Meanwhile, from 2000 to 2003, VNIITFA disposed of only about 100 RTGs various types decommissioned. In 2004, a total of 69 RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation were removed from various municipal territories across Russia for disposal. In 2005, it is planned to dispose of about 50 more RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. Rosatom plans to dispose of all RTGs (of both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense) by 2012. The Department of Energy budget for a program to monitor radiological dispersal devices that can be created using material contained in RTGs was $36 million in FY2004, and a $25 million request for FY2005. The Ministry of Transport of Russia started only in August 2004, within the framework of the DOE program. However, already after the start of the program, in November 2004, Deputy General Director of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation Evgeny Klyuev told Bellona that “there is no policy for the disposal of RTGs, only RTGs in the worst condition are disposed of.”

In negotiations with American and German partners, Minatom also provides for the option of storing the contents of RTGs in the regional Radon test sites. In particular, a plan is being discussed to create a long-term modern storage facility for RTGs in the Siberian region, presumably on the territory of one or more Radon plants, in order to exclude their transportation to Moscow and back through Siberia to the Mayak Production Association. Meanwhile, the Radon plants are designed to handle only medium and low radioactive waste, while RTGs are classified as high-level waste. In March 2005, Rosatom announced that DOE had promised to consider Russia's assistance in the construction at the DalRAO enterprise (near the nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk in Kamchatka) of a point for dismantling RTGs (to prevent their shipment to Moscow; burial is supposed to be carried out at "Mayak"). Meanwhile, with American assistance, DalRAO has already begun construction of an intermediate storage facility for RTGs in the Far East region. The estimated cost of removing one RTG from its location and the disposal procedure is 4 million rubles (about $120,000, which is approximately equal to the cost of a new RTG). According to VNIITFA, the cost of disposal for RTGs in Chukotka is 1 million rubles (about $30,000).

- One of the radioisotope generators of the Cassini probe Radioisotope generator of the New Horizons spacecraft Radioisotope energy sources of various devices design using the energy released during radioactive ... ... Wikipedia

One of the radioisotope generators of the Cassini probe Radioisotope generator of the New Horizons spacecraft Radioisotope energy sources devices of various designs that use the energy released during radioactive ... ... Wikipedia

One of the radioisotope generators of the Cassini probe The radioisotope generator of the New Horizons spacecraft Radioisotope energy sources devices of various designs that use the energy released during radioactive ... ... Wikipedia Wikipedia

AMS "Venera 13" Automatic interplanetary station (AMS) is an unmanned spacecraft designed to fly in interplanetary space (outside the Earth's orbit ... Wikipedia

Page 1

Radioisotope generators used on spacecraft usually operate on the principle of using radiation energy to heat the hot junctions of thermocouples, in which thermal and electrical energy are converted.

Modern radioisotope generators have an efficiency of 3-5% and a service life of 3 months to 10 years. The technical and economic characteristics of these generators can be significantly improved in the future.

One of these generators, the Soviet experimental radioisotope generator Beta-1, operated successfully for two years, supplying current to a radio transmitter of a meteorological station near Moscow in Khimki. Cerium-144 was used as an energy source, placed in anti-radiation containers made of tungsten and lead. Its energy intensity was 440 kWh, the average power was 5 watts, and the output (with accumulation) power during the operation of the transmitter was 150 - 200 watts.

The works suggested various options radioisotope generator with a two-stage system for converting nuclear energy into electrical energy, which belong to the family of photovoltaic atomic batteries. In such a generator, the energy of nuclear fission fragments is initially converted into radiation through some process of nuclear-stimulated fluorescence (for example, in an aerosol gas-filled converter), and then the photon energy is converted into electrical energy using a photovoltaic converter. This method of energy conversion has a number of advantages over those already available. For example, unlike many of the most widely used traditional methods, it does not contain a low-efficiency thermal cycle. Thus, the total efficiency of the system can be about 35%, which is 3 - - 5 times higher than the efficiency of systems using a thermal cycle and solar panels.

The most significant and costly part of the radioisotope generator development program is its testing. Can be predicted General characteristics one or another structural element, but it is often possible to determine the real physical parameters of a new node or system as a whole only experimentally.

Scheme of a thermionic radioisotope generator with a heat pipe that automatically stabilizes the heat flux and temperature at the converter cathode.

But this is the solution to the problem of stabilization heat flow and temperature at the cathode of the thermionic radioisotope generator under conditions of a continuous drop in the energy release in the capsule. Discharge of excess thermal energy generated in isotope fuel in initial period operation is carried out from the section of the heat pipe protruding beyond the cylindrical thermionic converter.

In addition to constructive improvement and increase in the power of thermoelectric generating sets with nuclear reactors in the Soviet Union, designs for radioisotope generators are being developed. To generate electric current they use the heat generated during the decay of radioactive isotopes of cobalt, curium, polonium, etc. They have small dimensions and operate reliably for a long time without recharging (depending on the half-life of the corresponding radioactive elements) and surpass electrochemical batteries in terms of the amount of energy generated per 1 kg of their own weight.

Let us consider the features of the formulation and solution of problem (9.18) for a combined power plant containing a two-stage TEG and a two-circuit PTP with a condensing injector and a single-stage turbine, the working medium of which is a DFS. The heat supply from the radioisotope generator to the TEG and from it to the PTP is carried out by a liquid metal coolant.

Why do we need such quantities of the heavy isotope of curium. It is believed that curium-244 can replace ilutonium-238 in radioisotope generators for space and ocean research. Generators based on 244Csh are less durable than plutonium ones, but their specific energy release is about five times greater... Therefore, curium generators are hardly applicable as cardiac stimulators. But in others offline sources energy curium-244 may well replace plutonium. In addition, curium is not as toxic as plutonium. And the maximum power of curium generators (determined by the critical mass) is approximately 10 times greater than that of plutonium generators: 162 and 18 kilowatts, respectively.

On the instructions of the AEC, the potential capabilities of thermoelectric generators based on polonium-210, plutonium-238 and curium-244 with an electric power of up to 10 kW are being studied in relation to space installations. This power is considered as a practical limit for radioisotope generators for this purpose. It should be noted that the AEC is developing rocket engines with isotopic heat sources. The heat released during the decay of polonium-210 is used to heat liquid hydrogen. Such an engine can develop thrust up to 0 11 kg with a specific impulse of 700 - 800 sec.

This type of generator is the most widely used today for powering on-board equipment and heating spacecraft. According to , of the nine radioisotope generators in orbit in the United States in 1992, eight were thermoelectric with the Pu238 isotope as fuel. In a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG), thermal energy is directly converted into electrical energy based on the Seebeck effect.

It should be said that in Lately in the United States, much attention is paid to work related to the search for more effective ways conversion of thermal energy RHS on plutonium-238 than thermoelectric. These primarily include work on the creation of thermophotoelectric radioisotope generators and radioisotope generators AMTES (Alkali metal thermal to electric conversion) using, in both cases, radioisotope heat sources based on plutonium-238, previously developed for space RTGs.

In 1965, in Leipzig (GDR), a Soviet radioisotope generator was demonstrated: the Beta-2 generator, which also powered the instruments of an automatic weather station. Beta-2 was awarded the gold medal of the Leipzig Anniversary Fair. In the same year, radioisotope generators of a different type with a power of 5–50 W were used to power the onboard systems of several artificial Earth satellites of the Kosmos series, the launch of which was envisaged by the research program. outer space adopted in the USSR.

What is RITEG

radioactive element

RTGs use heat sources based on the strontium-90 radionuclide (RHS-90). RHS-90 is a sealed radiation source in which the fuel composition, usually in the form of ceramic strontium-90 titanate (SrTiO3), is sealed twice by argon-arc welding in a capsule. Some rigs use strontium in the form of strontium borosilicate glass. The capsule is protected from external influences by a thick RTG shell made of stainless steel, aluminum and lead. Biological protection is made in such a way that the radiation dose on the surface of the devices does not exceed 200 mR / h, and at a distance of a meter - 10 mR / h

The radioactive half-life of strontium-90 (90Sr) is 29 years. At the time of manufacture RHS-90 contain from 30 to 180 kKi and 90Sr. The decay of strontium produces a daughter isotope, a beta emitter, yttrium-90 with a half-life of 64 hours. The dose rate of gamma radiation of RHS-90 by itself, without metal protection, reaches 400-800 R/h at a distance of 0.5 m and 100-200 R/h at 1 m from RHS-90.

Radioactive element RIT-90

According to the website of the developer of RTGs, the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation (VNIITFA), plutonium-238 is used as fuel for high-energy radionuclide power plants. However, the use of heat sources based on plutonium-238 in RTGs, along with some technical advantages, requires significant financial costs, therefore, in the last 10-15 years, VNIITFA has not supplied such RTGs to domestic consumers for ground purposes.

Security issues

Minatom admits that "there are RTGs in a state of abandonment." According to Agapov, “the fact is that organizations that are responsible for the operation of RTGs do not want to pay for their decommissioning. This is the same problem as with the states that formed on the territory of the former USSR - "take away everything bad, we will leave everything good for ourselves."

At the same time, according to VNIITFA Director General Nikolai Kuzelev, "there is no problem of radioactive contamination of the environment surrounding the RTG." At the same time, N. Kuzelev admits that “most RTG operating sites do not meet the requirements of the current regulatory documents, which is known to the management of operating organizations.” “In fact, there is a problem of vulnerability of the RTG in relation to terrorist acts, which consist in the targeted use of the radioactive material contained in the RTG”

Output of strontium-90

According to the experts of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, "only sources of ionizing radiation based on strontium-90 RIT-90 represent a fundamental radiation hazard." As long as the RTG case (which is the transport package of RIT-90) is intact, it is not considered radioactive waste. “RIT-90, which is outside the radiation protection, will pose a serious local danger to people who find themselves in close proximity to it. Radiation contamination of the environment is excluded.” This has not happened until now. An experimental explosion of a powerful anti-ship explosive device docked to the RTG destroyed the small RTG (57IK), but the RIT-90 included in it was undamaged.

As representatives of VNIITFA stated in 2003, “so far there has not been a single case of leakage of the RIT-90 capsule, although there have been a number of serious accidents with RTGs.” At the same time, commenting on the incidents with RTGs, official representatives of Gosatomnadzor and the IAEA repeatedly admitted the possibility of natural destruction of the RHS capsule. However, a survey in July 2004 recorded the release of Sr-90 into the environment from an RTG of the IEU-1 type, located at Cape Navarin, Beringovsky District, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. As noted in the statement of the Federal Service for Nuclear Supervision (FSAN), this “speaks of the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, thermal protection unit, protective housing and cartridge case nests.”

Presumably, about 1,500 RTGs were created in the USSR. The service life of all types of RTGs is 10 years. Currently, all RTGs in operation have exhausted their service life and must be disposed of.

Owners and Licensing

RTGs are owned by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, and Roshydromet. The Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation has about 380 RTGs, their records are maintained by the Hydrographic State Enterprise. There are 535 of them in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, including 415 in the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanology.

Nevertheless, in general, since 1995, oversight of radiation and nuclear safety in military units has been entrusted to the Ministry of Defense. It turns out that the controlling state body - Gosatomnadzor of the Russian Federation - often does not really have access to these RTGs. According to representatives of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, in order to ensure the safety of RTG operation along the Northern Sea Route, including taking into account the likelihood of “vandalism” and “terrorism”, it is enough to organize periodic (from several to once a year) control over their the physical state and the state of the radiation situation on the surface and near the RTGs.

RTG models

According to the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, 381 RTGs of the Beta-M, Efir-MA, Gorn and Gong types are in operation along the Northern Sea Route.

According to the official reports of the State Committee for Ecology, “the current system for handling RTGs contradicts the provisions of the federal laws “On the Use of Atomic Energy” and “On the Radiation Safety of the Population”, since the physical protection of these installations is not provided. When placing RTGs, the possibility of damaging effects of natural and anthropogenic factors on them was not taken into account.

Due to shortcomings in the practice of accounting and control of these installations by operating organizations, individual RTGs may be “lost” or “forgotten”. In fact, RTG locations can be considered as places for temporary storage of high-level waste.” “Particularly alarming are the possible negative consequences of the loss of control over the RTGs that are under the jurisdiction of the State Hydrographic Enterprise and the Russian Ministry of Defense.” In the 60s - 80s of the last century, VNIITFA developed about ten types (standard sizes) of RTGs based on sources of the RIT-90 type.

RTGs differ in various parameters in terms of output voltage, output electric power, weight, dimensions, etc. The most widely used RTG is the Beta-M type, which was one of the first products developed in the late 60s of the last century. About 700 RTGs of this type are currently in operation. This type of RTG, unfortunately, does not have welded joints and, as the practice of the last 10 years has shown, can be disassembled on site using ordinary plumbing tools. In the last 10 - 15 years, VNIITFA has not been working on the development of new RTGs.

Types and main characteristics of Soviet-made RTGs

Type	RHS thermal power, W	RHS initial nominal activity, thousand Curies	Electric power of RITEG, W	RTG output voltage, V	Mass of RTG, kgm	Start of production
Ether-MA	720	111	30	35	1250	1976
IEU-1	2200	49	80	24	2500	1976
IEU-2	580	89	14	6	600	1977
Beta-M	230	35	10	-	560	1978
Gong	345	49	48	14	600	1983
Horn	1100	170	60	7 (14)	1050 (3 RIT)	1983
IEU-2M	690	106	20	14	600	1985
Senostav	1870	288	-	-	1250	1989
IEU-1M	2200 (3300)	340 (510)	120 (180)	28	2 (3) * 1050	1990

Accounting for RTGs

Where are the RTGs located?

About 80% of all manufactured RTGs were sent to hydrographic military units of the Ministry of Defense and civilian hydrographic bases along the Northern Sea Route.

According to VNIITFA, today the institute does not have complete information on the number of all manufactured RTGs and on all organizations that own RTGs that are currently in operation. Considering the current situation in the country regarding RTG accounting, VNIITFA has been collecting information on RTGs in operation in Russia and other countries of the former USSR for a number of years. To date, it has been established that there are about 1,000 RTGs in Russia. All of them have worked out their service life and are subject to disposal at specialized enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation.

It is possible that there are lost generators in the Arctic region. According to official figures, in the late 1990s, at least six of them were in disrepair. According to the conclusion of the official commission with the participation of Gosatomnadzor specialists, “the state of safety of RTGs is extremely unsatisfactory and poses a real danger to the flora, fauna and water area of the Arctic seas. Their improper placement may expose part of the indigenous population of the Arctic to unreasonable exposure.”

There are about 75 RTGs in the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia. In 2002, the federal target program "National Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Anthropogenic Pollution in the Arctic Region of the Russian Federation" was approved. One of the points of the action plan for the protection of the marine environment was the inventory of RTGs. In Yakutia, it was decided to conduct a complete inventory in 2002-2003. According to Tamara Argunova, head of the radiation safety department of the Ministry of Nature Protection of Yakutia, due to the fact that the route of sea vessels is controlled by space satellites, the need to use RTGs has disappeared, and their prompt disposal should be carried out.

There are about 153 RTGs on the coast of the Barents and White Seas, including 17 in the area of the Kandalaksha Bay. According to VNIITFA director Nikolai Kuzelev, “100% of the RTGs on the coast of the Baltic Sea are subject to annual inspections. At the same time, it should be recognized that the inspection of RTGs by the specialists of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise VNIITFA on the Arctic coast of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug was not carried out due to the lack of contracts.”

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

As the commission established, the generator "self-destructed as a result of some, not yet precisely established by nature, internal influence." Radioactive contamination of the RTG body and the soil around it was revealed. This was reported in letter No. 04-05 \ 1603, sent to the leadership of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation on August 20, 2003, by the General Director of VNIITFA of Minatom N. R. Kuzelev and the responsible official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation A. N. Kunakov.

In July 2004, a second inspection of the emergency RTG at Cape Navarin was carried out. As a result of the survey, it was established: the radiation situation has deteriorated sharply, the level of DER of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h; the release of Sr-90 into the external environment began, which indicates the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, the thermal protection unit, the protective case and nests of the cartridge cases (previously, VNIITFA experts repeatedly stated that strontium could not be released into the environment).

Presumably, this RTG was shot down by an all-terrain vehicle by reindeer herders of the brigade stationed on Navarino in 1999. The generator has heated up to 800 °C inside. The metal plates blocking the path of radiation burst. So far, the situation is saved by a concrete slab weighing 6 tons, which closed the generator last year. However, the radiation is thousands of times higher than the permissible limits. On the southernmost cape of Chukotka, Navarin, herds of reindeer herders graze. Animals, and even people, are not stopped by warning signs - they come close to the source of radiation.

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

Abandoned RTGs in Chukotka

Shalaur Island	Exceeding the permissible dose limit by 30 times. The RTG is in an ownerless, abandoned condition.
Cape Okhotnichiy	Has severe external damage. It was established without taking into account the influence of natural hazards in the immediate vicinity of the thermokarst depression. The service personnel covered up a transport accident that happened to the RTG in March 1983.
Cape Heart-Stone	Installed 3 meters from the edge of a cliff up to 100 meters high. A cleavage crack passes through the site, and therefore the RTG can fall along with a large mass of rock. The installation of the RTG was carried out without taking into account the influence of natural hazards (marine abrasion). Stored there illegally.
Nuneangan Island	The external radiation of the RTG exceeds the established limits by 5 times. The reason is a design flaw. Transportation is possible only by special flight.
Cape Chaplin	Exceeding the permissible dose limit in the lower part of the body by 25 times. The technological plug is turned out from the lower part of the body. The RTG is located on the territory of the military unit. The cause of the accident is a design flaw of this type of generator and concealment by the personnel of a radiation accident with this RTG.
Chekkul island	Exceeding the established dose limits by 35% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.
Cape Shalaurova hut	Exceeding the established dose limits by 80% at a distance of 1 m from the RTG surface.

It is recognized that another 15 RTGs from the Tiksinskaya hydrobase are subject to removal due to the lack of need for use.

RTG incidents

Several incidents are detailed below; you can read about the latest incidents that took place at the end of 2003-2004 in the table at the end of this subsection.

Since the services of the border guards in charge of the lighthouse are not sufficiently equipped, on March 23 they turned to the Lenspetskombinat "Radon" (Sosnovy Bor) with a request to find and isolate the radioactive cylinder. LSK "Radon" does not have a license for this type of activity (the plant specializes in the disposal of radioactive waste), and therefore specifically coordinated the extraction of a strontium battery from under the ice with Gosatomnadzor. On March 28, the radioactive element was removed using an ordinary shovel and long-handled pitchfork and delivered to the road several kilometers away on ordinary sleds, where it was loaded into a lead container. The shell containing the strontium was not damaged. After temporary storage at LSK Radon, the cylinder was transported to VNIITFA.

Looted in March 2003, the lighthouse was located near the village of Kurgolovo, Kingisep district, not far from the borders with Estonia and Finland, on the territory of a nature reserve and a wetland of international importance. The reserve was established in 2000 by a decree of the governor of the Leningrad Region in order to protect rare species of flora and fauna, to protect the shallow zone of the bay, where commercial fish species spawn, as well as habitats for gray seals and ringed seals. On the territory of the reserve there are nesting colonies and migratory sites of rare waterfowl. When creating the reserve, it was planned to develop tourism. A system of "ecological" trails and routes was developed: the nature of the peninsula could attract tourists. However, after already two incidents involving the loss of a radioactive source, it is doubtful that tourists will want to come to these places.

In May 2001, three radioisotope sources were stolen from the lighthouses of the RF Ministry of Defense located on an island in the White Sea near the Kandalaksha nature reserve in the Murmansk region. This reserve is also one of the centers of ecological tourism. Two hunters for non-ferrous metals received strong doses of radiation, and the stolen RTGs were found and sent to VNIITFA in June 2001. From there they were transported to the Mayak plant in the Chelyabinsk region. The work was financed by the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark under an agreement with the administration of the Murmansk region under the program for the disposal of RTGs and the installation of solar panels on lighthouses.

VNIITF specialists also participated in the liquidation of an emergency caused by the unauthorized dismantling of six Beta-M RTGs in Kazakhstan near the town of Priozersk.

RTG incidents in Russia and the CIS

1978	Pulkovo Airport, Leningrad	The case of transporting a spent RTG without a transport container.
1983 March	Cape Nutevgi, Chukotka	On the way to the installation site, the RTG got into a transport accident and was badly damaged. The fact of the accident, hidden by the personnel, was discovered by a commission with the participation of specialists from Gosatomnadzor in 1997.
1987	Cape Low, Sakhalin Region	During transportation, the helicopter dropped a RTG of the IEU-1 type weighing 2.5 tons into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk.
1997	Tajikistan, Dushanbe	An increased gamma background was registered on the territory of Tajikhydromet. Three expired RTGs were stored at the company's coal storage in the center of Dushanbe (because there were problems with sending RTGs to VNIITFA) and were dismantled by unknown persons.
1997 August	Cape Maria, Sakhalin Region	A repetition of the events of a decade ago: during transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 type RTG into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk at a depth of 25-30 meters. The RTG was found as a result of an expedition in the fall of 2004, and its recovery is scheduled for the summer of 2005.
1998 July	Korsakov port, Sakhalin region	A disassembled RTG was found at a scrap metal collection point. The stolen RTG belonged to the Russian Defense Ministry.
1999	Leningrad region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found at a bus stop in Kingisepp. Taken to LSK "Radon".
2000	Cape Malaya Baranikha, Chukotka	Access to the RTG located near the village is not limited. In 2000, it was found that the radiation background of the source exceeds the natural one by several times. Due to lack of funds was not evacuated.
May 2001	Kandalaksha Bay, Murmansk Region	3 radioisotope sources were stolen from lighthouses on the island. All three sources were discovered and sent to Moscow by VNIITFA specialists.
February 2002	Western Georgia	Residents of the village of Liya, Tsalenjikha district, received high doses of radiation after finding RTGs in the forest. Shortly after the incident, the IAEA commission working in Georgia established that a total of 8 generators were brought to Georgia from the Baltiets plant in Soviet times.
March 2003	Cape Pikhlisaar, near the village of Kurgolovo, Leningrad Region	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found 200 m from the lighthouse, in the water of the Baltic Sea. Extracted by specialists of LSK "Radon".
2003, August-September	Chaunsky district, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	The inspection did not find a RTG of the type<Бета-М>No. 57 on paragraph<Кувэквын>, there were official speculations about the possible washing of the RTG into the sand as a result of a strong storm or its theft by unknown persons.
2003 September	Golets Island, White Sea	The personnel of the Northern Fleet discovered the theft of the metal of the biological protection of the RTG on Golets Island. The door to the lighthouse was also broken into. This beacon contained one of the most powerful RTGs with six RIT-90 elements that were not stolen. The radiation on the RTG surface was 100 R/h.
November 2003	Kola Bay, Olenya Bay and South Goryachinsky Island	Two RTGs belonging to the Northern Fleet were looted by hunters for non-ferrous metals, and their RIT-90 elements were found nearby.
March 2004	Lazovsky district of Primorsky Krai, near the village of Valentin	A RTG belonging to the Pacific Fleet was found dismantled, apparently by hunters for non-ferrous metals. RIT-90 found nearby.
July 2004	Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai	Three RTGs were found on the territory of military unit 40919. According to the commander of the unit, these RTGs were left over from another military unit previously stationed at this site. According to the Krasnoyarsk inspection department of Gosatomnadzor, the dose rate at a distance of about 1 m from the RTG body is 155 times higher than the natural background. Instead of solving this problem within the Ministry of Defense, the military unit in which the RTGs were found sent a letter to OOO<Квант>to Krasnoyarsk, which is engaged in the installation and adjustment of radiation equipment, with a request to take the RTGs to their disposal.
July, 2004	Cape Navarin, Beringovsky District, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	A re-examination of the emergency RTG type IEU-1 revealed that strontium-90 began to escape from the RTG into the environment as a result of<неизвестных теплофизических процессов>. This refutes the thesis supported by VNIITFA for a long time about the invulnerability of capsules with strontium. The technical state of the RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG does not exclude its complete destruction. The level of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h.
September, 2004	Bunge Land Island, New Siberian Islands, Yakutia	Carried out the transportation of two RTGs of the type<Эфир-МА>No. 04, 05 issue of 1982, owned by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Hydrographic Enterprise" of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, the MI-8 mt helicopter made an emergency drop of cargo from a height of 50 meters onto the sandy surface of the tundra of Bunge Island. According to the FSAN, as a result of the impact on the ground, the integrity of the external radiation protection of the RTG cases was violated, at a height of 10 meters above the RTG fall site, the dose rate of gamma radiation is 4 mSv/h. The cause of the incident is a violation<Гидрографическим предприятием>RTG transportation conditions (they were transported without transport packaging containers, which are required by the IAEA standards). The rise of RTGs is expected in the summer of 2005.

Threat of terrorism

The program website notes that the Russian government does not have sufficient data on the location of all RTGs. The goal of the program is to find them and free them from dangerous material.

On March 12, 2003, at the IAEA conference "Safety of Radioactive Sources", Minister for Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev acknowledged the existence of the problem. The facts complicating the situation, according to Rumyantsev, “include the activation of various terrorist groups in the world, and the disintegration of the former Soviet space, which led to the loss of control over the sources, and sometimes simply to the loss of the sources themselves. An example of this is the cases of unauthorized opening of RTGs by local residents in Kazakhstan and Georgia in order to use the non-ferrous metals contained in them. And the dose received as a result of such actions for some of them turned out to be extremely high.

Rumyantsev acknowledged that “after the collapse of the USSR, the once integral state system of control over the location and movement of radioactive, nuclear materials was re-created in separate independent states, which gave rise to an unprecedented surge of hitherto uncharacteristic crimes related, in particular, to radioactive sources.”

RTG recycling programs

Since the RTGs used in the navigation equipment of the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet have reached their end of life and pose a potential threat of radioactive contamination of the environment, the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark is funding work on their disposal and partial replacement with solar panels. Civilian RTGs are not included in this project. There are a number of agreements about this between the administration of Finnmark and the government of the Murmansk region. When dismantled, the RTGs of the Northern Fleet are transported to Murmansk for temporary storage at the RTP Atomflot, then they are delivered to the Izotop Military District in Moscow, from there to VNIITFA, where they are dismantled in a special chamber, after which the RIT-90 is sent for burial at the Mayak Production Association . At the first stage of the program, 5 RTGs were replaced with Western-made solar cells. In 1998, they were the first to replace an RTG at a lighthouse on Bolshoy Ainov Island in the Kandalaksha Nature Reserve, this work cost $35,400. According to the 1998 agreement, it was planned to replace 4 more RTGs (two were replaced in 1999, one in 2000 and one more in 2002 at the Laush navigation sign on the Rybachy Peninsula). In 2001, 15 RTGs were disposed of (12 in the usual way, as well as three RTGs dismantled by non-ferrous metal hunters in the Kandalaksha region). In June 2002, an agreement was signed for the disposal of another 10 RTGs, and another $200,000 was allocated for this purpose. In August 2002, Bellona, together with experts from the US Congress, inspected a Norwegian solar-powered lighthouse near the Russian border. Bellona announced the need to replace Russian radioactive beacons. On April 8, 2003, the governors of Finnmark and the Murmansk region signed two contracts: for the disposal of spent RTGs and for testing Russian solar panels. A new stage of RTG disposal, undertaken in 2004, costs about $600,000. As of September 2004, 45 RTGs had been decommissioned under the joint project, while it was planned to decommission 60 RTGs by the end of 2004, 34 of them with solar panels. As of September 2004, the Norwegian province of Finnmark had already invested about $3.5 million in this project, but how much the program will cost in the future depends largely on the efforts made by other potential donor countries. The cost of the project to replace RTGs with solar panels is $36,000, but these panels are Russian-made and cheaper than Western counterparts. The cost of each panel is about 1 million rubles. The solar battery is designed in such a way that it will accumulate electricity during the daytime, and give it away during the dark. The Krasnodar Saturn plant, owned by Rosaviakosmos, is participating in the work. Batteries were tested at one of the Murmansk lighthouses and at the lighthouse in Finnmark.

In August 2004, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) completed its independent report on the disposal of Russian RTGs.

US efforts

After September 11, 2001, the United States recognized the danger of RTGs, which could be used by terrorists to create a "dirty bomb". In September 2003, Minatom signed terms of reference with the US Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposal of a number of RTGs. According to the agreement, up to 100 RTGs per year will be disposed of at Mayak. According to the existing procedure, during disposal, the RTG body is disassembled in a special VNIITFA chamber. The RIT-90 contained inside can be used for energy purposes or converted into radioactive waste and sent for disposal in a special container to the city of Chelyabinsk at the Mayak plant, where it undergoes vitrification. Meanwhile, from 2000 to 2003, VNIITFA disposed of only about 100 decommissioned RTGs of various types. In 2004, a total of 69 RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation were removed from various municipal territories across Russia for disposal. In 2005, it is planned to dispose of about 50 more RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. Rosatom plans to dispose of all RTGs (of both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense) by 2012. The Department of Energy budget for a program to monitor radiological dispersal devices that can be created using material contained in RTGs was $36 million in FY2004, and a $25 million request for FY2005. The Ministry of Transport of Russia started only in August 2004, within the framework of the DOE program. However, already after the start of the program, in November 2004, Deputy General Director of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation Evgeny Klyuev told Bellona that “there is no policy for the disposal of RTGs, only RTGs in the worst condition are disposed of.”

- RITEG (radioisotope thermoelectric generator) is a source of electricity that uses the thermal energy of radioactive decay. Strontium 90 is used as fuel for RTGs, and plutonium 238 for high-energy generators. ... ... Wikipedia

Thermoelectric phenomena ... Wikipedia

One of the radioisotope generators of the Cassini probe ... Wikipedia

RITEG(radioisotope thermoelectric generator) - a radioisotope source of electricity that uses thermal energy released during the natural decay of radioactive isotopes and converts it into electricity using a thermoelectric generator.

Compared to nuclear reactors using a chain reaction, RTGs are much more compact and simpler in design. The output power of the RITEG is very low (up to several hundred watts) with a low efficiency. But they do not have moving parts and do not require maintenance throughout their entire service life, which can be calculated in decades.

Application

RITEG of the New Horizons spacecraft

RTGs are generally the most suitable source of energy for autonomous systems, requiring several tens to hundreds of watts with a very long operating time, too long for fuel cells or batteries.

In space

Scheme of the RTG used on the Cassini-Huygens spacecraft

RITEGs are the main source of power for those that have a long mission and are far away from (for example, Voyager 2 or Cassini-Huygens), where the use of solar panels is inefficient or impossible.

Plutonium-238 in 2006, during the launch of the New Horizons probe, found its application as a power source for the spacecraft equipment. The radioisotope generator contained 11 kg of high-purity 238 Pu dioxide, producing an average of 220 watts of electricity throughout the journey (240 watts at the beginning of the journey and an estimated 200 watts at the end).

But they do not have moving parts and do not require maintenance throughout their entire service life, which can be calculated in decades.

Encyclopedic YouTube

1 / 1

Collection of abandoned Sr 90 beta sources from RTGs in Georgia

Subtitles

Application

RITEGs are applicable as energy sources for autonomous systems remote from traditional power supply sources and requiring several tens to hundreds of watts with a very long operating time, too long for fuel cells or batteries.

In space

RITEGs are the main source of power supply on space vehicles with a long mission and very far from the Sun (for example, Voyager-2 or Cassini-Huygens), where the use of solar batteries is inefficient or impossible.

Several kilograms of 238 PuO 2 were used on some of the Apollo missions to power the ALSEP instruments. Power Generator SNAP-27 Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power), the thermal and electrical power of which was 1480 W and 63.5 W, respectively, contained 3.735 kg of plutonium-238 dioxide.

On the ground

RITEGs were used in navigation beacons, radio beacons, weather stations and similar equipment installed in areas where, for technical or economic reasons, it is not possible to use other power sources. In particular, in the USSR they were used as power sources for navigational equipment installed on the coast of the Arctic Ocean along the Northern Sea Route. At present, due to the risk of leakage of radiation and radioactive materials, the practice of installing unattended RTGs in hard-to-reach places has been stopped.

In the USA, RTGs were used not only for ground power sources, but also for sea buoys and underwater installations. For example, in 1988 the USSR discovered two American RTGs next to Soviet communications cables in the Sea of Okhotsk. The exact number of RTGs installed by the US is unknown, estimates by independent organizations indicated 100-150 installations in 1992.

Fuel

Radioactive materials used in RTGs must comply with the following characteristics:

Sufficiently high volumetric activity to obtain a significant energy release in a limited volume of the installation. The minimum volume is limited by the thermal and radiation resistance of materials, weakly active isotopes worsen the energy-mass perfection of the installation. This usually means that the half-life of the isotope must be short enough for high decay rates, and the decay must provide a sufficiently large amount of easily utilized energy.
A sufficiently long period of power maintenance to complete the task. This usually means that the half-life of the isotope must be long enough for a given rate of decay of the energy release. Typical half-lives of isotopes used in RTGs are several decades, although isotopes with a short half-life can be used for specialized applications.
A convenient form of ionizing radiation for energy utilization. Gamma radiation easily flies out of the structure, taking decay energy with it. Neutrons can also escape relatively easily. The high-energy electrons formed during β-decay are well retained, but in this case bremsstrahlung X-rays are formed, which carry away part of the energy. During α-decay, massive α-particles are formed, which effectively give up their energy almost at the point of formation.
A type of ionizing radiation that is safe for the environment and equipment. Significant gamma, x-ray and neutron radiation often require special design measures to protect personnel and nearby equipment.
The relative cheapness of the isotope and the ease of its production within the framework of existing nuclear technologies.

Plutonium-238 most often used in spacecraft. α-decay with an energy of 5.5 MeV (one gram gives ~0.54 W). The half-life is 88 years (power loss 0.78% per year) with the formation of a highly stable isotope 234 U. Plutonium-238 is an almost pure alpha emitter, making it one of the safest radioactive isotopes with minimum requirements to biological protection. However, obtaining a relatively pure 238th isotope requires the operation of special reactors, which makes it expensive.

Strontium-90 was widely used in ground-based RTGs of Soviet and American production. A chain of two β-decays gives a total energy of 2.8 MeV (one gram gives ~0.46 W). Half-life 29 years with the formation of a stable ⁹⁰ Zr. Strontium-90 is made from spent fuel nuclear reactors in large quantities. The cheapness and abundance of this isotope determines its widespread use in ground equipment. Unlike plutonium, strontium has significant levels of high-permeability ionizing radiation, placing relatively high demands on biological shielding.

There is a concept of subcritical RTGs. The subcritical generator consists of a neutron source and a fissile material. The neutrons of the source are captured by the atoms of the fissile material and cause their fission. The main advantage of such a generator is that the decay energy of a reaction with neutron capture can be much higher than the energy of spontaneous fission. For example, for plutonium it is 200 MeV versus 6 MeV of spontaneous fission. Accordingly, the required amount of the substance is much lower. The number of decays and radiative activity in terms of heat release are also lower. This reduces the weight and dimensions of the generator.

Ground RTGs in Russia

During the Soviet era, 1007 RITEGs were manufactured for ground operation. Almost all of them were made on a base with the isotope strontium-90 (RIT-90). The fuel element is a strong sealed welded capsule, inside which is an isotope. Several variants of RIT-90 were produced with different amounts of the isotope. The RTG was equipped with one or more RHS capsules, radiation shielding (often based on depleted uranium), a thermoelectric generator, a cooling radiator, a hermetically sealed enclosure, and electrical circuits. Types of RTGs produced in the Soviet Union:

Type	Initial activity, kCi	Thermal power, W	Electrical power, W	Efficiency, %	Weight, kg	Release year
Ether-MA	104	720	30	4,167	1250	1976
IEU-1	465	2200	80	3,64	2500	1976
IEU-2	100	580	14	2,41	600	1977
Beta-M (English) Russian	36	230	10	4,35	560	1978
Gong	47	315	18	5,714	600	1983
Horn	185	1100	60	5,455	1050	1983
IEU-2M	116	690	20	2,899	600	1985
Senostav	288	1870	-	-	1250	1989
IEU-1M	340	2200	120	5,455	2100	1990

The service life of installations can be 10-30 years, most of them have ended it. The RTG is a potential hazard because it is located in a deserted area and can be stolen and then used as a dirty bomb. Cases of disassembly of RTGs by hunters for non-ferrous metals were recorded, while the thieves themselves received a lethal dose of radiation.

Currently, they are being dismantled and disposed of under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and funded by the United States, Norway and other countries. By the beginning of 2011, 539 RTGs had been dismantled. As of 2012, 72 RTGs are in operation, 3 are lost, 222 are in storage, 31 are in the process of being decommissioned. Four installations were operated in Antarctica.

New RTGs for navigation purposes are no longer produced, instead wind power plants and photoelectric converters, in some cases diesel generators, are being installed. These devices are called AIP (alternative power sources). They consist of a solar panel (or wind generator), a set of maintenance-free batteries, an LED beacon (circular or pivot), a programmable electronic unit that sets the beacon operation algorithm.

RTG design requirements

In the USSR, the requirements for RTGs were established by GOST 18696-90 “Radionuclide thermoelectric generators. Types and general technical requirements". and GOST 20250-83 Radionuclide thermoelectric generators. Acceptance rules and test methods.

Incidents with RTGs in the CIS

date of	A place
1983 March	Cape Nutevgi, Chukotka	Severe damage to the RTG on the way to the installation site. The fact of the accident was hidden by the personnel, discovered by the Gosatomnadzor commission in 1997. As of 2005, this RTG was abandoned and remained at Cape Nutevgi. As of 2012, all RTGs have been removed from the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
1987	Cape Low, Sakhalin region	During transportation, the helicopter dropped an RITEG of the IEU-1 type, which belonged to the USSR Ministry of Defense, into the Sea of Okhotsk. As of 2013, search work, intermittently, continues.
1997	Tajikistan, Dushanbe	Three expired RTGs were stored disassembled by unknown persons in a coal warehouse in the center of Dushanbe, an increased gamma background was registered nearby.
1997 August	Cape Maria, Sakhalin region	During transportation, the helicopter dropped an RITEG of the IEU-1 type into the Sea of Okhotsk, which remained at the bottom at a depth of 25-30 m. After 10 years, it was raised and sent for disposal.
1998 July	Korsakovskiy port, Sakhalin region	A disassembled RITEG belonging to the RF Ministry of Defense was found at the scrap metal collection point.
1999	Leningrad region.	RITEG was looted by hunters for non-ferrous metals. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found at a bus stop in Kingisepp.
2000	Cape Baranikha, Chukotka	The natural background near the apparatus was exceeded by several times due to the failure of the RITEG.
May 2001	Kandalaksha Bay, Murmansk region	Three radioisotope sources were stolen from lighthouses on the island, which were discovered and sent to Moscow.
February 2002	Western Georgia	Near the village of Liya, Tsalenjikha district, local residents found two RTGs, which they used as heat sources and then dismantled. As a result, several people received high doses of radiation.
2003	about. Nuneangan, Chukotka	It was established that the external radiation of the apparatus exceeded the permissible limits by 5 times due to shortcomings in its design.
2003	about. Wrangel, Chukotka	Due to the erosion of the coast, the RTG installed here fell into the sea, where it was washed away by the soil. In 2011, it was thrown onto the coast by a storm. Radiation protection of the device is not damaged. In 2012 it was exported from the territory of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
2003	Cape Shalaurova Izba, Chukotka	The radiation background near the facility was exceeded by 30 times due to a flaw in the design of the RTG.
March 2003	Pikhlisaar, Leningrad region	RITEG was looted by hunters for non-ferrous metals. The radioactive element was thrown onto the ice cover. The hot capsule with strontium, having melted through the ice, went to the bottom, the background near was 1000 R/h. The capsule was soon found 200 meters from the lighthouse.
2003 August	Shmidtovsky district, Chukotka	The inspection did not find Beta-M type RTG No. 57 at the installation site near the Kyvekvyn River; according to the official version, it was assumed that the RTG was washed into the sand as a result of a strong storm or that it was stolen.
2003 September	Golets Island, White Sea	The personnel of the Northern Fleet discovered the theft of the RTG biological protection metal on Golets Island. The door to the lighthouse was also broken into, where one of the most powerful RTGs with six RIT-90 elements was stored, which were not stolen.
November 2003	Kola Bay, Olenya Bay and South Goryachinsky Island	Two RTGs belonging to the Northern Fleet were looted by hunters for non-ferrous metals, and their RIT-90 elements were found nearby.
2004	Priozersk, Kazakhstan	An emergency situation that occurred as a result of unauthorized dismantling of six RTGs.
March 2004	Valentin, Primorsky Territory	An RTG belonging to the Pacific Fleet was found dismantled, apparently by hunters for non-ferrous metals. The radioactive element RIT-90 was found nearby.
July, 2004	Norilsk	Three RTGs were found on the territory of the military unit, the dose rate at a distance of 1 m from which was 155 times higher than the natural background.
July, 2004	Cape Navarin, Chukotka	Mechanical damage to the RTG body of unknown origin, resulting in depressurization and part of the radioactive fuel fell out. The emergency RTG was removed for disposal in 2007, the affected areas of the adjacent territory were decontaminated.
September, 2004	Earth Bunge, Yakutia	Emergency release of two transportable RTGs from a helicopter. As a result of the impact on the ground, the integrity of the radiation protection of the hulls was violated, the dose rate of gamma radiation near the impact site was 4 mSv / h.
2012	about. Superfluous, Taimyr	Fragments of the RITEG of the "Gong" project were found at the installation site. It is assumed that the device was washed into the sea.

Notes

Konstantin Lantratov. Pluto has become closer (Russian) // Newspaper Kommersant: article. - Kommersant, 2006. - Issue. 3341 . - No. 10 .
Alexander Sergeev. Probe to Pluto: faultless start great travel (Russian) . - Elements.Ru, 2006.
Timoshenko, Alexey Space era - man turned out not needed (Russian) (unavailable link - history) . gzt.ru (September 16, 2010). Retrieved October 22, 2010. Archived from the original on April 19, 2010.
Energy pure science: Current from collider (Russian) // physics arXiv blog Popular Mechanics: Article. - 12.08.10.
NASA conducted the first test drive of the new rover (Russian) . Lenta.ru (July 26, 2010). Retrieved 8 November 2010. Archived from the original on 3 February 2012.
Ajay K. Misra. Overview of NASA Program on Development of Radioisotope Power Systems with High Specific Power (English) // NASA/JPL: overview. - San Diego, California, June 2006.
World Information Service on Energy. Alaska fire threatens air force nukes.
Drits M. E. et al. Properties elements. - Handbook. - M. : Metallurgy, 1985. - 672 p. - 6500 copies.
Venkateswara Sarma Mallela, V Ilankumaran, N. Srinivasa Rao. Trends in Cardiac Pacemaker Batteries (English) // Indian Pacing Electrophysiol J: article. - October 1, 2004. - Iss. 4 . - No. 4 .
Plutonium Powered Pacemaker (1974) (English) . Oak Ridge Associated Universities (March 23, 2009). Retrieved 15 January 2011.

What else to read

Apple jelly for the winter - a simple step-by-step photo recipe for cooking at home Apple jelly (the recipe will be discussed later) is a healthy and very tasty dish. Worth noting in particular...

Making an information stand with your own hands Do-it-yourself street information stand Anna Svetlichnaya Hello, dear colleagues! In connection with the introduction of the Federal State Educational Standard, the task of the educator is to organize work with ...

How to charm an Aquarius man and win his heart How to defeat an Aquarius man 09/04/2018 Fortuna Aquarius is a self-willed romantic, open to communication. His incredible activity and versatile...

RTG: prosaic heat and electricity for space vehicles.

What is RITEG

radioactive element

Security issues

Output of strontium-90

Owners and Licensing

RTG models

Accounting for RTGs

Where are the RTGs located?

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

RTG incidents

Threat of terrorism

RTG recycling programs

US efforts

What is RITEG

radioactive element

Security issues

Output of strontium-90

Owners and Licensing

RTG models

Accounting for RTGs

Where are the RTGs located?

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment

Emergency and abandoned RTGs

RTG incidents

Threat of terrorism

RTG recycling programs

US efforts

Application

In space

Encyclopedic YouTube

Subtitles

Application

In space

On the ground

Fuel

Ground RTGs in Russia

RTG design requirements

Incidents with RTGs in the CIS

see also

Notes

What else to read

THE LAST NOTES

Categories