Payments to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Deliveries to the USSR

Literally "loan-lease") - a system for the transfer by the United States on loan or on lease of weapons, military and other materials necessary for warfare to allied countries during the Second World War. Convinced by the experience of the First World War that the supply of military materials to the Allies on the basis of a loan does not provide a sufficiently profitable compensation, the United States during the Second World War decided to introduce another system, the idea of ​​which belonged to President F. Roosevelt (see) and which, according to him, was not supposed to be a "debit and credit system", but a system of mutual military supply. In January 1941, Roosevelt came up with a proposal to create a system of L., and, despite the opposition of the isolationists, the US Congress on March 11, 1941, by an overwhelming majority of votes, passed the L. Law. . The L. Act gave the president the authority to sell, transfer, trade, rent, loan, or otherwise, military material or military information to the government of any country whose defense the president deemed essential to the security of the United States. The term of office of the President of the United States for the supply of materials and services was initially determined until June 30, 1943, then annually extended, with the last term set until June 30, 1946. However, already on August 21, 1945, the US government announced the termination of supplies for L. In fact they were discontinued in September 1945 to all countries, with the exception of the Kuomintang government of China, supplies to which continued in the future, being one of the most important means of American intervention in China. After the adoption of the law on L., the US government concluded with the countries that received aid on L., "basic agreements on lend-lease" and "agreements on mutual assistance." The amount of Lend-Lease deliveries in 1941-45, on average, amounted to only 15% of the total amount of US military spending and over 50% of US exports. The agreements concluded by the United States with certain countries that received Lend-Lease materials established the following basic principles for settling accounts for L.: 1. Materials destroyed, lost, and consumed during the war are not subject to any payment. 2. Materials remaining after the end of the war and suitable for civilian needs are paid in whole or in part in the form of a long-term loan. 3. Military materials remain in the countries that received them, but the US government reserves the right to reclaim these materials. At the same time, the US government says it will generally not exercise this right. 4. Equipment not completed by the end of the war and lend-lease materials in the warehouses of US government agencies can be purchased by the countries for which they are ordered, with the US government providing long-term credit to pay for such materials and equipment. According to the agreement between the United States and England of December 6, 1945 on the settlement of relations arising from L. , England undertook to pay $532 million for Lend-Lease materials and surplus property belonging to the United States left after the war, as well as for US installations on the territory of the United Kingdom. In addition, Britain pledged to pay $118 million as the difference between the value of mutual deliveries of goods and services provided by the US and British governments through the Latvian system after the victory over Japan. The total amount of 650 million dollars is to be paid by England within 50 years, starting from December 31, 1951, in equal installments annually, with interest accruing from 1951 at a rate of 2% per annum. The importance of the assistance provided during the war in L. should not be exaggerated. In particular, the Soviet Army, which played a decisive role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, received from Soviet industry an immeasurably greater number of tanks, aircraft, guns and other types of weapons than from the United States along the Line. production at the socialist enterprises of the USSR during the period of the war economy amounted to only about 4%. The enormous material losses suffered by the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and its allies, were in no way compensated for by the help received from the United States in the Leningrad region. It is characteristic that the USSR received several times less supplies in the Leningrad region than The British Empire, although the role of the latter in the war could not be compared with the role of the Soviet Union. Although Roosevelt declared that the only important benefit that the United States would receive from deliveries along the L. was assistance in the speedy defeat of Germany and Japan, in fact L. facilitated the US economic penetration into the countries of Europe and Asia. L. to a large extent contributed to the expansion of US production during the war years by increasing government military orders for the supply of weapons to the allies. Therefore, the L. system strengthened the expansionist tendencies in the USA, since American goods did not find sufficient domestic markets after the war because of the decline in the standard of living of the broad masses of the US population. Both during the war and especially after its end, significant deviations from the goals for which it was formally introduced took place in the L. system. Even during the war years, the United States delivered deliveries through Latvia to countries that not only were not part of the anti-Hitler coalition, but, on the contrary, supported Germany (for example, Turkey). After World War II, the US government used L. for openly reactionary purposes, by continuing to supply weapons and other materials to the government of Chiang Kai-shek to fight against the democratic forces of China. In relation to England, France, and other capitalist countries, L. contributed to their economic and even political subordination to the United States, which manifested itself both in the settlement of settlements on L., and especially in the course of the implementation of the "Marshall Plan" by the USA. On October 15, 1945, the Soviet Union and the United States entered into an agreement on the supply of equipment, in the form of a long-term credit to the Soviet Union by the United States, which was available or ordered for L., but not delivered by that time, for a total amount of 244 million dollars. In December 1946 The United States unilaterally stopped supplying equipment to the USSR under this agreement, thus violating its obligations.

Lendliz (English "lend" - to lend, "lease" - to lease) - a program of assistance to the Soviet Union from the United States of America, Canada and England during the Great Patriotic War. Lendlis acted not only within the framework of the USA, England, Canada - the USSR, but also in the direction of the USA - England, the USA - France, the USA - Greece, however, assistance in the last three cases is a trifle compared to the volume of supplies of military equipment, food, fuel and many other things carried out by the allied powers to the Soviet Union.

The history of lend-lease for the USSR

Already on August 30, 1941, British Prime Minister W. Churchill wrote to his cabinet minister, Lord Beaverbrook:
“I want you to go to Moscow with Harriman to arrange long-term supplies for the Russian armies. This can be done almost exclusively with American resources, although we have rubber, boots, etc. A large new order must be placed in the United States. The pace of deliveries, of course, is limited by ports and the lack of ships. When the second narrow-gauge railway from Basra to the Caspian Sea is laid in the spring, this road will become an important transportation route. Our duty and our interests require the provision of all possible assistance to the Russians, even at the cost of serious sacrifices on our part..

On the same day Churchill wrote to Stalin
“I tried to find some way to help your country in its magnificent resistance until the implementation of longer-term measures, about which we are negotiating with the United States of America and which will serve as the subject of the Moscow Conference”

The Moscow Treaty on the supply of the USSR was signed on October 1, 1941. Then three more treaties were concluded: Washington, London and Ottawa

Stalin's letter to Churchill September 3, 1941:
“I am grateful for the promise, in addition to the previously promised 200 fighter aircraft, to sell another 200 fighter aircraft to the Soviet Union ... However, I must say that these aircraft, which, apparently, can not be put into action soon and not immediately, but in different time and by individual groups, they will not be able to make serious changes on the eastern front ... I think that there is only one way out of this situation: to create a second front somewhere in the Balkans or in France this year, which could pull 30 from the eastern front - 40 German divisions, and at the same time provide the Soviet Union with 30 thousand tons of aluminum by the beginning of October this year. and monthly minimum assistance in the amount of 400 aircraft and 500 tanks (small or medium)»

Churchill to Stalin September 6, 1941.
“…3. On the issue of supply. We…will do our best to help you. I am telegraphing President Roosevelt ... and we will try to inform you before the Moscow conference of the number of aircraft and tanks that we jointly promise to send you monthly along with rubber, aluminum, cloth and other supplies. For our part, we are ready to send you half of the monthly number of aircraft and tanks that you ask for from British production ... We will make every effort to start sending supplies to you immediately.
4. We have already given orders to supply the Persian railway with rolling stock in order to raise its current capacity from two trains each way per day ... to 12 trains each way per day. This will be achieved by the spring of 1942. Steam locomotives and wagons from England will be sent around the Cape of Good Hope after they have been converted to fuel oil. A water supply system will be developed along the railway. The first 48 locomotives and 400 wagons are about to be sent ... "

Lend-Lease supply routes

• Soviet Arctic
• Arctic convoys
• Far East
• Black Sea

Most of the goods under the lend-lease program (46%) were transported from Alaska through the Soviet Far East

Stalin - Churchill September 13, 1941
“... I am grateful for the promise of monthly assistance from England in aluminum, aircraft and tanks.
I can only welcome that the British Government is thinking of providing this assistance not through the sale and purchase of aircraft, aluminum and tanks, but through comradely cooperation…”

The Lend-Lease Act was signed into law by US President Roosevelt on March 11, 1941. It was extended to the Soviet Union on October 28, 1941. According to this law, the countries that received aid under the Lend-Lease program neither during the war nor after did not pay for this aid and should not have to pay. It was necessary to pay only for what remained intact after the war and could be used

Lend-lease deliveries to the USSR

• 22150 aircraft
• 12700 tanks
• 13,000 guns
• 35000 motorcycles
• 427,000 trucks
• 2000 locomotives
• 281 military ship
• 128 transport ships
• 11000 wagons
• 2.1 million tons of oil products
• 4.5 million tons of food
• 15 million pairs of shoes
• 44600 metal cutting machines
• 263,000 tons of aluminum
• 387,000 tons of copper
• 1.2 million tons of chemicals and explosives
• 35,800 radio stations
• 5899 receivers
• 348 locators
  Historians are still arguing about the benefits of the Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR. The value of aid is rated from unprincipled to essential

Britain owed the US at the end of the war $4.33 billion. Fully repaid in 2006. France paid off America in 1946. The USSR refused to repay the debt of 2.6 billion dollars. Negotiations on this matter have been conducted with varying success up to the present time, as Wikipedia says, partly Russia still paid off the debt. And finally it must pay off with the United States in 2030

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Importance of supplies

Your decision, Mr. President, to provide the Soviet Union with an interest-free loan in the amount of $ 1,000,000,000 to ensure the supply of military equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union was accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude, as vital assistance to the Soviet Union in its huge and difficult struggle against a common enemy - bloody Hitlerism.

original text(English)

Your decision, Mr. President, to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan to the value of $1,000,000,000 to meet deliveries of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendously and onerous struggle against our common enemy bloody Hitlerism.

The first official historical assessment of the role of lend-lease was given by Gosplan Chairman Nikolai Voznesensky in his book "The Military Economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War", published in 1948:

... if we compare the size of the deliveries of industrial goods to the USSR by the allies with the size of industrial production at the socialist enterprises of the USSR for the same period, it turns out that the share of these deliveries in relation to domestic production during the period of the war economy will be only about 4%.

The 4% figure was published without further comment and raised many questions. In particular, it was not clear how Voznesensky and his staff calculated these percentages. Estimating Soviet GDP in monetary terms was difficult due to the lack of convertibility of the ruble. If the bill went to units of production, then it is not clear how tanks were compared with aircraft, and food - with aluminum.

Voznesensky himself was soon arrested in the Leningrad case and shot in 1950, so he could not comment. Nevertheless, the figure of 4% was subsequently widely quoted in the USSR as reflecting the official point of view on the significance of Lend-Lease.

He highly appreciated the role of lend-lease and A. I. Mikoyan, who during the war was responsible for the work of seven allied people's commissariats (trade, procurement, food, fish and meat and dairy industries, maritime transport and the river fleet) and, as the people's commissar for foreign trade of the country, with 1942, who led the reception of allied Lend-Lease supplies:

- ... when we began to receive American stew, combined fat, egg powder, flour, and other products, what significant additional calories our soldiers immediately received! And not only the soldiers: something also fell to the rear.

Or take car deliveries. After all, we received, as far as I remember, taking into account the losses along the way, about 400,000 first-class cars of the Studebaker, Ford, Jeeps and amphibians type for that time. Our entire army actually turned out to be on wheels and what wheels! As a result, its maneuverability increased and the pace of the offensive increased noticeably.

Yes…” Mikoyan drawled thoughtfully. - Without lend-lease, we would probably have fought for another year and a half extra.

The lend-lease program was mutually beneficial both for the USSR (and other recipient countries) and for the United States. In particular, the United States won the necessary time to mobilize its own military-industrial complex.

materials	USSR production	lend-lease	Lend-Lease / Production of the USSR, in%
Explosives, thousand tons	558	295,6	53 %
Copper, thousand tons	534	404	76 %
Aluminum, thousand tons	283	301	106 %
Tin, thousand tons	13	29	223 %
Cobalt, tons	340	470	138 %
Aviation gasoline, thousand tons	4700 (according to V.B. Sokolov - 5.5 million tons)	1087	23 %
Car tires, million pieces	3988	3659	92 %
Wool, thousand tons	96	98	102 %
Sugar, thousand tons	995	658	66 %
Canned meat, million cans	432,5	2077	480 %
Animal fats, thousand tons	565	602	107 %

Lend-Lease debts and their payment

Immediately after the war, the United States sent a proposal to the countries receiving lend-lease assistance to return the surviving military equipment and pay off the debt in order to obtain new loans. Since the Lend-Lease law provided for the write-off of used military equipment and materials, the Americans insisted on paying only for civilian supplies: rail transport, power plants, steamships, trucks and other equipment that was in the recipient countries as of September 2, 1945. The United States did not demand compensation for the military equipment destroyed during the battles.

United Kingdom

The volume of UK debt to the US amounted to $4.33 billion, to Canada - $1.19 billion. The last payment in the amount of $83.25 million (in favor of the USA) and $22.7 million (Canada) was made on December 29.

China

China's debt to the United States for lend-lease deliveries amounted to $187 million. Since 1979, the United States has recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, and therefore the heir to all previous agreements (including lend-lease deliveries). Nevertheless, in 1989, the US demanded that Taiwan (not the PRC) repay its Lend-Lease debt. The further fate of Chinese debt is not clear.

USSR (Russia)

The volume of American lend-lease deliveries amounted to about 11 billion US dollars. According to the law on lend-lease, only the equipment that survived during the war was subject to payment; to agree on the final amount, immediately after the end of the war, Soviet-American negotiations began. At the 1948 negotiations, the Soviet representatives agreed to pay only a small amount and were met with a predictable refusal from the American side. The 1949 negotiations also came to nothing. In 1951, the Americans twice reduced the amount of the payment, which became equal to $800 million, but the Soviet side agreed to pay only $300 million. According to the Soviet government, the calculation should have been carried out not in accordance with the real debt, but on the basis of a precedent. This precedent was to be the proportions in determining the debt between the United States and Great Britain, which were fixed as early as March 1946.

An agreement with the USSR on the procedure for repaying lend-lease debts was concluded only in 1972. Under this agreement, the USSR undertook to pay $722 million by 2001, including interest. By July 1973, three payments were made for a total of $48 million, after which the payments were stopped due to the introduction by the American side of discriminatory measures in trade with the USSR (Jackson-Vanik Amendment). In June 1990, during the talks between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing the debt. A new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030, and the amount - $674 million.

Thus, out of the total volume of US lend-lease deliveries of $11 billion, the USSR, and then Russia, paid $722 million, or about 7%.

However, it should be noted that, taking into account the inflationary depreciation of the dollar, this figure will be significantly (many times) less. So, by 1972, when the amount of debt for lend-lease in the amount of $722 million was agreed with the United States, the dollar had depreciated 2.3 times since 1945. However, in 1972, only $48 million was paid to the USSR, and an agreement to pay the remaining $674 million was reached in June 1990, when the purchasing power of the dollar was already 7.7 times lower than at the end of 1945. Given the payment of $674 million in 1990, the total amount of Soviet payments in 1945 prices amounted to about 110 million US dollars, i.e. about 1% of the total cost of lend-lease supplies. But most of what was delivered was either destroyed by the war, or, like shells, was spent on the needs of the war, or, at the end of the war, in accordance with the lend-lease law, returned to the United States.

France

On May 28, 1946, France signed a package of agreements with the United States (the so-called Blum-Byrnes accords) that settled the French debt for Lend-Lease supplies in exchange for a number of trade concessions from France. In particular, France has significantly increased the quotas for showing foreign (primarily American) films on the French film market.

Notes

1. Using the USSR as an example, Lend-Lease received materials worth $11.3 billion, of which less than 1% was paid. The remaining 99% were actually received free of charge - for more details, see the section Lend-Lease Debts and Their Payment
2. Mutual Aid Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: June 11, 1942
3. For example, by denying the USSR the supply of such scarce raw materials as duralumin and tungsten, the United States supplied them to the Third Reich.
4. The recalculation was made on the basis of official data on inflation in the United States for 1913-2008 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (USA)
5. "The Big "L"--American Logistics in World War II", Alan Gropman, 1997, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC
6. Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
7. “The USSR has repeatedly recognized the enormous importance of the equipment and materials necessary for the conduct of hostilities that came from the United States with the participation of England to the Soviet Union. But in 1942, the agreed plans for these deliveries were only 55 percent fulfilled. In the most difficult time of preparation for the Kursk operation (in Washington and London they knew about this work), deliveries were interrupted for 9 months and resumed only in September 1943. Such a long break is not a technical issue, but a political one!” (O. B. Rakhmanin,). See also .
8. Vishnevsky A. G. Sickle and ruble. Conservative modernization in the USSR. Moscow, 1998, ch. ten
9. The First Lend-Lease Protocol was signed between the USSR and the USA, in the amount of $ 1 billion, valid until 06/30/1942.
10. The Reichstag speech of December 11, 1941: Hitler's declaration of war against the United States
11. http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/K/KUMANEV_Georgiy_Aleksandrovich/Govoryat_stalinskie_narkomy.(2005).%5Bdoc%5D.zip
12. Paperno A.L. Lend-Lease. Pacific Ocean. M., 1998. S. 10
13. Zaostrovtsev G. A. "Northern Convoys: Research, memories, documents", Arkhangelsk 1991. part 27
14. V. Zimonin "Lend-Lease: how it was", 10/26/2006, the newspaper "Red Star"
15. Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
16. Correspondence of Roosevelt and Truman with Stalin on Lend Lease and Other Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945
17. Voznesensky N. Military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. - M.: Gospolitizdat, 1948
18. Artem Krechetnikov, "Garden Hose" by Franklin Roosevelt, June 29, 2007, BBCRussian.com
19. From the report of the chairman of the KGB V. Semichastny - N. S. Khrushchev; stamp "top secret" // Zenkovich N. Ya. Marshals and general secretaries. M., 1997. S. 161-162
20. G. Kumanev "Stalin's people's commissars are talking", p. 70 - Smolensk: Rusich, 2005
21. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
22. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
23. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
24. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
25. Federal Agency for State Reserves, "Reserves during the Great Patriotic War"
26. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
27. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
28. V. Gakov "The Green Price of Victory", "Money" Magazine No. 23, 06/2002

phrase lend-lease comes from the English words: lend- to lend and lease- to rent. The article offered to readers by P. S. Petrov, Ph.D. attitude towards the Soviet ally during the last war.

According to the established opinion, when supplying the parties to the war against Germany, the United States of America was guided primarily by its own interests - to protect itself through the hands of others and to preserve its own forces as much as possible. At the same time, the US monopoly bourgeoisie pursued certain economic goals, bearing in mind that lend-lease supplies would contribute to a significant expansion of production and its enrichment through government orders.

The Lend-Lease Act (officially called the United States Defense Assistance Act) was passed by the US Congress on March 8, 1941. Initially, it extended to Great Britain and a number of other countries against which Germany fought.

According to this act, the head of state received the authority to transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise supply military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food, provide various goods and services, as well as information to the government of any country, “defense which the President deems vital to the defense of the United States."

The states that received Lend-Lease assistance signed agreements with the US government. According to them, delivered cars, various military equipment, weapons, other items destroyed, lost or consumed during the war, were not subject to payment after its end. The remaining goods and materials after the war, which could be used for civilian consumption, were supposed to be paid in full or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by America. And the United States could demand that military materials be returned back, although, as A.A. Gromyko, who was the USSR ambassador to the United States in 1943-1946, the American government has repeatedly stated that it will not exercise this right.

It is important to note that the countries that entered into agreements with the United States, in turn, assumed obligations to “contribute to the defense of the United States” and provide them with assistance with the materials that they had, provide various services and information. The United States thus received a counter, or reverse, lend-lease: machine tools, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, equipment for military factories, as well as various services, military information, strategic raw materials, precious metals, etc.

By supplying military equipment and materials to the countries fighting against Germany, the United States primarily pursued its own selfish interests. This is evidenced by many American authors, because the government provided lend-lease as an alternative to war. For example, R. Dawson wrote that in the US Congress and the country at the end of October 1941 there was a firm conviction, despite neutralist, isolationist and even anti-Soviet sentiments, that “dollars, even transferred to Soviet Russia, were a much more favorable contribution than sending American Army". On the other hand, the supply of goods contributed to the expansion of production and the receipt of large profits. Thus, the prudence underlying Lend-Lease was a characteristic feature of all types of assistance and US policy in the war, which was especially clearly manifested in relations with the USSR.

The US government, which declared after the attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 by fascist Germany and its satellites that it intended to help him, nevertheless, before doing this, it cleared up for itself for a number of months what "Russia's ability to resist" was, and then has already made its position.

The US proceeded from what danger Germany posed to them first of all and whether the UK and the US would be able to continue to rule the world or whether Germany and Japan would take their place. They understood that the victory of Germany in the war against the USSR would turn out to be "a catastrophe of the highest importance for England and America", because in the event of establishing control over all of Europe and Asia, the Third Reich "would threaten the United States from both sides". At the same time, they were also worried about the following question: “Suppose that we provide assistance to Russia and she defeats Hitler, who will dominate Europe ..?” .

Only having calculated all the pros and cons, the American leadership decided to provide assistance to the USSR. A week after the outbreak of hostilities on the eastern front, a special committee was created at the US State Department from representatives of various services, which prepared a small list of goods, including military ones, for export to the USSR. The Soviet side was able to purchase materials for cash. However, red tape and bureaucratic obstacles immediately got in the way of this undertaking, because various departments, sending applications from the USSR to each other, argued for a long time about how to get Russian gold.

US Secretary of State Harry Hopkins meeting with Stalin, summer 1941

At the same time, the United States, recognizing that the Russians are also defending America, considered it necessary to assure our country of the desire to help, since they also took into account the need to have a friendly Russia behind Japanese lines. To this end, US leaders began to run into Moscow. The first to arrive was presidential aide Harry Hopkins, who clarified the situation in the USSR and his ability to stand against Hitler. Based on the analysis of the information he received, the president was convinced that "helping the Russians is money well spent."

In negotiations between Hopkins and Stalin in late July 1941, it was determined that the Red Army was in particular need of anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, rifles, high-octane aviation gasoline, and aluminum for aircraft production. The United States assessed these requests as insignificant, but they were in no hurry to satisfy them. “Nearly six weeks have passed since the start of the war with Russia, but we have done practically nothing to deliver the necessary materials to them,” Roosevelt wrote in one document. In addition, he believed that the aircraft intended for sale to the Soviet Union did not have to be the latest models, and the deliveries could be "symbolic".

Former US Secretary of the Interior G. Ickes wrote that only five were sent on the request for 3,000 bombers.

From June to August 1941, only 128 tons of materials purchased for cash were delivered to the USSR. It was the third month of the war, and the United States supplied us only with tools and industrial equipment purchased earlier. The situation has not changed even a few months later. As G. Ickes testifies, the American leadership sought to ensure that “the Russians hand over to us all their gold, which will be used to pay for the supply of goods until (it) is exhausted. From now on, we will apply the lend-lease law to Russia. In payment for supplies, the USSR also transferred to the United States strategic raw materials - manganese, chromium, asbestos, platinum, etc.

It must be assumed that England began real deliveries of military materials to the Soviet Union before the United States, because on September 6, 1941, W. Churchill announced the first limited deliveries of the USSR on terms similar to the American Lend-Lease.

On October 1, 1941, the first protocol on deliveries for a period of 9 months - until June 30, 1942 was signed in Moscow by the representative of the US President A. Harriman. The value of imported goods was $1 billion. For payment, an interest-free loan was provided, which was supposed to begin to be repaid 5 years after the end of the war - within 10 years. On November 7, 1941, that is, four and a half months after the German attack on the USSR, Roosevelt finally signed the document on the basis of the permission passed by Congress to extend the lend-lease law to the Soviet Union.

The first deliveries from the USA date back to October 1941. In that year, the USSR received $545,000 worth of various weapons and military materials, less than one-tenth of a percent of the total cost of American deliveries to other countries. In addition, the USSR purchased goods for cash in the amount of 41 million dollars. Until the end of 1941, the USA supplied the USSR with 204 aircraft instead of 600 provided for under the protocol, 182 tanks instead of 750. According to Harriman, the USA fulfilled only a quarter of their obligations under the first protocol. All this was done with the goal not so much to help the USSR as to keep Russia in a state of war, to keep the front at a considerable distance from American territory with the least human losses, and to minimize direct military material costs. During the fighting near Moscow at the end of 1941, American weapons were just beginning to arrive. The front was provided with Soviet-made weapons, the output of which, after the evacuation of the country's enterprises from west to east, began to steadily increase from the summer of 1942.

In February 1942, Roosevelt advanced a second billion dollars and wished to renegotiate the terms of the loan, and then wrote to Stalin about the planned use of American military forces. These issues were discussed in Washington during Molotov's visit to the United States in May 1942. A second protocol was prepared for one year, according to which it was originally planned to supply 8 million tons of materials. However, the president, referring to the need to ensure the promised, but not opened in 1942, second front, reduced the volume of deliveries to 2.5 million tons. distribution of the most favored nation regime to the Soviet Union and regulated issues related to supplies. The United States abandoned the formal requirement to pay for loans and transferred lend-lease for the USSR to the same lend-lease basis as for England.

I must say about the quality of American technology, its suitability for combat. Stalin, in correspondence with Roosevelt, noted that American tanks burn very easily from anti-tank rifles that hit from behind and from the side, because they run on high-grade gasoline. He also wrote that the Soviet side was ready to temporarily completely abandon the supply of tanks, artillery, ammunition, pistols and other things, but was in dire need of an increase in the supply of modern-type fighter aircraft, but not of the "Keetyhawk" aircraft, which could not withstand the fight against German fighters. The preference was given to the Airacobra fighters, but it turned out that they often fall into a tailspin, and this did not cause the Americans themselves to want to fly them and risk their lives. Marshal G.K. Zhukov also wrote that tanks and aircraft from the United States were not distinguished by high combat qualities.

In 1942, the USSR delivered: 2505 aircraft, 3023 tanks, 78,964 vehicles. 12% of the total amount of equipment sent was lost on the way to our country (this is how much it was sunk at sea, which stopped deliveries in spring and summer). In the same 1942, the Soviet Union produced 25,436 aircraft and 24,446 tanks.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad in February 1943, the contribution of the allies to which was insignificant, a radical turning point in the war occurred and the United States slightly increased the supply of military equipment.

In the spring of 1943, the United States and Britain decided to suspend the dispatch of cargo convoys to the Soviet northern ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, citing preparations for an operation against Italy, a landing on its territory. As a result, by the end of the second protocol, 1.5 million tons of cargo were not delivered. Only towards the end of November, after an eight-month break, did another convoy arrive via the northern route. Thus, in the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, military equipment was almost entirely of domestic production.

On July 1, 1943, the third protocol came into force. Canada joined in deliveries to the Soviet Union, Great Britain began to take a more active part in them. By this time, the needs of the USSR had changed somewhat. More vehicles, communications equipment, clothing, medical equipment, explosives and food were needed than tanks, guns, ammunition.

Aid to the Soviet Union, despite a delay in mid-1943, increased over the year as a whole to 63% compared to 1942.

As for the supply of foodstuffs, and some American authors, proving the decisive role of the United States in supplying the Soviet Army, emphasize this, then not everything was all right here either. According to Roosevelt's promise, in 1943, food supplies were to be 10% of the total number of products produced in the United States. In the first six months of the year, food supplies to the Soviet Union accounted for only one third. It follows that the USSR received a little more than 3% of the food that was produced in the USA. Could this have played an important role for such a large country as the USSR?

For 1941 -1944 Our country received from the USA, Canada and Great Britain 2 million 545 thousand tons of food under Lend-Lease. At the same time, since 1944, the Soviet Union had to feed both the western regions of the USSR, and the countries of Eastern Europe, liberated by the Soviet Army, robbed and devastated by the Nazis.

However, the Soviet Union appreciated the help of the allies, especially since since the summer of 1943, American military equipment and various equipment could be increasingly seen on the fronts of the Soviet Army. American military supplies were based on increased by that time production in the United States (by 35% compared with the average of 1935-1939). According to the third protocol, in 1944, well-known and much needed by the USSR trucks and other motor vehicles, various metals, machinery and equipment, fuels and lubricants, steam locomotives, rails, and wagons were supplied.

Lend-Lease. Dodge WF32.

At the beginning of 1944, negotiations began on the content of the fourth delivery protocol. Although Roosevelt considered the USSR the main factor in ensuring the defeat of fascism, in the United States, the forces that slowed down deliveries, advocated a revision of relations with the Soviet Union, gained increasing influence, as the crisis in the war with Germany was overcome. The congress feared that some of the delivered materials, machinery, equipment could be used by our country to restore the economy after the war.

On May 2, 1945, i.e., after the death of Roosevelt (in April), a group of people in the US administration, which included, in particular, Deputy Secretary of State J. Grew and Head of the Foreign Economic Administration L. Crowley, insisted on limiting and even ending deliveries to the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the fact that the anti-Soviet-minded G. Truman became the president of the country, reported this opinion to him. And on May 10, a decision was made to revise the policy towards the USSR, expressed in a memorandum. According to this document, lend-lease supplies were allowed only for military operations against Japan. Purchases of other materials were possible only for cash. Deliveries to the Soviet Union after the surrender of Japan in August 1945 were finally stopped.

"Such a policy of change was one of the many harbingers of a new period in Soviet-American relations". Therefore, it is obviously no coincidence that in the United States a number of studies related to the termination of lend-lease include the concept of "cold war".

Having interrupted Lend-Lease deliveries, the United States signed an agreement with the USSR in October 1945 on the sale of previously ordered goods on credit. But in January 1947, the American government stopped deliveries under this agreement.

Summing up the results of the assistance provided to our country by the United States, Great Britain and Canada, it should be noted that the share of their deliveries in relation to domestic production amounted to only about 4%. In total, during the war, 42 convoys arrived in Soviet ports, and 36 were sent from the USSR. According to American sources, which differ in indicators, for the period from October 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, 2660 ships were sent to the USSR with a total cargo volume of 16.5- 17.5 million tons, of which 15.2-16.6 million tons were delivered to the destination (77 ships with 1.3 million tons of cargo were lost at sea). In value terms, deliveries to the Soviet Union, transport costs and services amounted to 10.8-11.0 billion dollars, that is, no more than 24% of the total number of dollars spent by the United States on lend-lease assistance to all countries (more than 46 billion) . This amount is equal to approximately 13% of all US military spending, of which only 3.3% accounted for aid to the eastern front. During the war, the USSR received: 401.4 thousand vehicles and 2 million 599 thousand tons of oil products, 9.6 thousand guns (that is, about 2% of the production of this type of weapon in our country in the amount of 489.9 thousand artillery guns), 14-14.5 thousand aircraft (taking into account losses during transportation - about 10% of the total, equal to 136.8 thousand aircraft produced by the Soviet industry), tanks and self-propelled guns - 12.2 thousand, or 12% (according to other sources, 7 thousand, or 6.8%), against 102.5 thousand Soviet-made tanks and self-propelled guns, 422 thousand field telephones, over 15 million pairs of shoes, about 69 million m2 of woolen fabrics, 1860 steam locomotives (6.3% of the total number of the USSR steam locomotive fleet), 4.3 million tons of food, which accounted for approximately 25% of the total supply tonnage.

“Our supplies,” acknowledges the head of the military mission, General Dean, “may not have won the war, but they should have supported the Russians.”

After the end of World War II, negotiations began between the USSR and the United States to settle Lend-Lease settlements, as the American government continued to seek maximum benefits in the form of payments or reimbursement of goods in kind. The administration initially valued its claims at $2.6 billion, but the following year lowered the amount to $1.3 billion. These claims showed discrimination against the Soviet Union, for, for example, Great Britain, which received twice as much assistance, had to pay only 472 million dollars, i.e., about 2% of the cost of military supplies.

Finally, on October 18, 1972, an agreement was reached to settle the Lend-Lease issue. The Soviet Union had to pay 722 million dollars on condition that the American side granted it the most favored nation treatment in trade with the United States, as well as export credits and guarantees. However, due to the unacceptable position for the USSR, which was then taken by the United States in accordance with the agreements reached, the implementation of the agreement remains incomplete.

I must say that the United States greatly enriched itself in the war. By the end of the war, their national income was one and a half times higher than the pre-war one. The total capacity of industrial production increased by 40% compared to 1939. The losses of the Soviet Union in that war reached 485 billion dollars (US military spending amounted to about 330 billion dollars).

Leskie R. The Wars of America. - New York, Evanston and London. 1968. - p. 719.
Leighton R. M. and Coakley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1940-1943. - Washington, 1955. - p. 259.
Dawson R. H. The Decision to Aid Russia 1941. - Chapel Hill, 1959. - p. 287.
The New York Times. - 1941. - June, 26. - p. eighteen.
Wall Street Journal. - 1941. June, 25. - p. 4.
Kimball W. F. Churchill and Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence I. Alliance Emerging. October 1933. - November 1942. - Princeton, New Jersey, 1984. - p. 226.
Ickes H.L. The Secret Diary - Vol. 3 - New York, 1954. - p. 595
Ibid. — p. 320.
Leighton R. M. and Cocley R. W. Global Logistics and Strategy. 1943-1945. - Washington, 1968. - P. 699.
Deane J.R. The Strange Alliance, - New York, 1947. - P. 95.

The topic of lend-lease supplies during the Second World War is the most discussed and controversial. Estimates of assistance from Western partners are extremely polar. Some believe that it was an economic sabotage, while others argue that without the help of the West, the victory of the Soviet Union in the war would have been impossible.

War is economic rivalry

The polarity of assessments is facilitated by the distortion of some facts and the silence of others. An objective assessment of events shows that the German victory was problematic. Back in the thirties, the German leadership made decisions that became the impetus for war. They affected both politics and economics. The full mobilization of all resources leads to a war of economies, in which the weak are always the losers.

The British are preparing "Matilda" in the USSR under Lend-Lease:

From this point of view, the USSR was also not in the best position. The First World War and the Civil War weakened the country, leaving behind many economic problems, hunger, and poverty. Conflicts smoldered in the border regions, filling the atmosphere of the world with a premonition of the coming big war. Almost all the major European powers, as well as Japan and China, either participated in military operations against Soviet Russia or were considered by it as possible aggressors.

The country lived in the conditions of a "besieged camp", but for that time it was natural. This situation needed to be changed. There is a severe need to build new factories with high-tech production. But any construction required economic costs in other areas.

The main ways of supplying Lend-Lease

The USSR existed in such a difficult state for the entire interwar period, and it had to enter the Patriotic War in it. But in addition to all the difficulties, industry had to be hastily evacuated inland. The economy had to be rebuilt on the go, and factories were mounted from wheels and began to function in the open.

The front required constant replenishment of equipment and equipment. Weapons and ammunition were sorely lacking, and the need for external assistance was extremely urgent. It was this help that Lend-Lease became.

Lend-Lease Supply Difficulties

The main problem of cargo delivery was the geographical position of our country. Not a single supplier country had land borders with it. But even this is not enough. It was impossible to call all supply routes easily accessible, so transporting goods that amounted to millions of tons along them became an extremely difficult task.

Column of American Lend-Lease trucks on a road in Iran

In total, three main supply routes were developed - the Arctic, the Pacific and the Persian. Each had specific advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage of the Arctic route was the delivery of goods directly to the major ports of the north of the USSR. However, the Germans constantly and quite successfully attacked the convoys, which is why the loss of cargo amounted to 15%. People died along with the cargo, as well as vehicles were damaged and drowned.

The delivery of goods by the Persian route required the construction of a highway, which had to be built almost from scratch and run through the entire country. In addition to the road with the necessary infrastructure, four large car factories were rebuilt. Trucks were assembled on them by local workers and then driven to their destination on their own.

The most effective was the route across the Pacific Ocean. This can be seen by examining the supply statistics. There were no hostilities between the USSR and Japan until 1945, so ships flying American flags left US ports without any problems. They arrived in Vladivostok already under the Soviet flag, having a Soviet crew as well.

Tanks M3s "General Lee" at the forefront of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. July 1943

The possibility of sinking such ships was extremely small. But occasional torpedoes from Japanese or American submarines sometimes caused damage. For all the time, 23 ships were lost, and only 9 of them were carried away by severe weather conditions. Transport ships were usually transferred along with cargo, being part of the Lend-Lease. During the use of the Pacific route, 128 units were received.

There were also two routes that were not the main ones: the Arctic Pacific and the Black Sea. The latter passed through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It functioned from May until September 20, 1945, when the fighting in Europe had already ended.

In addition to land and water routes, there was also an air route. Thousands of aircraft were ferried along the Uelkal-Krasnoyarsk highway. Fighters, transporters, bombers in the most difficult weather and climatic conditions reached their destination on their own.

Difficulties of choice

Often, in discussions about Lend-Lease deliveries, the effectiveness of the supplied equipment is compared with Soviet counterparts. Comparison is mainly subjected to more understandable goods, which include military equipment and weapons. But sometimes some essential aspects are missed in disputes. The main thing can be considered that the necessary goods and equipment were selected by representatives of the Soviet Union, who were extremely interested in their quality. It is also important that all documentation on the testing of the supplied equipment is open for access on the network. You can easily find primary documents, reports of commissions and persons responsible for testing.

Fighter "Spitfire". Preparation for Lend-Lease, for transfer to the USSR.

An example is a report on tests of a 37-mm cannon made in the USA. She, against the background of Soviet and British counterparts, looks more attractive. Its shells, having a similar caliber, hit German tanks with greater efficiency due to their increased strength. The actual characteristics obtained from the report do not allow us to call this weapon unnecessary and obsolete.

But there were such types of equipment that were not produced in our country. For some reason they keep silent about it. But it is impossible to successfully carry out large-scale military operations without heavy trucks, infantry armored vehicles or tow trucks to transport tanks. Battles are not won by tanks and planes alone. Although, without having trucks, it is still possible to fight, but the lack of tanks will not bring victory.

Therefore, the value of lend-lease deliveries is determined not by their value and share in the total production of the USSR, but by their absolute significance. Considering any type of delivered equipment, it is necessary to decide whether it would be possible in a warring country to produce it in the required quantity in such a short time? And what would you have to sacrifice for this?

1943 "Sherman" of the Ukrainian Front on the march.

With purely civilian products, the situation is the same. During a total war, there are practically no civilian factories left. Enterprises that produce steam locomotives or wagons will certainly switch to the manufacture of tanks and guns. But both locomotives and wagons will not stop breaking down and failing from enemy bombing. For all the war years in the USSR, several hundred units of rolling stock were produced. About 2,000 locomotives and several thousand flatcars were delivered under Lend-Lease. If we compare this with the entire fleet of equipment, it will not turn out very much, but in comparison with the output of railway equipment in the country, the volume is very large.

There are opinions that some of the supplied equipment in the countries that manufactured it was not popular. So, the Airacobra fighters were sent mainly to the USSR, because in the USA they did not show themselves on the good side.

But at the same time, it is forgotten that the same technique can solve completely different tasks on different fronts. Fighters in Europe cover or intercept heavy bombers. Departures in the Pacific Ocean involve long-distance, hours-long flights. And the eastern front is the interception of attack aircraft at low altitudes or the cover of their aircraft in the areas of the front line.

BTR M-17 with machine guns 4x12.7

In battles at low altitudes, the pilot does not need oxygen equipment. The machines themselves are becoming easier to maintain, and their best qualities are preserved. But for this it is necessary to carry out all routine maintenance prescribed by technical standards. And this is the concern of those who service the equipment.

The share of foreign fighters and bombers of all wartime aircraft in the USSR was 20%. Lend-lease deliveries received a quarter of all anti-aircraft guns (including large calibers) and all armored personnel carriers, which were not produced in the Soviet country.

About half a million trucks were delivered, which more than compensates for the lack of transport necessary for the entire Red Army for the period of peaceful 1941. Such volumes of supplies allowed Soviet car factories to switch to the production of military equipment without much loss.

Auxiliary equipment

For any state, the maintenance of science-intensive and high-tech industries in wartime is an unaffordable luxury. Therefore, gigantic quantities of radio stations, teletypes, as well as thousands and thousands of kilometers of telephone cable were imported into the country.

Of course, such goods do not have the visibility that tanks and aircraft have, but it is hardly possible to carry out high-quality command and control of troops without reliable radio communications. No military operation without communication can be successful. And radio stations made in Canada were intended to equip Soviet tanks. For this, there was a “Wireless set No. 19, Mk. III".

Torpedo boats of the Northern Fleet A-2 "Higgins" (Higgins). Boats from the USA, built in 1943 at the Higgins Indastri, Inc. shipyard. Wood.

Arguing constantly forget about other equipment. And it is also important for the conduct of hostilities, like weapons. All kinds of medical equipment and medicines saved the lives of fighters and prevented their injuries and disabilities.

Such equipment was delivered so much that they were equipped with their own production facilities. So, the SON-2 radar became an almost exact copy of its analogue, produced in England, and was made using equipment imported under Lend-Lease.

If we compare the total production figures, then we can “not understand” that it is impossible to replace a unique machine for cutting shoulder straps of a tank turret even with millions of Soviet-made files. It was precisely because of the lack of such machines at plant No. 183 that the production of T-34-85 tanks was delayed until mid-March 1944. And only the supply of machine tools under Lend-Lease corrected this situation.

Studying the protocols of 1944 and 1945, it is clear that the number of peace orders has increased significantly. Excavators, hoisting cranes, equipment for power plants, all kinds of machine tools came in stream... It is impossible, even wishing to do so, to belittle the role of supplied products in comparison with our own products.

"Studebakers" in the transport reserve of the command. May 1944. Mozhaisk.

The same deliveries include plants intended for oil refining. The Soviet Union did not produce high octane gasoline. His needs in the country for 1941 were satisfied by 4%. But for peacetime this figure is normal, but for the war years it is a disaster. During 1941-1945, more than 2 million tons of gasoline with an octane number of more than 99 were delivered under Lend-Lease. And this is 50-60% of the total production of such gasoline in the country for all the war years. Most of the fuel brought was used by Lend-Lease equipment, and the rest was used to dilute domestic gasoline in order to improve its quality.

Almost a third of all the ammunition that was used up in the fighting was filled with gunpowder from Lend-Lease supplies. Many branches of industry in the USSR would not have been able to develop without allied supplies of non-ferrous metals, alloying additives and rolled metal.

household goods

The number of shoes brought to our country during the war years is measured in millions of pairs. After the end of the war, many warehouses could boast of the presence of American boots, of which there were about 4 million.

High-calorie food is important not only for soldiers, but also for the civilian population. It means saving people from starvation and ensuring large-scale military operations. Under Lend-Lease, so much canned high-energy food was supplied that it would be quite enough to provide ten million fighters for one and a half thousand days. And this is somewhat more than the Great Patriotic War continued!

American food sent to Russia under Lend-Lease

The warring country had nowhere to take grain for crops, but in 1942, supplies from the Allies made it possible to carry out sowing work in full.

Lend-lease deliveries included not only essential products. There was also exotic, such as meat in chocolate. Despite the seeming absurdity, this combination is the best option for combining high-calorie foods with low weight and volume. So Lend-Lease turned the joke into reality, and people working in harsh climatic conditions received high-calorie foods.

Supply price

Lend-lease and payment for supplies is the main myth. During the Cold War, the problem of clearing up supply debts became a political tool. It was used by both conflicting parties.

Scope of deliveries and main lend-lease routes

The Western powers did not write off the lend-lease debts of the USSR, as they did for other indebted states. Now, in disputes about the specific cost of delivered goods, the numbers are very different. Some believe that the payments were completed in 2006, others call the amount of 10 billion at the time of the end of the supply. To this is added a certain coefficient for inflation, the value of which is the most uncertain.

Lend-lease deliveries occupy a special place in a number of Allied operations against the Axis. They helped to increase the efficiency of the Soviet troops, allowing to significantly reduce military and economic losses. And for the civilian population in the rear and in the liberated territories, these supplies have become a serious help.

Literature:

Lend-Lease Shipments World War II, US War Department Papers, 1946.
The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union, by Robert H. Jones, University of Oklahoma Press. 1969.
Soviet Supply Protocols, United States printing office.
A. Paperno, "Unknown WW2 in the North Pacific".
Vernidub I. I. "Ammunition of Victory".
TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 11355, d. 832 "Report of the NIBT from the test site for German tanks."