History of state security bodies of the USSR. Bodies of the Cheka-KGB: Soviet experience

In the fall of 1938, Comrade Yezhov wrote a letter to the Politburo asking to be released from his job as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. On November 24, the Politburo granted the request in view of the reasons stated in the statement, and also taking into account his painful condition. And a couple of months later it was established that Comrade Yezhov was a well-covered spy and Trotskyist.

The city of Yezhovo-Cherkessk was renamed for this occasion, posters about “hedgehog gloves” were removed, songs based on the words of Dzhambul about “batyr Yezhov” were excluded from the repertoire... Yezhov himself was tortured and shot.

And Comrade Beria was put in charge of the NKVD. But in 1953, Comrade Beria turned out to be an English spy, a scoundrel and a destroyer of personnel. He was also shot.

By the way, comrades Abakumov and Merkulov, who also headed the state security agencies at different times, were also shot. And even before Yezhov, Yagoda, also a spy and libertine (a collector of pornographic postcards), was shot.

“The investigation materials in the Yezhov case were partially published by different researchers, because they could be found in a scattered state in the archival investigative files of other persons involved in the NKVD. The FSB Central Archive does not release the Yezhov case itself,” says Nikita Petrov, author of our best book about Stalin’s People’s Commissar Yezhov.

It’s the same with Yagoda. And with Abakumov. And with Merkulov. And with Beria. And, actually, why? But because they have not been rehabilitated, and their investigative cases for this reason are firmly closed.

Logic is inaccessible, but there is no other.

And again Petrov: “There are clear provisions of the law “On State Secrets”: the period for classifying documents is 30 years. This is the extreme, highest limit. But it can be extended, it is written in the law, in exceptional cases based on the decision of the Interdepartmental Commission. And when we talk about the system of declassifying archives itself, we must ask ourselves the question: are these gigantic lists that are sent to the MVK for renewal - is this all an exceptional case? If we look at how much of the FSB documentation for the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s has been declassified, and how much is still secret, we will see that the only exception is declassification...”

“He knows me from working together”

But the Security Service of Ukraine has long opened all archival files relating to Stalin’s repressions; so that among the actual Ukrainian materials, it suddenly became available that Moscow sent to all regions of the Union: instructions, methodological instructions, orders, and also departmental correspondence concerning specific cases and characters, victims of terror and executioners. Everything that the FSB of the Russian Federation continues to keep under lock and key, because “deciphering the working methods” of the political police of a non-existent country can cause irreparable damage to the security of the new Russia.

Therefore, everyone who is going to study the history of repressions in the USSR goes not to Moscow, but to Kyiv or, say, Chisinau. Here they do not consider it necessary to protect the secrets of the NKVD and the good name of the executioners, and they do not strive to cover up the crimes of others.

On the eve of the Chekist anniversary, a thick, carefully documented book, “Chekists in the Dock,” was published by a Moscow publishing house, prepared by researchers from different countries based on materials from the archives of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. There are no Russian chapters in the book.

So, over the course of a year and a half of the Great Terror in Ukraine, five, or something like, People's Commissars of Internal Affairs were replaced, all five were energetic people who began their activities in the new post in exactly the same way - by clearing out the personnel inherited from their predecessor. Moreover, this cleansing was carried out directly by the comrades of those being cleaned up.

“...I answered Pertsov that I was not guilty, that he knew me from working together since 1932 as a decent person. Pertsov immediately knocked me off the chair onto the floor and began to beat me with his feet, and Kryukov took the baton he had brought from the window sill and began to beat me with it... Pertsov beat me with the toes of his boots all over my body, and when I was sick from the beating, Pertsov grabbed me by the head and started poking his face into the vomit.”

And then (after the arrest of the next People’s Commissar) this Pertsov himself was put on trial, received a prison term and ended his life in 1948 in a Kolyma logging camp.

“Heading a special operational investigative group, PERTSOV committed the grossest distortions of socialist legality... he allowed perverted methods of investigation in relation to the arrested NKVD officers, who did not have any incriminating materials... provocatively, using physical measures, forced them to give deliberately false testimony... During the existence of this group, that is, from February 21 to April 30, 1938, 241 employees were arrested, and as a result of the use of physical coercion... some of those arrested could not stand torture and died during interrogation (Frenkel, Shor, Taruts, etc.) ..."

In total, during the years of terror in the USSR, 20,000 security officers were subjected to repression. These include the deputy head of the NKVD Directorate for the Kharkov region, David Aronovich Pertsov, born in 1909, and his colleagues who were tortured by him. Who, in turn, themselves (judging by the materials of the same trial) did not know any other ways to obtain confessions. But they knew: “It is better to beat the enemy well and be responsible for what he beat, than not to touch him and for this be responsible to the party.” This is how the security officers were instructed, in particular, by the then secretary of the Kharkov regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) Comrade Osipov, who himself was soon repressed.

The chain of times will not fall apart! The Academy of Russian Symbolism “Mars” offers a set of memorial signs for the anniversary, including portraits of Dzerzhinsky, Beria and Abakumov. In the annotation, the academicians write: “100 years of the history of the Cheka-KGB-FSB were spent guarding the interests and security of the Fatherland. The history of the department is full of bright pages and outstanding personalities, and is always shrouded in a veil of secrecy..."

Wajda's wife was crying

It was not by chance that I chose the chapter “Kharkov” from this book.

Just before my arrival here, the head of the Kharkov human rights center, Evgeniy Efimovich Zakharov, sent an email with the names of those who, in his opinion, could help me on this business trip, and added:

“It’s a pity that I won’t be able to be at home these days and meet you. Have you been to Kharkov? At the end of the building of the regional police department hangs a memorial plaque in memory of the dead Poles near the entrance to the courtyard; in 1940, there was a commandant’s office in this place, in which they shot and threw corpses into the back of a truck that drove up to the commandant’s office in the very place where the gate is now. The truck transported the corpses to the forest park, where they were buried; now there is a memorial cemetery at this place in the forest park.

At one time I showed all this to Andrzej Wajda; his father, Captain Jakub Wajda, was shot here. Vaida was with his wife, she was sobbing continuously, and he had a completely motionless face and did not make a sound. Only at the end, when he said goodbye, he smiled and thanked me, and a week later they called me to the Consulate General of Poland and gave me the “Katyn” disc from him ( film by Andrzej Wajda. — Ed.) with an autograph..."

Taking this opportunity, I thank Zakharov and those whom he recommended to me - Lyudmila Borisovna Rovchak and Igor Vladimirovich Shuisky, the leaders of the organization with the cumbersome name “Communal Institution “Editorial and Publishing Group Kharkov Volumes “Rehabilitated by History” - about the victims of Stalin’s repressions. Such groups were created by government decision in all regions of Ukraine back in the early 90s.

It was planned to publish a volume of “Rehabilitated...” for each region; Now the sixth volume is being prepared for release in Kharkov. The shot Poles will hit him.

The police building on Zhen Myronosits Street (formerly Dzerzhinsky) is overwhelmingly monumental; the memorial plaque is in two languages ​​- Ukrainian and Polish. “On this site there was the regional department of the NKVD and its internal prison. In the spring of 1940, by decision of the highest authority of the Soviet Union, the NKVD killed 3,809 Polish Army officers from the camp in Starobelsk, as well as 500 Polish citizens brought from other NKVD prisons. Eternal memory to them! Ukrainian people and families from Poland. 2008".

In August 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed an agreement and secret protocols to it in Moscow, which made it possible for Germany to attack Poland from the West, and for the USSR to carry out a liberation campaign from the East. The Polish army received an order from its command not to resist the Soviet troops, and this order was generally followed. The Poles were disarmed and sorted into NKVD camps, within whose structure a special Directorate for Prisoners of War Affairs, headed by State Security Captain Soprunenko, had to be urgently created. Then part of the contingent held in these camps was transferred to participate in the construction of socialism in the eastern regions of the USSR, part was transferred to the German allies, and part disappeared without a trace. I repeat: without a trace.

The surrendered Polish officers were shot in three places - in Smolensk Katyn, in Medny near Kalinin (today's Tver) and in Kharkov.

“Katyn” has become a common symbol of this most carefully planned and carried out crime, which still amazes not only with its meanness, but also with its senselessness.

In the spring of 1940, Beria sent a note to Stalin: “In prisoner-of-war camps there are only 14,736 former officers, officials, landowners, policemen, gendarmes, jailers, siege guards and intelligence officers... Based on the fact that all of them are inveterate, incorrigible enemies of Soviet power, The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary... to consider the cases of 14,700 people in prisoner-of-war camps... in a special manner, with the application of capital punishment to them - execution... The consideration of cases should be carried out without summoning those arrested and without bringing charges, a resolution to complete the investigation and an indictment... »

On the note there were four signatures across the page: Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Mikoyan. Two more members of the Politburo approved the NKVD proposals through questioning - Kaganovich and Kalinin (their names are in the margin, in the secretary's handwriting). On March 5, 1940, the decision was formalized as Politburo Resolution No. P13/144.

That's all.

It is only necessary, perhaps, to add that the Soviet operation to “unload” the special camps strangely coincided with the German “Action A-B”, during which three and a half thousand Polish scientists were killed on the territory of the General Government in May 1940 , culture and art. A modern researcher writes: “Both aggressors acted in complete agreement with each other: both the Nazis and the Stalinists jointly destroyed the leading layer of the Polish intelligentsia, the flower of the Polish nation.”

They fled to Manchuria

In the Starobelsky special camp for officers (Voroshilovgrad region) those who surrendered without a shot under the personal guarantees of Marshal Tymoshenko in the Lviv region were kept - 8 generals, 55 colonels, 126 lieutenant colonels, 316 majors, 843 captains, 2527 lieutenants, 9 military chaplains.

By order of the NKVD of March 22, 1940, Polish officers from the Starobelsky camp were sent to the disposal of the NKVD Directorate for the Kharkov region. First, the “Polish contingent” was delivered from the camp to the Kharkov-Sortirovochnaya station, then they were loaded into cars of 15 people and transported to the regional NKVD Directorate on Dzerzhinsky Street. There, the Poles were led one by one into a cell where the commandant of the NKVD, senior lieutenant of state security Timofey Kupriy, and the prosecutor were sitting at the table, checking the personal details of the arrival. The interrogation ended the same way, Kupriy said: “You can go!” When the Pole turned around, he shot at him with a revolver...

They say that Timofey Fedorovich Kupriy was a true master of his craft; he never shot victims in the back of the head - only at a certain angle in the neck, at the level of the first vertebrae: the wound bled less and caused much less inconvenience to the executioner...

After the operation, Kupri was awarded a cash bonus by order of People's Commissar Beria. And in 1941, during the retreat of the Red Army from Kharkov, it was he who blew up the building of the internal prison. Allegedly, together with prisoners.

From the contingent of the Starobelsky camp, 78 people remained alive.

...At the end of 1941, the Soviet Union restored diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile, and Premier Sikorski arrived in Moscow to sign joint documents. At the meeting with Stalin, he was together with General Anders, who was forming a military unit in the USSR from Polish prisoners of war to jointly fight the Nazis.

The following conversation took place.

Sikorsky: I declare to you, Mr. President, that your order for amnesty is not being carried out. A large number of our people, the most valuable to the army, are still in camps and prisons. Stalin: This cannot be, since the amnesty applied to everyone, and all Poles were freed... Sikorsky: I have with me a list of about 4,000 officers... and this list is incomplete... These people are here. None of them returned! Stalin: This cannot be. They ran. Anders: Where could they have run? Stalin: Well, to Manchuria...

The statute of limitations has expired

All these years, the Soviet Union accused Nazi Germany of their murder and even tried to push this accusation through at the Nuremberg trials. But everyone already understood well what had happened. The British and Americans had difficulty approving our version, but they avoided it (which we later interpreted as a desire to shield the fascist monsters).

One way or another, I want to specifically emphasize, if anyone does not understand: Soviet lawyers were fully aware that what was done in 1940 would be brought to the International Tribunal in full.

And when perestroika broke out in the USSR, the word “Katyn” came up again. My now deceased friend Gena Zhavoronkov published a series of articles in Moscow News, for which Poland awarded him an order. And in 1990 (exactly half a century later), the Soviet Union for the first time admitted the fact of its responsibility for the execution of several thousand Polish officers who were captured by the Soviets in the fall of 1939. In 1992, Yeltsin gave the Poles copies of some documents on this case. At the same time, in the early 90s, a criminal case was opened into the shooting of Polish officers. Under Putin, the prosecutor's office closed it; under Medvedev, after considering the cassation appeal in the Supreme Court, this decision came into force. The Supreme Court considered that the statute of limitations had expired, because in this case it was necessary to rely... on the Stalinist Criminal Code of 1929. And the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation refused to provide the Poles with the materials of its investigation - a state secret! Most of its 183 volumes are classified as “Secret” or “Top Secret” to this day.

And it turns out that we live in a country where secret police officers today do not hesitate to call themselves security officers, and cases of 80 years ago are “secret” solely in order not to disturb the memory of the executioners and preserve their good name.

The cover of a 285-page “case” declassified this year in Ukraine about how already in the 60s security officers tried to hide the crime of 1940

Everything will be treated with bleach

The bodies of the officers shot in Kharkov were taken by truck at night to the 6th quarter of the city forest park (Pyatikhatka district), where they were dumped into pre-dug holes. They first started talking about this in the early 90s.

In 2003, the book “Kharkiv Katyn” by Ukrainian Security Service officer Sergei Zavorotnov was published. Not all of my Kharkov interlocutors like the book, but it was the first. Later, historian Alexander Zinchenko wrote an emotional and vivid book “The Hour of the Parrot”, one of the main characters of which was the prisoner of the Starobelsky camp, Major Ludwik Domoń, who miraculously survived and went through the war with Anders’ army. And three months ago, the SBU declassified another portion of materials in addition to the already available documents from the case of the execution of Poles. This is a secret correspondence in which the highest ranks of the USSR KGB were involved, including Andropov and his deputies, as well as the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Shelest.

Scheme of localization of the graves of executed Polish officers in Pyatikhatki

The fact is that in the summer of 1969, fifth-graders playing in the forest belt near Pyatikhatki came across a “mass grave” discovered by unknown people, and the discussion of what to do with all this now reads like an exciting adventure novel. At first, things were moving towards the construction of a new KGB detention center on the burial site, and even calculations were made of how much it would cost. But in the end, Comrade Andropov (labeled “Only in person”) was offered a less expensive plan for approval.

“We consider it appropriate to explain to the population that during the period of the German occupation of Kharkov, German punitive authorities in the indicated place carried out burials without honors of soldiers and officers of the German and allied armies who were shot for desertion and other crimes. At the same time, in the same place, Germans buried people dying from various dangerous infectious diseases (typhoid, cholera, syphilitics, etc.), and therefore this burial should be recognized by health authorities as dangerous for visiting. This area will be treated with bleach, quarantined and subsequently covered with soil.”

That's what they did.

I wonder what is more here - a cool head, clean hands or a warm heart?

The FSB, or Russian Federal Security Service, is one of the successors to the USSR Committee (KGB), an organization known for its terror and intelligence activities that operated in the Soviet Union in the 20th century.

Security - Cheka - OGPU - KGB - FSB

The history of the FSB includes a number of name changes and reorganizations after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Officially, it bore the name KGB for 46 years, from 1954 to 1991. Repressive organizations have long been part of the political structure of Russia. The functions of these organizations were significantly expanded compared to the role of the political police played by the secret police during the reign of Tsar Nicholas II.

In 1917, Vladimir Lenin created the Cheka from the remnants. This new organization, which eventually became the KGB, was responsible for a wide range of tasks, including espionage, counterintelligence, and isolating the Soviet Union from Western goods, news, and ideas. Which led to the fragmentation of the Committee into many organizations, the largest of which is the FSB.

History of the creation of the FSB of Russia

In 1880, Tsar Alexander II formed the Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order, known as the "Okhranka". This organization at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. dealt with various radical groups inside Russia - spying on their members, infiltrating them and neutralizing them. With members of the secret police in the leadership of various revolutionary groups, the Tsar was constantly aware of events and could easily prevent any potential attack. For example, between 1908 and 1909, 4 out of 5 members of the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Party Committee were members of the Okhrana Branch. Nicholas II was so confident in his power over these groups that in November 1916 he ignored warnings of an imminent revolution.

After the February Democratic Revolution, Lenin and his Bolshevik Party secretly organized forces and carried out a coup on the second attempt. Lenin was a staunch supporter of terror and admired the Jacobins, the most radical French revolutionaries of 1790. He appointed Felix Dzerzhinsky as chairman of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), whose main purpose was to fight the enemies of the regime and prevent sabotage throughout the country. The history of the Cheka (FSB) began with its creation on December 20, 1917 to increase the efficiency of the NKVD. The Extraordinary Commission became the basis for the later KGB. Lenin appointed its chairman Dzerzhinsky, a Polish nobleman who spent 11 years in prison for terrorist activities against the Tsar.

Red Terror

Soon Iron Felix began making changes to the Cheka. The history of the FSB in December 1920 was marked by the transfer of the organization's headquarters from St. Petersburg to the former office of the All-Russian Insurance Company, where it remains to this day. The Cheka itself conducted the investigation, made arrests, tried itself, kept them in concentration camps and executed them.

The history of the FSB-Cheka includes the murder of more than 500,000 people between its creation in 1917 and its renaming in 1922. “Red terror” became common practice. From each village, the security officers took 20-30 hostages and held them until the peasants gave up all their food supplies. If this did not happen, the hostages were shot. Although this system proved effective in maintaining Lenin's ideology, in order to improve economic relations with the West, the Cheka was dissolved and replaced by an equally brutal organization, the State Political Directorate (GPU).

Initially, the GPU was under the jurisdiction of the NKVD and had less powers than the Cheka. With Lenin's support, Dzerzhinsky remained chairman and eventually regained his former power. With the adoption of the USSR Constitution in July 1923, the GPU was renamed OGPU, or United State Political Administration.

Holodomor

In 1924, Lenin died and was succeeded by Joseph Stalin. Dzerzhinsky, who supported him in the battle for power, retained his position. After the death of Iron Felix in 1926, Menzhinsky became the head of the OGPU. One of the main tasks of the organization at that time was to maintain order among Soviet citizens when Stalin turned 14 million peasant farms into collective farms. The bloody history of the FSB includes the following fact. To meet the need for foreign currency, the OGPU forcibly seized bread and grain to sell for export, creating a famine that killed more than five million people.

From Yagoda to Yezhov

In 1934, Menzhinsky died under mysterious circumstances and was replaced by Genrikh Yagoda, a pharmacist by training. Under his leadership, the OGPU began to conduct research in the field of biological and chemical weapons. Yagoda liked to conduct experiments on prisoners personally. He was shot under Stalin after confessing to the murder of Menzhinsky in order to lead the OGPU.

The KGB had an umbrella structure, which consisted of similar committees in each of the 14 republics of the USSR. In the RSFSR, however, there was no regional organization. State security committees throughout Russia reported directly to the central authority in Moscow.

The leadership of the KGB was carried out by a chairman, approved by the Supreme Council on the proposal of the Politburo. He had 1-2 first and 4-6 just deputies. They, along with the heads of some departments, formed a collegium - a body that made important decisions regarding the actions of the organization.

The main tasks of the KGB covered 4 areas: protecting the state from foreign spies and agents, identifying and investigating political and economic crimes, protecting state borders and state secrets. To carry out these tasks, from 390 to 700 thousand people served in the six main departments.

Organizational structure

The 1st Main Directorate was responsible for all foreign operations and intelligence gathering. It consisted of several units, divided both by the operations performed (intelligence preparation, collection and analysis) and by geographical regions of the world. The specifics of the work required the selection of the most qualified personnel from all departments; the recruits had good academic performance, knew one or more languages, and also firmly believed in communist ideology.

The 2nd State Administration exercised internal political control over Soviet citizens and foreigners living in the USSR. This department prevented contacts between foreign diplomats and residents of the country; investigated political and economic crimes and maintained a network of informants; kept an eye on tourists and foreign students.

The 3rd Main Directorate was responsible for military counterintelligence and political supervision of the armed forces. It consisted of 12 departments that oversaw various military and paramilitary formations.

The 5th Main Directorate, together with the 2nd, dealt with internal security. Created in 1969 to combat political dissent, it was responsible for identifying and neutralizing opposition among religious organizations, national minorities and the intellectual elite (including the literary and artistic community).

The 8th Main Directorate was responsible for government communications. In particular, it monitored foreign communications, created ciphers used by KGB units, transmitted messages to agents abroad, and developed secure communications equipment.

The GU was responsible for protecting borders on land and at sea. It was divided into 9 border regions, which covered 67 thousand km of the USSR borders. The main duties of the troops were to repel a potential attack; suppression of illegal cross-border movement of people, weapons, explosives, contraband and subversive literature; monitoring of Soviet and foreign ships.

In addition to these six GIs, there were at least several other directorates, smaller in size and scope:

• The 7th engaged in surveillance and provided personnel and technical equipment to monitor the activities of foreigners and suspicious Soviet citizens.
• The 9th provided security for key party leaders and their families at the Kremlin and other government facilities throughout the country.
• The 16th ensured the operation of telephone and radio communication lines used by government agencies.

As a vast and complex organization, the KGB, in addition to these departments, had an extensive apparatus that ensured the daily functioning of the organization. These are the personnel department, secretariat, technical support personnel, financial department, archives, administration department, as well as the party organization.

Decline of the KGB

On August 18, 1991, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was visited at his government dacha on the Black Sea coast in Crimea by several conspirators, including Lieutenant General Yuri Plekhanov, head of the presidential security service, and Valery Boldin, Gorbachev's chief of staff, who felt that the party is under threat. They suggested that he either resign or renounce presidential powers in favor of Vice President Gennady Yanaev. Following Gorbachev's refusal, guards surrounded his home, preventing him from leaving or communicating with the outside world.

At the same time, in Moscow, the Alpha group of the 7th Directorate of the KGB received orders to attack the Russian parliament building and seize control of it. The unit was to conduct covert reconnaissance of the building on August 19th, and then infiltrate and capture it on August 20th and 21st. Contrary to the expectations of the members of the State Emergency Committee, the group led by Mikhail Golovatov decided not to carry out the operation. They delayed it until opposition forces led by Boris Yeltsin gathered to defend the building.

After the conspirators realized that the coup was poorly planned and would be unsuccessful, they tried to negotiate with Gorbachev, who was in their captivity. The President refused to meet with members of the State Emergency Committee. Some of the putschists were arrested and the coup was crushed.

The Gang of Eight included the vice president, the chairman of the KGB, a member of the Defense Council, a member of the Supreme Council, the chairman of the Association of State-Owned Enterprises and the Minister of Internal Affairs. Seven of them were arrested and convicted. The eighth shot himself in the head before his arrest.

After the coup attempt, Vladimir Kryuchkov, who had been chairman of the KGB for three years, was replaced by Vadim Bakatin, who had previously served as interior minister from 1988 to 1990, who then called for the dismantling of the State Security Committee. This position then became the reason for his removal and the appointment in his place of Boris Pugo, who subsequently supported the putsch.

Renaissance

Although the KGB formally ceased to exist, in 1991 it was divided into parts, which together performed the same functions as the Committee.

The Foreign Intelligence Service, created in October 1991, took over the tasks of the 1st Main Directorate for conducting foreign operations, collecting and analyzing intelligence.

The Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information was formed on the basis of the 8th Main Directorate and the 16th Directorate and is responsible for communications security and the transfer of intelligence data.

The 8-9 thousand military personnel who once made up the 9th Directorate were added to the Federal Security Service and the Presidential Security Service. These organizations are responsible for protecting the Kremlin and all important departments of the Russian Federation.

The history of the Russian FSB under its current name began after the Ministry of Security was disbanded in 1993. It included 75,000 people from the second, third and fifth GU. Responsible for internal security in the Russian Federation.

Forward to the past...

After years of terror among Soviet citizens, who constantly feared brutal interrogations by KGB officers or being sentenced to work in the harsh conditions of labor camps, the Committee for State Security ceased to exist under its former name. However, many still live in fear of this cruel and repressive organization. The history of the Russian FSB is full of glaring facts. Writers whose works were considered anti-Soviet and who had never seen their books in print became victims of the 5th Main Directorate of the KGB. Families were torn apart as Committee agents arrested, tried, and sentenced millions of people to Siberian labor camps or death. Most of those convicted did not commit any crimes - they became victims of circumstances, being in the wrong place at the wrong time, or because of a careless remark made at home. Some of them were killed simply because KGB agents had to fulfill quotas, and if there weren't enough spies within their jurisdiction, they would simply take innocent people and torture them until they confessed to crimes they didn't commit.

It seemed that this nightmare was gone forever. But the story of the Cheka-KGB-FSB does not end there. The recently announced plans to create the Ministry of State Security on the basis of the SVR and the FSB bring to mind the Stalinist structure of the same name, which was designed to protect the interests of the ruling party.

(1917-1992)

Encyclopedic YouTube

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✪ “Yezhovshchina”, what was it.

✪ Catch up and destroy. Escape of pilot Mikhail Devyatayev

✪ KGB of the USSR during the period of restoration of authorities and management (S.N. Lavrov) - Part 8 - 07/08/2017

Subtitles

Cheka (1917-1922)

From July to August 1918, the duties of the chairman of the Cheka were temporarily performed by J. H. Peters; on August 22, 1918, F. E. Dzerzhinsky returned to the leadership of the Cheka.

Regional (provincial) emergency commissions, special departments to combat counter-revolution and espionage in the Red Army, railway departments of the Cheka, etc. were created. The organs of the Cheka carried out Red terror.

GPU under the NKVD of the RSFSR (1922-1923)

Period from 1921 to 1922 - the time of reorganization of the Cheka and transformation into the GPU is associated with the changed situation and the transition to the NEP. According to S.V. Leonov, the main factor in the reorganization of the Cheka into the GPU was international - the preparation of the Soviet leadership for participation in the Genoa Conference.

NKGB - MGB USSR (1943-1953)

KGB USSR (1954-1991)

KGB of the RSFSR (1955-1965)

From March 26, 1955 to December 17, 1965, there was a State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.

Re-establishment of Russian state security agencies (May 1991)

On May 6, 1991, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR B. N. Yeltsin and the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. A. Kryuchkov signed a protocol on the formation, in accordance with the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, of a separate Committee for State Security of the RSFSR (KGB RSFSR), which had the status of a union-republican state committee. Until the fall of 1991, the staff of the recreated committee consisted of several people, but as the KGB of the USSR was liquidated, its powers and numbers began to grow.

On November 26, 1991, President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree transforming the KGB of the RSFSR into the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR (AFB RSFSR).

On December 19, 1991, President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the formation of the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR” (MBIA). At the same time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR and the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR were abolished. On January 14, 1992, the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR recognized this decree as inconsistent with the Constitution of the RSFSR and therefore canceled it. Accordingly, the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR were restored.

On January 24, 1992, President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree on the formation of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation (MBB) on the basis of the abolished Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR.

Division of the KGB and collapse of the USSR (August 1991 - January 1992)

On October 22, 1991, by resolution of the State Council of the USSR No. GS-8, the State Security Committee of the USSR was divided into the Inter-Republican Security Service (MSB), the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (TSSR) and the Committee for the Protection of the State Border of the USSR. A little earlier (in August-September), government communications units (the USSR Government Communications Committee was created) and government security units were also separated from it. On December 3, 1991, USSR President M. S. Gorbachev signed the Law “On the Reorganization of State Security Agencies,” adopted by the unconstitutional Council of Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, thus finally securing the liquidation of the KGB.

In contact with

Classmates

Cheka December 20, 1917 resolution of the Council of People's Commissars to combat

counter-revolution and sabotage in Soviet Russia, the All-Russian

Extraordinary Commission (EChK). Its first chairman was appointed

F.E. .

He held this post until February 6, 1922. From July to August 1918The duties of the Chairman of the Cheka were temporarily performed by Y.Kh.

GPU February 6, 1922 The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution on the abolition of the Cheka and the formationState Political Administration (GPU) under the NKVD of the RSFSR. OGPU November 2, 1923 The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR created the United Statepolitical administration (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Chairman of the GPU and OGPU until the endof his life (July 20, 1926) F.E. Dzerzhinsky remained, whom he replaced V.R.

Head of the OGPU until 1934

NKVD

July 10, 1934 in accordance with the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, state bodiessecurity entered the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR. AfterMenzhinsky's death by the work of the OGPU, and later the NKVD from 1934 to 1936. led G.G.Yagoda.

From 1936 to 1938 The NKVD was headed by N.I. Ezhov.

From November 1938 to 1945 The head of the NKVD was L.P. Beria.

NKGB USSR February 3, 1941 The NKVD of the USSR was divided into two independent bodies: the NKVD of the USSRand the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) of the USSR. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs -L.P. Beria. People's Commissar of State Security - V.N. Merkulov.

In July 1941 The NKGB of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR were again united into a single People's Commissariat -NKVD of the USSR. In April 1943 The People's Commissariat of State was re-establishedsecurity of the USSR, headed by V.N. Merkulov.

MGB March 15, 1946 The NKGB was transformed into the Ministry of Statesecurity. Minister - V.S. Abakumov.

In 1951 - 1953. held the post of Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev.

In March 1953 a decision was made to merge the Ministry of Internal Affairs and S.N. Kruglov.

Ministry of Internal Affairs 7 March 1953 a decision was made to merge the Ministry of Internal Affairs andMinistry of State Security into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR headed by S.N. Kruglov. KGB USSR March 13, 1954 the State Security Committee was created under the Council of Ministers THE USSR. From 1954 to 1958 The leadership of the KGB was carried out by I.A. Serov,

from 1958 to 1961 — A.N. Shelepin,

from 1961 to 1967 — V.E. Semichastny,

from 1967 to 1982 — Yu.V. Andropov,

from May to December 1982 — V.V. Fedorchuk,

from 1982 to 1988 — V.M. Chebrikov,

from August to November 1991 — V.V. Bakatin.

December 3, 1991 USSR President M.S. Gorbachev signed the Law “On Reorganizationstate security bodies." On the basis of the Law of the KGB of the USSR there wasabolished and for the transition period the Inter-Republican Service was created on its basissecurity and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (currently the Serviceforeign intelligence of the Russian Federation).

SME November 28, 1991 USSR President M.S. Gorbachev signed the Decree "On approvalTemporary Regulations on the Inter-Republican Security Service."Head - V.V. Bakatin (from November 1991 to December 1991).

KGB RSFSR May 6, 1991 Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and Chairman of the KGBUSSR V.A. Kryuchkov signed a protocol on education in accordance with the decisionCongress of People's Deputies of Russia of the State Security Committee of the RSFSR,having the status of a union-republican state committee. Headhe was appointed by V.V. Ivanenko.

AFB November 26, 1991 Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed a Decree on the transformation of the KGBRSFSR to the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR.Headed the AFB - V.V. Ivanenko from November 1991 to December 1991.

MB January 24, 1992 Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed a Decree on EducationMinistry of Security of the Russian Federation on the basis of the abolished AgencyFederal Security of the RSFSR and the Inter-Republican Security Service.Minister - V.P. Barannikov since January 1992. to July 1993,

N.M.Golushko since July 1993 to December 1993

FSK December 21, 1993 Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed a Decree on the abolitionMinistry of Security and the creation of the Federal Counterintelligence Service.Director - N.M. Golushko since December 1993. to March 1994,S.V. Stepashin since March 1994 to June 1995

FSB April 3, 1995 President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin signed the Law “On the Bodies of the Federalsecurity services in the Russian Federation", on the basis of which the FSB issuccessor to FSK.Director - M.I. Barsukov since July 1995. to June 1996,

N.D. Kovalev since July 1996 to July 1998,

V.V. Putin since July 1998 to August 1999,

N.P. Patrushev since August 1999

The badge of 5 years of the Cheka-GPU with the inscription: "VChK-GPU. 1917-1922" was established in 1923. The badge was awarded for the merciless fight against counter-revolution. Cavalier of the signawarded the title of Honorary Worker of the Cheka-GPU. He had the right to wearweapons, entrance to all GPU buildings.The first recipients were employees of the Cheka and the State Political Administration who participated indefeat of the "Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom", "National Center", "Tacticalcenter”, in carrying out the “Trust” and “Syndicate” operations, which ended with the arrests of B.Savinkova and S. Reilly.

On December 17, 1927, by order of the OGPU, for the 10th anniversary of the security organs,a sign with the profile of F.E. was established. Dzerzhinsky against the background of a red banner. PlaceThe left breast pocket was designated for wearing the "anniversary badge".

On November 23, 1932, the OGPU issued an order that said: “Into commemorate the 15th anniversary, establish the badge "VChK-OGPU. 1917-1932",to which to give the significance of the highest award of the OGPU collegium"The badge was awarded until the end of 1940 to OGPU employees, and since1934 - Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR,distinguished himself “in the fight against counter-revolution” and suppressing hostile intriguesforeign intelligence services both in Russia and in Republican Spain.

The badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD", put into effectby decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR from December 31, 1940, employees were awarded "formerits in leadership or direct performance of security workstate security and for the successful completion of special tasks government." This badge was also awarded to employees who distinguished themselves on the fronts of the SecondWorld War, who managed to neutralize the efforts of the Abwehr and the Gestapo.The awards were made until 1946, when the NKVD was transformed intoMinistry of State Security.

The badge "Honored Chekist of the MGB" repeated the badge in appearance"Honored Worker of the NKVD."Established in 1946.

In 1957, three years after the formation of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the age of 40anniversary of the state security agencies, the badge “Honorary Officer” was establishedstate security." The awards were made "for specific achievementsresults in operational activities" in accordance with the decisionBoard of the Committee.This award was given to 7,375 people.

Anniversary badge with a gilded number "50" was issued in 1967 for the 50th anniversary of the organs security.

An anniversary badge with a gilded number "60" was issued in 1977 for the 60th anniversary of the organs security.

An anniversary badge with a gilded number "70" was issued in 1987 for the 70th anniversary of the organs security.

By order of the FSB of March 22, 1994, the badge “Honorary Officer” was establishedcounterintelligence." They were awarded for special merits in operational serviceactivities and demonstrated initiative and perseverance.The awardees were provided with benefits in the field of medical, sanatorium andhousing provision, they were given a monthly bonus to their official salaryand was given the right to wear a military uniform upon dismissal, regardless of length of service.

The badge of three degrees "For service in counterintelligence" was established by order ofFSB No. 256 dated July 12, 1994. This badge is awarded to military personnel andcivilian personnel of the FSB of the Russian Federation "for the positive results achieved inofficial activity and having work experience in security agencies of at least 15 years". As of December 2000, the badge “For Service in Counterintelligence” was awarded to 16working employees of the FSB Directorate for the Yaroslavl Region.

FSB MEDAL "FOR EXCELLENCE IN MILITARY SERVICE" 1st class

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VChK - ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION for the fight against counter-revolution (1918-1922) was created by the Bolsheviks on December 20, 1917 to fight dissidents. The task of the Cheka was to systematically organize large-scale political terror in Russia to follow the October Revolution. The reason for the creation of the Cheka was partly because the ideas of the Bolsheviks did not enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of the population, and they could stay in power only through brutal violence and cynical lawlessness. At first, the Cheka had little investigative powers, only from February 1918, on the basis of the decree “The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger”, the security officers received emergency powers and the right to apply capital punishment without trial (close to the execution site), which was confirmed by the decree “On the Red Terror” " The Cheka's methods of struggle were very diverse: terror, hostage-taking, provocations, confiscation of property, trial in concentration camps, the introduction of agents into anti-Soviet organizations, foreign missions and institutions. The scope of the Cheka's activities was unusually wide: from the suppression of anti-Bolshevik armed uprisings and uncovering conspiracies of foreign intelligence services to ensuring the operation of transport, combating homelessness and typhoid epidemics. The bodies of the Cheka, especially in local areas, included many morally corrupt people with a criminal past and even with mental disabilities, who enjoyed unlimited power, regardless of any legal norms, without going into ideological reasoning, and trampling on moral principles. The mass terror and arbitrariness that accompanied the activities of the Cheka caused outbreaks of anti-Soviet protests and open discontent among wide sections of the population, even that part of the Russian intelligentsia that was initially loyal to the Soviet regime. The Cheka existed on the eve of 1922, if this punitive body was transformed into the GPU. Throughout the entire period of its existence, the Cheka gang was led by Felix Dzerzhinsky.
CHON - SPECIAL PURPOSE UNITS of the Cheka of the USSR (1919-1925) - military party detachments created near factory party cells, district committees, city committees, regional committees and provincial party committees on the basis of a resolution of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated April 17, 1919 to provide assistance to the bodies of Soviet power in the fight against counter-revolution, guard duty at critically important objects, etc. For general leadership, responsible organizers near the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and organizers close to the provincial committees, regional committees, etc. were allocated. At first, CHONs were formed from party members and candidates, and later from the best Komsomol members. The first CHONs arose in Petrograd and Moscow, except in the central provinces of the RSFSR (by September 1919 they had been created in 33 provinces). CHON of the front line of the Southern, Western and Southwestern fronts took part in front-line operations. In November 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a verdict on the introduction of ChON into the Vsevobuch system, only with the preservation of the independence of their formation and readiness for use in accordance with the orders of the local party organization. On March 24, 1921, the Party Central Committee adopted a regulation based on the decision of the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) to include the ChON in the number of militia units of the Red Army. CHON personnel were divided into personnel and police (variable). In September 1921, the command and headquarters of the country's ChON were established (commander A.K. Alexandrov, chief of staff V.A. Kangelari), for the sake of political leadership - the Council of the ChON under the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (Secretary of the Central Committee V.V. Kuibyshev, deputy chairman Cheka I. S. Unshlikht, commissar of the headquarters of the Red Army and commander of the ChON), in the provinces and districts - the command and headquarters of the ChON, the Councils of the ChON near the provincial committees and party committees. In December 1921, the ChON had 39,673 personnel. and variable - 323,372 people. The CHON included infantry, cavalry, artillery and armored units. In connection with the improvement of the internal and international situation of the USSR and the strengthening of the Red Army in 1924-25, in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the ChON was disbanded.
OGPU - 1922-1934 - November 15, 1923, by the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the GPU NKVD of the RSFSR was transformed into the United State Political Dominion (OGPU) approximately the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which is an independent body through the NKVD. In turn, the NKVD retained the functions of ensuring public security and suppressing banditry and other crimes; the OGPU retained its specialization in combating counter-revolution, espionage, ensuring state security and combating elements alien to Soviet power. The chairman of the GPU, and later the OGPU, until July 20, 1926 was F. E. Dzerzhinsky, then until 1934 the OGPU was headed by V. R. Menzhinsky.
SPECIAL PURPOSE DIVISION - ODON OGPU (NKVD) USSR (1922-1955) - On June 17, 1924, on the basis of OSNAZ, it was reorganized into a Special Purpose Division near the OGPU USSR. In addition to the existing units, the newly formed division included the 6th regiment and the 61st division of the OGPU troops. The division's staff consisted of 4 rifle regiments and an armored vehicle division (formerly an armored squadron), which was later reorganized into an armored regiment in 1931. In May 1926, the Special Solovetsky Regiment of the OGPU became part of the division. In July 1926, F. E. Dzerzhinsky died suddenly. At a meeting of the division personnel, it was decided to petition for the division to be named after him. By order of the OGPU of the USSR No. 173 on August 19, 1926, the formation received the name Special Purpose Division under the OGPU of the USSR named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky. In November 1926 age. The measure of the division included the 1st Tula, 4th Voronezh, 5th Nizhny Novgorod, 8th Yaroslavl, 15th Vyatka divisions of the OGPU troops. The division's strength was 4,436 people. In February 1929, the division was still being reorganized, its composition was based on the type of the Red Army. The division consisted of 2 rifle regiments, a scooter regiment, a cavalry regiment, an armored division, a communications division, each Suzdal division, and a regimental class. In the 20-30s, the division carried out tasks to protect the Kremlin, the administrative buildings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and other individually important objects. In addition, parts of the division were involved in operations to suppress rebellions in the Don and Tambov region, and the fight against the Basmachi in Central Asia. SINCE 1937, SEPARATE MOTOR-RIFLE DIVISION OF SPECIAL PURPOSE - OMDON NKVD USSR - 1937-1943 - Units of the division participated in battles during the era of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, individual units of the division participated in the defense of Moscow. the remaining units guarded vitally important objects of the capital, carried out patrol duty on the streets of the city, and were involved in measures to eliminate reconnaissance and sabotage groups in the front line and for the city. In battles with German troops, the snipers of the 4th Cavalry Regiment (later the 4th Motorized Rifle Regiment) distinguished themselves beyond measure. During the first mission of the regiment's two sniper teams in 1942 alone, they destroyed 853 German soldiers and officers. Since 1943, 1st BRIDGE RIFLE DIVISION of the NKVD of the USSR - (1943-1955). In 1944, the 2nd OMSDON Regiment was entrusted with the protection of government delegations of the USSR, USA and Great Britain near the Yalta Conference of countries allied in the anti-Hitler coalition. From August 1943 to 1990, on public holidays, the division's artillery battalion fired artillery salutes from the territory of the Moscow Kremlin. During 1944-1947 Units of the division participated in the liquidation of the nationalist movement in Western Ukraine and repeatedly clashed with OUN-UPA units. At the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945, soldiers of the 2nd regiment of the division were entrusted with the honor of carrying enemy banners and standards along Red Square and throwing enemy banners and standards at the foot of the Mausoleum. This passage was captured by Soviet and foreign filmmakers.
SEPARATE MOTORIZED RIFLE BRIGADE OF SPECIAL PURPOSE (1941-1943) – Since the beginning of the 30s, operations on enemy communications, in his deep rear, have been actively developed in the USSR. The main tasks of sabotage groups intended for such raids, naturally, were to disrupt the management and supply of enemy troops. Preparation for the actions of sabotage groups at the beginning of hostilities was carried out by two main departments - the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, on the one hand, and the NKVD - NKGB - on the second. By order of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, on June 27, 1941, a Training Center for the preparation of special reconnaissance and sabotage detachments was created for operations behind enemy lines. In an organizational sense, the whole matter of coordinating these activities was assigned to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD - NKGB of the USSR around the leadership of State Security Commissioner P. A. Sudoplatov. By the fall of 1941, the center included two brigades and several separate companies: sapper and demolition, communications and automobile. In October, it was reorganized into the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes of the NKVD of the USSR (OMSBON). Sudoplatov himself unreasonably describes these events: “On the first day of the war, I was entrusted with leading all reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the German army in accordance with the line of the Soviet state security agencies. For this purpose, a special unit was formed in the NKVD - a Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. By order of the People's Commissariat, my task as the head of the group was issued on July 5, 1941. My deputies were Eitingon, Melnikov, Kakuchaya. The heads of the leading directions in the fight against the German armed forces that invaded the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine were Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Gudimovich, Orlov, Kiselev, Massya, Lebedev, Timashkov, Mordvinov. The heads of all services and divisions of the NKVD, by order of the People's Commissariat, were obliged to assist the Special Group with people, equipment, and weapons in order to deploy reconnaissance and sabotage work in the near and far rear of the German troops. The main tasks of the Special Group were: conducting reconnaissance operations against Germany and its satellites, organizing guerrilla warfare, creating an intelligence network in territories near the German occupation, and managing special radio games with German intelligence in order to misinform the enemy. We immediately created a military unit of the Special Group - a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes (OMSBON NKVD USSR), which was commanded at different times by Gridnev and Orlov. By decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Comintern, all political emigrants who were in the Soviet Union were invited to join this combination of the Special Group of the NKVD. The brigade was formed in the first days for the Dynamo stadium. Under our command we had more than twenty-five thousand soldiers and commanders, of which two thousand were foreigners - Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Romanians. We had at our disposal the best Soviet athletes, including boxing and athletics champions - they became the basis of sabotage formations sent to the front and thrown behind enemy lines.” After completion of formation, the contingent of the motorized rifle brigade included up to 25,000 people, of which two thousand foreigners - Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Romanians, who were political immigrants and lived in the USSR. The formation included the best Soviet athletes, including boxing and athletics champions, who later became the basis of sabotage formations sent to the front and thrown behind enemy lines. The unit was directly subordinate to Lavrentiy Beria. The brigade was assigned the following tasks: conducting reconnaissance operations against Germany and its satellites, organizing guerrilla warfare, creating intelligence networks in territories under German occupation, and managing special radio games with German intelligence in order to misinform the enemy. In October 1941, the Special Society, due to the expanded scope of work, was reorganized into the 2nd section of the NKVD, still directly subordinate to Beria.” The brigade was staffed by employees of the NKVD - NKGB apparatus, including from the Main Directorate of Border Troops, cadets of the Higher School of the NKVD, personnel of the police and fire departments, volunteer athletes of the Central State Institute of Physical Culture, CDKA and the Dynamo society, as well as Komsomol members mobilized in accordance with the call of the Komsomol Central Committee. A small, but very important package of the brigade was staffed by foreign communists who were members of the Comintern. Colonel M.F. became the first commander of OMSBON. Orlov, who previously held the position of head of the Sebezh Military School of the NKVD Troops. A special combat training program was developed for the brigade personnel. The tasks of the OMSBON included the installation of mine barriers, mining and demining of important military installations, parachute operations, and carrying out sabotage and reconnaissance raids. In addition to the general program, the brigade trained specialists to perform special tasks for capital and behind the front line. In terms of its regular organization, the brigade admittedly was an ordinary motorized rifle formation, of which there were many in the ranks of the NKVD troops at the beginning of the war. During the Battle of Moscow, OMSBON, as part of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the NKVD Special Purpose Troops, was used for the purpose, but even at this time, combat groups were formed in its composition, intended to be deployed to the enemy rear. A typical group included a commander, a radio operator, a demolitionist, an assistant demolitionist, a sniper and two machine gunners. Depending on the tasks performed, combat groups could unite or split up. During the critical period of the battle for Moscow, in the winter of 1941/1942, mobile detachments of OMSBON carried out a series of daring raids and raids behind German lines. Some groups were used to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage in the interests of the headquarters of combined arms armies. Most of the raids were successful, but the saboteurs suffered heavy losses. Since 1942, the brigade's primary task was to prepare detachments for operations behind enemy lines. By the beginning of autumn, 58 such detachments were sent behind enemy lines. Like life, the reconnaissance group, withdrawn to the German rear, became the nucleus for the formation of a partisan detachment. The growth in the number of the latter was due to the influx of Red Army soldiers who lagged behind their units in 1941 - 1942, escaped prisoners of war, and simple local residents dissatisfied with the German occupation regime. Ultimately, many detachments turned into large partisan formations that confidently controlled vast areas deep in the German rear. During the war era, 212 detachments and groups with a total number of 7,316 people were formed. In total, OMSBON personnel trained over 11,000 commanders and Red Army soldiers in various specialties. The bulk of this number were demolitionists (5,255 people) and paratroopers (more than 3,000 people). Other military specialties included radio operators, demolition instructors, snipers, mortarmen, drivers, medical instructors and chemists. In addition, instructors of special task forces operating behind enemy lines for two or three years from civilians and partisans also trained 3,500 demolitionists. At the OMSBON bases, 580 trainees from the personnel of the RGK guards units (mainly paratroopers) underwent sabotage and reconnaissance training. The brigade's paratrooper service was engaged in logistical, technical, educational and methodological support for operations behind enemy lines, as well as supplying groups located behind the front line. During the entire war, Li-2 and S-47 aircraft carried out 400 combat missions, delivered 1,372 people to the occupied territories (landing at partisan airfields or by parachute), and transported about 400 tons of special cargo. The result of OMSBON's combat activities over the course of four years of war is the destruction of 145 tanks and armored vehicles, 51 aircraft, 335 bridges, 1,232 locomotives and 13,181 carriages. The brigade's fighters carried out 1,415 crashes of enemy military trains, disabled 148 kilometers of railway tracks, and carried out 400 other acts of sabotage nearby. In addition, 135 OMSBON operational groups transmitted 4,418 intelligence reports, including 1,358 to the General Staff, 619 to the commander of Long-Range Aviation, and 420 to front commanders and Military Councils.
SPECIAL PURPOSE DETAIL OSNAZ NKVD 1943 – 1945 - At the beginning of 1943, the OMSBON age was reorganized into a Special Purpose Detachment close to the NKVD - NKGB USSR (OSNAZ). This military unit was more clearly oriented towards solving reconnaissance and sabotage tasks. At the end of 1945, OSNAZ was disbanded. Some of its functions were transferred to the special detachments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs-MGB, which waged a difficult “forest war” with detachments of Baltic and Ukrainian nationalists. These forces concentrated in their ranks a significant number of personal numbers: in the midst of the war, in a series of analysis of the heavy losses suffered by SD reconnaissance groups, Walter Schellenberg noted “the difficulty of countering the special forces of the NKVD, whose units are finally 100% staffed with snipers.”
EQUIPMENT AND UNIFORMS OF THE OSNAZ NKVD TROOPS OF THE USSR
The NKVD troops were supplied with weapons, ammunition and uniforms much better than in the Red Army. In conditions behind the front, captured weapons were widely used, mainly MP 38/40 assault rifles and mg 34/42 machine guns. OMSBON units were equipped with PPSh (then PPS-43) submachine guns to almost 100%, with the exception of machine gunners, armor-piercing specialists and some other specialists. All military personnel carried holstered weapons, including automatic weapons: TT pistols or revolvers, as well as all kinds of captured samples. Saboteurs from the brigade, along with fighters from other deep reconnaissance units, were required to arm themselves with so-called scout knives (hp). OMSBON fighters and commanders wore the uniform of the NKVD troops: border or internal (with colored caps, piping and cloth, assigned to these types of troops). Employees of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD who served in the brigade's operational groups also wore their uniforms with special insignia. It should be noted that for the purpose of secrecy, the uniform of the Red Army was often worn instead of departmental uniforms. Police personnel included in the OMSBON received protective uniforms with police insignia. On the blue buttonholes with red edging were pinned enamel insignia, similar to the army ones, but filled with blue enamel with a red metal edge. On the elbow of the left sleeve, commanders wore the color shade of the USSR coat of arms, and political workers wore a blue cloth star with golden edging and an image of a hammer and sickle in the center. Blue piping was sewn onto the side seams of blue command breeches. As a headdress, police officers mobilized for service wore protective caps with a blue band and the same piping for the crown. The cockade is a scarlet enamel star with a colored image of the coat of arms in the middle (the metal parts of the star and coat of arms were brass for commanders and nickel-plated for privates). This uniform was abolished after the introduction of shoulder straps in February 1943, in addition, most of the personnel recruited from the police had by that time already been transferred to the NKVD troops (state security). Soviet paratroopers and special forces had a significant range of summer and winter camouflage uniforms: robes and suits. Since the late 30s, the army and NKVD troops have widely used so-called wet camouflage suits, made from bundles of wet grass and dry grass, either in factories, without reason, and in makeshift conditions. During the era of battles in the steppes, this device well camouflaged the owner in thickets of grass, which was widely used during the age of battles on Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River. All other examples of costumes, like the white ones, randomly and spotted, like Poz, were made of calico - a very fragile, but cheap material. In the 30s and early 40s, there were two variants of fabric designs. They were officially called autumn and summer; in fact, for practice in the warm season, uniforms with both color options were worn. Summer camouflage had a grass-green base with large amoeba-shaped black spots applied to it. The autumn version was distinguished by a sandy-olive color with spots of the same shape, but brown. Before the start of the war, camouflage suits were widely used in the Airborne Forces and border troops. Since June 1941, the wearing of camouflage uniforms has been extended to military reconnaissance units (including OMSBON), groups of snipers, demolitions and other special forces units. In addition, the operational units of the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were involved in the liquidation of nationalist formations in the Baltic states and western Ukraine during the war, were required to be supplied with camouflage suits. The coloring of the 1943 model uniform was designed around the strong influence of the small-spotted SS camouflage: for the basic grassy base, the outlines of branches and leaves were painted with yellow or light olive paint. In some cases, amoeba-shaped black or brown spots were depicted on top of this composition, that is, for old mask costumes. The summer camouflage suit consisted of a loose blouse and trousers. The clasp of the blouse reached the middle of the chest; There were roomy welt pockets on the sides of the dress. The floors and sleeves were equipped with long ribbon curtains. The low legs of the trousers were tucked into tarpaulin boots. Summer camouflage suits were often equipped with baggy hoods: the size of the latter allowed them to be pulled over a steel helmet. The hoods were sewn in a circle to the shoulders of the blouse. The neckline of the hood, which was also the front of the blouse, was fastened with three or four plastic buttons, and the small front bag was covered with a thick gauze net in camouflage coloring. In the traveling position, the hood was first unfastened from the very bottom and thrown back behind. In airborne units, especially before the war, they often wore blouses without a hood: the neckline was pulled in with a drawstring. Often in special forces units, instead of suits, they wore robes: a cape with sleeves and a hood, which was fastened at the front with a button just before the bottom.
GUK "SMERSH" NKO USSR (1943-1945) - Transformed from the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD by a secret Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated April 19, 1943. The same Decree created the Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the NKVMF of the USSR and the Counterintelligence Department "SMERSH" of the NKVD of the USSR . On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created with its transfer to the department of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. On April 21, 1943, Joseph Stalin signed the State Defense Committee Resolution No. 3222 ss/s regarding the approval of the regulations on the GUKR "Smersh" NPO of the USSR. The main opponent of SMERSH in its counterintelligence activities was the Abwehr, the German intelligence and counterintelligence service in 1919-1944, the field gendarmerie and the Main Reign of Imperial Security RSHA, the Finnish military intelligence. The service of the operational staff of the GUKR SMERSH was very dangerous - on average, an operative served for 3 months, for which he was discharged due to death or injury. During the battles for the liberation of Belarus alone, 236 military counterintelligence officers died and 136 went missing. The first front-line counterintelligence officer awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) was Senior Lieutenant Zhidkov P.A. - detective officer of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the motorized rifle battalion of the 71st mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. The activities of GUKR SMERSH are characterized by obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence services; in terms of effectiveness, SMERSH was the most effective intelligence service during the Second World War. From 1943 until the end of the war, the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR and its front-line departments held 186 radio games alone. During these games, they managed to bring over 400 personnel and Nazi agents to our territory and seize tens of tons of cargo. Since April 1943, the size of the GUKR "Smersh" included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. 3/ssh of the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin: 1st volume - intelligence and operational work in the central office of the People's Commissariat of Defense (chief - Colonel GB, then Major General Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich) 2nd fragment - a case between prisoners of war, checking Red Army soldiers who were in captivity (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kartashev Sergey Nikolaevich) 3rd passage - the fight against agents sent to the rear of the Red Army (chief - GB Colonel Georgy Valentinovich Utekhin) 4th part - action for the enemy side to identify agents being dropped into Red Army units (chief - GB Colonel Petr Petrovich Timofeev) 5th ration - management of the work of Smersh bodies in military districts (head - Colonel GB Zenichev Dmitry Semenovich) 6th department - investigative (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Leonov Alexander Georgievich) 7th branch - operational accounting and statistics, checking the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NPOs, NKVMF, code workers, admission to top secret and secret work, checking workers sent to cross the border (chief - Colonel Sidorov A. E. (appointed later, there is no reason in the order)) 8th section - operational equipment (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Sharikov Mikhail Petrovich) 9th section - searches, arrests, external surveillance (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kochetkov Alexander Evstafievich) 10- th fragment - Department “C” - special assignments (chief - Major GB Zbrailov Alexander Mikhailovich) 11th issue - encryption (chief - Colonel GB Chertov Ivan Aleksandrovich)
OPERATIONAL RAIDING GROUPS (OVG) OF THE INTERNAL TROOPS NKVD-MGB (1945-1955) - The main task of these raiding operational-military (otherwise KGB-military) groups was the rapid implementation of operational data through the territorial bodies of internal affairs and state security through the search and neutralization of nationalist participants gangs. The activities of the OVG were regulated in more detail in the directive of the head of the NKVD Internal Troops of the Ukrainian District, Lieutenant General Marchenko, to the commanders of formations and units of the district on July 21, 1945:
“Each raiding detachment is to tear out and liquidate a certain gang registered with the NKVD and the headquarters of the formation or unit, ... The raiding detachment is to be equipped with a radio station, the personnel are to be given the necessary ammunition and food. Do not burden the detachments with convoys. ...When a gang is discovered, the raiding detachment pursues it before completely eliminating it, and only then the problem is considered completed.... The raiding detachment operates day and night, in any weather and in any terrain conditions, being not connected with the administrative boundaries of the district or region. ...In each battalion, regiment and formation, place a mobile reserve (on vehicles, on carts, groups of cavalry) to assist the raiding detachment near the outbreak of a battle with a gang.... The commander of the formation, unit, having received a report from the head of the raiding detachment about the outbreak battle with a gang, takes decisive measures to assist the detachment by sending a mobile reserve with the task of blocking the likely escape routes and completely destroying the bandits. population from the chairmen of village councils, documenting this with the appropriate documents."
SEPARATE SPECIAL PURPOSE BRIGADE OF THE FIRST MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE KGB OF THE USSR (OBON PGU KGB USSR) (1955 - 1969) - In 1955, a special department was created close to the PGU KGB. During the war era, the Directorate of Sabotage Intelligence was developed at the department's base. In turn, a separate special purpose brigade was created near this department. But the brigade wore a cropped figure. One of the main tasks of the department was to prepare a special reserve of the KGB for wartime happiness, which was consolidated into a brigade with a total number of 4,500 people. The brigade organizationally included 6 regiments and an operational battalion. The formation of these regiments by reservists and their deployment in peacetime was carried out by the territorial bodies of the KGB of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as the Khabarovsk and Krasnodar territories, the Moscow and Leningrad regions. In this they were supervised by a special department. In addition, he was involved in the selection and preparation of a special foreign intelligence reserve, organized courses and training camps. The most famous actions are the holding of special events in preparation for the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968. OFFICER IMPROVEMENT COURSES - By the decision of the KGB leaders in 1969, as part of the KGB Higher School, but under the operational subordination of intelligence, the Officer Improvement Courses (CUOS) were created. Their main task was to train KGB “operatives” for operations as part of operational combat groups on enemy territory in the retail (threatened) era or in its deep rear with the outbreak of hostilities. The training program included a set of disciplines aimed at training the commander of an operational combat group, a well-developed and professionally competent officer in charge of a reconnaissance and sabotage unit. For seven months, students underwent special physical, fire, airborne and mountain training. They mastered special tactics, mine demolition, topography, improved intelligence skills, studied the experience of guerrilla warfare and much more. As a result, a separate special-purpose brigade, which had training grounds for all geographical latitudes of the Soviet Union, also received a private training center, where groups were put together during training and commander skills were tested in practice. The most trained personnel, both from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, were recruited for teaching. Undoubtedly, the moral and physical stress of the special reservists, the property allocated for their training and logistical guarantees were not wasted.
"ZENIT" - One of the groups was formed from the "Kuos" members, called "Zenith", which took part in the coup d'etat in Afghanistan. The most famous action associated with the seizure of the Taj Beg Palace in Kabul in December 1979. As is now widely known, the problem was completed with honor, at the highest professional level.
"CASCADE" - In May 1980, the State Security Committee at the level of the Chairman was working on the task of mobilizing the Separate Special Purpose Brigade in order to send it in full force to Afghanistan. Lazarenko proposed, and based on his proposals, an order was developed and signed regarding the mobilization of the Krasnodar and Alma-Ata regiments, as well as part of the Tashkent battalion. From other units of the brigade, only those who knew Persian were taken. In total, the combined detachment included thousands of people nearby. Colonel A.I. Lazarenko was ordered to command the detachment, who coined the word “Cascade” for him. Additional training of the detachment was carried out in Fergana, for the base of the 105th Airborne Division.

“Cascade” was assigned the following tasks:
Helping Afghans establish local security agencies
Organization of intelligence and operational work in spite of existing gangs
Organization and holding of special events in front of the most aggressive opponents of the existing Afghan regime and the USSR.
The second task was the most difficult due to the local national, ethnic and religious characteristics that had land in Afghanistan.
"Cascade" was called upon to confront opponents of the new government and teach its defenders to harp on their own. Over time, “Cascade” began to supply the army with reliable intelligence information related to gangs, and joint operations were often carried out. The stunt epic ended in the spring of 1983.
"OMEGA" - "Cascade" replaced the "Omega" detachment, whose tasks included mainly advisory activities in the special forces of the Afghan Ministry of Security. It also existed for about a year. In April 1984, Mikhail Tsybenko, on the territory of the KGB representative office in Kabul, in the presence of two officers, chopped the coat of arms and the corner stamp “Omega” with an ax. The witnesses signed the document and the Omega squad ceased to exist.
"VIMPEL" - The actions of non-standard KGB special forces units in Afghanistan clearly demonstrated the need to create a regular structure that would be capable of solving special tasks deep behind enemy lines. This idea was expressed by Major General Drozdov Yu.I. during the meeting with Andropov Yu.V. at the end of 1979. During the 1980s, this idea was often discussed in the Government and Politburo and, in the end, the KGB leadership agreed with the idea of ​​its creation. On August 19, 1981, a closed meeting of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which a decision was made to create a literally secret special-purpose detachment in the KGB of the USSR to conduct operations outside the USSR during the “partial period.” The first commander was captain 1st rank Evald Grigorievich Kozlov. The detachment was named "Pennant" in association with the admiral's braid pennant for the mast. The official name of the structure is the Separate Training Center of the KGB of the USSR.
Orders to carry out operations with the forces of this detachment could only be paid by the chairman of the KGB and only in writing. However, there were no cases of its use abroad; however, some Vympel employees illegally underwent “internship” in NATO special forces units.
The unique unit required the development of a special training program for its employees so that they could carry out special measures at the right time in order to disorganize the enemy rear. It was necessary to train highly qualified, thinking fighters, ready to make independent decisions and even self-sacrifice in the name of the interests of the Motherland. The training program was developed practically from scratch. In this case, the experience of training airborne units, border guards, operational personnel of the KGB and a truly personal test were used. Recommendations and techniques developed for KUOS provided enormous assistance. Intense combat training for Vympel employees began immediately due to the formation of the unit. Since ancient times, only officers were recruited into combat units. Mostly these were people who had passed the Cascade and KUOS. But since the unit initially consisted of about a thousand people, officers were recruited from the border troops and from the Airborne Forces and from other branches of the military. In a brutal selection process, only ten candidates remained. Great attention was paid to physical training and hand-to-hand combat. Mountain training was at a high level. We learned to shoot from anything that shoots, to drive cars and armored personnel carriers. Serious preparation was given to mine explosives. The soldiers knew how to make explosives from household chemicals. When working at radio stations, they were trained to work equally in telephone and telegraph mode. And many many others. The Vympel fighters were ready to appear in the country against which they were preparing with partial legalization. This allowed them to speak one or two foreign languages ​​and have excellent knowledge of the enemy’s country and the national characteristics of its population.
It took about five years to train a fighter from scratch. Rarely, the level of training in the detachment became high and was not inferior, and in many ways exceeded the height of training of the most elite units in the world, let’s take, for example, the British SAS.