Causes of the first Soviet failures in the Great Patriotic War. Reference
In the military history literature and in the memoirs of participants in the Great Patriotic War, many different reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war are mentioned.
One of the main reasons for the failures of military experts called the miscalculations of the military-political leadership of the country in assessing the timing of the attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Despite the regular receipt of information from the middle of 1940 from Soviet intelligence about the preparation of fascist Germany for an attack on the USSR, Stalin did not exclude the possibility that in 1941 the war could be avoided and its start could be delayed by various political maneuvers until 1942. Because of the fear of provoking a war, the Soviet troops were not tasked with bringing the border districts to full combat readiness, and the troops did not occupy the intended defensive lines and positions before the enemy attack began. As a result, the Soviet troops were actually in peacetime, which largely predetermined the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles of 1941.
Of the 57 divisions intended to cover the border, only 14 calculated divisions (25% of the allocated forces and means) managed to occupy the designated defense areas, and then mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. The construction of the defense was designed only to cover the border, and not to conduct a defensive operation in order to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces.
Before the war, the military-political leadership of the USSR insufficiently developed and mastered the forms and methods of strategic and operational defense. The methods of conducting operations in the initial period of the war were incorrectly assessed. No provision was made for the possibility of the enemy going on the offensive at once by all available pre-deployed groupings of troops simultaneously in all strategic directions.
Difficulties in the preparation of the theater of military operations (TVD) created the transfer of the border and the withdrawal of the main part of the troops of the western military districts to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic republics and Bessarabia. A significant part of the fortified areas on the old border was mothballed. There was a need for the urgent construction of fortified areas on the new border, the expansion of the airfield network and the reconstruction of most airfields.
The possibility of conducting military operations on its territory was practically excluded. All this had a negative impact on the preparation not only of defense, but also of theaters of military operations in the depths of their territory in general.
It also turned out to be a mistake to concentrate the main forces of the Soviet troops in the southwestern strategic direction by the beginning of the war, i.e. in Ukraine, while in June 1941 the fascist troops delivered the main blow in the western direction - in Belarus. Also unjustified was the decision to bring supplies of material and technical assets closer to the border, which made them vulnerable with the outbreak of war.
Not enough attention was paid to the mobilization preparation of industry. The mobilization plans developed for transferring the national economy to a military footing were designed for too long periods.
Before the war, a major organizational and technical reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces began, which was planned to be completed before 1942. A radical restructuring of the system of operational, combat and political training of the armed forces began. Here, too, major miscalculations were made. Overly cumbersome formations and associations were created without taking into account the real possibilities of equipping them with modern weapons and staffing. The timing of the completion of the formation of most new compounds turned out to be unrealistic. As a result, by the beginning of the war, a significant part of them could not be formed, equipped with equipment and trained. This happened, for example, with almost simultaneously formed new mechanized corps, many of which turned out to be unfit for combat.
The Soviet troops were not fully equipped with command and rank and file, as well as tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, vehicles, means of traction for artillery, fuel delivery, equipment repair and engineering weapons.
The Red Army did not have in sufficient quantities such important technical means as radio, engineering equipment, automobiles, and special tractors for artillery.
The Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy in the number of personnel and artillery, but outnumbered him in the number of tanks and aircraft. However, the qualitative superiority was on the side of Germany. It was expressed in better technical equipment, higher coordination, training and staffing of the troops. The enemy had tactical and technical superiority in the main fleet of aircraft.
Most of the Soviet tanks were no worse, and the new ones (T34, KB) were better than the German ones, but the main tank fleet was badly worn out.
On the eve of the war, enormous damage was done to the cadres of the Soviet armed forces and intelligence: almost 40 thousand of the most qualified commanders and political workers were subjected to mass repressions. Most of the commanders of military districts, fleets, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, members of military councils, and other party and political workers were arrested and destroyed. Instead of them, military personnel who did not have the necessary practical experience were hastily promoted to leading positions.
(Military Encyclopedia. Military Publishing. Moscow, in 8 volumes. 2004)
In the command and control system of the Armed Forces, there were continuous reshuffles of the leadership in the central apparatus and military districts. So, in the five pre-war years, four chiefs of the General Staff were replaced. In the year and a half before the war (1940-1941), the heads of the air defense department were replaced five times (on average every 3-4 months), from 1936 to 1940, five heads of the intelligence department were replaced, etc. Therefore, most officials did not have time to master their duties associated with the implementation of a large range of complex tasks before the war.
By this period, the command staff of the German army had acquired the necessary practical skills in command and control, in organizing and conducting large-scale offensive operations, in using all types of military equipment and weapons on the battlefields. The German soldier had combat training. As the events of the first weeks of the war showed, the fact that the German army had combat experience played an important role in the first successes of the fascist troops on the Soviet German front.
As a result of the defeat suffered by the states of Europe in the first period of the Second World War, the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe fell into the hands of fascist Germany, which significantly increased its military and economic potential.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources.
2. On the morning of June 22, 1941, fascist Germany invaded the USSR without declaring war. At the beginning of the war, the Nazis suffered heavy losses. During the first 20 days of the war, Germany lost more equipment and people than during the two years of the war in Europe. However, our Army suffered even greater losses. Until December 1, 1941, the losses in killed, missing and captured amounted to 7 million people, about 22 thousand tanks, up to 25 thousand aircraft. In the first months of the war, the country lost up to 40% of its economic potential.
The failures of the Red Army were due to the following reasons:
1. A miscalculation in determining the timing of a likely collision with Germany. Stalin was sure that the attack would not occur until the end of spring 1942. By this time, it was planned to complete all preparations for the war.
2. The main reason for the failures of K.A. at the beginning of the war there were unjustified repressions in the country. Only for 1937-1938. more than 40 thousand commanders and political workers were exterminated. In 1937-1940. out of 264 military leaders (from marshal to division commander) 220 were repressed, out of 108 representatives of the highest political composition of the Red Army - 99. The command and political staff of brigades and regiments were subjected to extensive repressions.
3. In the inability to organize the available resources to repel the enemy.
4. K.A. was in a state of reformation and rearmament. The reorientation of the defense industry to the production of military equipment began belatedly. An extremely negative role was played by subjectivist assessments and Stalin's incompetence in assessing the situation.
5. On the eve of the attack, the troops of the border military districts were not put on high alert. This allowed the enemy to easily win border battles and inflict heavy damage on K.A.
6. The construction of defensive lines on the new border of the USSR was not completed, and the fortifications on the former border were mostly dismantled.
7. It is also negative that the army and the people were oriented towards an easy victory. They said that if there was a war, it would be fought on enemy territory and would end with little bloodshed.
However, Stalin considered the betrayal of commanders and Red Army men the main reason for the retreat. On August 16, an order was issued for the troops of the western direction. By this order, a large group of military specialists, heads of military production, generals was arrested: People's Commissar for Armaments B.L. Vannikov, Deputy. Commissar K.A. Meretskov, designer Taubin, more than 10 combat generals. Many of them were shot on October 28, 1941 in Kuibyshev and Saratov.
12. Restructuring the life of the country on a military footing. 1941
On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. All power was concentrated in the hands of the GKO. Centralization became the basic principle of leadership even more than before the war. All military organizational work has been seriously restructured, which has acquired a huge scale:
1. Only in the first 7 days of the war, 5.3 million people were drafted into the army. A call was announced for 32 ages (from 1890 to 1922, the reserve was a large 30 million).
2. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was created.
3. The institution of military commissars was introduced.
4. A system for training commanders and reserves has been created and adjusted (universal compulsory military training has been introduced).
5. Parts of the military militia began to form from the people.
6. The redistribution of communists from territorial to military party organizations has begun, the conditions for admission to the party at the front have been facilitated.
7. From the first days of the war, the organization of the partisan movement behind enemy lines began. 70 million people ended up in the occupied territory. They behaved differently: some went over to the partisans, and some went over to the side of the enemy. Those and others were about the same - about 1 million people. 500 thousand participated in the partisan movement in Ukraine, 400 thousand in Belarus. There were few partisans in the newly annexed (before the war) territories.
The economy of the country was transferred to the military rails, its main directions were:
1. Redistribution of material and financial resources for the needs of the front.
2. Strengthening centralization in economic management.
3. Solving the problem of workers: legislative consolidation in production, mobilization to the labor front, attracting housewives, pensioners, teenagers (13-16 years old), cancellation of holidays, days off. The working day was 11 hours.
4. Tougher sanctions for violation of labor discipline: for being late from 3 months to 1 year in prison, for unauthorized leaving the enterprise from 6 to 8 years.
5. Taxes and loans were introduced, deposits were frozen, income tax was doubled, and a card system was introduced.
6. Churches and prayer houses were opened, some clergy were returned from the Gulag.
7. There was a relocation to the east of industrial enterprises. Only in July - November 1941, 1523 enterprises were evacuated to the east, incl. 28 in Tyumen. Production was established in the shortest possible time.
8. The party leadership of the national economy has sharply increased.
Inside the country, the party and state leadership of the USSR focused on total mobilization and the use of all available resources in order to repel aggression. In this respect, the USSR surpassed all other countries participating in the Second World War. The AKC has demonstrated its advantages in the extreme conditions of war. The Soviet government was able to determine the main directions of the people's activity. Even slogans were developed for each category of the population: for the army - to fight to the last drop of blood; for the rear - everything for the front, everything for victory; for the occupied territories - the creation of a party and Komsomol underground and a partisan movement.
In the military history literature and in the memoirs of participants in the Great Patriotic War, many different reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war are mentioned.
One of the main reasons for the failures of military experts called the miscalculations of the military-political leadership of the country in assessing the timing of the attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Despite the regular receipt of information from the middle of 1940 from Soviet intelligence about the preparation of fascist Germany for an attack on the USSR, Stalin did not exclude the possibility that in 1941 the war could be avoided and its start could be delayed by various political maneuvers until 1942. Because of the fear of provoking a war, the Soviet troops were not tasked with bringing the border districts to full combat readiness, and the troops did not occupy the intended defensive lines and positions before the enemy attack began. As a result, the Soviet troops were actually in peacetime, which largely predetermined the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles of 1941.
Of the 57 divisions intended to cover the border, only 14 calculated divisions (25% of the allocated forces and means) managed to occupy the designated defense areas, and then mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. The construction of the defense was designed only to cover the border, and not to conduct a defensive operation in order to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces.
Before the war, the military-political leadership of the USSR insufficiently developed and mastered the forms and methods of strategic and operational defense. The methods of conducting operations in the initial period of the war were incorrectly assessed. No provision was made for the possibility of the enemy going on the offensive at once by all available pre-deployed groupings of troops simultaneously in all strategic directions.
Difficulties in the preparation of the theater of military operations (TVD) created the transfer of the border and the withdrawal of the main part of the troops of the western military districts to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic republics and Bessarabia. A significant part of the fortified areas on the old border was mothballed. There was a need for the urgent construction of fortified areas on the new border, the expansion of the airfield network and the reconstruction of most airfields.
The possibility of conducting military operations on its territory was practically excluded. All this had a negative impact on the preparation not only of defense, but also of theaters of military operations in the depths of their territory in general.
It also turned out to be a mistake to concentrate the main forces of the Soviet troops in the southwestern strategic direction by the beginning of the war, i.e. in Ukraine, while in June 1941 the fascist troops delivered the main blow in the western direction - in Belarus. Also unjustified was the decision to bring supplies of material and technical assets closer to the border, which made them vulnerable with the outbreak of war.
Not enough attention was paid to the mobilization preparation of industry. The mobilization plans developed for transferring the national economy to a military footing were designed for too long periods.
Before the war, a major organizational and technical reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces began, which was planned to be completed before 1942. A radical restructuring of the system of operational, combat and political training of the armed forces began. Here, too, major miscalculations were made. Overly cumbersome formations and associations were created without taking into account the real possibilities of equipping them with modern weapons and staffing. The timing of the completion of the formation of most new compounds turned out to be unrealistic. As a result, by the beginning of the war, a significant part of them could not be formed, equipped with equipment and trained. This happened, for example, with almost simultaneously formed new mechanized corps, many of which turned out to be unfit for combat.
The Soviet troops were not fully equipped with command and rank and file, as well as tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, vehicles, means of traction for artillery, fuel delivery, equipment repair and engineering weapons.
The Red Army did not have in sufficient quantities such important technical means as radio, engineering equipment, automobiles, and special tractors for artillery.
The Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy in the number of personnel and artillery, but outnumbered him in the number of tanks and aircraft. However, the qualitative superiority was on the side of Germany. It was expressed in better technical equipment, higher coordination, training and staffing of the troops. The enemy had tactical and technical superiority in the main fleet of aircraft.
Most of the Soviet tanks were no worse, and the new ones (T34, KB) were better than the German ones, but the main tank fleet was badly worn out.
On the eve of the war, enormous damage was done to the cadres of the Soviet armed forces and intelligence: almost 40 thousand of the most qualified commanders and political workers were subjected to mass repressions. Most of the commanders of military districts, fleets, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, members of military councils, and other party and political workers were arrested and destroyed. Instead of them, military personnel who did not have the necessary practical experience were hastily promoted to leading positions.
(Military Encyclopedia. Military Publishing. Moscow, in 8 volumes. 2004)
In the command and control system of the Armed Forces, there were continuous reshuffles of the leadership in the central apparatus and military districts. So, in the five pre-war years, four chiefs of the General Staff were replaced. In the year and a half before the war (1940-1941), the heads of the air defense department were replaced five times (on average every 3-4 months), from 1936 to 1940, five heads of the intelligence department were replaced, etc. Therefore, most officials did not have time to master their duties associated with the implementation of a large range of complex tasks before the war.
By this period, the command staff of the German army had acquired the necessary practical skills in command and control, in organizing and conducting large-scale offensive operations, in using all types of military equipment and weapons on the battlefields. The German soldier had combat training. As the events of the first weeks of the war showed, the fact that the German army had combat experience played an important role in the first successes of the fascist troops on the Soviet German front.
As a result of the defeat suffered by the states of Europe in the first period of the Second World War, the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe fell into the hands of fascist Germany, which significantly increased its military and economic potential.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources.
The beginning of the war. Reasons for the failures of the Red Army . The implementation of the Barbarossa plan began at dawn on June 22, 1941 with extensive air bombardments of the largest industrial and strategic centers, as well as the offensive of the ground forces of Germany and its allies along the entire European border of the USSR (over 4.5 thousand km). Together with the Wehrmacht, the armed forces of Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland participated in combat operations. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people began, which immediately became an integral part of the Second World War for the fate of the peoples of the Earth.
In the first few days, the Nazi troops advanced tens and hundreds of kilometers. The invading forces were directly opposed by the Red Army of the Western Border Districts. It included 2.7 million Soviet soldiers and officers, 37.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand new tanks and combat aircraft each, not counting a significant number of light tanks and obsolete aircraft. On the main directions, the enemy managed to ensure superiority by 3-4 times, and even more in places of the main attack.
On the evening of June 22, the political leadership rashly gave the Armed Forces an order to crush the enemy groupings that had penetrated and break into the territories adjacent to the Soviet borders with fighting. But already at the end of June, given the unreality of this task, a different directive was given to the troops - to switch to strategic defense. Its main frontiers were also designated: the first - along the line of fortified regions along the old (until August 1939) state borders; the second - at 120 - 200 km. east. Somewhat later, a decision was made to prepare a third line of strategic importance, capable of providing the troops with the opportunity to cover the near approaches to Leningrad, Moscow and the Donbass. On these lines, with the help of the civilian population, trenches, trenches and ditches were dug, anti-tank "hedgehogs" and barbed wire fences were installed, long-term firing points and dugouts were arranged. There the command pulled up military reinforcements. Strategic defense pursued the following objectives: to wear down the enemy's striking forces, to knock out his trained personnel and combat equipment, to buy time to create the necessary reserves and conditions in order to achieve a radical turn in the course of the war.
Encountering fierce resistance from the Red Army, the Wehrmacht lost in the first five weeks of the war about 200 thousand people, over 1.5 thousand tanks and 1 thousand aircraft. However, the Soviet troops, taken by surprise, could not stop the superior enemy forces.
In the central direction, in early July 1941, all of Belarus was captured and German troops reached the approaches to Smolensk. In the northwest - the Baltic states are occupied, Leningrad is blockaded on September 9th. In the south, Nazi troops occupied Moldova and the right-bank Ukraine. Thus, by the autumn of 1941, Hitler's plan to capture the vast territory of the European part of the USSR was carried out.
The rapid advance of the German troops and their successes in the summer campaign were explained by many factors of an objective and subjective nature. Hitler's command and troops had experience in modern warfare and extensive offensive operations accumulated during the first stage of World War II. Germany used not only its own, but also the resources of many other European countries to strike at the USSR. The technical equipment of the Wehrmacht (tanks, aircraft, communications equipment, etc.) was significantly superior to the Soviet one in terms of mobility and maneuverability.
The Soviet Union, despite the efforts made during the years of the Third Five-Year Plan, did not complete its preparations for war. The rearmament of the Red Army was not completed. Military doctrine assumed the conduct of operations on enemy territory. The dominant thesis was that the USSR, in the event of an attack on it, would conduct offensive military operations with little bloodshed and turn them into a civil war - the world proletariat against the world bourgeoisie. Therefore, more than half of the strategic stocks (weapons, ammunition, uniforms, equipment, fuel) were stored near the border and in the first weeks of the war either fell into the hands of the Germans or were destroyed during the retreat.
In this regard, the defensive lines on the old Soviet-Polish border were dismantled, and new ones were not created quickly enough. Stalin's biggest miscalculation was his disbelief in the beginning of the war in the summer of 1941. Therefore, the whole country and, first of all, the army, its leadership were not prepared to repel aggression. As a result, in the first days of the war, a significant part of Soviet aviation (3.5 thousand aircraft) was destroyed right on the airfields. Large formations of the Red Army were surrounded, destroyed or captured. However, a nationwide catastrophe was averted, because the military-industrial complex remained, although deformed due to losses.
According to most Russian historians, one of the main reasons for the major defeats in 1941 were repressions in the Red Army on the eve of the war.
Immediately after the German attack, the Soviet government carried out major military-political and economic measures to repel the aggression. On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was formed. On July 10, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included I. V. Stalin (appointed Commander-in-Chief and soon becoming People's Commissar of Defense), V. M. Molotov, S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budyonny, K. E. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. K. Zhukov. On June 30, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created, concentrating all power in the country.
At the end of June - the first half of July 1941, large defensive border battles unfolded (the defense of the Brest Fortress, etc.). From July 16 to August 15, the defense of Smolensk continued in the central direction. In the northwestern direction, the German plan to capture Leningrad failed. In the south, until September 1941, the defense of Kyiv was carried out, until October - Odessa. The stubborn resistance of the Red Army in the summer-autumn of 1941 frustrated Hitler's plan for a blitzkrieg. At the same time, by the fall of 1941, the capture by fascist Germany of the vast territory of the USSR with its most important industrial centers and grain regions was a serious loss for the Soviet country.
Alarming reports of an impending German attack came from everywhere:
In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked in Japan as a German journalist) reported on the possible timing of the attack.
Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.
Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, Romania reported.
Information from diplomats and ambassadors.
Messages from border districts.
from other scouts.
But Stalin ignored these messages, because he was afraid of provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - A special TASS report appeared stating that all rumors about a war with Germany were lies. The troops were not put on alert, although Zhukov, appointed chief of the General Staff in January 1941, insisted on this.
The Great Patriotic War has begun June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided an advantage. German aviation dominated the air - bombing attacks were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, 1200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of ββthe scale of the invasion, conflicting directives were issued.
The Germans developed the offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:
Army Group North advanced on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.
Army Group "Center" advanced on Moscow, advanced 600 kilometers.
Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.
Our army suffered huge losses, the ratio of losses was 1: 8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 lost up to half of their composition. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met with desperate resistance. The frontier outposts were the first to take the blow of the enemy - the outpost of Lieutenant Lopatin fought for 11 days, the Brest Fortress, rams in the air, an oncoming tank battle near Rovno for 1 month.
When the situation cleared up, strategic defense plan.
Major defensive battles unfolded in all three directions:
June - August - the defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.
Mogilev defended for 23 days.
July 10 - September 10 - the defense of Smolensk (on September 5, in the area of ββ\u200b\u200bthe city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counteroffensive, the Soviet guard was born).
Kyiv defended for 2 months.
Odessa defended for 73 days.
250 days - the defense of Sevastopol (the losses of the Germans are greater than during the capture of Europe).
Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is waging stubborn defensive battles. Hitler focuses his main forces on the central direction.
Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy:
1. A general military mobilization of men born in 1905-1918 has been announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.
2. Martial law has been introduced in the western regions of the country.
3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).
4. June 24 - a special council for evacuation was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).
5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ from May 5 he headed the government + head of the party).
6. GKO was created - to manage the activities of all government departments and institutions in a war.
7. Detachments of the people's militia are being formed.
8. The mobilization national economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:
Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.
Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.
The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.
An 11-hour working day was introduced, holidays were canceled, and mandatory overtime work was introduced.
9. The call of the country's leadership to the deployment of various forms of socialist competition, to raise funds for the defense fund, donations.
The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing a rebuff to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining the fighter battalions to fight saboteurs, the people's militia, volunteers for the Red Army, duty to help air defense, raising funds and things for the defense fund .
Results of the initial period of the war:
Loss of a huge territory (the Baltic States, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).
Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.
Economic problems - the loss of areas with large enterprises of various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.
Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy.
The mood of the German soldiers has changed (the war in Russia is not a walk around Europe).
Causes of failures in the initial period of the war:
1. The suddenness of the attack for the army, not brought to full combat readiness, and for the population, confident that in the near future there will be no war with Germany.
2. The superiority of the German army (in terms of numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer cadres, there were plans, allies, a huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).
3. The miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:
Incorrect timing of the attack,
Ignored intelligence data and reports of a possible outbreak of war,
Mistaken military doctrine
The direction of the main blow is incorrectly determined.
4. Low professional level of officers (due to repressions).
5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganization of the army and rearmament of the army, the construction of defensive fortifications on the western borders.
6. The need to keep large armed forces in the Far East (against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to protect prisoners).
Thus, in the initial period, the war is developing extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the tide, but everything possible is being done for this.