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Radioisotope thermoelectric generator. Radioisotope sources of electrical energy and heat

It so happened that in the series we are moving from fantastic to common. Last time we talked about power reactors, the obvious next step is to talk about radioisotope thermoelectric generators. Recently there was an excellent post on Habré about RTG of the Cassini probe, and we will consider this topic from a broader point of view.

Process physics

Heat production

Unlike a nuclear reactor, which uses the phenomenon of chain nuclear reaction, radioisotope generators use the natural decay of radioactive isotopes. Recall that atoms are made up of protons, electrons, and neutrons. Depending on the number of neutrons in the nucleus of a particular atom, it may be stable, or it may show a tendency to spontaneous decay. For example, the cobalt atom 59Co with 27 protons and 32 neutrons in the nucleus is stable. Such cobalt has been used by mankind since ancient Egypt. But if we add one neutron to 59Co (for example, by putting "ordinary" cobalt in a nuclear reactor), we get 60Co, a radioactive isotope with a half-life of 5.2 years. The term "half-life" means that after 5.2 years, one atom will decay with a probability of 50%, and about half of a hundred atoms will remain. All "ordinary" elements have their own isotopes with different half-lives:

3D isotope map, thanks crust group for the picture.

By selecting a suitable isotope, it is possible to obtain an RTG with the required service life and other parameters:

Isotope	How to obtain	Specific power, W/g	Volumetric power, W/cm³	Half life	Integrated isotope decay energy, kWh/g	Working form of the isotope
60 Co (cobalt-60)	Irradiation in the reactor	2,9	~26	5.271 years	193,2	Metal, alloy
238 Pu (plutonium-238)	atomic reactor	0,568	6,9	86 years old	608,7	plutonium carbide
90 Sr (strontium-90)	fission fragments	0,93	0,7	28 years	162,721	SrO, SrTiO 3
144 Ce (cerium-144)	fission fragments	2,6	12,5	285 days	57,439	CeO 2
242 Cm (curium-242)	atomic reactor	121	1169	162 days	677,8	Cm 2 O 3
147 Pm (promethium-147)	fission fragments	0,37	1,1	2.64 years	12,34	Pm 2 O 3
137 Cs (cesium-137)	fission fragments	0,27	1,27	33 years	230,24	CsCl
210 Po (polonium-210)	bismuth irradiation	142	1320	138 days	677,59	alloys with lead, yttrium, gold
244 Cm (curium-244)	atomic reactor	2,8	33,25	18.1 years old	640,6	Cm 2 O 3
232 U (uranium-232)	thorium exposure	8,097	~88,67	68.9 years old	4887,103	dioxide, carbide, uranium nitride
106 Ru (ruthenium-106)	fission fragments	29,8	369,818	~371.63 days	9,854	metal, alloy

The fact that the decay of isotopes occurs on its own means that the RTG cannot be controlled. After loading the fuel, it will heat up and produce electricity for years, gradually degrading. Reducing the amount of fissile isotope means that there will be less nuclear decay, less heat and electricity. Plus, the drop in electric power will aggravate the degradation of the electric generator.
There is a simplified version of the RTG, in which the decay of the isotope is used only for heating, without generating electricity. Such a module is called a heating unit or RHG (Radioisotope Heat Generator).

Turning heat into electricity

As in the case of a nuclear reactor, the output we get is heat, which must somehow be converted into electricity. For this you can use:

Thermoelectric Converter. By connecting two conductors from different materials(for example, chromel and alumel) and heating one of them, you can get a source of electricity.

Thermionic transducer. In this case, an electronic lamp is used. Its cathode heats up, and the electrons get enough energy to "jump" to the anode, creating an electric current.

Thermophotoelectric Converter. In this case, a photocell operating in the infrared range is connected to the heat source. The heat source emits photons, which are captured by a photocell and converted into electricity.

Thermoelectric converter on alkali metals. Here, an electrolyte of molten sodium and sulfur salts is used to convert heat into electricity.

The Stirling engine is a heat engine that converts temperature differences into mechanical work. Electricity is obtained from mechanical work using any generator.

Story

The first experimental radioisotope energy source was introduced in 1913. But only from the second half of the 20th century, with the spread nuclear reactors, on which it was possible to obtain isotopes in industrial scale, RITEGs began to be actively used.

USA

In the US, RTGs were dealt with by the organization SNAP, already familiar to you from the last post.
SNAP-1.
It was an experimental 144 Ce RTG with a Rankine cycle generator (steam engine) with mercury as a coolant. The generator successfully worked for 2500 hours on Earth, but did not fly into space.

SNAP-3.
The first RTG that flew into space on the Transit 4A and 4B navigation satellites. Energy power 2 W, weight 2 kg, used plutonium-238.

Sentry
RITEG for meteorological satellite. Energy power 4.5 W, isotope - strontium-90.

SNAP-7.
A family of ground based RTGs for lighthouses, light buoys, weather stations, acoustic buoys and the like. Very large models, weight from 850 to 2720 kg. Energy power - tens of watts. For example, SNAP-7D - 30 W with a mass of 2 tons.

SNAP-9
Serial RITEG for Transit navigation satellites. Weight 12 kg, electric power 25 W.

SNAP-11
Experimental RTG for lunar landing stations Surveyor. It was proposed to use the isotope curium-242. Electric power - 25 W. Not used.

SNAP-19
The serial RTG was used in many missions - Nimbus meteorological satellites, Pioneer -10 and -11 probes, Viking Mars landing stations. Isotope - plutonium-238, energy power ~ 40 W.

SNAP-21 and -23
RITEGs for underwater use on strontium-90.

SNAP-27
RITEGs to power the scientific equipment of the Apollo program. 3.8 kg. plutonium-238 gave an energy power of 70 watts. Lunar scientific equipment was turned off in 1977 (people and equipment on Earth demanded money, but they were not enough). RTGs in 1977 produced from 36 to 60 W of electrical power.

MHW-RTG
The name stands for "multi-hundred-watt RTG". 4.5 kg. plutonium-238 gave 2400 W of thermal power and 160 W of electrical power. These RTGs were installed on the Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES-8,9) and have been providing heat and electricity to the Voyagers for 37 years. For 2014, RTGs provide about 53% of their initial capacity.

GPHS-RTG
The most powerful space RTG. 7.8 kg of plutonium-238 gave 4400 watts of thermal power and 300 watts of electrical power. It was used on the Ulysses solar probe, the Galileo, Cassini-Huygens probes and flies to Pluto on the New Horizons.

MMRTG
RITEG for Curiosity. 4 kg of plutonium-238, 2000 W of thermal power, 100 W of electrical power.

Warm lamp cube of plutonium.

US RTGs with time reference.

Pivot table:

Name	Media (number on machine)	Max power		Isotope	Fuel weight, kg	Gross weight, kg
Name	Media (number on machine)	Electric, W	Thermal, W	Isotope	Fuel weight, kg	Gross weight, kg
MMRTG	MSL/Curiosity rover	~110	~2000	238 Pu	~4	<45
GPHS-RTG	Cassini (3) , New Horizons (1) , Galileo (2) , Ulysses (1)	300	4400	238 Pu	7.8	55.9-57.8
MHW-RTG	LES-8/9 , Voyager 1 (3) , Voyager 2 (3)	160	2400	238 Pu	~4.5	37.7
SNAP-3B	Transit-4A (1)	2.7	52.5	238 Pu	?	2.1
SNAP-9A	Transit 5BN1/2 (1)	25	525	238 Pu	~1	12.3
SNAP-19	At the same time, RTGs were very actively used in lighthouses, navigation buoys and other ground equipment - the BETA series, RITEG-IEU and many others. Design Almost all RTGs use thermoelectric converters and therefore have the same design: prospects All flying RTGs are distinguished by a very low efficiency - as a rule, the electrical power is less than 10% of the thermal power. Therefore, at the beginning of the 21st century, NASA launched the ASRG project - an RTG with a Stirling engine. An increase in efficiency up to 30% and 140 W of electric power with 500 W of heat was expected. Unfortunately, the project was stopped in 2013 due to over budget. But, theoretically, the use of more efficient heat-to-electricity converters can seriously increase the efficiency of RTGs. Advantages and disadvantages Advantages: Very simple design. It can work for years and decades, degrading gradually. Can be used for heating and power at the same time. Does not require management and supervision. Disadvantages: Rare and expensive isotopes are required as fuel. Fuel production is complex, expensive and slow. Low efficiency. Power is limited to hundreds of watts. An RTG with a kilowatt electric power is already poorly justified, a megawatt one is practically meaningless: it will be too expensive and heavy. The combination of such advantages and disadvantages means that RTGs and heating units occupy their own niche in the space energy industry and will keep it in the future. They make it possible to simply and efficiently heat and power interplanetary vehicles, but one should not expect any kind of energy breakthrough from them. Sources In addition to Wikipedia used: Paper "Space Nuclear Power: Opening the Last Horizon". Topic "Domestic RITEGs" at "News of Cosmonautics".

It so happened that in the Peaceful Cosmic Atom series we are moving from the fantastic to the widespread. Last time we talked about power reactors, the obvious next step is to talk about radioisotope thermoelectric generators. Recently there was an excellent post on Habré about RTG of the Cassini probe, and we will consider this topic from a broader point of view.

Process physics

Heat production

Unlike a nuclear reactor, which uses the phenomenon of a nuclear chain reaction, radioisotope generators use the natural decay of radioactive isotopes. Recall that atoms are made up of protons, electrons, and neutrons. Depending on the number of neutrons in the nucleus of a particular atom, it may be stable, or it may show a tendency to spontaneous decay. For example, the cobalt atom 59Co with 27 protons and 32 neutrons in the nucleus is stable. Such cobalt has been used by mankind since ancient Egypt. But if we add one neutron to 59Co (for example, by putting "ordinary" cobalt in a nuclear reactor), we get 60Co, a radioactive isotope with a half-life of 5.2 years. The term "half-life" means that after 5.2 years, one atom will decay with a probability of 50%, and about half of a hundred atoms will remain. All "ordinary" elements have their own isotopes with different half-lives:

3D isotope map, thanks to LJ user crustgroup for the picture.

By selecting a suitable isotope, it is possible to obtain an RTG with the required service life and other parameters:

Isotope	How to obtain	Specific power, W/g	Volumetric power, W/cm³	Half life	Integrated isotope decay energy, kWh/g	Working form of the isotope
60 Co (cobalt-60)	Irradiation in the reactor	2,9	~26	5.271 years	193,2	Metal, alloy
238 Pu (plutonium-238)	atomic reactor	0,568	6,9	86 years old	608,7	plutonium carbide
90 Sr (strontium-90)	fission fragments	0,93	0,7	28 years	162,721	SrO, SrTiO 3
144 Ce (cerium-144)	fission fragments	2,6	12,5	285 days	57,439	CeO 2
242 Cm (curium-242)	atomic reactor	121	1169	162 days	677,8	Cm 2 O 3
147 Pm (promethium-147)	fission fragments	0,37	1,1	2.64 years	12,34	Pm 2 O 3
137 Cs (cesium-137)	fission fragments	0,27	1,27	33 years	230,24	CsCl
210 Po (polonium-210)	bismuth irradiation	142	1320	138 days	677,59	alloys with lead, yttrium, gold
244 Cm (curium-244)	atomic reactor	2,8	33,25	18.1 years old	640,6	Cm 2 O 3
232 U (uranium-232)	thorium exposure	8,097	~88,67	68.9 years old	4887,103	dioxide, carbide, uranium nitride
106 Ru (ruthenium-106)	fission fragments	29,8	369,818	~371.63 days	9,854	metal, alloy

Turning heat into electricity

As in the case of a nuclear reactor, the output we get is heat, which must somehow be converted into electricity. For this you can use:

Thermoelectric Converter. By connecting two conductors of different materials (for example, chromel and alumel) and heating one of them, you can get a source of electricity.
Thermionic transducer. In this case, an electronic lamp is used. Its cathode heats up, and the electrons get enough energy to "jump" to the anode, creating an electric current.
Thermophotoelectric Converter. In this case, a photocell operating in the infrared range is connected to the heat source. The heat source emits photons, which are captured by a photocell and converted into electricity.
Thermoelectric converter on alkali metals. Here, an electrolyte of molten sodium and sulfur salts is used to convert heat into electricity.
The Stirling engine is a heat engine that converts temperature differences into mechanical work. Electricity is obtained from mechanical work using some kind of generator.

Story

The first experimental radioisotope energy source was introduced in 1913. But only from the second half of the 20th century, with the spread of nuclear reactors, which could produce isotopes on an industrial scale, RTGs began to be actively used.

USA

SNAP-3.
The first RTG that flew into space on the Transit 4A and 4B navigation satellites. Energy power 2 W, weight 2 kg, used plutonium-238.

Sentry
RITEG for meteorological satellite. Energy power 4.5 W, isotope - strontium-90.

SNAP-9
Serial RITEG for Transit navigation satellites. Weight 12 kg, electric power 25 W.

SNAP-11
Experimental RTG for lunar landing stations Surveyor. It was proposed to use the isotope curium-242. Electric power - 25 W. Not used.

SNAP-19
The serial RTG was used in many missions - Nimbus meteorological satellites, Pioneer probes -10 and -11, Viking Mars landing stations. Isotope - plutonium-238, energy power ~ 40 W.

SNAP-21 and -23
RITEGs for underwater use on strontium-90.

MMRTG
RTG for Curiosity. 4 kg of plutonium-238, 2000 W of thermal power, 100 W of electrical power.

Warm lamp cube of plutonium.

US RTGs with time reference.

Pivot table:

Name	Media (number on machine)	Max power		Isotope	Fuel weight, kg	Gross weight, kg
Name	Media (number on machine)	Electric, W	Thermal, W	Isotope	Fuel weight, kg	Gross weight, kg
MMRTG	MSL/Curiosity rover	~110	~2000	238 Pu	~4	<45
GPHS-RTG	Cassini (3) , New Horizons (1) , Galileo (2) , Ulysses (1)	300	4400	238 Pu	7.8	55.9-57.8
MHW-RTG	LES-8/9 , Voyager 1 (3) , Voyager 2 (3)	160	2400	238 Pu	~4.5	37.7
SNAP-3B	Transit-4A (1)	2.7	52.5	238 Pu	?	2.1
SNAP-9A	Transit 5BN1/2 (1)	25	525	238 Pu	~1	12.3
SNAP-19	Nimbus-3 (2), Pioneer 10 (4) , Pioneer 11 (4)	40.3	525	238 Pu	~1	13.6
SNAP-19 modification	Viking 1 (2), Viking 2 (2)	42.7	525	238 Pu	~1	15.2
SNAP-27	Apollo 12-17 ALSEP (1)	73	1,480	238 Pu	3.8	20

USSR/Russia

There were few space RTGs in the USSR and Russia. The first experimental generator was RTG "Lemon-1" on polonium-210, created in 1962:

The first space RTGs were Orion-1 with an electric power of 20 W on polonium-210 and launched on the Strela-1 series communication satellites - Kosmos-84 and Kosmos-90. The heating units were on Lunokhods -1 and -2, and the RTG was on the Mars-96 mission:

At the same time, RTGs were very actively used in lighthouses, navigation buoys and other ground equipment - the BETA series, RITEG-IEU and many others.

Design

Almost all RTGs use thermoelectric converters and therefore have the same design:

prospects

All flying RTGs are distinguished by a very low efficiency - as a rule, the electrical power is less than 10% of the thermal power. Therefore, at the beginning of the 21st century, NASA launched the ASRG project - an RTG with a Stirling engine. An increase in efficiency up to 30% and 140 W of electric power with 500 W of heat was expected. Unfortunately, the project was stopped in 2013 due to over budget. But, theoretically, the use of more efficient heat-to-electricity converters can seriously increase the efficiency of RTGs.

Advantages and disadvantages

Advantages:

Very simple design.
It can work for years and decades, degrading gradually.
Can be used for heating and power at the same time.
Does not require management and supervision.

Disadvantages:

Rare and expensive isotopes are required as fuel.
Fuel production is complex, expensive and slow.
Low efficiency.
Power is limited to hundreds of watts. An RTG with a kilowatt electric power is already poorly justified, a megawatt one is practically meaningless: it will be too expensive and heavy.

The combination of such advantages and disadvantages means that RTGs and heating units occupy their own niche in the space energy industry and will keep it in the future. They make it possible to simply and efficiently heat and power interplanetary vehicles, but one should not expect any kind of energy breakthrough from them.

Sources

In addition to Wikipedia used:

Paper "Space Nuclear Power: Opening the Last Horizon".
Topic "Domestic RTGs" at "Cosmonautics News".

Tags:

RITEG
ICA

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Process physics

Heat production

3D isotope map, thanks to LJ user crustgroup for the picture.

By selecting a suitable isotope, it is possible to obtain an RTG with the required service life and other parameters:

Isotope	How to obtain	Specific power, W/g	Volumetric power, W/cm³	Half life	Integrated isotope decay energy, kWh/g	Working form of the isotope
60 Co (cobalt-60)	Irradiation in the reactor	2,9	~26	5.271 years	193,2	Metal, alloy
238 Pu (plutonium-238)	atomic reactor	0,568	6,9	86 years old	608,7	plutonium carbide
90 Sr (strontium-90)	fission fragments	0,93	0,7	28 years	162,721	SrO, SrTiO 3
144 Ce (cerium-144)	fission fragments	2,6	12,5	285 days	57,439	CeO 2
242 Cm (curium-242)	atomic reactor	121	1169	162 days	677,8	Cm 2 O 3
147 Pm (promethium-147)	fission fragments	0,37	1,1	2.64 years	12,34	Pm 2 O 3
137 Cs (cesium-137)	fission fragments	0,27	1,27	33 years	230,24	CsCl
210 Po (polonium-210)	bismuth irradiation	142	1320	138 days	677,59	alloys with lead, yttrium, gold
244 Cm (curium-244)	atomic reactor	2,8	33,25	18.1 years old	640,6	Cm 2 O 3
232 U (uranium-232)	thorium exposure	8,097	~88,67	68.9 years old	4887,103	dioxide, carbide, uranium nitride
106 Ru (ruthenium-106)	fission fragments	29,8	369,818	~371.63 days	9,854	metal, alloy

Turning heat into electricity

As in the case of a nuclear reactor, the output we get is heat, which must somehow be converted into electricity. For this you can use:

Thermoelectric Converter. By connecting two conductors of different materials (for example, chromel and alumel) and heating one of them, you can get a source of electricity.
Thermionic transducer. In this case, an electronic lamp is used. Its cathode heats up, and the electrons get enough energy to "jump" to the anode, creating an electric current.
Thermophotoelectric Converter. In this case, a photocell operating in the infrared range is connected to the heat source. The heat source emits photons, which are captured by a photocell and converted into electricity.
Thermoelectric converter on alkali metals. Here, an electrolyte of molten sodium and sulfur salts is used to convert heat into electricity.
The Stirling engine is a heat engine that converts temperature differences into mechanical work. Electricity is obtained from mechanical work using some kind of generator.

Story

USA

SNAP-3.
The first RTG that flew into space on the Transit 4A and 4B navigation satellites. Energy power 2 W, weight 2 kg, used plutonium-238.

Sentry
RITEG for meteorological satellite. Energy power 4.5 W, isotope - strontium-90.

SNAP-9
Serial RITEG for Transit navigation satellites. Weight 12 kg, electric power 25 W.

SNAP-11
Experimental RTG for lunar landing stations Surveyor. It was proposed to use the isotope curium-242. Electric power - 25 W. Not used.

SNAP-19
The serial RTG was used in many missions - Nimbus meteorological satellites, Pioneer probes -10 and -11, Viking Mars landing stations. Isotope - plutonium-238, energy power ~ 40 W.

SNAP-21 and -23
RITEGs for underwater use on strontium-90.

MMRTG
RTG for Curiosity. 4 kg of plutonium-238, 2000 W of thermal power, 100 W of electrical power.

Warm lamp cube of plutonium.

US RTGs with time reference.

Pivot table:

Name	Media (number on machine)	Max power		Isotope	Fuel weight, kg	Gross weight, kg
Name	Media (number on machine)	Electric, W	Thermal, W	Isotope	Fuel weight, kg	Gross weight, kg
MMRTG	MSL/Curiosity rover	~110	~2000	238 Pu	~4	<45
GPHS-RTG	Cassini (3) , New Horizons (1) , Galileo (2) , Ulysses (1)	300	4400	238 Pu	7.8	55.9-57.8
MHW-RTG	LES-8/9 , Voyager 1 (3) , Voyager 2 (3)	160	2400	238 Pu	~4.5	37.7
SNAP-3B	Transit-4A (1)	2.7	52.5	238 Pu	?	2.1
SNAP-9A	Transit 5BN1/2 (1)	25	525	238 Pu	~1	12.3
SNAP-19	Nimbus-3 (2), Pioneer 10 (4) , Pioneer 11 (4)	40.3	525	238 Pu	~1	13.6
SNAP-19 modification	Viking 1 (2), Viking 2 (2)	42.7	525	238 Pu	~1	15.2
SNAP-27	Apollo 12-17 ALSEP (1)	73	1,480	238 Pu	3.8	20

USSR/Russia

There were few space RTGs in the USSR and Russia. The first experimental generator was RTG "Lemon-1" on polonium-210, created in 1962:

At the same time, RTGs were very actively used in lighthouses, navigation buoys and other ground equipment - the BETA series, RITEG-IEU and many others.

Design

Almost all RTGs use thermoelectric converters and therefore have the same design:

prospects

Advantages and disadvantages

Advantages:

Very simple design.
It can work for years and decades, degrading gradually.
Can be used for heating and power at the same time.
Does not require management and supervision.

Disadvantages:

Rare and expensive isotopes are required as fuel.
Fuel production is complex, expensive and slow.
Low efficiency.
Power is limited to hundreds of watts. An RTG with a kilowatt electric power is already poorly justified, a megawatt one is practically meaningless: it will be too expensive and heavy.

Sources

In addition to Wikipedia used:

Paper "Space Nuclear Power: Opening the Last Horizon".
Topic "Domestic RTGs" at "Cosmonautics News".

Tags: Add tags

Bellona Working Papers

There are about 1,000 radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) in Russia, most of which are used to power light beacons. All existing RTGs have expired and must be disposed of. The need for their prompt disposal is confirmed by radiation incidents constantly occurring with RTGs.

In 1992, Bellona prepared a working paper reporting 132 radioisotope-powered lighthouses along the coast of northwestern Russia, including one just a few dozen meters from the Norwegian border.

Bellona warned of possible radioactive incidents, both due to the wear and tear of beacons and the deliberate theft of radioactive strontium-90. RTGs that have exhausted their service life are waiting for burial for decades. Installations that need urgent disposal are, at best, stored in violation of all standards on unequipped sites. At worst, they are dismantled by collectors of non-ferrous metals, risking their health and exposing others to the risk of radioactive exposure.

Access to most RTGs is not limited in any way; they do not have fences or radiation hazard signs. RTG inspections are carried out no more than once every six months, and some are not inspected at all for more than 10 years.

If the radioactive material ends up in the hands of terrorists who disperse it with explosives, this so-called "dirty bomb" will cause damage many times greater than that of a conventional one. The area of its explosion - within a radius of tens of kilometers - will be contaminated with radiation for many years.

1. What are RTGs
RTGs are sources of autonomous power supply with a constant voltage of 7 to 30 V for various autonomous equipment with power from a few watts to 80 watts. Together with RTGs, various electrical devices are used to ensure the accumulation and conversion of electrical energy generated by the generator. RTGs are most widely used as power sources for navigation beacons and light signs. 1 . RTGs are also used as power sources for radio beacons and weather stations.

RTGs use heat sources based on the strontium-90 radionuclide (RHS-90). RHS-90 is a sealed radiation source in which the fuel composition, usually in the form of ceramic strontium-90 titanate (SrTiO3), is sealed twice by argon-arc welding in a capsule. In some rigs, strontium is used in the form of strontium borosilicate glass. The capsule is protected from external influences by a thick RTG shell made of stainless steel, aluminum and lead. The biological protection is made in such a way that the radiation dose on the surface of the devices does not exceed 200 mR/h, and at a distance of a meter - 10 mR/h [Rylov, 2003, p. 32].

The radioactive half-life of strontium-90 (90Sr) is 29 years. At the time of manufacture RHS‑90 contain from 30 to 180 kKi and 90Sr. The decay of strontium produces a daughter isotope, the beta emitter, yttrium-90, with a half-life of 64 hours. The dose rate of gamma radiation RIT-90 by itself, without metal protection, reaches 400-800 R/h at a distance of 0.5 m and 100-200 R/h at 1 m from RIT-90.

Table 1. Radioactive element RIT-90
Cylinder size	10 cm x 10 cm
The weight	5 kg
Power	240 watts
Strontium-90 content	1500 TBq (40000 Curies)
Power	240 watts
Surface temperature	300-400 degrees Celsius
Exposure dose rate at a distance of up to 0.02-0.5 m	2800-1000 R/hour

Safe activity of RIT‑90 is reached only after 900‑1,000 years. According to Gosatomnadzor (currently the Federal Service for Nuclear Supervision), “the current system for handling RTGs does not allow for the physical protection of these devices, and the situation with them can well be classified as an incident, expressed in unsupervised storage of hazardous sources. Therefore, generators require immediate evacuation” [Report…, 1999, p. 72; Rylov, 2003, p. 32].

According to the website of the developer of riegs, the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation (VNIITFA), plutonium-238 [VNIITFA] is used as fuel for high-energy radionuclide power plants. However, the use of heat sources based on plutonium-238 in RTGs, along with some technical advantages, requires significant financial costs, therefore, in the last 10–15 years, VNIITFA has not supplied such RTGs to domestic consumers for ground purposes.

The US also used RTGs, mainly for space purposes, but at least 10 RTGs were installed at remote military sites in Alaska in the 1960s and 70s. However, after a wildfire threatened one of the RTGs in 1992, the US Air Force began to replace them with diesel generators. According to the IAEA classification, RTGs belong to hazard class 1 (strongest sources, strongest emitters) [VNIITFA].

2. Security issues
According to the developers of RTGs, even if RIT-90 gets into the environment during an accident or unauthorized removal from the RTG, the integrity of the source can be violated only as a result of its intentional, forced destruction.

“Perhaps it would be better to bury them so that no one finds them. But they were installed 30 years ago, when the threat of terrorism was not thought of, in addition, the RTGs were not vandal-protected,” said Alexander Agapov, head of the Department of Security and Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation. 2 .

Minatom admits that "there are RTGs in a state of abandonment." According to Agapov, “the fact is that organizations that are responsible for the operation of RTGs do not want to pay for their decommissioning. This is the same problem as with the states that formed on the territory of the former USSR - "take away everything bad, we will keep everything good for ourselves."

At the same time, according to VNIITFA Director General Nikolay Kuzelev, “there is no problem […] of radioactive contamination of the environment surrounding the RTG” [Kuzelev, 2003, p. 33]. At the same time, N. Kuzelev admits that “most RTG operating sites do not meet the requirements of current regulatory documents, which is known to the management of operating organizations” [Kuzelev, 2003, p. 33]. “In fact, there is a problem of RTG vulnerability in relation to terrorist acts, which consist in the targeted use of radioactive material contained in the RTG” [Kuzelev, 2003, p. 33].

Strontium-90 output
According to the specialists of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, “only sources of ionizing radiation based on strontium-90 […] RIT-90 pose a fundamental radiation hazard.” As long as the RTG case (which is the transport package of RIT-90) is intact, it is not considered radioactive waste. “RIT-90, which is outside the radiation protection, will pose a serious local danger to people who find themselves in close proximity to it. Radiation contamination of the environment is excluded.” This has not happened until now. An experimental explosion of a powerful anti-ship explosive device docked to the RTG destroyed the small RTG (57IK), but the RIT-90 included in it was undamaged [Klyuev, 2000].

As representatives of VNIITFA stated in 2003, “so far there has not been a single case of leakage of the RIT-90 capsule, although there have been a number of serious accidents with RTGs” 3 . At the same time, commenting on the incidents with RTGs, official representatives of Gosatomnadzor and the IAEA repeatedly admitted the possibility of natural destruction of the RHS capsule (see below). However, a survey in July 2004 recorded the release of Sr-90 into the environment from an RTG of the IEU-1 type, located at Cape Navarin, Beringovsky District, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. As noted in the statement of the Federal Service for Nuclear Supervision (FSAN), this “indicates the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, thermal protection unit, protective housing and cartridge case nests” [Annual reference…, 2004].

There are about 1,000 RTGs on the territory of Russia (according to the head of the Department of Security and Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Alexander Agapov, as of September 2003 - 998 units), on the territory of other countries - about 30 units 4 . According to Rosatom data for March 2005, there are "approximately 720 RTGs" in operation, about 200 have been decommissioned and disposed of with international assistance [Antipov, 2005].

Presumably, about 1,500 RTGs were created in the USSR [Rylov, 2003, p. 32]. The service life of all types of RTGs is 10 years. Currently, all RTGs in operation have exhausted their service life and must be disposed of 5 .

3. Owners and licensing
RTGs are owned by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transport, and Roshydromet. The Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation has about 380 RTGs, their records are maintained by the Hydrographic State Enterprise. There are 535 of them in the Ministry of Defense, including 415 in the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanology.

Gosatomnadzor controls RTGs owned by the Ministry of Transport. Also, in accordance with Government Decree 1007 and Directive D-3 of the Ministry of Defense of January 20, 2003, Gosatomnadzor licenses and controls the RTGs of the Ministry of Defense as nuclear installations that are not related to nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, in general, since 1995, oversight of radiation and nuclear safety in military units has been entrusted to the Ministry of Defense. It turns out that the controlling state body - Gosatomnadzor of the Russian Federation - often does not really have access to these RTGs.
According to representatives of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, in order to ensure the safety of RTG operation along the Northern Sea Route, including taking into account the likelihood of "vandalism" and "terrorism", it is enough to organize periodic (from several to once a year) monitoring of their the physical state and the state of the radiation situation on the surface and near the RTGs [Klyuev, 2000].

However, Gosatomnadzor criticizes the Hydrographic Enterprise's approach, including for the extreme slowness of the decommissioning of end-of-life RTGs. The issues of storage, ensuring the physical protection of RTGs and radiation safety of the population at their locations still remain problematic [Reference about the work of the North European…, 2004]. Gosatomnadzor notes that in the current situation, the hydrographic services of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense are actually violating Article 34 of the Law "On the Use of Atomic Energy", according to which the operating organization must have the necessary material and other resources for the operation of nuclear power facilities. In addition, according to Gosatomnadzor, the structural subdivisions of the Hydrographic Enterprise “lack of trained specialists for the timely inspection and maintenance of RTGs” [Spravka o trudnevostochnogo…, 2004].

4. Models of RTGs
According to the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, 381 Beta-M, Efir-MA, Gorn and Gong RTGs are in operation along the Northern Sea Route.

According to the official reports of the State Committee for Ecology, “the current system for handling RTGs contradicts the provisions of the federal laws “On the Use of Atomic Energy” and “On the Radiation Safety of the Population”, since the physical protection of these installations is not provided. When placing RTGs, the possibility of damaging effects of natural and anthropogenic factors on them was not taken into account.

Due to shortcomings in the practice of accounting and control of these installations by operating organizations, individual RTGs can be “lost” or “forgotten”. […] In fact, RTG locations can be considered as places for temporary storage of high-level waste” [Government Report…, 1999]. “Particularly alarming are the possible negative consequences of the loss of control over RTGs that are under the jurisdiction of the State Hydrographic Enterprise and the Russian Ministry of Defense” [State report ..., 1998].
In the 1960s-1980s, VNIITFA developed about ten types (standard sizes) of RTGs based on sources of the RIT-90 type.

RTGs differ in various parameters in terms of output voltage, output electric power, weight, dimensions, etc. The most widely used RTG is the Beta-M type, which was one of the first products developed in the late 60s of the last century. About 700 RTGs of this type are currently in operation. This type of RTG, unfortunately, does not have welded joints and, as the practice of the last 10 years has shown, can be disassembled at the place of operation using ordinary plumbing tools. 6 . In the last 10–15 years, VNIITFA has not been working on the development of new RTGs.

Table 2. Types and main characteristics of Soviet-made RTGs [Agapov, 2003; Rylov, 2003, p. 32] 13
	RHS thermal power, W	RHS initial nominal activity, thousand Curies	Electric power of RITEG, W	RTG output voltage, V	Mass of RTG, kg	Start of production
Ether-MA	720	111	30	35	1250	1976
IEU-1	2200	49	80	24	2500	1976
IEU-2	580	89	14	6	600	1977
Beta-M	230	35	10		560	1978
Gong	315	49	18	14	600	1983
Horn	1100	170	60	7 (14)	1050 (3 RIT)	1983
IEU-2M	690	106	20	14	600	1985
Senostav	1870	288			1250	1989
IEU-1M	2200 (3300)	340 (510)	120 (180)	28	2(3)x1050	1990

5. Accounting for RTGs
The developer of the RTG design documentation was VNIITFA (All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation) in Moscow. The documentation was handed over to the manufacturer. The main RTG customers were the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transport, the State Committee for Hydrometeorology (now Roshydromet) and the Mingeo (the former Ministry of Geology, whose functions were transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources).

During the development of RTGs, VNIITFA produced small quantities of prototypes. The serial manufacturer of RTGs in the USSR was the Baltiets plant in Narva, Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. This plant was converted in the early 1990s and is currently not related to RTGs. Balti EES (this is how the company is now called) confirmed to Bellona that they had no information about where the RTGs were supplied. Nevertheless, the plant's specialists participated in the replacement of RTGs with other energy sources at lighthouses in Estonia.

Commissioning of RTGs in the 1960s was carried out by a specialized organization of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, which was liquidated long ago, or by the operating organizations themselves.

Where are the RTGs located?
About 80% of all manufactured RTGs were sent to hydrographic military units of the Ministry of Defense and civilian hydrographic bases along the Northern Sea Route.

As VNIITFA told us, today the institute does not have complete information on the number of all manufactured RTGs and on all organizations owning RTGs that are currently in operation. Taking into account the current situation in the country regarding RTG accounting, VNIITFA has been collecting information on RTGs in operation in Russia and other countries of the former USSR for a number of years. To date, it has been established that there are about 1,000 RTGs in Russia. All of them have worked out their service life and are subject to disposal at specialized enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation.

Under agreements with the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, VNIITFA annually sends its specialists to inspect RTGs at their operating sites. In 2001-2002 104 RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation were examined.

In the report of Gosatomnadzor for 2003, the state of RTGs in the Far Eastern District was recognized as unsatisfactory [Spravka o aktivnosti…, 2003]. In 2004, it was noted that the most “unfavorable” organizations that operate RTGs with serious violations of safety requirements remain the Tiksinskaya, Providenskaya hydrographic bases and the Pevek pilot and hydrographic detachment of the State Hydrographic Enterprise of the Federal Agency for Sea and River Transport. It was noted that “the condition of the RTG physical protection is at an extremely low level.
Inspection of RTGs by specialists of structural subdivisions of the above enterprise is carried out rarely and mainly located near the locations of these subdivisions; a number of RITEGs have not been examined for more than 10 years (there are not enough trained specialists in the Pevek LGO detachment and the Providenskaya hydrographic base) ”[Information about the work of the Far East ..., 2004].

According to various sources, about 40 lighthouses with RTGs are located along the coast of Sakhalin, 30 - near the Kuril Islands. In Chukotka, according to official figures, 150 RTGs have accumulated, many of which are ownerless. For example, RTGs belonging to Kolymgidromet were abandoned on the shores of Shelting Bay and at Cape Evreinov in connection with the collapse of the observation service [State Report…, 1997]. Of these, 58 are Beta-M, 13 are Efir, 8 are Gorn, and 6 are Gong [Rylov, 2003, p. 32]. Some RTGs turn out to be simply lost: for example, in September 2003, the inspection did not find Beta-M RTG No. 57 at the Kuvekvyn checkpoint, and there were official suggestions that the RTG could be washed into the sand as a result of a strong storm or stolen by unknown persons [Reference on activities - 2, 2003].

It is possible that there are lost generators in the Arctic region. According to official data, in the late 90s, at least six of them were in disrepair [Kaira; Report…, 1998, p. 72]. According to the conclusion of the official commission with the participation of Gosatomnadzor specialists, “the state of safety of RTGs is extremely unsatisfactory and poses a real danger to the flora, fauna and water area of the Arctic seas. Their improper placement may expose part of the indigenous population of the Arctic to unreasonable exposure.”

There are about 75 RTGs in the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia. In 2002, the federal target program "National Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Anthropogenic Pollution in the Arctic Region of the Russian Federation" was approved. One of the points of the action plan for the protection of the marine environment was the inventory of RTGs. In Yakutia, it was decided to carry out a complete inventory in 2002–2003 [O sostoyanie…, 2002]. According to Tamara Argunova, head of the radiation safety department of the Ministry of Nature Protection of Yakutia, due to the fact that the route of sea vessels is controlled by space satellites, the need to use RTGs has disappeared, and their prompt disposal should be carried out.

Generators located on the islands of the Laptev, East Siberian and Arctic coasts of the territories of the Anabar, Bulunsky, Ust-Yansky, Nizhnekolymsky uluses belong to the area of responsibility of the Khatanga, Tiksinskaya, Kolyma hydrobases and the Pevek pilot detachment only on paper. Radiation safety requirements for the operation of RTGs along the Northern Sea Route remain violated. Control over 25 such installations has been lost [On the state…, 2002]. There are more than 100 RTGs in the Siberian District, mainly in Taimyr.

There are about 153 RTGs on the coast of the Barents and White Seas, including 17 in the area of Kandalaksha Bay. According to VNIITFA Director Nikolai Kuzelev, “100% of the RTGs on the coast of the Baltic Sea are subject to annual inspections. At the same time, it should be recognized that the examination of RTGs by specialists of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise VNIITFA on the Arctic coast of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug was not carried out due to the lack of contracts” [Kuzelev, 2003, p. 33].

Emergency RTG in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug: release of 90Sr into the environment
According to the Far Eastern Interregional Territorial District of Gosatomnadzor of Russia, on August 16, 2003, during the examination by the commission of RTGs located on the Arctic coast of the Chukotka Autonomous District, an emergency RTG of the IEU-1 type was discovered at Cape Navarin in the Beringovsky District. The exposure dose rate on the generator surface was up to 15 R/h.

As the commission established, the generator "self-destructed as a result of some, not yet precisely established by nature, internal influence." Radioactive contamination of the RTG body and the soil around it was revealed. This was reported in letter No. 04‑05\1603, sent to the leadership of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation on August 20, 2003, by the General Director of VNIITFA of Minatom N.R. Kuzelev and the responsible official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation A.N. Kunakov.

In July 2004, a second inspection of the emergency RTG at Cape Navarin was carried out. As a result of the survey, it was established that the radiation situation has deteriorated sharply, the level of DER of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h; the release of Sr-90 into the external environment began, which indicates the beginning of the destruction of the radiation protection unit, the thermal protection unit, the protective case and the sockets of the cartridge cases (previously, VNIITFA experts repeatedly stated that strontium could not be released into the environment).

Presumably, this RTG was shot down by an all-terrain vehicle by reindeer herders of the brigade stationed on Navarino in 1999. The generator heated up to 800 °C inside. The metal plates blocking the path of radiation burst. So far, the situation is saved by a concrete slab weighing 6 tons, which closed the generator last year. However, the radiation is thousands of times higher than the permissible limits. On the southernmost cape of Chukotka, Navarin, herds of reindeer herders graze. Animals, and people, are not stopped by warning signs - they come close to the source of radiation.

As mentioned in the FSAN report for 2004, "the technical condition of the RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG does not exclude its complete destruction", moreover, thermophysical processes ("bursting" by internal pressure) remain "unknown". To date, the Russian Ministry of Defense is solving the issue of its removal and disposal in July 2005 [Annual information ..., 2004; Gorbunov, 2004].

Abandoned RTGs in Chukotka
Shalaurova Island	Exceeding the permissible dose limit by 30 times. The RTG is in an ownerless, abandoned condition.
Cape Nutevgi	Has severe external damage. It was established without taking into account the influence of natural hazards in the immediate vicinity of the thermokarst depression. The service personnel covered up a transport accident that happened to the RTG in March 1983.
Cape Okhotnichiy	They are dragged into the sand in the immediate vicinity of the surf zone. The cause of the accident is the negligence of the personnel. Stored there illegally.
Cape Heart-Stone	Installed 3 meters from the edge of a cliff up to 100 meters high. A cleavage crack passes through the site, and therefore the RTG can fall along with a large mass of rock. The installation of the RTG was carried out without taking into account the impact of natural hazards (marine abrasion). Stored there illegally.
Nuneangan Island	The external radiation of the RTG exceeds the established limits by 5 times. The reason is a design flaw. Transportation is possible only by special flight.
Cape Chaplin	Exceeding the permissible dose limit in the lower part of the body by 25 times. The technological plug is turned out from the lower part of the body. The RTG is located on the territory of the military unit. The cause of the accident is a flaw in the design of this type of generator and concealment by the personnel of a radiation accident with this RTG.
island of Chekkul	Exceeding the established dose limits by 35% at a distance of 1 m from the surface of the RTG.
Cape Shalaurova hut	Exceeding the established dose limits by 80% at a distance of 1 m from the surface of the RTG.

[Based on: Kaira; Rylov, 2003, p. 32]

6. RTG incidents
Several incidents are detailed below; you can read about the latest incidents that took place at the end of 2003-2004 in the table at the end of this subsection.

On November 12, 2003, the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet, during a scheduled inspection of navigational support, discovered a completely dismantled Beta-M type RTG in the Olenya Bay of the Kola Bay (on the northern shore opposite the entrance to Ekaterininskaya Harbor), near the city of Polyarny. The RTG is completely destroyed, and all of its parts, including the depleted uranium shield, are stolen by unknown thieves. A radioisotope heat source - a capsule with strontium - was found in the water near the shore at a depth of 1.5-3 meters.

On November 13, 2003, the same inspection, also in the area of the city of Polyarny, discovered a completely dismantled RTG of the same type Beta-M, which provides power to navigational sign No. 437 on Yuzhny Goryachinsky Island in the Kola Bay (opposite the former village of Goryachiye Ruchi). Like the previous one, the RTG was completely destroyed, and all its parts, including the depleted uranium shield, were stolen. RIT was found on land near the coastline in the northern part of the island.

The administration of the Murmansk region qualifies the incident as a radiation accident. According to the administration, “RIT is a source of increased radiation hazard with a radiation power on the surface of about 1,000 roentgens per hour. The presence of people and animals near the source (closer than 500 meters) is a danger to health and life. It must be assumed that the people who dismantled the RTGs received lethal doses of radiation. Currently, the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are searching for the thieves and parts of the RTGs at the scrap metal acceptance points.”

The exact date when the RTGs were looted has not been established. Apparently, the previous inspection of these RTGs was carried out no later than the spring of 2003. As Bellona learned, the territory where the RTGs were located and where the capsules with strontium were scattered is not closed and access there was not limited. Thus, for a long time it was possible to irradiate people.

On March 12, 2003 (the same day that Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev shared his concerns about the safety of nuclear materials at a conference in Vienna - see below), the military at the Leningrad Naval Base discovered that one of the lighthouses on the Baltic Sea had been looted (Cape Pikhlisaar of the Kurgalsky Peninsula in the Leningrad Region) 7 .

Before the discovery of the loss, the last scheduled check of this beacon with a Beta-M type generator was carried out in June 2002 [Karpov, 2003]. Non-ferrous metal hunters carried away about 500 kg of stainless steel, aluminum and lead, and a radioactive element (RIT-90) was thrown into the sea 200 meters from the lighthouse. The hot capsule with strontium melted through the ice and went to the bottom of the Baltic Sea. At the same time, the exposure dose rate of gamma radiation on the surface of an almost meter thick ice above the source was more than 30 R/h.

Since the services of the border guards in charge of the lighthouse are not sufficiently equipped, on March 23 they turned to the Lenspetskombinat "Radon" (Sosnovy Bor) with a request to find and isolate the radioactive cylinder. LSK "Radon" does not have a license for this type of activity (the plant specializes in the disposal of radioactive waste), and therefore specifically coordinated the extraction of a strontium battery from under the ice with Gosatomnadzor. On March 28, the radioactive element was removed using an ordinary shovel and long-handled pitchfork and delivered to the road several kilometers away on ordinary sleds, where it was loaded into a lead container. The shell containing the strontium was not damaged. After temporary storage at LSK Radon, the cylinder was transported to VNIITFA.

A similar lighthouse in the Leningrad region was looted in 1999. Then the radioactive element was found at a bus stop in the city of Kingisepp, 50 km from the scene. At least three people who stole the source have died. The liquidation of the incident was then also carried out by the specialists of the LSK "Radon" [Radioactive bomb ..., 2003] 8 .

Looted in March 2003, the lighthouse was located near the village of Kurgolovo in the Kingisep district, not far from the borders with Estonia and Finland, on the territory of a nature reserve and a wetland of international importance. The reserve was established in 2000 by a decree of the governor of the Leningrad Region in order to protect rare species of flora and fauna, to protect the shallow zone of the bay, where commercial fish species spawn, as well as habitats for gray seals and ringed seals. On the territory of the reserve there are nesting colonies and migratory sites of rare waterfowl. When creating the reserve, it was planned to develop tourism. A system of "ecological" trails and routes was developed: the nature of the peninsula could attract tourists [Governor's Resolution, 2000]. However, after already two incidents involving the loss of a radioactive source, it is doubtful that tourists will want to come to these places.

In May 2001, three radioisotope sources were stolen from the lighthouses of the RF Ministry of Defense located on an island in the White Sea near the Kandalaksha nature reserve in the Murmansk region. This reserve is also one of the centers of ecological tourism. Two hunters for non-ferrous metals received strong doses of radiation, and the stolen RTGs were found and sent to VNIITFA in June 2001. From there they were transported to the Mayak plant in the Chelyabinsk region. The work was financed by the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark under an agreement with the administration of the Murmansk region under the program for the disposal of RTGs and the installation of solar panels on lighthouses.

In 1987, the MI-8 helicopter of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration, at the request of military unit 13148 of the Russian Ministry of Defense, transported on a suspension to the area of \u200b\u200bNizkiy Cape on the eastern coast of Sakhalin (Okhinsky District) a RTG of the IEU-1 type weighing two and a half tons. As the pilots explained, the weather was windy and the helicopter was so loose that they were forced to drop the cargo into the sea to prevent a fall.

In August 1997, another RTG of the same type crashed from a helicopter into the sea near Cape Maria in the north of Sakhalin Island (Smirnykhovsky District). The installation fell into the water at a distance of 200-400 meters from the shore and lies at a depth of 25-30 meters. The reason, according to the military, was the opening of the external suspension lock on the helicopter due to incorrect actions of the crew commander. Despite the fault of the civil aviators who transported the RTGs on the external sling of helicopters, the entire responsibility lies with the owner of the RTGs, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Defense Ministry. The military were obliged to develop measures to prevent emergencies, as well as conduct special briefings for helicopter crews, but nothing was done.

The search operation that discovered one of the RTGs (flooded in 1997) in the Sea of Okhotsk took place only in 2004. It is planned that the RTG will be raised no earlier than the summer of 2005 [Radioisotopnaya…, 2004]. An expedition to search for another RTG has not yet been carried out.

Currently, both RTGs lie on the seabed. So far, there is no high content of strontium-90 in sea water samples in these places, but the marine environment is quite aggressive. It is a chemically active medium, moreover, RTGs are under pressure of several atmospheres. And in the cases of RTGs there are technological connectors and channels through which sea water will surely seep inside. Then the strontium-90 radionuclide will get into the sea and through the food chain "bottom microorganisms, algae, fish" - into human food 9 . In favor of the likelihood of such a scenario, representatives of the Magadan Department of Radiation Safety Inspection speak out, representatives of local departments of Gosatomnadzor demand the rise of RTGs, while indicating that the developers of RTGs from VNIITFA did not test them for the effects of a chemically aggressive marine environment. The possibility of release of radionuclides from RTGs near capes Nizkoye and Maria is officially confirmed by IAEA experts. In addition, the release of strontium-90 into the environment began to be assessed by experts as a likely scenario after the release of strontium from an emergency RTG at Cape Navarin in Chukotka was recorded in July 2004 (see above). According to calculations by the Norwegian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRPA), under the worst-case scenario, the release of radioactivity into seawater could be up to 500 MBq Sr-90 daily; despite this figure, the NRPA considers that the risk of strontium entering the human body through the food chain is negligible.

VNIITF specialists also participated in the liquidation of an emergency caused by unauthorized dismantling of six Beta-M RTGs in Kazakhstan near the city of Priozersk [Annual reference…, 2004; Gorbunov, 2004].

In 1998, in the village of Vankarem in Chukotka, a two-year-old girl died of leukemia. Two more children were in the district hospital to confirm the same diagnosis. According to some reports, the cause of exposure was an abandoned RTG that was lying around near the village [Plechikova, 2002].

So far, the fact of exposure of the head of the Plastun navigation support station at Cape Yakubovsky in the Primorsky Territory, Vladimir Svyatets, remains officially unconfirmed. In March 2000, a damaged RTG from the Olginsky section of the hydrographic service of the Pacific Fleet, which had an increased radiation background, was unloaded near the lighthouse near the lighthouse. As a result of being near the damaged RTG, V. Svyatets developed chronic radiation sickness, but this diagnosis of civilian doctors is disputed by the leadership and doctors of the Pacific Fleet [Selezneva, 2003, p. eighteen; Izyurov, 2003].

RTG incidents in Russia and the CIS
1978	Pulkovo Airport, Leningrad	The case of transporting a spent RTG without a transport container [Dovgusha, 200].
1983 March	Cape Nutevgi, Chukotka	On the way to the installation site, the RTG got into a transport accident and was badly damaged. The fact of the accident, hidden by the personnel, was discovered by a commission with the participation of specialists from Gosatomnadzor in 1997.
1987	Cape Low, Sakhalin region.	During transportation, the helicopter dropped a RTG of the IEU-1 type weighing 2.5 tons into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk.
1997	Tajikistan, Dushanbe	An increased gamma background was registered on the territory of Tajikhydromet. Three expired RTGs were stored at the company's coal depot in the center of Dushanbe (because there were problems with sending RTGs to VNIITFA) and were dismantled by unknown persons [Radiatsiya v tsentr..., 2002].
1997 August	Cape Maria, Sakhalin region	A repetition of the events of a decade ago: during transportation, the helicopter dropped an IEU-1 type RTG into the sea. The RTG, which belonged to the Ministry of Defense, remains at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk at a depth of 25-30 m. The RTG was found as a result of an expedition in autumn 2004;
1998 July	Korsakov port, Sakhalin region	A disassembled RTG was found at a scrap metal collection point. The stolen RTG belonged to the Russian Defense Ministry.
1999	Leningrad region.	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found at a bus stop in Kingisepp. Taken to the LSK "Radon".
2000	Cape Malaya Baranikha, Chukotka	Access to the RTG located near the village is not restricted. In 2000, it was found that the radiation background of the source exceeds the natural one by several times. Due to lack of funds was not evacuated.
May 2001	Kandalaksha Bay, Murmansk region	3 radioisotope sources were stolen from lighthouses on the island. All three sources were discovered and sent to Moscow by VNIITFA specialists.
February 2002	Western Georgia	Residents of the village of Liya, Tsalenjikha district, received high doses of radiation after finding RTGs in the forest. Shortly after the incident, the IAEA commission working in Georgia established that a total of 8 generators were brought to Georgia from the Baltiets plant in Soviet times.
March 2003	Cape Pikhlisaar, near the village of Kurgolovo, Leningrad Region.	The RTG was looted by non-ferrous metal hunters. A radioactive element (background near - 1000 R/h) was found 200 m from the lighthouse, in the water of the Baltic Sea. Extracted by specialists of LSK "Radon".
2003, Aug. Sept	Chaunsky district, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	The inspection did not find Beta-M type RTG No. 57 at the Kuvekvyn checkpoint, and there were official suggestions that the RTG might have been washed into the sand as a result of a strong storm or stolen by unknown persons [Account Report-2, 2003].
2003, September	Golets Island, White Sea	The personnel of the Northern Fleet discovered the theft of the metal of the biological protection of the RTG on Golets Island. The door to the lighthouse was also broken into. This beacon contained one of the most powerful RTGs with six RIT-90 elements that were not stolen > 10 ;. The radiation on the RTG surface was 100 R/h.
November 2003	Kola Bay, Olenya Bay and South Goryachinsky Island	Two RTGs belonging to the Northern Fleet were looted by hunters for non-ferrous metals, and their RIT-90 elements were found nearby
2004, March	Lazovsky district of Primorsky Krai, near the village. Valentine	A RTG belonging to the Pacific Fleet was found dismantled, apparently by hunters for non-ferrous metals. RHS-90 was found nearby [Yurchenko, 2004].
July 2004	Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Territory	Three RTGs were found on the territory of military unit 40919. According to the commander of the unit, these RTGs were left over from another military unit previously stationed at this site. According to the Krasnoyarsk inspection department of Gosatomnadzor, the dose rate at a distance of about 1 m from the RTG body is 155 times higher than the natural background. Instead of solving this problem within the Ministry of Defense, the military unit in which the RTGs were found sent a letter to Kvant LLC in Krasnoyarsk, which is engaged in the installation and commissioning of radiation equipment, with a request to take the RTGs to their burial [Information about the facts ..., 2004].
July, 2004	Cape Navarin, Beringovsky District, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	A re-examination of the emergency RTG type IEU-1 revealed that strontium-90 began to escape from the RTG into the environment as a result of "unknown thermophysical processes." This refutes the thesis supported by VNIITFA for a long time about the invulnerability of capsules with strontium. The technical state of the RTG and the dynamics of the development of thermophysical processes in the RTG does not exclude its complete destruction. The level of gamma radiation reaches 87 R/h.
September, 2004	Bunge Land Island, New Siberian Islands, Yakutia	Carried out the transportation of two RTGs of the Efir-MA type No. 04, 05, issue. 1982, owned by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Hydrographic Enterprise” of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, an MI-8 mt helicopter made an emergency drop of cargo from a height of 50 m onto the sandy surface of the tundra of Bunge Island. According to the Federal Sanitary Service, as a result of the impact on the ground, the integrity of the external radiation protection of the RTG cases was violated; at a height of 10 m above the RTG impact site, the gamma radiation dose rate is 4 mSv/h [Information about violations…, 2004]. The cause of the incident was the violation by the Hydrographic Enterprise of the conditions for transporting RTGs (they were transported without transport packaging containers, which are required by IAEA standards). The rise of RTGs is expected in the summer of 2005.

7. The threat of terrorism
A US Congressional program since 1991 known as the CTR, Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar Program, views RTGs as a threat to the spread of radioactive materials that could be used to build a "dirty bomb".

The program website notes that the Russian government does not have sufficient data on the location of all RTGs. The goal of the program is to find them and free them from hazardous material. 11 .

On March 12, 2003, at the IAEA conference "Safety of Radioactive Sources", Minister for Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev acknowledged the existence of the problem. The facts complicating the situation, according to Rumyantsev, “include the activation of various terrorist groups in the world, and the disintegration of the former Soviet space, which led to the loss of control over the sources, and sometimes simply to the loss of the sources themselves. An example of this is the cases of unauthorized opening of RTGs by local residents in Kazakhstan and Georgia in order to use the non-ferrous metals contained in them. And the dose received as a result of such actions for some of them turned out to be extremely high.

Rumyantsev acknowledged that "after the collapse of the USSR, the once integral state system of control over the location and movement of radioactive, nuclear materials was re-created in separate independent states, which gave rise to an unprecedented surge of hitherto uncharacteristic crimes related, in particular, to radioactive sources" .

According to the IAEA, “High-risk radioactive sources that are not under reliable and regulated control, including so-called “orphan” sources, pose serious security and safety issues. Therefore, under the auspices of the IAEA, an international initiative should be carried out to promote the location, return and security of such radioactive sources throughout the world” [International Conference…].

8. RTG disposal programs
Since the RTGs used in the navigation equipment of the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet have reached their end of life and pose a potential threat of radioactive contamination of the environment, the administration of the Norwegian province of Finnmark is financing work on their disposal and partial replacement with solar panels. Civilian RTGs are not included in this project.
There are a number of agreements about this between the administration of Finnmark and the government of the Murmansk region. When dismantled, the RTGs of the Northern Fleet are transported to Murmansk for temporary storage at the Atomflot RTP, then they go to the Izotop Military District in Moscow, from there to VNIITFA, where they are dismantled in a special chamber, after which the RIT-90 is sent for disposal at the Mayak Production Association .
At the first stage of the program, 5 RTGs were replaced with Western-made solar cells. In 1998, the first to replace the RTG on the lighthouse on about. Bolshoy Ainov in the Kandalaksha Reserve, this work cost $35,400 [International cooperation, 2000]. According to the 1998 agreement, it was planned to replace 4 more RTGs (two were replaced in 1999, one in 2000 and one more in 2002 at the Laush navigation sign on the Rybachy Peninsula).
In 2001, 15 RTGs were disposed of (12 in the usual way, as well as three RTGs dismantled by non-ferrous metal hunters in the Kandalaksha region). In June 2002, an agreement was signed for the disposal of another 10 RTGs, and another $200,000 was allocated for this purpose.
In August 2002, Bellona, together with experts from the US Congress, inspected a Norwegian solar-powered lighthouse near the Russian border. Bellona announced the need to replace Russian radioactive beacons.
On April 8, 2003, the governors of Finnmark and the Murmansk region signed two contracts: for the disposal of spent RTGs and for testing Russian solar panels. A new stage of RTG disposal, undertaken in 2004, costs about $600,000. As of September 2004, 45 RTGs had been decommissioned under the joint project, while it was planned to decommission 60 RTGs by the end of 2004, 34 of which would be equipped with solar panels. 12 . As of September 2004, the Norwegian province of Finnmark has already invested about $3.5 million in this project, but how much this program will cost in the future depends largely on the efforts made by other potential donor countries 13 .
The cost of the project to replace RTGs with solar panels is $36,000, but these panels are Russian-made and cheaper than their Western counterparts [Bolychev, 2003]. The cost of each panel is about 1 million rubles. The solar battery is designed in such a way that it will accumulate electricity during the daytime, and give it away during the dark. The Krasnodar Saturn plant, owned by Rosaviakosmos, is participating in the work. Batteries were tested at one of the Murmansk lighthouses and at the lighthouse in Finnmark.

In August 2004, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) completed its independent report on the disposal of Russian RTGs.

At the next Russian-Norwegian meeting in February 2005, it was decided to finance the disposal of the remaining 110 lighthouses (about 150 RHS, since some RTGs have several RHSs) of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions until 2009, replacing them with solar cells. The cost of the program is estimated at about $3.5 million.

US efforts
After September 11, 2001, the US recognized the danger of RTGs, which could be used by terrorists to create a "dirty bomb".
In September 2003, Minatom signed terms of reference with the US Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposal of a number of RTGs 14 . According to the agreement, up to 100 RTGs per year will be disposed of at Mayak.
According to the existing procedure, during disposal, the RTG body is disassembled in a special VNIITFA chamber. The RIT-90 contained inside can be used for energy purposes or converted into radioactive waste and sent for disposal in a special container in Chelyabinsk to the Mayak plant, where it undergoes vitrification.
Meanwhile, from 2000 to 2003, VNIITFA disposed of only about 100 decommissioned RTGs of various types. 15 . In 2004, a total of 69 RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation were removed from various municipal territories across Russia for disposal. In 2005, it is planned to dispose of about 50 more RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. Rosatom plans to dispose of all RTGs (of both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defense) by 2012.
The Department of Energy budget for a program to monitor radiological dispersal devices that can be created using material contained in RTGs was $36 million in FY2004, and a request for FY2005 was $25 million 16 .
Dismantlement of RTGs of the Ministry of Transport of Russia started only in August 2004, within the framework of the DOE program. However, already after the start of the program, in November 2004, Deputy General Director of the Hydrographic Enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation Yevgeny Klyuev told Bellona that “there is no policy for the disposal of RTGs, only RTGs in the worst condition are disposed of.”

In negotiations with American and German partners, Minatom also provides for the option of storing the contents of RTGs in the regional Radon test sites. In particular, a plan is being discussed to create a long-term modern storage facility for RTGs in the Siberian region, presumably on the territory of one or more Radon plants, in order to exclude their transportation to Moscow and back through Siberia to the Mayak Production Association. 17 . Meanwhile, the Radon plants are designed to handle only medium and low radioactive waste, while RTGs are classified as high-level waste. In March 2005, Rosatom announced that DOE had promised to consider Russia's assistance in the construction at the DalRAO enterprise (near the nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk in Kamchatka) of a point for dismantling RTGs (to prevent their shipment to Moscow; burial is supposed to be carried out at "Mayak"). Meanwhile, with American assistance, DalRAO has already begun construction of an intermediate storage facility for RTGs in the Far East region [Antipov, 2005].
The estimated cost of removing one RTG from its location and the disposal procedure is 4 million rubles (about $120,000, which is approximately equal to the cost of a new RTG) [Yakutia, 2003]. According to VNIITFA, the cost of disposal for RTGs in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug is 1 million rubles (about $30,000) [Kuzelev, 2003, p. 33].

9. Notes and sources

Notes:
1. Information provided at the request of the author by the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation was used.
2. A.Agapov’s statements are given in response to the author’s question at a conference at the GROTs of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg on September 1, 2003.
3. Information provided at the request of the author by the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation.
4. A.Agapov's statements are given in response to the author's question at a conference at the GROTs of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg on September 1, 2003.
5. These data were confirmed at the request of the author by the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation.
6. Information provided at the request of the author by the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation was used.
7 Cape Pihlisaar: 59°47'N 28°10'E.
8. Interview of the author with the director of LSK "Radon" Alexander Ignatov.
9. Also see the message of the Gosatomnadzor website of the Russian Federation, http://www.gan.ru/mto/dvmto/stat2.htm.
10. Correspondence between Bellona and Ingar Amudsen of the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, September 23, 2004.
11. The Soviet Union manufactured RTGs to supply power at remote sites. These generators pose a proliferation threat and are spread all over the states of the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Union produced hundreds of small nuclear generators, known as Radioisotope Thermal Generators (RTGs), to supply power at remote sites. These RTG's are considered very dangerous because they hold nuclear material that might be used in a dirty bomb. The Russian government does not have an accurate accounting as to where all the generators are located. We must find these units, secure them and remove the dangerous materials (http://web.archive.org/web/20030423022347/http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar.htm).
12. Correspondence between Bellona and Ingar Amudsen of the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, September 23, 2004.
13. Ibid.
14. A.Agapov's statements are given in response to the author's question at a conference at the GROTs of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg on September 1, 2003.
15. Information provided at the request of the author by the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automation.
16. Information about the DOE budget was provided by William Hoehn III, director of the Washington office of the Russian American Nuclear Security Council, in correspondence with Bellona on September 17, 2004.
17. Answer of Vladimir Prilepskikh, Head of the Siberian Interregional District of the Federal Supervision of the Russian Federation for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, and his Deputy Sergey Chernov to the author's question about the situation with RTGs in the District, September 17, 2004.

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