Is it possible to live without conflicts in life? Is it possible to live without conflicts? NATO will remain a nuclear alliance

Life without conflicts... What is it? Paradise? The ideal cohesive group of people? Or is it endless boredom and regression of society and, in particular, of man? The English writer John Le Carré once put it this way: “Conflict is a very important thing. “The cat sat on the pillow” is not the beginning of a novel, but “the cat sat on the dog’s pillow” is.” Conflicts can stir up people, an entire generation, which, in turn, can play a significant role and change the previously established order of life. Conflicts can give rise to progress. They influence a person, society, and any influence in life is very significant. Life without conflicts is monosyllabic, unpromising, and unproductive. I'm not afraid of this word, it is meaningless. So is it possible to live without such an important component of our destiny as conflicts?

Conflicts are important for all people, even for friends: to test the strength of their friendship, to test the similarities of their moral beliefs and life interests. Conflict resolution will reveal a true friend. A quarrel, an inability to find compromises, and ultimately an insoluble dispute will open a person’s eyes, because this will mean that people have different life positions, that their relationships create only a visible manifestation of friendship. There is undoubtedly confirmation of my words in the literature. For example, in the novel by A.S. Pushkin’s “Dubrovsky”, the rich, noble gentleman Troekurov, whom everyone fears, finds a friend in the poor neighbor-landowner Andrei Gavrilovich Dubrovsky, who is not afraid of the arrogant Kirila Petrovich. One day one of Troekurov’s hounds insulted Dubrovsky, and he, in turn, writes a letter to his friend demanding an apology and punishment for the hound. Troekurov is outraged by Andrei Gavrilovich’s tone. The conflict is getting worse. This is where the reader can understand what kind of friends they really were. True friendship cannot be broken by such petty, insignificant reasons. Both Troekurov and Dubrovsky needed the conflict to realize that their beliefs and moral standards are completely different, that they are definitely not friends, that they are only wasting their time on the wrong person when they can try to find a true friend.

To prove my words, let us turn to another work of the great Russian writer Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin. In the novel in verse "Eugene Onegin" there are two so-called friends. One of them is Vladimir Lensky, a young enthusiastic dreamer and romantic poet who respects his friend and his opinion. The second is Evgeny Onegin, a cold man, already tired of life in his young years, who casually makes fun of his friend, of his love impulses. Both of them are invited to Tatiana Larina’s name day. Evgeny gets bored and dances several dances in a row with Vladimir’s fiancee. Lensky challenges Onegin to a duel, where he misses, but Onegin ends the duel with the bloodshed of his friend. Of course, it is necessary to look for another solution so that the conflict does not have a fatal outcome, but in this novel the reader can be convinced that it is impossible to live without conflicts, a person will always create them, because his nature needs to search for the truth. But the truth was still found: their relationship was not friendship.

So, life without conflicts does not make sense; a person himself is not able to live without conflicts, since on a subconscious level he still understands their significance. Thanks to conflicts, the life experience of an individual and an entire generation accumulates. Moreover, conflicts are the basis of history.

Question 1. List the activities that will help you manage your feelings and emotions.

Psychologists and psychotherapists give some simple tips that will help you manage your feelings and emotions:

• you need to cultivate self-control and will;
• you should learn to analyze various situations (what caused them, what the consequences may be, what depends on you to successfully resolve them; practice shows that there are no hopeless situations); if it is difficult to cope with a conflict situation, you need to turn to your parents or friends for help;
• You cannot give vent to negative emotions and throw them out on others; you need to try to relieve stress in another way (for example, a confidential conversation with a loved one);
• you should not take impulsive, ill-considered actions - this will only complicate the situation and not help resolve it;
• we must strive for objectivity in assessing the actions of other people (before passing a sentence on someone, you should put yourself in their place and think about what you would do);
• you need to try to always be in a good mood - this is the key to success and good health; This mood facilitates contacts with others.

Question 2. Define conflict. What kinds of conflicts are there? Give examples of conflicts from your life, literature, and current life events. Describe the types of conflicts.

Conflict is a clash of opposing goals, positions, opinions or views of two or more people. In a conflict, there is always a contradiction, behind which there is a different approach to values ​​and norms. The basis of any conflict is a situation, the essence of which is the opposition of goals or means of achieving them, or the divergence of interests, desires and inclinations of opponents.

Conflicts are different. A conflict of values ​​arises as a result of disagreements regarding views (perceptions) of an event. A conflict of interest occurs when different interests conflict with each other. A conflict in the rules of interaction occurs when people, during long-term contacts, enter into closer communication with each other, to which they transfer their views, prejudices, cultural stereotypes, traditions, and customs. Conflicts can also be divided into constructive (creative) and destructive (destructive). In constructive conflicts, opponents do not go beyond ethical standards, business relationships and reasonable arguments. An unconstructive conflict arises when one of the parties stubbornly and rigidly insists on its position, not wanting to take into account the interests of the other party. At the same time, she resorts to morally condemnable methods of struggle, seeks to psychologically suppress her partner, discrediting and humiliating him. According to the scope of conflict resolution, conflicts are divided into business and personal-emotional.

Examples of conflicts can be cited from the immortal comedy by A. S. Griboyedov “Woe from Wit.” There are many different conflicts visible in this work. The main conflict of the comedy is the confrontation between the progressive man Chatsky and the backward Famus society.

Another example from the literature. In I. S. Turgenev’s novel “Fathers and Sons,” the conflict of generations runs like a red thread. This type of conflict is still relevant today.

Question 3. Is it possible to live without conflicts in life? What are their reasons?

The potential for conflict exists in all areas. Conflicts are born out of numerous differences between people in their views, disagreements and confrontations between different opinions, needs, motivations, desires, lifestyles, hopes, interests and personal characteristics. They represent constant competition and confrontation between people in the sphere of principled or emotional clashes that disturb personal peace.

However, with the appropriate upbringing and experience, many conflicts can be prevented or resolved and even used to improve relationships with other people. The task is not to avoid conflict, which is potentially possible in all social relations and situations, but to recognize the conflict and control it in order to obtain the best outcome. After all, most people dream that their relationships with others will be based on peace and mutual understanding, without clashes and conflicts.

Question 4. Explain a method for overcoming disagreements.

The method proposed below for overcoming disagreements is designed so that everyone can use it. This method is as follows:

• you need to find time for conversation, that is, any problem needs to be discussed;
• conditions for communication should be prepared (choose the right time, place, style of behavior);
• discuss the problem (not “me against you”, but “we are against the problem”);
• jointly draw up a final agreement that suits both parties.

Question 5. What are the rules of conduct in a conflict situation?

Rules of conduct in a conflict situation:

• you cannot strive to dominate at any cost (at any cost);
• one must be principled, but not fight only on principle;
• remember that straightforwardness is good, but not always (you also need to be able to tell the truth);
• criticize opponents, but not criticize;
• smile more often (a smile is cheap, but highly valued);
• take into account that traditions can be good and not so good;
• show independence, but it should not turn into self-confidence;
• do not turn persistence into importunity;
• do not expect fair treatment of yourself by being unfair to others;
• do not overestimate your abilities and capabilities;
• do not take initiative where it is not needed;
• strive to show kindness and restraint in any situation.

Several years ago, the US Secretary of Defense said that Russia was on the “steps of NATO.” Indeed, in 1991, the NATO border in Germany ran from Moscow at a distance of 1,700 km, and since 2004 in the Baltic states - at a distance of 600 km. In 1991, NATO consisted of 16 states; now there are 29 countries in the bloc. There are two more countries in line to join the bloc. Plans for the further expansion of NATO clearly provide for the addition to this organization of the Slavic, Transcaucasian and part of the Central Asian republics of the former USSR, as well as other countries, in order to complete the arc of encirclement of the Russian Federation in the Euro-Atlantic region from Finland in the north to the Caspian Sea in the south. But it is not the Russian Federation that is on the steps of NATO’s porch, but NATO is rushing to the threshold of our house.

AGAIN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE BY DETERRENCE

The documents of the next meeting of the NATO Council at the highest level, held in July 2018, indicate that the security situation in Europe is deteriorating, there will be a “prolonged period of instability”, all measures taken by NATO “are defensive”, “NATO does not seek confrontation and does not represent threats to Russia”, “the circumstances under which NATO could use nuclear weapons are very remote”, the “task of nuclear deterrence” and maintaining the proper capability to carry out this task remain in the field of view of NATO leadership.

But in them the reader will not find the presence of the standard formulations of past years about the presence of a minimum nuclear warhead in Europe, about the maintenance of dual-purpose aircraft (DUA) in low readiness for the use of nuclear weapons, about reducing the number of units with UDU or the number of such aircraft. These documents do not contain either previous promises not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO countries in peacetime, or previous statements about the cessation of constant planning for the use of nuclear weapons in NATO. There is no hint of NATO abandoning the first use of nuclear weapons. But the NATO Council declaration repeated the threat made in 2016 that the enemy would pay an “unacceptable” price if he used nuclear weapons against NATO. And the United States continues to implement extended deterrence through deterrence, covering NATO with its “nuclear umbrella.”

Let us recall some moments in the development of NATO nuclear forces in recent history - after the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the USSR, the disappearance of its ideological enemy from the bloc and the expansion of NATO’s sphere of influence outside its area of ​​​​responsibility.

As stated in NATO's 1999 New Strategic Concept, "the fundamental purpose of Allied nuclear forces is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and war of any kind." This formulation, in force since 1991, was later changed to another, now in force: “The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capabilities is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression through deterrence.”

The terms “deterrence” and “aggression” are very flexible and capacious. Deterrence can be offensive or defensive. The aggressor can be a group of people, a non-governmental organization, one or more countries. Aggression can be military, economic, ideological, hybrid. If desired, aggression can be invented. It is obvious that in information warfare, the use of the term “aggression” with a broad interpretation of its meaning is more beneficial than the use of the term “war”.

To understand the formulation of the purpose of NATO nuclear weapons, it is of interest to see the statement of the tasks of the bloc’s nuclear weapons made in 1991 with soldierly directness by the Deputy Supreme Commander (SHC) of NATO Allied Armed Forces (ALLI) in Europe, German General Dieter Klaus: “In the new NATO strategy, nuclear weapons could have the following objectives: ending the war, preventing the initial use of nuclear weapons by the enemy or nuclear blackmail on his part, limited retaliation against a nuclear strike by the aggressor.” It was no coincidence that the clear conclusions in the Western media, made on the basis of a study of the document MC 400, published in 1991 by the Military Committee, were that in NATO “the controversial idea of ​​using nuclear weapons first will be preserved”, that “nuclear weapons, primarily in the initial stage, should be applied selectively, in a limited manner, with restraint” “at the most important military targets, primarily on enemy territory.” These were the conditions for NATO's use of nuclear weapons in 1991, when the bloc reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. The wording of the 2018 public documents no longer provides for selectivity, limitation, or restraint in the use of nuclear weapons by NATO forces.

POLITICAL WEAPONS

Having rejected the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield and declaring nuclear weapons a political means, the military-political leadership (MPL) of the bloc provided for a strategic and sub-strategic nuclear response.

Substrategic and strategic nuclear responses could be multi-temporal and simultaneous. In the latter case, it would certainly turn into a strategic nuclear operation of NATO Allied Forces in Europe against the Russian Federation, carried out in conjunction with the implementation of the SIOP/OPLAN 80XX plans against the Russian Federation by US strategic nuclear forces. NATO's strategic nuclear response in Europe was to be carried out by a dedicated number of ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​from US and UK nuclear-powered missile submarines (SSBNs). The substrategic nuclear response was entrusted to dual-purpose tactical aircraft from European countries and the United States based in Europe. At the same time, it was possible to strengthen NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe during a period of threat and during the war with American surface ships and multi-purpose nuclear submarines armed with Tomahawk sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles (these SLCMs were withdrawn from service in 2010–2012), and also by American carrier-based aircraft.

Judging by an official statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1999, the United States even then retained nuclear bombs for its aircraft carriers. Since 1995, NATO’s sub-strategic nuclear forces began to include British monoblock nuclear SLBMs “Trident-2”, equipped with nuclear warheads (YBZ) with a yield of 5–15 kt; each British SSBN had at least one such “non-strategic” missile. In the next decade, due to the upcoming reduction in the number of missiles on each English SSBN in 2011–2015 (from 12 to eight) and nuclear warheads with a capacity of 80–100 kt (from 48 to 40), non-strategic nuclear SLBMs were no longer mentioned in official open documents .

As can be seen, one of the criteria for a substrategic (non-strategic or pre-strategic) nuclear response was the use of low-yield nuclear warheads. Now, when the commander of the United Strategic Command (USC) of the US Armed Forces directly says that “all nuclear weapons are strategic,” it can be assumed that they will be graded into two unequal parts: a small part of lower power and everything else of higher power.

The second criterion for a substrategic nuclear response is that it is limited in comparison to a strategic nuclear response and that it is used in circumstances where the threat of a strategic nuclear attack may become unconvincing. It was stated in the 1999 British Naval Doctrine that if the threat of a strategic nuclear attack is unconvincing, a limited sub-strategic attack will be used. But times are changing, and now the NATO threat has become fashionable: “The circumstances in which NATO would have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. NATO reiterates that any use of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally change the nature of the conflict. But if the fundamental security of any of its members were to be jeopardized, NATO has the capability and determination to force an adversary to pay a price that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the gains that any aggressor would hope to obtain.” This bargaining formulation, as part of a policy of creating uncertainty regarding the specific conditions for the use of NATO nuclear weapons, is intended to show the viability of the “limited retaliation” proclaimed by General Klaus.

NATO WILL REMAIN A NUCLEAR ALLIANCE

On the composition of nuclear forces

The NATO Council Declaration of 2018 states: “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO must remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic forces of the Union, especially the United States, are the supreme guarantor of the security of the Allies. Independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France fulfill their own deterrence role and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Union. NATO also relies on the United States' forward-deployed nuclear weapons deployed in Europe to maintain nuclear deterrence." Let's immediately figure out who controls the nuclear forces, what is included in the concept of “nuclear weapons” and what is included in the concept of “NATO nuclear weapons.”

The highest military leader of NATO is the Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe, who is also the Supreme Commander of NATO's Strategic Operations Command (SOC) and the Commander of the US Unified Command (UC) in the European area. In normal circumstances, US nuclear forces located in Europe, committed for transfer to NATO, are subordinate to the commander of the US Armed Forces in the European zone; The British nuclear forces intended for transfer to NATO are subordinated to the Chief of the British Defense Staff, and the dual-use aircraft of the bloc countries intended for allocation to NATO remain in national ownership.

“Nuclear weapons” are means of destruction (nuclear warheads) and means of delivering them to targets. More often, “nuclear weapons” mean nuclear warheads. “NATO nuclear weapons” is not the sum of all nuclear weapons available to the United States, Great Britain and France, but just a component of this sum - those nuclear weapons allocated in an emergency by the United States and Great Britain, which can only be used with the approval of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister. British Minister, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe.

Let's start with France, which returned to the NATO military organization in 2010, but retains its independent and autonomous nuclear forces (four SSBNs, approximately 50 SDN, up to 300 nuclear warheads in total). France reserves the right to decide for itself, and not the US, UK or NATO, when and against whom it will use its nuclear weapons. The frequent visits to the headquarters of the US Armed Forces Command by the commanders of the nuclear components of the French Armed Forces so far indicate an increase in the coordination of the nuclear forces of these countries, and not a refusal by France of the independence and autonomy of its nuclear forces.

The UK's nuclear forces (four SSBNs, 180-225 nuclear warheads) are independent. However, plans for their use are coordinated with the plans of the US Armed Forces. Officially, the nuclear forces of this country are intended to be included in the NATO nuclear forces, therefore, the planning of their tasks is carried out by the Supreme Commander of the North Caucasus of NATO, but they can only be used by order of the Prime Minister for actions either as part of NATO or together with the United States, or independently: separate from the US and separate from NATO.

US nuclear forces (14 SSBNs, 66 heavy bombers, 450 ICBMs, up to 200 fighter-bombers, up to 3,800 nuclear warheads in total) have always been a contributor to NATO's strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. A few examples to illustrate. During the Cold War, Europe at times contained 24–30% of the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile. The reduction of the country's nuclear weapons, initiated by President Bush, led to the fact that in 1994–2000, 4.5% (480 nuclear warheads) remained in Europe, and in 2009 - 3.5% (180 nuclear warheads) of the nuclear warhead of the US Armed Forces. Obviously, this quantity was sufficient to meet changing security conditions (that is, needs in peacetime, during periods of crisis and for war). Between 1991 and 2002, NATO adopted and implemented several decisions to reduce the number of dual-use aircraft and units carrying such aircraft. As a result, NATO's "non-strategic nuclear forces" have become "non-strategic nuclear weapons." In 2011, US lawmakers banned the reduction of their country's non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

Talks about creating one consolidated air wing of NATO nuclear weapons carriers in Europe or the United States, about the possibility of reducing NATO's reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons, and about maintaining a minimum level of nuclear forces in Europe died down after 2012. And in 2013, the Secretary of Defense's report to Congress on the United States' nuclear weapons strategy called for, under the heading "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons," the requirement to "ensure the capability to deploy forward-deployed nuclear weapons on heavy bombers and dual-mission aircraft to support extended deterrence and to ensure security of US allies and partners."

As for NATO’s strategic nuclear forces, it should be noted that in the 60–80s of the last century, for the Supreme Commander of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe, the United States intended three SSBNs with 48 SLBMs that were on combat duty; their ammunition load for guaranteed use in the interests of the bloc reached after rearmament with the Poseidon SLBM 400 YaBZ. In the 90s, the allocation of US SLBMs to the NATO High Command in Europe was officially confirmed. Periodic visits by American SSBNs to the UK indicate the continuation of this practice by the navies of the two countries.

IN VARIABLE DEGREES OF READINESS

Plans for the use of US and UK SLBMs in the interests of NATO military forces in Europe (such as “main contingency options” - MCO) are permanent. Plans for the use of NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons (such as “selected contingency options” - SCO) were intended to be quickly recreated in a crisis situation on the basis of a database of objects constantly updated in peacetime. Plans for NATO nuclear strike forces are coordinated with the plans of the United States Armed Forces. Under normal circumstances, NATO's nuclear weapons do not target any country, as official documents claim. Military targets are considered targets for nuclear strikes. Judging by the statement of the NATO Secretary General in 1992, large cities are excluded from the list of nuclear strike targets. From this we can conclude that medium-sized and small cities have not been removed from this list and that targeting military installations in cities remains.

Components of NATO's nuclear forces are maintained in varying readiness for use. British SSBNs, according to official publications, are ready to launch SLBMs a few days after receiving an order (obviously this refers to the ability to launch missiles from all combat-ready SSBNs that go to sea), but they can quickly go into high readiness and maintain it for a long time (obviously there is referring to the SSBN on patrol). Patrolling US SSBNs with 90 nuclear warheads each and SLBMs intended for NATO are at standard levels of missile launch readiness (it is noteworthy that at the turn of the century the goal of maintaining the readiness of American SSBNs changed: “deterrence and/or retaliation” gave way to “strategic deterrence by intimidation").

Dual-purpose aircraft of several NATO countries based in Europe after the Cold War were kept in two or three levels of readiness for use (for example, some aircraft were ready for more than a month, others for up to six months, and others for up to a year). In 1991–1994, the readiness of the VOS was calculated in hours and days, then weeks; in 1999, 50% of the VOS was in readiness, calculated in weeks, and 50% in readiness, calculated in months; in 2002, all 100% of dual-purpose aircraft were in readiness "months". But already in 2017, the highest level of readiness was 30 days.

There is an obvious paradox in the readiness of NATO's strategic and non-strategic nuclear components, casting doubt on the complete reliability of such readiness indicators. Let me remind you of some American standards of the 90s: 600 nuclear ALCMs were loaded onto 30 B-52 bombers of one air wing in 36 hours, the suspension of nuclear bombs on 24 B-1 bombers was carried out in 32 hours, and B-2 bombers were allocated for preparation for nuclear missions 24 hours. Imagine the situation: these bombers were loaded with nuclear ammunition in one or two days and are flying to their targets in Europe, the SLBMs transferred to NATO are in immediate readiness for launch, and NATO dual-purpose aircraft in Europe are asked to wait a couple of weeks until they get ready in the necessary readiness to launch nuclear strikes. In recent years, the bloc's military leadership has required the Armed Forces to increase the level of combat effectiveness, combat readiness, survival and deterrence. Judging by individual media reports, the implementation of these requirements to a certain extent affected not only the readiness levels of the SDN.

Maintaining the proper level of combat effectiveness and combat readiness of NATO nuclear forces is unthinkable without conducting exercises, command post exercises, command post exercises, inspections and training with control, communications, warning bodies of nuclear forces, with nuclear weapons supply facilities and with nuclear weapons carriers. The work, invisible to the world, of checking and testing the readiness of NATO nuclear forces for use occurs regularly with a given frequency. In our military press in 2005 and in 2013–2017, quite interesting figures were given on the intensity and scale of the development of such events in the US Armed Forces in Europe and in the NATO North Command. The Western media don’t like to talk about this. Only occasionally does the media slip into a report about participants in a command post exercise practicing measures for the conditional use of nuclear weapons (for example, from the territory of new NATO countries) or about conducting a field tactical exercise with a dozen dual-use aircraft from several NATO countries (as part of nuclear-related events such as Steadfast NXXX). The logic of the US and NATO information struggle against the Russian Federation continues to operate. Even in 2018, Western researchers argued that the NATO North Caucasus does not conduct exercises directed against Russia, has reduced the number of training events related to nuclear weapons, and does not practice the use of nuclear weapons (nuclear release). Information about the conduct of such training events in the US Armed Forces in Europe is taboo in the media.

MANAGEMENT PYRAMID

In the United States, the commander of the USC is responsible for detailed planning of the use of strategic nuclear forces, while in NATO, detailed planning of the use of the bloc's nuclear forces is the prerogative of the Supreme Commander of the North Caucasus. The general tasks for planning the use of nuclear weapons are set by the United States and NATO.

The construction of the control pyramid responsible for making and implementing decisions to use nuclear weapons in the United States and NATO is almost the same. Below - in the USA the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (CHS) with its Joint Staff (JS) and in NATO the Military Committee (MC) of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces of the countries participating in the bloc with its International Military Staff; in the middle - in the USA the Minister of Defense, and in NATO - the Nuclear Planning Group (NSG) of the defense ministers of the bloc countries; at the top - in the USA the president, in the North Atlantic Alliance - the NATO Council of the heads of state and government of the bloc countries.

The procedure in the United States or NATO in the event of a transition to the use of nuclear weapons is as follows. The Chairman of the US Commander-in-Chief / the Chairman of the NATO VC gives their political leadership recommendations on the use of nuclear weapons; the US President and Secretary of Defense/NATO Council and NATO NSG decide to use nuclear weapons; The US Joint Chiefs of Staff / the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe (that is, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Strategic Command of NATO Operations) formalize and communicate to the executors the order of the US President / NATO Council to use nuclear weapons, while simultaneously communicating the codes for unlocking nuclear weapons; US nuclear forces/NATO nuclear forces begin to carry out the order.

The most important thing here is that the US nuclear weapons have a lock (the British nuclear weapons, according to them, do not need such an ability), without which not a single nuclear warhead will explode and not a single missile will fly. In the US-Great Britain nuclear tandem, the United States plays the leading role. So in reality, taking into account France’s evasion from officially joining NATO’s nuclear pool, the only command authority in the US and NATO determining whether or not to use nuclear weapons either only by US forces, or only by NATO forces, or by all US and NATO forces together , is the President of the United States. Regarding nuclear “democracy” in NATO, the opinion expressed in November 1957 by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is typical. Asked at a news conference whether European governments could have a veto power over the use of NATO nuclear weapons, he said: “No, I don’t think they would have that power any more than an individual citizen would have over the actions of a police officer on duty.”

ARE THE REDUCTIONS REAL?

Let's return to US nuclear weapons reductions and the retention of nuclear bombs in Europe. When assessing these actions, one must proceed from the purely selfish interests of the United States, masked by Euro-Atlantic solidarity, and from the naive belief of North Americans that what is good for the United States should be considered good for others.

The general reductions in US nuclear weapons were caused by euphoria from the liquidation of an ideological enemy, an understanding of the consequences of the “nuclear winter” as a result of the massive use of nuclear weapons, a premonition of the imminent collapse of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces due to demilitarization and the decomposition of the country’s economy, and a reduction in the number of strategic objects intended for destruction by nuclear weapons on the territory of the Russian Federation. , awareness of the uselessness of tactical nuclear weapons (“battlefield weapons”) for the Army and Navy. One recalls the words of President George H. W. Bush at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1992: “Democrats in the Kremlin can guarantee our security in a way that nuclear missiles never could.” It is also no coincidence that in 1997 the United States counted on the complete extinction of all ICBMs of the Strategic Missile Forces produced under Soviet rule as early as 2009. The degradation of other components of the Russian nuclear triad seemed inevitable, and the reproduction of even monoblock ICBMs on any significant scale seemed unrealistic.

The reduction in the number of American nuclear bombs stationed in Europe from 1,700 (approximately 300 of them were intended for the VOS of European allies) in the 80s to 180 in 2009 was compensated by the partial closure of the borders of NATO and the Russian Federation, resulting in the range of the VOS of NATO tactical aviation In addition to the SSBN bases of the Northern Fleet that were previously located there, they also included the base areas of several ICBM divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces and Long-Range Aviation airfields in the European part of the Russian Federation.

Naturally, the Americans benefited from the forced diversion of some of our strategic nuclear forces from facilities in the United States to facilities with VOS in Europe and from the reduction in the flight time of VOS to their designated targets when such aircraft were stationed near the border with the Russian Federation. The United States is well aware that American nuclear bombs stationed in Europe are a visible indicator of this country’s fidelity to its obligations for extended nuclear deterrence, especially in the eyes of young NATO members, and accusations against Moscow of Russia conducting “exercises with testing” directed against the United States and NATO limited use of nuclear weapons first" contribute to an increase in financial expenditures by European NATO countries to increase the combat effectiveness, combat readiness and survivability of their nuclear weapons carriers.

The combined NATO forces of 2018 are inferior to the NATO forces of the early 90s. Compare for yourself. If then, in the event of a war in the Baltics, it was planned to concentrate a NATO group consisting of 18 divisions of ground forces, 66 squadrons of tactical aviation of the Air Force and six aircraft carrier multi-purpose groups of the Navy in 30 days in the adjacent areas, now NATO only plans to achieve in 2019 the ability to deploy in some or area in the same 30 days, 30 mobile battalions of the Army, 30 combat squadrons of tactical aviation of the Air Force and 30 warships of the Navy. Over the past 30 years, the US stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe has been reduced by more than 20 times, but the remaining US nuclear weapons there, due to the expansion of the bloc's members and the approaching borders of NATO countries to the Russian Federation, have turned from non-strategic to strategic.

The range of US nuclear weapons capabilities allocated to NATO is noteworthy. US SLBMs carry nuclear warheads with a constant explosion power of 100 and 475 kt. The B61 nuclear bombs remaining in Europe with a switchable TNT equivalent provide an explosion power of 0.3/1.5/60/170 kt for the B61-3 and 0.3/1.5/10/45 kt for the B61-4. It is noteworthy that the newer and less powerful B61-10 aerial bombs with a switchable equivalent of 0.3/5/10/80 kt, previously located in Europe, were removed from service in 2016, while the older and more powerful B61-3 were left in Europe . In the 1920s, the NATO SDN will receive the B61-12 high-precision nuclear bomb. In the near future, a number of US SLBMs will become monoblock, receiving nuclear warheads with a capacity of about 5 kt. Perhaps the United States will become a donor for NATO not only of such SLBMs, but also of new sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads.

Despite its relative limitations, the nuclear ammunition intended by the Americans for allocation to the NATO Strategic Command of Operations for US SLBMs and SDN of European NATO countries and the US in the form of several hundred nuclear warheads of varying power creates a constant threat to the Russian Federation, being capable of becoming a detonator of a nuclear conflict.

NATO nuclear weapons stationed in Europe (more precisely, American nuclear bombs in Europe) continue to be for the United States both a shield that allows them to hide from individual responsibility for the possible use of their nuclear weapons by the Americans in Europe, shifting collective responsibility to NATO Europeans, and a sword that complements arsenal of weapons of the US strategic nuclear forces.

Everyone has quarrels. And each of us has our own way of dealing with such situations.

Psychologists call this behavior a “conflict resolution style”; it is based on the experience you have acquired.

What classification of conflict resolution styles exists?

The most popular model is K.W. Thomas and R.K. Kilman, which is based on indicators of assertiveness (protection of one’s interests) and cooperation (attention to the interests of others). And as a result, there are five styles: Avoidance, Concession, Competition, Compromise, Cooperation. Anyone can use any style, but generally people find their “favorite” style and behave accordingly.

Today we will look at Avoidance under the microscope.

Avoidance is based on low attention to one's own interests and the interests of others. In this situation, a person will do everything to avoid a quarrel, even ignoring everyone's needs.

This style is the most unsuccessful in resolving conflicts.

Avoidant Behavior:

Most often, such people will tell you that the topic of the quarrel does not deserve attention, or the Avoidant may begin to laugh it off, change the topic, or offer to postpone the discussion to another time. The purpose of this is to do everything so as not to “raise dust.” For example, my husband will do everything (within reason) to maintain peace and not “go on the warpath.” This is a manifestation of his essence, for the most part.

Results of avoidance behavior:

Frequently avoiding conflict resolution will cause one of you to hide your growing resentful feelings. Either the avoidant will be indignant at the partner’s whining, noting that he is pressing with his “serious conversations,” or the partner himself will be dissatisfied with the eternal ignoring of problems and disagreements.

The main problem that besets those who avoid conflict resolution is the loss of intimacy with their partner. If the dispute is not resolved, negative emotions accumulate. Increasing tension will lead to an emotional explosion and saying in a fit of feelings what should not have been said.

But there are also positive aspects to Avoidance. For example, if the disagreements are minor. Above I wrote about my husband and how he tends to use Avoidance tactics. Sometimes this is the best solution for the reason that is it really that important how the dishes are stacked in the dishwasher?

The key to successfully using such a strategy is knowing the appropriateness of its use.

So to use or not to use Avoidance?

Let's consider this scenario.

You come home to your wife feeling upset because you don't spend enough time with your friends. You've been working hard all week and now you want to unwind on the weekend. You spent a couple of hours at the bar with your friends on Friday and made plans to play airsoft with them over the weekend, despite the fact that your loved one asked you to spend time with your family. After you tell her your plans, which exclude the presence of her and the children, she gets upset. And a quarrel begins. If you still ask: “Is it really that important? Maybe we can talk about this later?”, then you are essentially saying that her emotions and needs are unimportant to you. Avoidance in this case is dangerous.

Strategies for overcoming conflict.

When a tense situation arises, the following points should be adhered to:

2. Discuss your problem - find out from your loved one the best way to overcome disagreements without escalating the situation.

3. Law of correspondence - set priorities. The situation described could be resolved by listening to the wishes of the wife, for example, by inviting her on a Saturday night date.

Additional Resources

If you feel that the tension between you and your partner is growing, and you cannot cope with it on your own, you can turn to an expert who will help you look at the problem from the outside and find a solution. In this case, a psychologist is a good solution if you want to get to the root of your quarrels. Even by inviting your partner to see a psychologist for help, you make it clear that you care about him or her.

Conclusion

Thus, avoidance tactics may sometimes be appropriate, but more often than not they create considerable difficulties. If you or your partner have a history of avoidance, there are two ways to overcome disruptive behavior: attention and openness to discussion.