Military losses in the Middle Ages. Thomas Asbridge Crusades

D. Uvarov

The problem of assessing losses is primarily a problem of assessing sources, especially since until the 14th century chronicles were almost the only sources.

It is only for the late Middle Ages that more objective clerical reports and, occasionally, archaeological data become available (for example, information about the Danish-Swedish battle of 1361 near Visby was confirmed by the discovery of 1185 skeletons during the excavation of 3 of the 5 ditches in which the dead were buried).

Ring city walls of Visby

Chronicles, in turn, cannot be correctly interpreted without understanding the psychology of that time.

The European Middle Ages professed two concepts of war. In the era of "developed feudalism" (XI-XIII centuries), they existed de facto, in the late Middle Ages, military treatises also appeared, directly and explicitly expounding and investigating them (for example, the work of Philippe de Maizières, 1395).

The first was the war "mortelle", "death", a war of "fire and blood", in which all "cruelties, murders, inhumanities" were tolerated and even systematically prescribed. In such a war it was necessary to use all forces and methods against the enemy, in battle it was necessary not to take prisoners, to finish off the wounded, to catch up and beat the fugitives. It was possible to torture high-ranking prisoners in order to obtain information, kill enemy messengers and heralds, break agreements when it was beneficial, and so on. Similar behavior was allowed in relation to the civilian population. In other words, the greatest possible extermination of "trash" was proclaimed the main virtue. Naturally, these are primarily wars against "infidels", pagans and heretics, but also wars against violators of the "God-established" social order. In practice, wars against formally Christians, but sharply different in terms of national, cultural or social characteristics, also approached this type.

The second concept was "guerroyable" warfare. "chivalrous", "guerre loyale" ("honest war"), waged between "good warriors", which should be waged in accordance with the "droituriere justice d" armes "(" direct right of arms ") and" discipline de chevalerie ", ( "knightly science"). In such a war, the knights measured their strength among themselves, without interference from the "auxiliary personnel", in compliance with all the rules and conventions. The purpose of the battle was not the physical destruction of the enemy, but to determine the strength of the parties. Capture or put the knight to flight the opposite side was considered more honorable and "noble" than to kill him.

Let us add from ourselves that the capture of a knight was also economically much more profitable than killing him - you could get a large ransom.

In essence, the "knightly war" was a direct descendant of the ancient German concept of war as "God's judgment", but humanized and ritualized under the influence of the Christian church and the general growth of civilization.

Here some digression would be appropriate. As is known, the Germans considered the battle as a kind of trial (judicium belli), revealing the "truth" and "right" of each side. Characteristic is the speech put by Gregory of Tours into the mouth of a certain Frank Gondovald: "God will judge when we meet on the battlefield, whether I am the son or not the son of Chlothar." From today's point of view, this way of "establishing paternity" seems anecdotal, but for the Germans it was quite rational. After all, in fact, Gondovald did not claim to establish the "biological fact" of paternity (which at that time was simply impossible), but to the material and legal rights arising from this fact. And the battle was to establish whether he possessed the necessary powers and abilities to retain and exercise these rights.

Alexander the Great fights monsters. French miniature of the 15th century

On a more private level, the same approach was manifested in the custom of "judicial duel", with a healthy man having to defend himself, and a woman or an old man could nominate a deputy. It is noteworthy that the replacement of the duel with wergeld was perceived by early medieval public opinion not as a sign of the "humanization" of society, but as a sign of "corruption of morals", worthy of all condemnation. Indeed, in the course of a judicial duel, the stronger and more skilled warrior prevailed, and therefore the more valuable member of the tribe, already by virtue of this, more deserving, from the point of view of public benefit, to possess the disputed property or rights. A “monetary” settlement of the dispute could give an advantage to a less valuable and necessary tribe to a person, even if he had great wealth due to some accidents or baseness of his character (a tendency to hoarding, cunning, bargaining, etc.), that is, it stimulated not "valor" and "vice". It is not surprising that with such views, the judicial duel in various forms (including martial arts) could be preserved among the Germanic peoples until the end of the Middle Ages and even survive them, turning into a duel.

Finally, the Germanic origin of the concept of "knightly" war is also visible at the linguistic level. In the Middle Ages, the Latin word for war, bellum, and the German word for war, werra (turned into French guerre), were not synonyms, but names for two different types of war. Bellum was applied to an official, "total" interstate war declared by the king. Werra originally referred to war as the realization of "fiida", family blood feuds, and "divine judgment" under customary law.

Let us now return to the chronicles, the main source of information about losses in medieval battles. It is hardly necessary to prove that in the vast majority of cases the chronicle is not an objective "clerical" document, but rather a semi-artistic "panegyric-didactic" work. But after all, one can glorify and teach on the basis of different, even opposite premises: in one case, these goals are to emphasize ruthlessness towards "enemies of faith and order", in the other - "chivalry" in relations with "noble" opponents.

In the first case, it is important to emphasize that the "hero" beat the "infidels" and "villains" as best he could, and achieved considerable success in this; from here appear tens of thousands of slain Saracens or commoners in chronicles devoted to "deadly" wars. The record holder for this part is the description of the battle on the Salado River in 1341 (the last major attempt by the African Moors to invade Spain): 20 knights killed by Christians and 400,000 killed by Muslims.

Modern researchers emphasize that although one cannot literally understand the exaggerated figures "20,000", "100,000", "400,000" of the "crusading" chronicles (the killed "pagans" were rarely counted), they have a certain semantic load, since they convey the scale and significance of the battle in understanding of the chronicler and, most importantly, serve as psychologically accurate evidence that we are talking about a "mortal" battle.

On the contrary, in relation to the "knightly" war, that is, the ritualized "God's judgment" within the knighthood, a large number of killed "brothers" of the winner can in no way put him in a favorable light, testify to his generosity and "correctness". According to the concepts of that time, the commander who put to flight or captured enemy nobles, and did not arrange their extermination, looked more "chivalrous". Moreover, taking into account the tactics of that time, the heavy losses of the enemy imply that the knights who were knocked out of the saddle or wounded, instead of being captured, were achieved by the commoners knechts walking behind - shameful behavior according to the concepts of that time. That is, here a good chronicler should rather strive to underestimate the losses among the knights, including the enemy.

St. Louis, King of France, sets out on the Seventh Crusade in 1248.

Unfortunately, "minimalist" historians, rightly criticizing the obviously inflated figures, did not take into account the other side of the coin - that in a different psychological situation, the "poets" chroniclers could be just as inclined to downplay losses (since "objectivity" in the modern sense they were still alien). After all, if you think about it, 3 French knights killed out of one and a half thousand after a three-hour close hand-to-hand fight at Buvin (1214) are no more plausible than 100 thousand Muslims killed at Las Navas de Tolosa.

As a standard of "bloodless battles" of the XII-XIII centuries, they cite such as at Tanshbre (1106), when only one knight was allegedly killed on the French side, at Bremul (1119), when out of 900 knights participating in the battle died only 3 with 140 prisoners, or under Lincoln (1217), when only 1 knight (out of 400) died among the victors, 2 among the vanquished with 400 prisoners (out of 611). The statement of the chronicler Orderic Vitalis about the battle of Bremul is characteristic: “I found that only three were killed there, because they were covered with iron and mutually spared each other, both out of fear of God and because of brotherhood in arms (notitia contubernii); they tried not to kill the fugitives, but to take them prisoner. Truly, like Christians, these knights did not thirst for the blood of their brethren and rejoiced in an honest victory provided by God himself ... ". It can be believed that in these cases the losses were small. But are such battles the most characteristic of the Middle Ages? In fact, this is only one of their categories, significant, but not predominant. Knights of the same class, religion and nationality participated in them, for whom, by and large, it was not so important who would become their supreme overlord - one applicant or another, Capet or Plantagenet.

However, in battles of this type, such low losses are possible only if the opponents deliberately spared each other, avoiding mortal blows and finishing off, and in a difficult situation (being wounded or knocked out of the saddle) easily surrendered, instead of fighting to the end . The chivalrous method of individual close-quarters combat fully allows for "dosage of the damaging effect." However, this same method can also be extremely bloody - if the opponents intend to act not only in full force, but also mercilessly towards each other. Breaking away from an aggressive opponent and escaping in a melee situation is extremely difficult.
Richard the Lionheart in a duel knocks Salah ad-din out of the saddle. A drawing embodying the dream of the crusaders. England, ca. 1340.

The latter is confirmed by the mutually exterminating crusader-Muslim battles in the Middle East and in Spain - they took place at the same time and with the participation of the same knights that fought at Bremul and Lincoln, but here the chroniclers count the losses by thousands, tens and even hundreds of thousands (for example, 4 thousand crusaders and a clearly exaggerated 30 thousand Turks under Dorilei in 1097, 700 crusaders and 7 thousand Saracens under Arzuf in 1191, etc.). Often they ended with the total extermination of the defeated army, without distinction of class rank.

Finally, many European battles of the XII-XIII centuries are, as it were, an intermediate character between "chivalrous" and "deadly", adjoining either the first or the second type. Obviously, these are battles in which a strong national feeling was mixed in and in which foot militias from commoners (usually townspeople) actively participated. There are few such battles, but usually these are the largest battles.

Capture of Jerusalem in July 1099. Beginning of the XIV century.

The battle of 1214 near Buvin, which was mentioned above, adjoins the "chivalrous" type. It is known from three sources - a detailed rhymed chronicle by Guillaume le Breton "Philippis", a similar poetic chronicle by Philippe Muske, as well as an anonymous chronicle from Bethune. It is noteworthy that all three sources are French, and their preferences are visible to the naked eye. This is especially true of the most detailed chronicles of Le Breton and Muske - it seems that the authors competed in writing laudatory odes to their king Philip-August (the first of them was Philip's personal chaplain at all).

It is from the poems of Le Breton and Musk that we learn that under Buvin, 3 French and 70 German knights (with at least 131 prisoners) perished for 1200-1500 participants on each side. Delbrück and his followers take these casualty figures as an axiom. The later Verbruggen suggests that about 170 knights died among the allies (since a memorial inscription in the church of St. Nicholas in Arras speaks of 300 enemy knights killed or captured, 300-131=169). However, the French losses of 3 killed knights are all left without discussion, although the texts of the same chronicles can not be combined with such a ridiculously low figure:

1) Two hours of hand-to-hand combat between the French and Flemish knights on the southern flank - were all of these traditional rivals inclined to spare each other? By the way, after Bouvin, Flanders submitted to the French king, and his court chroniclers had every political reason not to offend new subjects and emphasize the "knightly" nature of the test.

2) Before Duke Ferdinand of Flanders was taken prisoner, all 100 of his bodyguard sergeants were killed after a fierce battle. Did these certainly not bad warriors allow themselves to be slaughtered like sheep without inflicting any losses on the French?

3) The French king himself barely escaped death (it is noteworthy that the German or Flemish infantrymen who knocked him off his horse tried to kill him, and not capture him). Did his entourage not suffer in any way?

4) The chronicles also speak of the valiant behavior of the German emperor Otto, who fought with an ax for a long time, and his Saxon entourage. When a horse was killed near Otto, he barely escaped capture and was hardly beaten off by bodyguards. The battle was already being lost by the allies and the Germans had no reason to hope to save the prisoners, i.e. they had to beat to death in order to save themselves. And as a result of all these exploits, 1-2 Frenchmen were killed?

5) On the northern flank, 700 Brabancon spearmen, lining up in a circle, fought off the attacks of the French knights for a long time. From this circle, Count Renaud Dammartin of Boulogne made sorties with his vassals. The count was an experienced warrior and, as a traitor, he had nothing to lose. Did he and his people manage to kill 1-2 French knights, at best?

6) Finally, almost the entire load of the French in this long and important battle fell on the knights, since the French communal foot militia almost immediately fled. These one and a half thousand French knights coped with the German-Flemish knights, and with the many times more numerous, aggressive, albeit poorly organized German-Dutch infantry. At the cost of only 3 dead?

In general, the statements of le Breton and Muske could only be believed if they were confirmed by the same data from the German and Flemish side. But the German and Flemish descriptions of this major battle of that time have not been preserved - apparently, it did not inspire the chroniclers of these countries. In the meantime, we have to admit that the chronicles of le Breton and Muske are a tendentious propaganda panegyric and the casualty figures in them are not credible.

Another example of this kind is the battle of Muret on September 12, 1213, the only major battle of the Albigensian Wars. In it, 900 northern French horsemen with an unknown number of foot sergeants under the command of Simon de Montfort defeated 2,000 Aragonese and southern French (“Occitan”) horsemen and 40 thousand infantrymen (Toulouse militia and rutiers) in parts. The Aragonese king Pedro II (an active participant in the Reconquista and the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212), while in the vanguard, collided with the French avant-garde and was killed, after a fierce battle, all his maynade, i.e. several dozen knights and sergeants of the inner circle. Then the French, with a blow to the flank, overturned the Aragonese knights demoralized by the death of the king, they carried away the Occitan knights in their flight, then the French dismembered and drove the Toulouse foot militia into the Garonne, and supposedly 15 or 20 thousand people were hacked or drowned (too an outstanding achievement for 900 horse soldiers ).

At the same time, according to the "History of the Albigensian Crusade" by the monk Pierre de Vaux-de-Cerny (aka Peter Serneysky, an ardent panegyrist of Simon de Montfort), only 1 knight and several sergeants were killed by the French.

You can still believe that the French cavalry slaughtered the Toulouse foot militia like a flock of sheep. The figure of 15-20 thousand dead is clearly exaggerated, but on the other hand, the death of a significant part of the male population of Toulouse in the battle of Muret is an objective and subsequently repeatedly manifested fact. However, it is impossible to believe that King Pedro II and his court knights allowed themselves to be killed so cheaply.

In conclusion, a little about another well-studied battle of the same era, at Worringen (1288). According to the rhymed chronicle of Jan van Heel, the victorious Brabantians lost only 40 people in it, and the losing German-Dutch coalition - 1100. Again, these figures do not correspond in any way with the course of the battle described in the same chronicle, long and stubborn, and even "minimalist" Verbruggen considers the number of Brabant losses disproportionately underestimated. The reason is obvious - van Heelu was the same panegyrist of the Duke of Brabant, like Peter of Serney - Montfort, and Le Breton and Muske - Philippe-August. Apparently, it was good form for them to underestimate the losses of their victorious patrons to the point of implausibility.

All the above battles are characterized by the same features: detailed descriptions of them have been preserved only from the side of the winners, and each time there is a huge gap in combat losses between the winners and the vanquished, in no way compatible with a detailed description of a long and stubborn struggle. This is all the more strange because all these battles were no less significant for the vanquished, who had their own continuous chronicle tradition. Obviously, the losing side, not experiencing any poetic delight, preferred to limit itself to a few lines in the general chronicles. We also add that the chroniclers' restraint immediately disappears when it comes to common soldiers - here thousands of numbers are a common thing.

This is what concerns the battles of the XII-XIII centuries. Their sad feature is the impossibility, in the overwhelming majority of cases, of verifying the figures of the chronicles describing them, no matter how incredible they may be.

The picture changes dramatically at the turn of the 13th-14th centuries, after the battles of Falkirk in 1298 and Courtrai in 1302. "Anemia" battles practically disappear, no matter what series of battles of the late Middle Ages you take - only bloody battles with the death of 20 to 50% of active participants in the losing side. Indeed:

A) The Hundred Years War - the "pathetic" 15% of those killed by the French in the battle of Crecy (1346) are explained only by the passive defensive tactics of the British and the night that came, which allowed most of the wounded to escape; but in the battles of Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415), which took place during the day and ended in a successful counterattack by the British, up to 40% of the French knights were killed; on the other hand, at the end of the war, the French, having gained a tactical advantage, killed up to half of the English soldiers in the battles of Pat (1429), Formigny (1450) and Castillon (1453);

B) on the Iberian Peninsula - in the largest battles at Najera (1367) and Aljubarrota (1385), English archers made exactly the same blockage of the corpses of Castilian and French knights as at Poitiers and Agincourt;

C) Anglo-Scottish wars - more than 5 thousand Scots killed (probably about 40%) at the Battle of Falkirk (1298), 55% of the Scottish cavalry were killed at Halidon Hill (1333), more than half died (perhaps 2/3, including prisoners) of the Scots who participated in the Battle of Neville's Cross (1346); on the other hand, at least 25% of the English army (against about 10% of the Scots) was killed at the Battle of Bannockburn (1314), more than 2 thousand killed by the British (20-25%) at the Battle of Otterburn (1388);

D) Franco-Flemish wars - 40% of French knights and mounted sergeants killed at the Battle of Courtrai (1302), 6 thousand Flemings killed (i.e. 40%, according to French, possibly inflated data) and 1,500 French killed in the battle of Mont-en-Pevel (1304), more than half of the Flemish army was exterminated in the battles of Cassel (1328) and Rosebeck (1382);

E) wars involving the Swiss - more than half of the Austrian knights were killed in the battles of Morgarten (1315) and Sempach (1386), in the battle of Saint-Jacob-en-Birse, the Berne-Basel detachment of 1500 people was destroyed to the last man ., an unknown number of Baselians who tried to save him also died, 4 thousand people were allegedly killed by French mercenaries, more than half of the Burgundian army, 12 thousand people, were killed in the Battle of Murten (1476);

E) wars in the North - at Visby (1361) more than 1500 people were killed, the Danes completely destroyed the Swedish detachment defending the city, at Hemmingstedt (1500) the peasants of Dithmarshen, having lost 300 killed, destroyed 3600 soldiers of the Danish king Johann I (30 % of the entire army);

G) battles of the Hussite wars of 1419-1434. and the wars of the Teutonic Order with the Poles and Lithuanians, including Grunwald (1410) - are also known for the merciless extermination of the losing side.

Emblem of the Holy Roman Empire

Previously, only the wars of the condottieri in Italy were presented as a kind of island of "chivalrous" war (although already in a perverted form). The opinion about the habit of the leaders of the condottieri to conspire among themselves and arrange almost bloodless imitations of battles, thereby deceiving employers, is based mainly on the works of the Italian politician and writer Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). His "History of Florence" (1520), written under the clear influence of ancient models and its specificity compares favorably with medieval chronicles, until recently was unconditionally taken for granted as the most important source on the late medieval history of Italy. For example, about the battle between the Florentine-papal and Milanese troops at Anghiari (1440), he writes: "Never before has any other war on foreign territory been less dangerous for attackers: with such a complete defeat, despite the fact that the battle lasted four hours , only one person died, and not even from a wound or any masterful blow, but from the fact that he fell off his horse and expired under the feet of the fighters. But about the battle between the Florentines and the Venetians at Molinella (1467): "However, not a single person fell in this battle - only a few horses were injured and, in addition, several prisoners were taken from both sides" . However, when the archives of Italian cities were carefully studied in recent decades, it turned out that in reality 900 people died in the first battle, 600 in the second. Maybe this is not so much for armies of thousands of 5 people, but the contrast with Machiavelli's statements is striking .

Thus, it became obvious that the "History of Florence", contrary to external impression, is not an accurate account of the events of that time, but rather a tendentious political pamphlet in which the author, defending certain ideas (the need to replace condottiere mercenaries with regular national armies), very freely deals with facts.

Manuscript Illustration Depicting the Taking of Damietta During the Fifth Crusade 15th

The case with the "History of Florence" is indicative in the sense that even the most convincing and plausible, at first glance, medieval descriptions can be very far from the true state of affairs. "History of Florence" modern researchers managed to "bring to clean water", for the chronicles of the XII century, this, alas, is impossible.

Hans Burgkmair the Elder. Fight with the Wild Man.

However, certain patterns can be detected. Two types of wars have already been mentioned at the beginning of the article. It is even more significant that the degree of "bloodyness" of medieval wars is inseparable from the general social and cultural development of medieval society. The early period (until the 11th century) was characterized by "feudal anarchy", the instability of social institutions and morality. The morals at that time were barbaric, the battles, although small in scale, were bloody. Then came the "golden age" of chivalry, when its hierarchy and morality were already formed and were not yet too spoiled by commodity-money relations. At that time, the dominant military and political role of the knights was not questioned by anyone, which allowed them to play power and property according to their own, sparing rules. Most of the Western European "battles-tournaments" belong to this not so long period (XII-XIII centuries). However, on the periphery of the Catholic world, even at that time, the old rules were in effect - with the Gentiles and heretics there was a struggle not for life, but for death.

Wall painting in the Templar church in Cressac-sur-Charentes

However, the "golden age", if you look closely, was internally heterogeneous. The most "feudal" was the XII century, the time of the highest religiosity and the power of the papacy in Europe. This leading role of the church had a profound effect on military morality, gradually modifying the original Germanic-pagan mentality of chivalry. It was in the XII century that intra-European (that is, inter-knightly) wars were the most bloodless and external "crusading" aggression was the most bloody. In the XIII century, the church begins to be pushed into the background by royal power, and religiosity - by "state interests", "brotherhood in Christ" begins to give way to nationalism again. Little by little, intra-European wars escalate, which is facilitated by the kings' extensive use of commoners-townspeople. The real turning point comes around 1300, when the "chivalrous war" and within Europe finally gives way to the "mortal war". The bloody battles of the XIV-XV centuries can be explained by several factors:

1) The forms of hostilities are becoming more and more complicated, one main type of troops and method of hostilities (frontal clash of knightly cavalry in the open field) are being replaced by several types of troops and many tactics with sharply different sets of advantages and disadvantages. Using them in different, not yet fully understood conditions can lead to both complete victory and catastrophic defeat. A good example is the English archers: in some battles they destroyed the French heavy cavalry almost without loss, in others the same cavalry destroyed them almost without loss.

2) The same complication of the forms of hostilities leads to the regular participation in battles of mercenary formations of infantrymen-commoners, whose uncontrollability is sharply different from the former knechts - knightly servants. Along with them, inter-class hatred returns to the fields of regular battles.

3) New technical means and tactics, such as massed shooting of archers in areas, are fundamentally incompatible with the "consciously sparing" method of conducting combat operations.

4) The aggressive "state interest" and the specifics of more and more regular and disciplined armies turn out to be incompatible with the international chivalrous "brotherhood in arms". A good example is the order of Edward III during the Battle of Crecy in 1346 not to take prisoners until the end of the battle.

5) The morality of the chivalry itself is also decomposing, no longer having sole control over the course of battles. "Christian magnanimity" and "knightly solidarity" are increasingly yielding to rational interest - if in the given specific conditions it is not possible to receive a ransom for oneself personally from a captured "noble" enemy, it turns out to be natural to kill him.

However, even the "anemic" battles of the 12th century were not harmless for the losers - there is nothing good in a ruinous ransom. Recall that under Bremul (1119), a third of the knights of the defeated side were captured, and under Lincoln (1217), even two-thirds.

In other words, throughout the Middle Ages, a general battle in the open field was an exceptionally risky affair, threatening irreparable losses.

Alfred Rethel. Death is the winner. Woodcut

Hence the distinctive feature of medieval military affairs in the period under review (from 1100 to 1500) - the emphasis on the defense / siege of fortresses and "small war" (ambushes and raids) while avoiding large battles in the open field. Moreover, general battles were most often associated with unblocking actions, that is, they were of a forced nature. A typical example is the Albigensian Wars (1209-1255): over 46 years, in dozens of sieges and thousands of small skirmishes, many tens of thousands of soldiers on each side died, and the knights were killed to the same extent as common sergeants, but there was a major battle only one - under Muret in 1213. Thus, a medieval knight could have a huge, regularly updated combat experience, and at the same time participate in only 1-2 big battles in his whole life.

CONCLUSION

In essence, the originality of the military affairs of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, in comparison with antiquity, Byzantium and Modern times, consists in the qualitative predominance of well-trained heavy cavalry, which has expensive horses with deep saddles and stirrups, as well as full armor; in most cases, each fighter, surrounded by military servants, is the owner of his equipment and, in his way of life, value system and income, belongs to the secular aristocracy in its broadest sense. For these people, military activity seems to be a normal form of existence, no matter what institutional framework it takes place. They maintain complex and unstable relations with the existing authorities, often entering their service, retaining, however, a fair amount of independence either as individuals or as members of small communities (contubernia, commilitones) of consanguineous, feudal, regional or professional character. Even receiving a salary from a prince or king, these mounted warriors were not considered to be in the service of public authority in all respects: if they were captured, then the ransom was laid on themselves, or their relatives, or people dependent on them; as for income, they, like risk, remained purely individual.

Among the various ways of waging war, the Western Middle Ages, with the exception of early times, did not know invasions-migrations, that is, the movements of large masses of the population, "usually moving from one geographical zone to another with brute force." All the more unknown were (for obvious reasons) slave wars, although internecine wars of a more or less clearly expressed social nature were very frequent. The Middle Ages are practically unfamiliar (even despite the extensive conquests of Charlemagne) with wars for the establishment of hegemony, for the domination of one people or one dynasty over a vast territory: “Like invasions, imperial conquests separate antiquity from the Middle Ages and Modern times in Europe.” With the exception of the periphery, the wars of the medieval West did not take the form of rivalry between nomads and settled peoples. At least since the 11th century. they deployed over a vast area with a high population density and many fortified points. Most often, wars were episodic, reminiscent of a simple robbery or vendetta. But along with countless neighborhood conflicts that slightly changed the alignment of political forces, there were also major conquest or liberation campaigns both within the Christian Latin world itself and beyond its borders - in pagan lands, in the Islamic world and Byzantium.

In medieval conflicts, at different levels, almost all the objective and obvious causes that the science of war reveals are found: wars generated by ambition, anger, a thirst for revenge, ritual wars in the ethnographic sense of the word, wars for entertainment or adventure, religious or ideological wars ( crusades on this and that side of the sea), civil wars (Armagnacs and Burgundians, counts and communes of Flanders, jacqueries), wars for the assertion of sovereignty or greatness, with the aim of developing and consolidating political structures, and, finally, economic wars - for the sake of booty , mastering natural resources or in order to establish control over trade routes and merchant centers. All of them, of course, were carried out by means of their time.

Despite the usually limited scope of medieval wars, in terms of number of participants and duration, they often had tangible and even devastating economic consequences. According to the Domesday Book, traces of devastation caused by the Norman Conquest were visible in England. Recent studies have shown the truly disastrous results of the Hundred Years War for some French provinces. Equally depressing were the consequences of military conflicts in the 15th century. (especially the Hussite wars) for Silesia. This explains the great sacrifices that urban communities were willing to make in order to secure themselves as best as possible. Undoubtedly, wartime taxation was more acceptable, but only when the destruction caused by the war was taken into account. But in any case, the wars were not so frequent, long and intense as to entail irreparable destruction, with the exception of certain areas. On the scale of the West, the war was only one of the components of economic and demographic evolution. Moreover, individual peoples or social groups have managed to turn it into a source of prosperity. The financial well-being of the Scandinavian world has developed both thanks to robberies and trade. Very profitable was the military policy of Venice on the continent and in Crete. The Carolingian aristocracy lived off conquest for a long time and declined when they ceased. At the end of the Middle Ages, it was widely believed that the conquests on the Continent allowed the English people to increase their wealth.

As in other eras, in the Middle Ages war stimulated a certain amount of technological progress, sometimes initiated and controlled by states. This progress affected primarily armaments, but was also noticeable in other industries: metallurgy, metalworking; military "engineering", transport, cartography, geography, etc. have been developed.

Medieval society is sometimes presented as predominantly military. This is true in the sense that there was no clearly defined and limited military class in society and the physical presence of the war was not limited to some front-line areas, but was felt very strongly, influenced and made itself felt in almost the entire West; this is also true in the sense that there were close and strong links between the organization of power, the social hierarchy and the military hierarchy, and that personal military equipment (though often primitive) was widespread, but more in cities than in rural areas.

However, let's not forget that the Middle Ages introduced and recognized the status of non-belligerents who, by definition, are outside the war: these are some marginal social groups, children and youths (under fourteen, fifteen, sixteen or eighteen years old), old people (over sixty, sixty-four or seventy years), women, clerics and monks. In addition, the Middle Ages did not know the military accounting system that existed in the Roman state and the principles of which were developed in modern states. The process of social differentiation associated with the mode of economic production led to the isolation of a small number of professional warriors, the maintenance of which could take a variety of forms. As for the bulk of the population, sometimes defined as unarmed, although their participation in the war was never excluded, it was in general episodic: “communes”, “people” were, at best, potential soldiers who were called up (not without apprehension and hesitation) only in critical situations.

On the other hand, it would be absurd to imagine medieval ethics deeply imbued with military values, spirit and subordinate to them; the military ideal was alien to Christian and courtly values ​​(there are no bourgeois values ​​yet) even when the former gave way to the latter or in some sense merged with them. If we confine ourselves to considering the secular world of only the 15th century, then there are many social types: the Italian humanist, the councilor of parliament, even the courtier, who owe very little to knightly values! Finally, it is possible that wars had less devastating social consequences than in other eras: there were no conversions to slavery, as in antiquity, there were rare mass expropriations and displacements of large groups of the population. Many conflicts only slightly affected society and were limited to the upper strata, while the majority at that time waited for the thunderstorm to pass in order to return to their village and to their allotment. What did it matter that the lord was replaced and justice was restored, since the quitrent would be collected on behalf of the new lord. If medieval society was military, it was primarily because military obligations and activities constituted an essential part of the responsibility and activity of secular structures.

It would be just as wrong to imagine the medieval world in a state of continuous war, a victim of the constant violence of the military people. Here everything was built on contrasts, and only accurate chronological calculations for certain periods would give a correct assessment. One gets the impression, however, that if, contrary to the possibility, one draws up in a general form “summaries of battles, like meteorological tables,” then it turns out that whole centuries of the Middle Ages were less tragic than, for example, the 16th or 17th centuries. The illusion is explained by the fact that in the Middle Ages, life was willingly decorated with military images. The war did not hide, it did not hesitate to demonstrate and advertise itself in entertainment, buildings and clothing styles.

They usually like to oppose small knightly armies with huge forces that could have gathered long before the advent of industrial civilization and the explosive growth of the productive forces of the state of antiquity, the French kingdom or the great Asian powers (Baghdad Caliphate, Mughal Empire, Middle Empire). In absolute terms, this is undeniable: 90,000 soldiers sent by Antigonus and Demetrius against Egypt in 306 BC. e., 125,000 legionaries of the Roman Republic during the Second Punic War, 360,000 soldiers of the early Roman Empire. All this is data (quite reliable and plausible), which cannot be equaled in the Middle Ages. At the beginning of the XVIII century. the Austrian army reached 100,000 people (1705), the French - 300,000 (1710), the English - 75,000 (1710), the Russian - 200,000 (1709), and the Swedish - 110,000 (1709). .). Never in the Middle Ages was any state, no matter how powerful, able to muster a force exceeding 100,000 people, even for a very short time. The largest number of troops of the great monarchies of the West was probably noted in the first decades of the 14th century. In August and September 1340 (when the record was reached) Philip of Valois had about 100,000 men (troops and auxiliaries) in all theaters of war, paid by himself or by cities and lords; at the same time, Edward III, with the allied Netherlands and the empire, could probably oppose him with 50,000 people.

It is worth noting, however, that the insignificant number of military contingents in the Middle Ages is explained only by political fragmentation. In terms of their size and population, medieval states mobilized forces by no means small. When Gaston Phebus “wished to start a war, he could count on about 2,500 men in Béarn and Marsanne; troops from the county of Foix and the lands dependent on it numbered about the same ”; we have no data to estimate the population of the county of Foix, but it is known that Béarn had 50,000 inhabitants in 1385; multiply this number by three to get the number of all the subjects of Gaston Phoebus, and we get the ratio between the size of the army and the population of 1:30, which is comparable to the same figure (1:27) for Prussia in 1740 and more than double the figure ( 1:66) for France in 1710. For the Falkirk campaign of 1298, Edward I of England mustered at least 25,700 infantry and 3,000 cavalry; assuming that the population of the country was 4 million in total, we get the ratio between the size of the army and the population of 1:139, while in 1710 it will be 1:150. In the second half of the XV century. the Swiss (if all men of suitable age and ability to fight were mobilized) could put up an army of 50,000 to 60,000 men. It is noteworthy that several times their troops reached 20,000 people.

The real difficulty for the medieval authorities was not to raise large armies (at least after 1200), but to keep them up to par for more than a few weeks. In relation to the New Age, the correct comparison should concern permanent, regular troops. And in this case, the Middle Ages were strikingly inferior: even the French kingdom, which was a pioneer in this area, had in the second half of the 15th century. a regular army of about 15,000 people, which, with an average population of 8 million, gave a ratio of 1:533.

The fact is that the medieval states for a long time did not have enough money, and they had only a weak administration. However, it must be admitted that if they gradually developed and strengthened these structures, it was largely under the pressure of the needs of the war, this most powerful stimulus. In addition, most of the already insufficient funds were absorbed by military spending: during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages (sources, however, allow us to give only rough estimates), it was normal for the state to spend on war half of its income, both permanent and unforeseen. War is the cause and meaning of the existence of political power. "Every empire and every lordship has its origin in war."

Finally, we note that medieval warfare cannot be studied in isolation. It was partly the heir of ancient warfare, thanks to some technical aspects, customs, and especially the paradigm proposed by the Roman army. In the military realm, the Middle Ages were also in the shadow of Rome. It would be a mistake to assume that the fascination with Roman legions and eagles first arose only in the time of Machiavelli. It is even more obvious that there is no gap between the wars of the Middle Ages and the New Age, on the contrary, there is a gradual transition, slow transformations both at the practical level and at the level of mentality. The myth of chivalry and the memory of Roland and the valiant knights will live on for a long time to come. Branthom, in his Discourse on the Colonels of the Infantry of France, reverently recalls the times of Froissart, the capture of King John, and the great wars with the English.

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From the book by Zoe Oldenburg “The Bonfire of Montsegur. History of the Albigensian Crusades

How did they fight in that era when there were no bombs, no cannons, no military service?

Our ancestors did not have the technical means of mass destruction. But this does not mean at all that the war in that era was less cruel than today, and the soldiers did not have the means to terrorize the enemy.

Indeed, hand-to-hand fighting did not take as many lives as it does today, even if we take into account the smaller population in those days. An army of 20,000 men was considered very large. Inaccuracies in the testimonies of historians stem from the fact that they estimate the size of the army by the number of knights. Each knight was a very flexible combat unit, since he could carry from 4 to 30 people. Under him, the crew consisted of horse and foot soldiers, partly from his relatives and friends, and in all cases - their tried and tested vassals. Whether it was squires or sergeants, these people participated in the battle along with the knight, and if the concept of military discipline was rather weak in those days, then the concept of military partnership between a knight and his companions, especially in the north of France, had an almost mystical meaning. And often the fighters, who were absolutely indifferent to the purpose of the battle, showed miracles of courage in order to maintain the reputation of their liege. The knights were the military elite, and the power of the army was determined not so much by the number as by the quality of this elite.

Jean Froissart, Chroniques

Medieval warfare is an emphatically aristocratic war: a knight is considered a combat unit, a character called upon not to spare himself, but also less exposed to danger than others. He is well protected by armor, and arrows, spears and swords can rain down on him without causing much harm. The chronicler poet Ambroise describes how one day King Richard returned from the battlefield so studded with arrows that he looked like a hedgehog. However, with all the lightness of these arrows, each could kill a person not protected by chain mail. And chain mail was an expensive and rather rare item intended for the elite. The knight's chain mail covered the entire body, the squire's chain mail was knee-length, a simple sergeant wore a tunic made of leather plates, very dense, but not protected from sword blows. Foot soldiers were only entitled to a long one and a half meter shield - infantry protective equipment was the most primitive. The full brunt of the battle fell, therefore, not on the most protected knights and their companions, but on the nameless warriors, sergeants and foot soldiers, whose corpses littered the battlefields and the surroundings of the besieged cities.

Along with regular units - battalions or small detachments, for which the knights were personally responsible - the medieval army had auxiliary troops responsible for the technical support of the war. These were, first of all, professionals, specialists in various military trades: archers, crossbowmen, masters of military vehicles, the most qualified of whom considered their craft God knows how honorable and regularly served those who paid well.

Below in the military hierarchy were the rutiers (an army of hired foot soldiers), the most brutal force that the generals had at their disposal. Rutieri were one of the most important elements of the army and were widely used both in regular military operations and during sieges. For their inhumanity, the routiers were considered, as it were, outside the law, but nevertheless everyone had a need for them. If for the knights the war meant, first of all, the opportunity to become famous and defend their more or less lofty interests, then for the common people it meant the Rutierian terror. Talking about a medieval war, it is impossible not to mention the unaccountable horror that was caused by the mere mention of a routier - a creature without God, outside the law, without rights, without pity and without fear. He was feared like a rabid dog and treated like a dog, not only by the enemy, but also by his own masters. His name alone served as an explanation for all the cruelties and sacrileges, he was perceived as a living embodiment of hell on earth.

<...>The routiers were bandits, all the more dangerous because they practiced this craft professionally, constantly blackmailing their baron employers and threatening to attack their lands for not paying their salaries on time. During the war, they plundered conquered territories and squabbled with the regular army over booty, so that often victories ended in fights between knights and robbers. The crusader army, although considered the army of the Lord, also used the services of the rutiers.

The commanders and the contingent of these detachments were formed for the most part from alien people, a stranger in those parts where the hostilities were fought. In France, routiers were most often recruited among Basques, Aragonese or Brabantese. But in an age when battles, fires and famines continually threw out on the high road guys determined to ensure their existence at any cost, the detachments of the rutiers were replenished with hotheads, rebels and adventurers from all over.

These barefoot, ragged, poorly armed gangs, who knew neither order nor discipline and recognized only their commanders, had two great advantages from a military point of view. First, they were known for their absolute contempt for death. They had nothing to lose, they rushed headlong into any danger. Secondly, no one reproached himself by sacrificing them. Therefore, it was from them that shock battalions were formed. They aroused boundless horror among the civilian population: these atheists staged orgies in churches, mocked the images of saints. Not satisfied with robbery and violence, they slaughtered and tortured just like that, for the sake of pleasure, having fun roasting children on a slow fire or dismembering corpses.

In addition to the knights, along with their retinue, technicians and mercenaries of all kinds, many civilians moved with the army. A huge amount of luggage was carried behind the army: chests with weapons and armor, awnings, camp kitchens, everything necessary for fortification work and installation of siege mechanisms. The army also had its own female contingent: laundresses, laundry menders, prostitutes. Some warriors took their wives and even children with them on a campaign. And, finally, at the transition, a large army attracted crowds of vagabonds, beggars, curious, thieves, jugglers, in short, it overgrown with a mass of useless people who expected to profit at its expense, and as a result, placed an additional burden on the occupied country.

Here is the approximate composition of the army in the medieval campaign. No matter how small it was, its mere presence created confusion, paralyzed traffic on the roads, sowed panic among the population and devastated nearby territories where food and fodder were searched.

The war was, in principle, more of a siege than a field war, and a kind of artillery played a large role in it. The towers and walls of cities were bombarded with two to three pounds of stone cannon balls from catapults with a range of up to 400 meters. Mounted on wooden scaffolds or on revolving siege tower platforms, these weapons sometimes penetrated walls many meters thick, not to mention the destruction they caused in a besieged city if they managed to build siege towers higher than the walls. Then, under the cover of artillery, the attacking side filled up the ditches, and the miners dug under the bases of the towers. The assault on some ladders rarely succeeded, it was easier to destroy the walls first. However, this work was long and dangerous, because in this case the besieged made sorties and burned the siege towers, after which they shot the enemy who had lost his defense. Siege warfare was most often a war of attrition.

The approach of the enemy forced the local population to flee to castles and fortified cities, taking their belongings and cattle. Cities and castles, already depleted of their livelihoods, received many extra mouths, so that the siege led to famine and epidemics. On the other hand, an army that occupied enemy territory devastated the fields, burned crops and cut down fruit trees, unless the enemy himself did the same in advance in order to starve the aggressor. Both those and others tried to pollute the wells, and therefore disease and crop failure claimed more lives than battles, both in the besieged and in the besieging army.

<...>From a distance, the army seemed even more dangerous than it really was, because, in addition to any "dark" bands that accompanied each army formation on the campaign, crowds of pilgrims swarming around the "backbone" of the crusaders, who set off on a campaign in the hope of earning the promised indulgences and thirsty, in naivety his own, to participate in the holy cause of the extermination of heretics. The age-old tradition of the presence of civilian pilgrims-crusaders in the campaign, coming from campaigns in the Holy Land, led to these lands a kind of "pilgrims" who were no longer going to reconquer the shrines, but to admire the fires and participate in the massacre. These civilians, useless in battle, a burden for the army, gave it, however, a frightening appearance of a huge wave of invaders that swept the whole earth.

What about the battle of Hittin?

More about routiers

Evasion of military vassal service caused the appearance of mercenary soldiers (The word "soldier" itself comes from the German word "sold" - a salary in a mercenary army). Gradually, money became the true "engine" of the war. Already in the early Middle Ages, it was possible for low-ranking vassals, those who were old, sick or absent (for example, on a pilgrimage) to pay a special tax so that they could be replaced by someone else. Over time, this practice is becoming more widespread. In England, starting from the middle of the XII century, any vassal had the right to pay off military service. There was even a tendency to oblige all free people to pay a tax that would allow them to support the royal army. In France, a little later, Philip Augustus established the so-called "money fiefs": those who used them received not the land itself, but rent and had to provide military assistance to the king for this, often as archers or crossbowmen. These measures enabled sovereigns to better reward those who agreed to fight on their side by hiring true military professionals, and thus lay the foundations for a standing army.

Although there were individual knights who sold their services to those who offered a high price, the mercenaries were mostly people of ignoble origin, most often from the poorest and sparsely populated areas of Western Europe: Wales, Brabant, Flanders, Aragon, Navarre. To designate them, they usually used the name of the area from which they came (Aragonese, Brabantians), or more general words - commoners ”and“ chain mail ”. At the beginning of the XII century, mercenary soldiers were still quite rare and mainly among the kings of England. The number of mercenaries increased from 1160-1170, when they turned into a real disaster for the entire West, since not only revolutionized the art of war with a new weapon that kills(highlighted by me, mask_ ), and not just helping to capture the enemy (knives, hooks, crossbows), but also began to organize gangs, and practically indestructible, led by military leaders who acted solely for their own benefit. These gangs had to be constantly negotiated and bargained with, because they turned out to be even more dangerous in peacetime than during the period of hostilities. Expecting the start of another war, they openly lived at the expense of local residents, committing all sorts of illegal extortions and outrages. Periodically, they were persecuted, arranging real crusades. But despite the harsh measures taken against those who managed to be captured (in 1182, Richard the Lionheart ordered that half of the band of Brabant he caught be hanged, and the rest ordered to be sent out, having previously gouged out their eyes), Western Europe suffered from mercenaries, at least until the middle of the 15th century.

Philippe Contamine

War in the Middle Ages

PHILIPPE CONTAMINE AND HIS WORK

Philippe Contamine, born in 1932, belongs to the older generation of French historians who continue the tradition of the trend in French historiography that is sometimes called the "new historical science". The founders of this trend were the well-known scientists Mark Blok and Lucien Febvre, but it is useful to recall here that they were inspired by Henri Burr, the founder of the school of historical synthesis and the author of the philosophical, historical and methodological work Synthesis in History, published in 1911. Proceeding from the principle of pluralism, that is, the plurality of factors of historical development, in contrast to the monistic view of history characteristic of Marxism with the allocation of one determining factor - economic, he believed that historical research should cover the most diverse aspects of society. True, his dream of some kind of comprehensive historical synthesis turned out to be unrealizable in practice, but the important thing is that the desire for such a synthesis, even on a limited scale, has become a characteristic feature of historians of the new direction.

The book by F. Kontamine “War in the Middle Ages” offered to the reader in Russian translation is not just a history of military affairs, but a history of war as the most important factor in the life of medieval Western European society in its various manifestations and consequences. Many researchers turned to the events of the military history of the Middle Ages, but no one tried to give a comprehensive analysis of the war as a phenomenon of socio-political and spiritual-religious life. That is why the work of the French scientist is unique, his book is translated into different languages, and now the Russian-speaking reader will be able to get acquainted with it.

Using a huge number of the most diverse sources, F. Contamine carried out a historical synthesis in two main directions. He presented rich material on the history of wars in European countries and analyzed many related problems. The book provides both classical material on the history of weapons and an original analysis of medieval tactics and strategy, which military historians have always neglected in the past, believing that, compared with antiquity, they practically did not exist in the Middle Ages. F. Contamine also addresses such rare but important topics as the "history of courage", which was considered the main virtue of a warrior, as a manifestation of war in church and religious life. In other words, his work covers purely military, social, political, and spiritual and religious aspects of the war in the Middle Ages.

F. Contamine's interest in the phenomenon of war in a broad historical sense was not accidental. Being primarily a researcher of the late Middle Ages, that is, the XIV-XV centuries, he studied the Hundred Years War between France and England for a long time. The range of problems that were considered in his works devoted to this era is very wide. As Contamine himself said, in his books appears “by no means the France of peasants and villages, not the France of clerics and monks, merchants and fairs, artisans and workshops, but France, also very real, wars and diplomacy, the state and its servants, nobility and power haves." The scientist was especially interested in the history of the nobility, which remained the "enzyme of freedom" and "the main or at least the central figure on the socio-political chessboard." In this regard, he also refers to the evolution of chivalry in the late Middle Ages, believing that talking about its inevitable decline in the XIV-XV centuries. in France, as historians usually do, prematurely.

A privileged place among the topics previously dealt with by F. Contamine belongs to the history of everyday life in France and England in the era of the Hundred Years War, mainly in the 14th century. After a comprehensive analysis of the conditions and means of subsistence in both countries, Contamine came to the conclusion that these peoples were very close in terms of lifestyle, worldview, social organization and other “parameters”. And their relationship, according to the researcher, partly explains, although it does not justify, the conquering ambitions of the kings. Studying the history of the XIV-XV centuries, which, unlike the classical Middle Ages, did not enjoy the attention of medieval historians, F. Contamine raised the question of whether these centuries can be attributed to the “real” Middle Ages, or whether adjustments should be made to periodization. Characteristically, he finds weighty arguments in favor of his conclusions that we should talk about the continuation of the Middle Ages thanks to a careful analysis of the ideological foundations of war and peace.

However, F. Contamine was always more interested in war as the most important factor of human existence in the Middle Ages. The result of his many years of scientific research was the book "War in the Middle Ages" written in 1980.

Yu. P. Malinin

FOREWORD

In recent years, excellent generalizing studies have appeared in French about the war as a phenomenon, the armies of both antiquity and Europe in modern times. There are no similar works about the Middle Ages, and the first task of this book was to fill in the gap and, in accordance with the rules of the New Clio series, to provide readers with a fairly rich bibliography, to reveal the general features of the military history of the Middle Ages, and finally to reveal some topics more specifically, since they have either become the subject of modern research or, in our opinion, deserve closer attention.

Of course, it is hard work to try to cover at once, in one volume, the period of more than ten centuries, during which the war made its presence felt. We would gladly take on our own account the remark of one researcher: "No scientist can hope that he will master all the sources on such a vast subject over the course of a millennium." Moreover, medieval warfare was a whole world that combined both canon law and intercessory inscriptions on swords, both equestrian fighting techniques and the art of healing wounds, both the use of poisoned arrows, and the food recommended to fighters. In a word, the subject requires consideration from different angles if we want to comprehend it in its entirety: martial art, weapons, recruitment into the army, the composition and life of armies, the moral and religious problems of war, the relationship between the phenomenon of war and the social, political and economic environment. . And at the same time, it is necessary to observe chronology (understood more as a difference between "before" and "after" than as a sequential chain of events), which, as it seems to us, means as much for history as perspective does for classical painting.

1. The Billmen

Source: bucks-retinue.org.uk

In medieval Europe, the Vikings and Anglo-Saxons often used in battles numerous detachments of bilmen - foot soldiers, whose main weapon was a combat sickle (halberd). Derived from a simple peasant sickle for harvesting. The combat sickle was an effective edged weapon with a combined tip of a needle-shaped spear point and a curved blade, similar to a battle ax, with a sharp butt. During battles, it was effective against well-armored cavalry. With the advent of firearms, the units of bilmen (halberdiers) lost their significance, becoming part of beautiful parades and ceremonies.

2. Armored boyars

Source: wikimedia.org

The category of service people in Eastern Europe in the period of the X-XVI centuries. This military estate was common in Kievan Rus, Muscovy, Bulgaria, Wallachia, the Moldavian principalities, and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Armored boyars come from "armored servants" who served on horseback in heavy ("armored") weapons. Unlike the servants, who were released from other duties only in wartime, the armored boyars did not bear the duties of the peasants at all. Socially, armored boyars occupied an intermediate stage between peasants and nobles. They owned land with peasants, but their civil capacity was limited. After the accession of Eastern Belarus to the Russian Empire, the armored boyars became close in their position to the Ukrainian Cossacks.

3. Templars

Source: kdbarto.org

This was the name given to professional warrior-monks - members of the "order of the mendicant knights of the Temple of Solomon." It existed for almost two centuries (1114-1312), having arisen after the First Crusade of the Catholic army in Palestine. The order often performed the functions of military protection of the states created by the crusaders in the East, although the main purpose of its establishment was the protection of pilgrims visiting the "Holy Land". The Knights Templars were famous for their military training, mastery of weapons, clear organization of their units and fearlessness bordering on madness. However, along with these positive qualities, the Templars became known to the world as tight-fisted usurers, drunkards and debauchees, who took their many secrets and legends with them into the depths of centuries.

4. Crossbowmen

Source: deviantart.net

In the Middle Ages, instead of a combat bow, many armies began to use mechanical bows - crossbows. The crossbow, as a rule, surpassed the usual bow in terms of shooting accuracy and lethal force, but, with rare exceptions, it lost a lot in terms of rate of fire. This weapon received real recognition only in Europe from the 14th century, when numerous detachments of crossbowmen became an indispensable accessory of knightly armies. The decisive role in raising the popularity of crossbows was played by the fact that from the 14th century their bowstring began to be pulled with a collar. Thus, the restrictions imposed on the force of tension by the physical capabilities of the shooter were removed, and the light crossbow became heavy. Its advantage in penetrating power over the bow became overwhelming - bolts (shortened arrows of crossbows) began to pierce even solid armor.