Types of accidents on the main gas pipeline. The largest accidents on pipelines and gas pipelines in America
Page 1
Pipeline accidents under operating conditions occur mainly due to metal corrosion (33 - 50%), defects of construction origin (mechanical damage, girth weld defects), factory weld defects, violation of operating rules, equipment malfunctions and others. Statistical data on the destruction of gas pipelines and oil pipelines, presented in Table. 3.2 over a ten-year period (1967 - 1977) indicate a fairly large number of failures. More than 220 pipeline failures occurred annually.
An analysis of accidents in pipelines that have operated for more than 20 years shows that their aging affects the increase in the number of failures. This is primarily due to a decrease in the protective properties of insulating coatings, with the accumulation and development of defects in pipes and welded joints, and metal fatigue processes. Reduced plastic and viscous properties of the metal and welded joints.
The main causes of pipeline accidents are defects in their manufacture and installation, hydraulic shocks.
In case of pipeline failures due to defects in tees (bends), the entire tee assembly should be cut out and replaced with a new one.
Most often, pipeline accidents occur due to a malfunction at the junction of pipes.
To prevent accidents in pipelines laid in difficult engineering and geological conditions, it is necessary to establish the impact of changing operating conditions and parameters on the strength and stability of the pipeline, as well as to find potentially hazardous areas. Failures and accidents of pipelines laid in these conditions, along with other factors, are facilitated by their excessive bending, which is accompanied by uneven settlement and unstable position of the soil-pipe-liquid or gas system.
The main causes of pipeline failures are defects in their manufacture and installation, hydraulic shocks.
When the liquidation of a pipeline accident is carried out using underwater welding in a caisson, and in order to obtain a high-quality seam, the pipe is preheated to high temperatures, the diver-welder is subjected to double exposure: on the one hand, the high temperature of the gases of the welding arc, on the other hand, the high radiation temperature emitted pipe. Working in a hot, humid environment of the caisson, sweating profusely, bending over the body can cause fainting. To prevent this from happening, it is necessary to provide active cooling of the worker, a supply of water for drinking.
When liquidating an accident in pipelines for liquefied gases, some additional measures are required, precautions related to the specific properties of the products.
There have been cases of pipeline accidents caused by errors in the selection of pipes and fittings according to normals, defects made during manufacture. During installation and repair work, it is necessary to strictly control the compliance of materials specified in the projects, GOSTs, standards and technical conditions. The placement and methods of laying gas pipelines should provide the possibility of monitoring their technical condition. On pipelines transporting liquefied gases, it is necessary to install safety valves for gas discharge. On gas pipelines supplying liquefied gases to tanks, check valves must be installed between the pressure source and the shut-off valves. Valves must be installed on all liquefied gas pipelines before they enter the tank farm, which disconnect the tanks from the internal network in the event of an accident or any malfunction. At the inputs of gas pipelines of combustible gases to production shops and installations, shut-off valves with remote control outside the building must be installed.
In order to avoid an accident of pipelines, they are laid in such a way that self-compensation of thermal elongations of pipelines occurs. However, it is not always possible to achieve self-compensation. In most cases, special devices called compensators are used.
Data on the most significant pipeline accidents with complete rupture of joints show that such joints also had significant lack of penetration along the entire length of the seam, reaching 40% and even 60% of the wall thickness, and other defects.
The severity of the consequences of a pipeline accident is determined by the ratio of the size of the reservoir and the amount of oil that got into it. However, whatever these ratios may be, impacts of this kind can be considered very dangerous for wildlife.
LLC "City Center of Expertise" Head of the Industrial Safety Expertise Department Zinaida Arsentieva of GCE-Energo LLC. Head of the Department for the Development of Emergency Response Plans (PLAS)
LLC "City Center of Expertise" Head of Risk Analysis Department
Anton Chugunov
LLC "City Center of Expertise" Expert of the Industrial Safety Expertise Department
LLC "City Center of Expertise" Risk Analysis Department Expert
annotation
To date, the total length of the linear part of the main pipelines in the Russian Federation is more than 242 thousand km, of which: main gas pipelines - 166 thousand km; main oil pipelines - 52.5 thousand km; main product pipelines - 21.836 thousand km. Currently, more than 7,000 objects supervised by Rostekhnadzor are operated in the system of main pipeline transport. The specifics of the operation of pipeline transport is directly related to the risk of cascading accidents. Therefore, ensuring the safety of main oil and gas pipelines is of great importance for the energy security of the country.
One of the most important problems of pipeline transport is maintaining the operational state of the linear part of field and main pipelines. Numerous surveys show that underground gas pipelines operating under normal conditions have been in a satisfactory condition for several decades. This is facilitated by the great attention that is paid to the systematic monitoring of the condition of underground and aboveground gas pipelines and the timely elimination of emerging defects.
It is known that the main part of the gas transmission system of Russia was built in the 70-80s of the last century. To date, the depreciation of fixed assets in the linear part of the main gas pipelines is more than half, or rather - 5 7.2%.
Most of the main gas pipelines have an underground construction scheme for laying. Underground pipelines are affected by corrosive soils. Under the influence of corrosive wear of the metal, the thickness of the pipe wall decreases, which, in turn, can lead to emergencies at main pipelines.
The safety of pipeline transport facilities should be as high as possible to ensure reliable uninterrupted supplies of hydrocarbon raw materials, and the risk of accidents should be minimized.
As a rule, it appears as a result of corrosion and mechanical damage, the determination of the location and nature of which is associated with a number of difficulties and high material costs. It is quite obvious that opening a gas pipeline for its immediate visual inspection is not economically justified. In addition, only the outer surface of the object can be examined. Therefore, in recent years in our country and abroad, the efforts of specialized research and design organizations have been aimed at solving the problem of determining the state of underground and aboveground field, main oil product pipelines without opening them. This problem is associated with great technical difficulties, but with the use of modern methods and means of measuring technology, it is successfully solved.
The main scenarios of possible accidents on gas pipelines are related to the rupture of pipes to the full cross section and the outflow of gas into the atmosphere in a critical mode (at the speed of sound) from the two ends of the gas pipeline (upstream and downstream). The length of the rupture and the probability of gas ignition have a certain relationship both with the technological parameters of the pipeline (its energy potential) and with the characteristics of the soil (density, the presence of rocky inclusions). Large-diameter pipelines (1200–1400 mm) are characterized by long ruptures (50–70 m or more) and a high probability of gas ignition (0.6–0.7).
Gas combustion can proceed in two main modes. The first of them appears, as a rule, in the form of two independent (weakly interacting) flat flame jets with an orientation close to the gas pipeline axis. This is typical mainly for pipelines of large diameter (jet flame mode). The second should include the resulting (in terms of gas consumption) column of fire with a close to vertical orientation (combustion "in the pit"). This mode of gas combustion is more typical for pipelines of relatively small diameter.
Rice. Fig. 1. Total distribution of causes of accidents at main gas pipelines according to Rostekhnadzor data for 2005–2013.
The amount of natural gas that can participate in an accident depends on the diameter of the gas pipeline, operating pressure, location of the break, the time of the break identification, the placement features and the reliability of the operation of the linear valves. According to statistics, average gas losses per accident range from two and a half to three million cubic meters.
Rice. 2. Distribution of accidents on the linear part of gas pipelines of different diameters by their causes To analyze the causes and predict the expected intensity of accidents in the near future, data and generalizations published in official sources, including the annual reports of Rostekhnadzor, were used. The results of the analysis of the information contained in the annual reports on the activities of the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (http://www.gosnadzor.ru/public/annual_reports/) are given in Table. one.
Table 2.
From the above data, it can be seen that the largest number of accidents on the linear part of the main pipeline occurred due to external and internal corrosion (26%), defective construction and installation works (25.8%) and mechanical damage (21%).
Separately, it is possible to single out the accidents that occurred at the sections of crossings through water barriers as the most difficult sections of the linear part of the main pipeline in terms of engineering.
Table 3. Change in the intensity of accidents (number of accidents / 1000 km per year) on gas pipelines of the Russian Federation of various diameters, 2000–2010 
Table 4. Influence of the duration of operation on the relative indicators of the accident rate of gas pipelines It should be noted that there is a clearly traceable dependence of the frequency of accidents on the linear part of the gas pipeline on the period of its operation. This dependence is presented in table. 4. Including breakdown by different diameters (Table 5).
Table 5. Distribution of accidents (in % of their total number) for gas pipelines of different diameters depending on their service life The analysis of statistical data has shown that the intensity of accidents at main pipelines has a pronounced regional character, i.e. it is determined not only by general indicators of scientific and technical progress in the industry, but also by a number of local climatic, engineering-geological and geodynamic factors, features construction and operation of a particular site, development of industrial and transport infrastructure, general economic activity in the region. The main danger of emergency depressurization of gas pipelines are:
- Sections of gas pipelines after compressor stations (up to 5 km) - due to non-stationary dynamic loads;
- Sections of gas pipelines at connection points;
- Sections of underwater crossings;
- Sections passing near settlements and areas with a high level of anthropogenic activity (construction areas, intersections with roads and railways).
It is important to note that after 1990 there were no accidents such as avalanche destruction on Russian gas pipelines. This was the result of an increase in the level of technical requirements for pipes and welded joints. In addition, the quality of design work has improved, and the level of maintenance of gas pipelines has increased.
The available statistical data indicate that compliance with the established standard distances when laying various branches of main gas pipelines in one corridor is a measure sufficient to prevent accident chain development options (i.e., occurring according to the “domino” principle).
The manifestation of accidents on the main gas pipelines, representing, is of a pronounced territorial nature. The regional manifestation of accidents is associated with the difference in different regions of the engineering and geological features of the routes, the state of the road network, the general level of industrial and agricultural development, and so on.
The analysis showed that the corrosion rate north of the 60th parallel in natural soil conditions is 15–20 times higher due to relatively low temperatures than, for example, in the regions of Central Asia. Due to the influence of climatic factors in combination with regional characteristics of soil corrosion activity, the failure rate in the northern zone is 1.4 times, and in the southern zone 16 times higher than the value of λav for the middle zone.
Of particular importance are indicators of regional agricultural and industrial activity that affect mechanical and. The regional nature of the manifestation of accidents, in addition to general technological causes and anthropogenic influence, is determined by complex geodynamic processes in the upper layer of the earth's crust.
The analysis showed significant differences (up to 40 times) in the intensity of accidents in different regions of the Russian Federation. This must be taken into account in the risk analysis by appropriate correction of λav according to the accident rate of a particular region (region) or enterprise. In a number of areas, in addition, it is necessary to make more detailed clarifications, taking into account the specific local specifics of the pipeline route. Due to the lack of engineering methods, such clarifications are recommended to be carried out by introducing a special coefficient determined by the method of expert assessments.
Also, failures are often caused by planned and deep deformations of the river bed at the crossing site, bank erosion, mechanical damage by ship anchors, drags, ice, loss of pipeline stability, corrosion and defective pipes, as well as defects in construction and installation works.
Table. 6.
Accidents in the channel part most often occur during the spring flood. Thanks to the system of periodic monitoring and preventive maintenance created by OAO Gazprom, accidents at this part of the crossings are now quite rare. According to experts, the intensity of accidents in the channel part of the crossings is about 5-7 times higher than the similar indicator for adjacent "land" sections.
In the floodplain part of underwater crossings, pipeline breaks occur mainly in winter. This is explained by the fact that due to the violation of the insulation coating of certain sections of gas pipelines, corrosion can occur on them, associated with increased soil moisture and intense geochemical processes. Corrosion-weakened sections of pipes can be easily destroyed under the influence of intense compressive loads from flooded soils when they freeze.
It is necessary to single out the main problems, the solution of which will allow to some extent reduce the accident rate of gas profile facilities.
First, the main emphasis is placed on counteracting visible (currently relevant) hazards to the detriment of hazard prevention activities at the design stage and early stages of the object's life cycle.
Secondly, there is a repeated repetition of the same type of emergencies due to the lack of mechanisms for taking into account the experience of investigating incidents, failures and accidents in the prevention of emergencies at the stages of design, construction, reconstruction and operation of the facility.
In addition, the lack of effectiveness of the existing monitoring services can be noted. Services for tracking the actual situation at enterprises, as a rule, are limited to fixing "physical" phenomena and processes. They are not built into the systems that provide the synthesis and analysis of observations, the adoption of managerial decisions and the adjustment of their own activities.
Literature
- Materials of the annual reports on the activities of the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service for 2004-2014 (http://www.gosnadzor.ru/public/annual_reports/).
- Industrial safety and reliability of main pipelines / Ed. A.I. Vladimirova, V.Ya. Kershenbaum. - M.: National Institute of Oil and Gas, 2009. 696 p.
- Bashkin V.N., Galiulin R.V., Galiulina R.A. Emergency emissions of natural gas: problems and ways to solve them // Protection of the environment in the oil and gas complex. 2010. No. 8. S. 4-11.
- Lisanov M.V., Savina A.V., Degtyarev D.V. and others. Analysis of Russian and foreign data on accidents at pipeline transport facilities // Labor safety in industry. 2010. No. 7 S. 16-22.
- Lisanov M.V., Sumskoy S.I., Savina A.V. Risk analysis of main oil pipelines in substantiating design decisions that compensate for deviations from current safety requirements // Safety of labor in industry. 2010. №3. pp. 58-66.
- Mokrousov S.N. Problems of ensuring the safety of main and inter-field oil and gas pipelines. Organizational aspects of the prevention of unauthorized tie-ins // Safety of labor in industry. 2006. No. 9. S. 16-19.
- Revazov A.M. Analysis of emergency and emergency situations at the facilities of the main gas pipeline transport and measures to prevent their occurrence and reduce the consequences // Quality Management in the Oil and Gas Complex. 2010. No. 1. S. 68-70. Head of the Department for the Development of Emergency Response Plans (PLAS)
Emergency work on gas pipelines is classified as fire and gas hazardous, so here much attention is paid to ensuring the safety of repair work.
When eliminating accidents on a gas pipeline, the following work is performed: shutting off the emergency section of the gas pipeline and freeing it from gas; disabling the means of active protection of the pipeline against corrosion; excavation; cutting holes in the gas pipeline for installing rubber balls; installation of balls to isolate the cavity of the pipeline at the repair
tired area; welding work; checking the quality of seams by physical control methods; removal of shut-off rubber balls; hole welding; displacement of air from the emergency area; testing the seams of the repaired section under pressure of 1 MPa; applying an insulating coating; pipeline testing under working pressure; inclusion of means of active protection against corrosion.
Welding work on the gas pipeline is performed at an excess gas pressure of 200-500 Pa. At a lower pressure, the gas pipeline can be quickly emptied and air can enter it, resulting in the formation of an explosive mixture. At high pressures during hot work, a large flame is formed.
Fistulas formed in the gas pipeline are eliminated by welding, for which the edges of the fistula are carefully prepared for welding.
If cracks appear on the gas pipeline in welded joints or along the whole metal, then the defective sections are removed, and branch pipes are welded in their place. At the same time, holes are cut out on both sides of the defect for the installation of rubber locking balls. Air is pumped into the latter, creating a pressure of 4-5 kPa, and then proceed to cutting out the emergency section. During hot work, the gas pressure in the gas pipeline is closely monitored. To do this, a hole with a diameter of 3-4 mm is drilled in it, into which a fitting is inserted for connecting an 11-shaped pressure gauge. Welding work is carried out in the same way as described earlier.
If there is condensate in the gas pipeline, then it is removed before the start of hot work.
Upon completion of welding, new seams are checked by physical control methods, and then the rubber balls are removed. The holes for the balls are welded. Air is forced out of the gas pipeline, for which the disconnected section is blown in one direction. The gas is released through the spark plug. When purging, the gas pressure should be no more than 0.1 MPa. The purge of the gas pipeline is completed if the amount of oxygen in the gas mixture displaced through the candles is no more than 2% by volume. The repaired area is tested under working pressure. After applying an insulating coating to the welded pipe, the repaired area is backfilled, compacting the soil under the pipeline.
Hot work on existing gas pipelines transporting raw materials with a high content of hydrogen sulfide is recommended to be carried out in the following order. Section of the gas pipeline under repair 2 (Fig. 90) are turned off by linear taps 1. In it, the gas pressure is reduced to 200 - 500 Pa. Excessive gas pressure is controlled by liquid manometers. When performing scheduled hot work on gas pipelines transporting raw materials, in which the content of sulfur--246
hydrogen exceeds d,02 g/m 3 , the area between the line taps is pre-filled with purified gas.
In the area to be replaced 5 pipeline, which is marked in the pit, a technological hole is cut out 6 with a diameter of about 160 mm for the introduction of rubber locking shells into the pipeline. If the pipeline contains a large amount of liquid (water, condensate), then the section to be replaced is pre-purged with gas until it is completely removed. A small amount of liquid substances is pumped into special collection containers for subsequent disposal.
After the pipeline is freed from liquid through the process hole 6 rubber sheaths are inserted into the pipe, on both sides of it 4, which are filled with air until the flow section of the pipeline is blocked. The degree of filling of the shut-off shells with air is controlled visually and by checking their ability to move through the pipeline under the influence of forces of 50-60 N.
Technological hole 6 sealed with an elastic conical plug 9, in the central hole of which the end of the sleeve is hermetically fixed 10 for supplying an inert medium, and flexible tubes are passed through the side holes 11 10 m long for filling the shells with air. Then gas-mechanical foam is supplied under pressure into the space between the shells, under the action of which the rubber shells 4 move to a safe distance from the place of hot work (to the position 3), and then they are filled with air to working pressure.
To prevent damage to the shut-off shells on the inner surface of the pipeline, it is recommended to use rubber shells of the same size, damaged or expired, as protective covers. In this case, set to 3 shells are filled with air to a pressure of 5-6 kPa.
If there is a through damage in the replaced section of the pipeline, then it is sealed with a plaster for the period of movement of the shells. Locking shells easily move through the pipeline at an excess pressure of the medium in the space between them is not more than 0.5 kPa. When performing this operation, gas-mechanical foam is obtained using
 |
special technical means by irrigating the mesh package in the foam generator 8 sprayed in the exhaust gas stream with a foaming solution supplied from the tank 12 with sprayer 7.
After installing the locking shells in the working position, the flexible tubes 11 are placed in the cavity of the pipeline so as not to damage them during the fire cutting of the pipe. The area to be replaced is cut out. A new element is installed in its place. After welding this element, they proceed to the final operations. Upon completion of work in the pit, the section of the gas pipeline between the line valves in order to displace atmospheric air from it is blown with gas through purge candles to a residual volume fraction of oxygen in the gas of not more than 2%. When performing this operation, the shut-off shells are removed from the pipeline through piston receiving units or purge candles.
ORGANIZATION AND CARRYING OUT OF WORKS DURING THE INTERCONNECTION OF BENDS INTO OPERATING PIPELINES
During operation, it is often necessary to perform a tie-in to connect new lines to an existing pipeline, devices for receiving and launching a pig, bypass lines, and connecting loopings. Insertion is a laborious and fire hazardous process. The currently used non-flame (cold) tie-in methods make it possible to reduce the degree of fire hazard, reduce the volume and time of carrying out 1 work, which is carried out without stopping the pumping of oil or gas and with virtually no loss of the transported product.
A device was designed for tapping branches into main oil and oil product pipelines, which allows to carry out work without stopping pumping at a working pressure in the pipeline up to 6.4 MPa.
Installation for tapping branches into existing pipelines consists of an electric motor 16, gearbox 4, end cutter. 3 and corps 14 (Fig. 91).
The worm wheel of the reducer is cut along the middle plane into two parts. Bottom half 13 worm wheel forms with spindle 8 a pair of "screw - nut", and the upper half 12 is planted loosely on the hub of the lower half and has cams interacting with the cam clutch //,. which together with the spindle forms a movable key connection. With the help of the switching mechanism 5, the dog clutch is then engaged with the cams of the upper half 12 worm wheel, then with half-coupling cams 6, rigidly mounted on the gearbox 4. As a result of this, respectively, the working and accelerated feed of the cutting tool is carried out.
On gearbox for spindle guard 8 casing fixed 10 with limit switch 9, serving to turn off the electric motor when the cutting tool reaches the end position, and cam 7, which controls the feed of the cutting tool.
As a "cutting tool, an end | face annular cutter is used 3, "fixed together with a drill 15 at the end of the spindle 8. The unit is equipped with interchangeable housings 14 and cutters for cutting holes of various diameters. All housings have a spigot 1 with flange 2. The coolant is supplied through the branch pipe. A pump is attached to it, with the help of which the casing of the installation, the valve and the branch pipe welded to the existing pipeline are sealed.
The work on the tie-in branch is carried out as follows. After opening the pipeline at the tie-in point, the insulating coating is cleaned from its surface. At the tie-in point, a branch pipe of the same diameter as the future outlet is welded to the pipeline.
When carrying out welding work, the pressure in the pipeline through which the product is pumped must not exceed 2 MPa. Upon completion of welding work, it can be increased to a working one. A valve is attached to the welded pipe with a flange, under which a temporary support is installed. The installation is attached to the mating flange of the valve. Before milling the hole, the entire cavity from the pipeline to the installation is filled with an emulsion for cooling and lubrication of the cutting
using a pump, the installation housing, valves and a branch pipe welded to the pipeline (pressure equal to 1.5 working pressure in the pipeline) are checked. The pressing pressure is maintained for 5 minutes. Leaks at the joints and sweating of welds are not allowed.
After that, the cutting tool is brought to the surface of the pipe through an open valve and a hole is milled. At the end of the operation, the cutting tool, together with the cut out “penny”, is retracted to its original position. The valve is closed, and the installation is dismantled. A branch is attached to the valve. This completes the work on the tie-in tap. When inserting a branch, the installation is served by one person. The maximum hole cutting time is 25 minutes. The mass of the installation is 306 kg.
A technology has been developed for a fireless method of tapping branches into existing gas pipelines under high pressure. It completely eliminates welding work on an existing gas pipeline due to the use of a docking unit attached to the gas pipeline using a special sealant and a milling machine for cutting holes.
The docking unit consists of two halves with longitudinal flanges. One half of it has a branch pipe with a locking device, the diameter of which corresponds to the diameter of the connected gas pipeline. Both halves are connected with studs after they are installed on the surface of the pipeline.
The docking station is made on special equipment individually for each diameter and sealed with the surface of the pipeline by means of a sealing ring and sealant, providing absolute sealing at a pressure of 5.6-7.5 MPa. The sealant is designed for a gas pipeline operation period of 20-30 years at temperatures from +80 to -40°C.
The outlet holes on the existing gas pipeline are cut out with a special milling machine. The cutting tool is a set of crown cutters with a special tooth profile and a drill.
After determining the point of connection of the future outlet to the pipeline, a pit is torn off, the outer surface of the pipeline is cleaned of insulating coatings and corrosion products. On the cleaned surface of the pipeline and the inner surface of both halves of the docking station, a thin layer of sealant is applied, prepared on the basis of epoxy resins with the addition of the necessary fillers and plasticizers, which ensure reliable operation of the docking station during the entire period of operation of the pipeline. At the moment of tightening the hairpin connection, the sealant fills the shells and microcracks. The reliability of the entire assembly is checked by a hydraulic test for strength and tightness. After that, a milling unit is mounted to the flange of the locking device of the docking unit.
The milling unit is connected to a mobile power station. The electric drive through the gearbox transmits the rotational movement to the cutting tool, which is brought to the pipe body through an open locking device. To prevent water hammer during tapping under pressure, the pipe body is first drilled with a drill. After drilling for 30-40 s, the pressure in the pipeline and the cavity of the branch pipe is equalized, then milling begins. The milling mode is controlled by the handwheel of the feed drive.
The design of the cutting tool ensures the timely removal of chips and the cut element of the pipe body from the working area and prevents them from entering the gas pipeline. At the end of milling, the cutting tool is brought to the extreme right position, and the locking device on the branch pipe is transferred to the closed position. Through the purge fitting of the installation, gas is discharged from the cavity between the working body of the locking device and the connecting flange of the installation until atmospheric pressure is reached. A gas pipeline-outlet or a process line is connected to the locking device of the branch pipe.
- this is a dangerous incident on the pipeline associated with the release and (or) outflow under pressure of hazardous chemical fire-explosive or neutral substances (liquid, gaseous or multiphase), leading to a man-made emergency and causing damage to humans, technosphere objects and the environment. The emergency limit state of pipelines corresponds to a complete failure of the pipeline due to excessive loads and (or) local damage with a mandatory loss of pipeline integrity (leak / rupture).
Energy development, incl. nuclear, space-rocket and aviation technology, the chemical industry, is associated with the widespread use of high (up to 10 MPa) and ultra-high (up to 500 MPa) pressure pipelines. The continuous growth in the scale of production and processing of hydrocarbon raw materials causes an increase in unit capacities and concentration of technological and main pipelines with a total length of up to 400 thousand km and a pressure of up to 25 MPa in production areas and highways of combustible and explosive products, and primarily liquefied hydrocarbon gases, oil, wide fractions hydrocarbons. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the scale, number and severity of fires, the power of emergency explosions and the complication of the operational situation in the event of an accident.
The causes of A. on t. can be: mechanical damage due to fatigue, chemical and electrochemical corrosion, technological defects, external electromagnetic influences, erroneous actions of operators and personnel, terrorist acts. Major accidents and explosions on pipelines, as a rule, are accompanied by leakage of radioactive coolants, flammable and chemically hazardous liquids and gases, liquefied hydrocarbon gases. Of particular danger are large volley releases of these substances, which create significant difficulties in localizing accidents and protecting people.
In recent years, the production, transportation and consumption of liquid ammonia has significantly increased at manufacturing (up to 70 thousand tons), processing enterprises, and transportation bases (at port bases - up to 130 thousand tons). Chemical plants produce, store and transport liquid chlorine in large volumes. The rapid growth of its production causes an increase in the volume of warehouses, and, consequently, an increase in the potential danger of diamonds by t.
At launch rocket systems using liquid-jet engines, special pipeline systems (with pressures up to 60 MPa and temperatures up to 1200 ° C) are widely used for liquid fuels and oxidizers, which create the danger of fires, explosions and contamination. In nuclear power facilities, water and steam coolants, liquid metals (sodium, lead, bismuth) with pressures up to 20 MPa and temperatures up to 650 °C are pumped through pipelines at speeds up to 50 m/s. In case of accidents on such pipelines, there are: dangerous jet leaks that destroy engineering structures, powerful reactive forces that move pipelines for tens and hundreds of meters; large fragmentation effects.
Particularly dangerous are accidents on the main circulation pipelines and tube bundles of steam generators of nuclear power plants with the loss of radioactive coolant.
Accidents with the formation of leaks or complete destruction of technological and main pipelines create the danger of fires and pollution of soils and water areas. Pipelines transporting wide fractions of hydrocarbons, when leaks form, create an extremely high risk of explosions and fires due to the accumulation of large masses of these substances in lowlands due to a higher density than air.
To prevent A. on the pipeline, modern methods of calculation and testing for strength and service life, methods of regular and operational diagnostics (including in-line diagnostics), methods for detecting and locating leaks, special systems for fixing pipelines, and laying them in channels and tunnels are used. Pipeline cladding and corrosion protection systems, pressure pulsation and vibration suppression systems show high efficiency. New technologies for repair and restoration work on emergency pipelines (using composite materials and materials with shape memory) make it possible not to stop their operation. When dangerous leaks from emergency pipelines are detected, warning systems for personnel and the public are used, as well as rather sophisticated technologies for eliminating the consequences of emergency situations.
Pipeline accidents
Federal Agency for Education
Saratov State
socio-economic university
Department of Life Safety
"Accidents on pipelines".
UEF first-year students
Grigorieva Tamara Pavlovna
Head: Associate Professor of the Department
Bayazitov Vadim Gubaidullovich
Saratov, 2007.
Introduction.
1. General information on the state of the pipeline system in the Russian Federation in 2008;
2. Accidents on oil pipelines;
3. Accidents on the gas pipeline;
4. Accidents on the water supply;
5. Consequences of accidents on pipelines;
6. Self-rescue and rescue of victims of fires and explosions on pipelines;
Conclusion.
Bibliography.
Introduction:
In terms of the length of underground pipelines for transporting oil, gas, water and wastewater, Russia ranks second in the world after the United States. However, there is no other country where these pipelines are so worn out. According to experts of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia, the accident rate at pipelines is increasing every year, and in the 21st century these life support systems have become worn out by 50-70%. Leaks from pipelines bring enormous economic and environmental damage to the country. A particularly large number of accidents occur in cities as a result of water leaks from worn-out communications - sewer, heating and water supply networks. From the destroyed pipelines, water seeps into the ground, the level of groundwater rises, sinkholes and subsidence occur, which leads to flooding of foundations, and ultimately threatens to collapse buildings. Foreign experience shows that this problem can be solved if plastic pipes are used instead of steel pipelines, and the laying of new ones and the repair of worn ones is carried out not in an open, but in a trenchless way. The advantages of repairing pipelines using the trenchless method are obvious: repair costs are reduced by 6-8 times, and work productivity increases tenfold.
There is a process of gradual transition from traditional building materials to new ones. In particular, when laying and reconstructing pipelines, polymer pipes are increasingly being used. Compared to steel or cast iron, they have a number of undeniable advantages: ease of transportation and installation, high corrosion resistance, long service life, low cost, smoothness of the inner surface. In such pipes, the quality of the pumped water does not deteriorate, since due to the hydrophobicity of the surface, various deposits do not form in them, as happens in steel and cast iron pipelines. Plastic pipes do not require any waterproofing, including cathodic protection, they provide continuous transportation of water, oil and gas without high maintenance costs.
The experience of reconstruction and construction of underground utilities in Chelyabinsk indicates that the use of advanced trenchless technologies can significantly reduce the cost and simplify such work. This is especially true for the central districts of the city, where the work of laying pipelines in the traditional trench way is associated with significant difficulties: these works often require the closure of passages, changing the routes of urban transport. Numerous approvals from various organizations are required. With the introduction of the latest technologies, it became possible to carry out the laying of pipelines and utilities without opening the surface and the participation of a large number of people and heavy construction equipment. Thus, the movement of urban transport is not disturbed, work on the installation of bypasses, transitional bridges is excluded, which is especially important for a city with dense buildings and a high level of traffic. Due to the absence of inconvenience and inappropriate costs (compared to construction in trenches, labor costs are reduced by about 4 times), the use of these technologies is very effective. In many cases, the use of modern technologies makes it possible to abandon the construction of new communications and, through reconstruction, completely restore and improve their technical characteristics.
The use of the latest technologies in underground construction is designed to solve the main problem - to improve the quality of underground facilities under construction and ensure the safety of their operation. The city government pays close attention to this issue. Only specialized organizations that have the appropriate license are allowed to work. At all stages of construction, multilateral monitoring is carried out, which provides data on the progress of the project and changes in the environment, constant monitoring of changes in the level of groundwater, settlements in the foundations of nearby buildings, and deformation of the soil mass is carried out.
General information on the state of the pipeline system in the Russian Federation for 2008
The field pipeline systems of the majority of oil producing enterprises in Russia are in a pre-emergency state. In total, 350,000 km of infield pipelines are in operation on the territory of the Russian Federation, where more than 50,000 incidents leading to dangerous consequences are recorded annually. The main reasons for the high accident rate in the operation of pipelines are the reduction in repair capacity, the slow pace of work to replace expired pipelines with pipelines with anti-corrosion coatings, as well as the progressive aging of existing networks. More than 100,000 km of field pipelines are operated at the fields of Western Siberia alone, of which 30% have a 30-year service life, but no more than 2% of pipelines are replaced per year. As a result, up to 35,000–40,000 incidents occur each year, accompanied by oil spills, including into water bodies, and their number is increasing every year, and a significant part of the incidents are deliberately hidden from registration and investigation.
The accident rate at the facilities of the main pipeline transport decreased by 9%. The system of main oil pipelines, gas pipelines, oil product pipelines and condensate pipelines operating on the territory of the Russian Federation does not meet modern safety requirements.
In the process of reforming the economy and as a result of changes in the oil markets, there is a constant decrease in the volume of financing for new construction, overhaul, reconstruction, modernization, maintenance and current repairs of physically worn out and obsolete trunk pipeline facilities. The development of new equipment, instruments and technologies for flaw detection of pipelines and equipment, as well as the development of new regulatory documents and the revision of outdated ones are extremely insufficiently funded.
There is no legislative basis for state regulation of the safety of the operation of main pipelines, and therefore the need has arisen for the adoption of a federal law on main pipelines. The development of this law, which began in 1997, has not yet been completed.
In the Russian Federation, the total length of underground oil, water and gas pipelines is about 17 million kilometers, while due to constant intense wave (pressure fluctuations, water hammer) and vibration processes, sections of these communications have to be constantly repaired and completely replaced. The issues of corrosion protection for the oil, oil and gas production, processing and transportation industries are very relevant, due to the metal consumption of oil storage tanks and other structures, the presence of aggressive environments and harsh operating conditions for metal structures. The losses caused by water hammer and corrosion amounted to several hundred billion dollars for the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the former USSR and about 50 thousand tons of ferrous metals per year. With the general dynamics of accidents, according to experts, the causes of pipeline rupture are:
60% of cases - water hammer, pressure drops and vibrations
25% - corrosion processes
15% - natural phenomena and force majeure.
During the entire period of operation, pipelines experience dynamic loads (pressure pulsations and associated vibrations, water hammer, etc.). They occur during the operation of injection units, actuation of shut-off pipeline valves, accidentally occur due to erroneous actions of maintenance personnel, emergency power outages, false operation of process protection, etc.
The technical condition of pipeline systems operated for 20-30 years leaves much to be desired. The replacement of worn-out equipment and pipeline fittings has been carried out at an extremely low rate over the past 10 years. That is why there is a steady tendency to increase the accident rate in pipeline transport by 7-9% per year, as evidenced by the annual State reports "On the state of the environment and industrial hazards of the Russian Federation."
Pipeline accidents have become more frequent, accompanied by large losses of natural resources and widespread environmental pollution. According to official data, only oil losses due to accidents at main oil pipelines exceed 1 million tons per year, and this does not take into account losses due to breaks in infield pipelines.
Here are just a few examples of oil pipeline accidents in 2006:
As a result of a major accident at the Druzhba main oil pipeline in the territory of the Surazh district of the Bryansk region on the border with Belarus, the terrain, water bodies and lands of the state forest fund were contaminated with oil. The deputy head of Rosprirodnadzor noted that since the spring of 2006, 487 dangerous defects have been discovered in the section of the Druzhba oil pipeline, where the accident occurred. Pipeline corrosion was the cause of the oil pipeline accident.
A major accident occurred at 326 km of the main oil pipeline Uzen - Atyrau - Samara in the south-west of Kazakhstan. According to ITAR-TASS, emergency recovery work has begun at the scene. Meanwhile, nothing is known about the scale and cause of the accident, the area of oil pollution and the amount of remediation work. Over the past week, this is the second major incident on the oil pipelines of Kazakhstan. On January 29, as a result of a metal rupture due to a water hammer, about 200 tons of oil spilled onto the ground at 156 km of the main pipeline Kalamkas - Karazhanbas - Aktau.
Therefore, the complete elimination or significant reduction in the intensity of wave and vibration processes in pipeline systems allows not only to reduce the number of accidents with pipeline ruptures and failure of pipeline fittings and equipment by several times, to increase the reliability of their operation, but also to significantly increase their service life.
Currently, to combat pulsations and fluctuations in pressure and flow in pipeline systems, air caps, pressure accumulators, various types of dampers, receivers, throttle washers, relief valves, etc. are used. They are obsolete, do not correspond to the modern development of science and technology, are ineffective, especially in the case of water hammer and transient dynamics, do not meet the requirements of environmental safety, as evidenced by accident statistics. At the moment, in Russia there are new technologies for emergency protection of pipelines that allow you to extinguish all intra-system disturbances: water hammer, pressure fluctuations and vibrations. A fundamentally new highly efficient non-volatile technical means of damping pressure fluctuations, vibrations and hydraulic shocks are pressure stabilizers (SD).
At the same time, oil losses inevitably occur, the average level of which is estimated at 0.15-0.2 tons / day. for one impulse. In addition, highly aggressive mixtures enter the environment, causing significant damage to it.
According to the State report "On the state of industrial safety of hazardous production facilities, rational use and protection of the subsoil of the Russian Federation in 2006" main causes of accidents on main pipelines during 2001-2006. become:
external influences - 34.3%, (their total number),
marriage during construction - 23.2%,
external corrosion - 22.5%,
defects in the manufacture of pipes and equipment at factories - 14.1%,
erroneous actions of personnel - 3%.
The main cause of accidents at infield pipelines is pipe ruptures caused by internal corrosion. The wear of infield pipelines reaches 80%, so the frequency of their breaks is two orders of magnitude higher than on the main ones, and is 1.5 - 2.0 breaks per 1 km. Thus, 21,093 km of infield and main oil and gas pipelines have been built on the territory of the Nizhnevartovsk region of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug since the beginning of the field operation, most of which have already fallen into disrepair, but continue to be operated.
The dominant cause of accidents on existing gas pipelines in Russia is stress corrosion. For the period from 1991 to 2001, 22.5% of the total number of accidents were due to stress corrosion. In 2000, it already accounted for 37.4% of all accidents. In addition, the geography of manifestation of corrosion under stress is expanding.
The fixed assets of pipeline transport, like the entire technosphere, are aging, highways are degrading at an ever-increasing rate. Inevitably, crises are approaching. For example, the depreciation of fixed assets of the gas transmission system of OAO Gazprom is about 65%. Thus, extending the safe service life of pipeline systems is the most important task of oil and gas transporters.
At present, an in-pipe survey has been carried out in relation to the main oil pipelines, as well as 65 thousand km of gas pipelines out of 153 thousand km of the total length. At the same time, about 1.5% of dangerous defects from the total number of detected defects are repaired. According to Transneft, the distribution density of corrosion defects is 14.6 def./km. The corrosion rate in a significant part is 0.2 - 0.5 mm/year, but there is also a much higher rate - from 0.8 to 1.16 mm/year.
The most vulnerable today are the main gas pipelines of the Northern Corridor. The Northern Corridor is a multi-line system of gas pipelines laid from the areas of northern fields (Urengoyskoye, Zapolyarnoye, Medvezhye, etc.) to the borders of Belarus on one side and to the border with Finland on the other. The route of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline under construction runs in the same corridor. The total length of the existing gas pipelines of the Northern Corridor in a single-line calculation is about 10 thousand km. The total productivity of gas pipelines in the head part is 150 billion m? gas per year. In the areas where the Ukhta-Torzhok gas pipeline passes (1-4 lines), the gas pipeline's capacity is 80 billion m2 per year.
In recent years, there has been a high proportion of accidents of this particular section of main pipelines due to stress corrosion (71.0%). In 2003, 66.7% of accidents were also stress-corrosive in nature. The age of gas pipelines that have suffered stress-corrosion accidents is continuously growing. Along the corridors of the Northern Corridor for 2001-2003 this average age was 24.2 years, the maximum was 28 years. Approximately 10 years ago, the average age of gas pipelines that suffered stress-corrosion accidents was 13-15 years.
2. Accidents on oil pipelines
Accidents on the pipeline occur not only for technical reasons: there are a number of others, the main of which is the so-called human factor. A huge number of accidents occur as a result of negligence, both employees and superiors. This is precisely what is emphasized in a number of further examples.
On June 5, in the Vitebsk region, the repair of more than 40-kilometer section of the Russian main oil product pipeline "Unecha - Ventspils" was completed. At the same time, the culprit of the largest accident on this transport line was officially announced.
As the BelaPAN was told in the directorate of the Russian unitary enterprise Zapad-Transnefteprodukt (Mozyr), oil products have been pumped through the Unecha-Ventspils pipeline for forty years already. During the diagnostics of the pipeline in 2005, specialists found many defects. The owner of the oil pipeline considers the culprit to be the manufacturer - the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant (Russia), on the basis of which four enterprises currently operate. After two accidents at the oil pipeline in the Beshenkovichi district of the Vitebsk region (in March and May 2007), specialists from Zapad-Transnefteprodukt conducted a re-examination of the pipeline and began to replace potentially dangerous sections on their own. Transportation of diesel fuel from Russia to Latvia through Belarus was suspended for 60 hours. During this time, five Belarusian repair teams of Zapad-Transnefteprodukt from Mozyr and Rechitsa (Gomel region), Senno and Disna (Vitebsk region), Krichev (Mogilev region) replaced 14 fragments of the pipeline.
The prosecutor's office identified the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant as the culprit of its outbursts on the territory of the Beshenkovichi district, which manufactured defective pipes in 1963.
It should be reminded that on March 23, 2007 in the Beshenkovichi district of the Vitebsk region there was a rupture of the Unecha-Ventspils oil product pipeline. As a result of the accident, diesel fuel through the reclamation canal and the Ulla River got into the Western Dvina and reached Latvia. Zapad-Transnefteprodukt compensated the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Belarus for the losses incurred in eliminating the consequences of the accident on 23 March. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of Belarus has calculated the damage caused to the environment from the first rupture of the oil pipeline. It is expected that by June 15 the amount of damage will be agreed with the owner of the pipeline and presented to the public.
The second pipe break at the Unecha-Ventspils oil product pipeline occurred on 5 May. "The breakthrough is local. A small amount of oil products leaked out of the pipeline," Minister for Emergency Situations of Belarus Enver Bariyev told the BelaPAN at the time.
He assured that the accident would not bring serious consequences for the environment. "Oil products will not get into the rivers," the minister said.
It is symptomatic that the second break occurred near the village of Baboyedovo, Beshenkovichi district, near the place where the first major pipe break occurred in March.
As they say, where it is thin, it breaks there.
On February 27, 2007, in the Orenburg region, 22 km from the city of Buguruslan, an oil leak occurred from the infield pipeline of the Buguruslanneft Oil and Gas Production Department (a subdivision of Orenburgneft, a part of TNK-BP).
Fortunately, or unfortunately, but the spill, the volume of which, according to the preliminary estimates of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, was about 5 tons, hit the ice of the Bolshaya Kinel River. Unfortunately, the pipe leaked right in the area of the river. Fortunately, it seems that the oil did not spill directly into the water, but onto ice 40 cm thick.
In Makhachkala, an oil leak occurred due to a gust on an oil pipeline. The leak occurred in the Leninsky district of the city on a section of an oil pipeline with a diameter of 120 millimeters.
As a result of an oil pipeline rupture, about 250-300 liters of oil spilled out, the slick is about ten square meters. To eliminate the accident, they blocked the flow of oil in this area.
"The slick is bunded (contamination is localized)," the Ministry of Emergency Situations said. According to him, there were no reports of casualties.
An operational group of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Republic of Dagestan worked on the spot. At the moment, specialists from OAO Dagneftegaz are dealing with the liquidation of the accident.
The oil pipeline Omsk - Angarsk - the largest (2 threads with a diameter of 700 and 1000 mm) stretches from the western border of the region and almost to the east. Crude oil is pumped. The oil pipeline is owned by OAO Transsibneft AK Transneft of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation. In the Irkutsk Region, the oil pipeline is operated by the Irkutsk Regional Oil Pipeline Administration (IRNPU). In 2001, IRNPU developed the “Plan for the Prevention and Elimination of Emergency Oil Spills of the Irkutsk Regional Oil Pipeline Department of OAO Transsibneft” - is being agreed. The number of accidents on the oil pipeline for the period from 1993 to 2001:
1. March 1993. At 840 km of the main oil pipeline Krasnoyarsk - Irkutsk (the pipeline was damaged by a bulldozer), 8 thousand tons of oil spilled onto the relief. Timely measures taken to localize the place of the strait made it possible to minimize the consequences of this accident. The spilled oil was mostly pumped to storage facilities. The contaminated soil was collected and taken out for disposal.
2. March 1993. At 643 km of the main oil pipeline Krasnoyarsk - Irkutsk (rupture of the oil pipeline due to a defect in the weld, the moment of the accident was not recorded in time) more than 32.4 thousand tons of oil poured onto the surface. The urgent measures taken to eliminate the consequences of this accident made it possible to quickly neutralize the negative phenomena. However, about 1 thousand tons of oil penetrated into the bowels and was localized 150-300 m from the operating Tyretsky economic groundwater intake. About 40% of the 2nd and 3rd belts of the sanitary protection zone of the water intake turned out to be contaminated with oil. About 1,000 more tons of oil penetrated into the soil in the area of the swampy floodplain of the river. Ungi and gradually migrated downstream to the economically valuable aquifer. In order to protect the Tyretsky utility groundwater intake from oil pollution, a special protective water intake was built and put into operation, which has been “cutting off” oil-contaminated water from the utility water intake for 9 years. The ecological and hydrogeological situation remains difficult in terms of oil pollution of the extracted water by economic water intake. Throughout the years, after the accident, state environmental control was carried out over the conduct of environmental and hydrogeological work in the area of the accident. Every year, joint meetings of persons and services interested in cleaning up oil-contaminated lands and underground horizons (land users, environmental authorities, sanitary and epidemiological supervision, hydrometeorological services, hydrogeologists, oil pipeline management) are held - the monitoring results for the past year are summed up and a further program of work is determined. Until 1999, maintenance of monitoring and control systems for the geological environment in the area of the Tyretsky water intake was carried out under the contract of the State Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Irkutskgeologia”. Since 1999 - IRNPU
3. March 1995. At 464 km of the main oil pipeline Krasnoyarsk - Irkutsk (crescent-shaped crack on the pipeline DN 1000 mm, length 0.565 m, width 0.006 m) 1683 m3 of oil poured onto the surface. The oil along the stream bed (300 m) reached the Kurzanka River and spread over the ice of the river to a distance of 1150 m. During the liquidation works, 1424 m3 of oil was collected and pumped into the reserve pipeline DN 700 mm. The Kurzanka River was completely cleared of pollution before the onset of the spring flood. Irretrievable oil losses amounted to 259 m3, of which 218.3 m3 was burned. Oil-contaminated soil from the stream bed was removed and stored in a quarry, where it was treated with bioprin.
4. January 1998. At 373 km of the main oil pipeline Krasnoyarsk - Irkutsk (380 mm long crack on the pipeline DN 1000 mm) oil outflow to the surface is about 25 m3, about 20 m3 is collected. Contaminated snow was removed to the oil traps of the Nizhneudinskaya PS.
5. November 1999. At 565 km of the main oil pipeline Krasnoyarsk - Irkutsk (depressurization of the Du 700 pipeline, as a result of damage to the valve during repair work, followed by ignition of spilled oil). The pollution area is 120 m2, 48 tons of oil burned.
6. December 2001 at 393.4 km of the main oil pipeline Krasnoyarsk - Irkutsk (during the emptying of the reserve line DN 700 mm, with the pumping of oil from the PNU into the pipeline DN 1000 mm), the suction line of the pump was depressurized. About 134 m3 of oil spilled onto the surface. The oil was localized in a lower part of the relief - a natural ravine located at a distance of 80 m from the accident site. After the damage was repaired, oil from the ravine - 115 m3 - was pumped into the operating oil pipeline. The rest of the oil was collected by a special vehicle. The volume of irretrievable oil losses amounted to 4 m3. The oil-contaminated soil surface was treated with the Econaft sorbent, followed by the removal of contaminated soil to the Nizhneudinskaya PS. According to the Order of the CRC, monitoring of lands and surface waters of the river is organized in the Irkutsk region. Oody
2. Accidents on gas pipelines.
As a result of the accident on the Aksai-Gudermes-Grozny gas pipeline, three districts of Chechnya and part of the city of Grozny were left without gas. Now, repair and restoration work is underway at the site of the accident, the information portal "Caucasian Knot" reports.
“The accident happened on the evening of January 26, between 19:00 and 20:00,” the Chechen Ministry of Emergency Situations reported. - A gas leak on the main gas pipeline was recorded about one and a half kilometers from the city of Gudermes, near the village of Beloreche. Here, along the bottom of the Belka River, the line of the Aksai-Gudermes-Grozny gas pipeline runs.
According to experts, the reasons for the rupture of the gas pipe, the diameter of which is 50 centimeters, are "man-made".
Large-scale repair and restoration work has been underway at the accident site since early morning. Emergency services, employees of the republican Ministry of Emergency Situations and the military are involved in the liquidation of the accident.
As a result of an accident on the main gas pipeline, three districts of Chechnya remain without gas: Kurchaloy, Shali and Groznensky. There is no gas in the northern part of the Chechen capital either.
In the Stavropol Territory, three villages were left without gas due to an accident on a gas pipeline.
In the Tarashchansky district of the Kyiv region, on the border with the Boguslavsky district, an explosion occurred on the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline, owned by Ukrtransgaz.
Transportation of natural gas from Russia to Europe via the main gas pipeline was suspended. The Ministry of Emergency Situations of Ukraine told Interfax that gas is supplied to Europe via a bypass line. This was confirmed by Naftogaz Ukrainy and Gazprom, and later by the EU.
The accident, according to updated data, occurred at about 15:15 Kyiv time (16:15 Moscow time) near the Stavishche compressor station near the village of Luka. The blast wave threw a 30-meter piece of pipe with a diameter of 1420 mm by 150 m. The gas was supplied at a pressure of 74 atmospheres. The fire at the site of the explosion has been extinguished. On an area of 1.5 hectares, green spaces burned out, including 100 trees, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Ukraine reported.
22 settlements in the Tarashchansky district of the Kyiv region, including the district center itself, 4 settlements in the Boguslavsky district and 6 in the Cherkasy region were left without gas supply.
There are no victims or injured. At the scene, the leadership of the main department of the Ministry of Emergency Situations in the Kyiv region, as well as employees of Cherkasytransgaz, the police, and the district prosecutor's office are working. An investigation is underway, a criminal case has not yet been started.
Minister of Transport and Communications of Ukraine Mykola Rudkovsky did not rule out that the accident could be the result of sabotage. "The situation that we had on the railway near Kyiv with the 168th train, and this accident today - it is not excluded, may be a link in the planned actions to destabilize the situation in the country," the minister said on the air of the Ukrainian Channel 5 on Monday evening.
The Ukrtransgaz company, which services this gas pipeline, claimed that there was no pipe rupture. The company does not report on the possible timing of the elimination of the consequences of the explosion and the resumption of gas transportation through the pipeline.
"The gas pipeline where the accident occurred is now blocked and gas has been released through other branches," Ukrtransgaz said, adding that there is currently no danger to others. The press service stressed that the affected section is located in a marshy area, and "the swampy environment negatively affects the gas pipeline."
The explosion will not affect the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine to European countries, the press center of Naftogaz Ukrainy reported. "Ukraine's obligations for the transit of natural gas to European consumers are fully fulfilled by increasing the supply of gas through other gas pipelines, as well as by withdrawing gas from underground storage facilities," said Oleksiy Fedorov, head of Naftogaz Ukrainy's public relations department.
Gazprom assured that the company fully ensures the fulfillment of its obligations to supply gas to European consumers in the direction of Ukraine. There were no restrictions on gas supplies to European consumers, the company's press service told PRIME-TASS.
The Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline was built in 1983. The length of the gas pipeline is 4451 km. The design capacity is 32 billion cubic meters per year. The length of the main gas pipeline Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod through the territory of Ukraine is 1160 km, its capacity is 27.9 billion cubic meters of gas per year. There are nine compressor stations along the pipeline route.
On October 24, 2007, gas supply was restored in the Stavropol Territory after an accident in the village of Burlatsky, Blagodarnensky District.
As Rosbalt-South news agency was informed by the press service of the Southern Regional Center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, “the day before at 11.20, when plowing the fields, damage occurred on the 75th km switchboard of the local gas pipeline Kamennaya Balka - Mirnoye - Zhuravskoye with a diameter of 514 mm."
The press service said that there was no explosion or fire, and there were no casualties. The repair and operational team "Stavropolkraigas" 15.00 restored the gas supply to the settlement, which is home to 3.5 thousand people, more than 1 thousand of whom are children.
3. Accidents on the water supply.
On the fact of the accident on the main water supply in the Petrovsky district of the Stavropol Territory, a criminal case was initiated under Part 1 of Art. 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (negligence). As a REGNUM correspondent was informed in the press service of the regional prosecutor's office, the prosecutor's office of the Petrovsky district is investigating the case. An audit conducted by the prosecutor's office found that the main water supply system had been in disrepair for a long time. However, officials did not take measures to eliminate defects and irregularities in the operation of the water supply system and did not prevent freezing of its individual sections.
A rush on the main water supply and freezing of its sections became possible due to improper performance by officials of the Svetlograd branch of the state unitary enterprise of the Stavropol Territory "Stavropolkrayvodokanal" of their official duties due to dishonest attitude to service.
January 23, 2006 at 21:25 in the area of the village of Martynovka, Petrovsky district, Stavropol Territory, there was a rupture of the main water supply, which is on the balance sheet of the Svetlograd branch of the state unitary enterprise "Stavropolkrayvodokanal". As a result of an accident in a number of microdistricts of the city of Svetlograd and nearby villages with a total population of over 41 thousand people, the water supply was interrupted. The amount of damage to the state unitary enterprise "Stavropolkrayvodokanal" amounted to 1,026 thousand rubles.
The center of Asino is without water for 5 days. The reason for the shutdown of water - a rush of water supply on the street. Goncharova. The restoration of the damaged section of the water pipeline is being carried out by the teams of JSC Asinovskie Utility Systems. As Avtoradio-Tomsk was informed at the control room of Asinovskie Utility Systems, this accident did not affect the heating of residential buildings and educational institutions, and water supply will be restored in the near future.
Due to an accident on the water supply, traffic is paralyzed in the Zemlyanoy Val area in Moscow
In the capital, in the area of Zemlyanoy Val, a highway was flooded due to an accident at the water supply, RIA Novosti reports with reference to the capital's traffic police department. The movement of cars due to the flooding of three lanes of the road is paralyzed.
The accident on the cold water supply pipeline with a diameter of 100 millimeters occurred at about 17.00. Currently, the damaged area is closed, and restoration teams are working at the scene.
Twenty garages were flooded today as a result of an accident on the water supply near the fourteenth school in the Oktyabrsky district of Irkutsk. Water spouted from the well, flowed through the school stadium and the garage cooperative, and then went into the sewer. There are many water lines in the area, and it was difficult for specialists to determine the location of the accident. The fountain beat from two o'clock in the afternoon and only at five it was possible to liquidate it. A school and several residential buildings were left without water.