From the headquarters of Army Group Center in the OKH In early 1942, after frostbite on my right leg, I received a short leave to recuperate. I used my vacation so that in the Eastern Ministry, as well as in the circles of leading industrialists (whose firms I represented in

Such was his point of view in the winter of 1939/40. Hitler is by no means a far-sighted statesman. For him, politics was never a means to an end, but first and foremost a dream, and he, the dreamer, ignored time, space, and the limitations of German power. He forgot that Germany itself was just a tiny patch on a huge globe. Probably, soon after the campaign in Poland, his dreams were completely swallowed up by the East. Perhaps he even mentally saw a new "Germanization" of the vast eastern territories, as it was in past centuries. But the boundless steppes, bad roads or almost complete lack of roads, huge swamps and forests, and with all this a staunch, brave Russian soldier - he did not imagine this. During the First World War, he served as a private only in the West and was not familiar with the conditions of the East.

After lightning victories in Poland, Norway, France and the Balkans, Hitler was convinced that he could defeat the Red Army as easily as his former opponents. He remained deaf to numerous warnings. In the spring of 1941, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who had spent most of World War I on the Eastern Front, asked Hitler if he knew what it meant to invade Russia. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, and his chief of staff, General Halder, tried to dissuade Hitler from going to war with Russia. General Kestring, who had lived in Russia for many years and knew the country and Stalin himself, addressed him with the same warnings. But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted.

It seems to me that Hitler seriously conceived an attack on Russia in the summer of 1940. He wanted, firstly, to strike at the Russians before they could attack Germany, and, secondly, to win living space for the growing population of Germany. At that time, only top political and other leaders knew about the intention. In some respects, Hitler's plan depended on making peace with England, which he still dreamed of. He knew that the successful execution of his intentions would depend on the security of the Western Front. A war on two fronts meant the defeat of Germany. But when all hopes for the realization of an important condition failed, when it became absolutely clear that England would never make peace with Nazi Germany, the Fuhrer still did not refuse to go to the East. With a firm hand, he took the helm and led Germany to the rocks of complete defeat.

Despite the conclusion of the German-Soviet treaty, a chill of distrust remained between the countries. However, relations between Russia and the West, especially between Russia and England, were even worse. During the Russian-Finnish campaign, England almost declared war on the Soviets, and now Hitler decided to do something that England had refrained from. By making this fateful decision, Germany lost the war.

In 1940, shortly after the end of the campaign in the West, the headquarters of Army Group B under the command of Field Marshal von Bock was transferred to Poznań. Some time later, the headquarters of the 4th Army of Field Marshal von Kluge was transferred to Warsaw. Prior to this, there were only a few divisions along our eastern border, including one cavalry division. They were deployed in major cities, as in peacetime, and the usual security measures were taken along the border. The Red Army, located on the other side of the demarcation line that divided Poland, behaved as quietly as our army. It was clear that neither side was thinking about war. But as soon as all operations in France ceased, German divisions began to gradually but steadily be transferred to the East.

Until January 1941, neither Field Marshal von Kluge nor his staff received any instructions to prepare for war with Russia. general provisions.

With the plan of operation "Barbarossa" (symbol for the invasion of Russia), the top commanders got acquainted later. In the spring of 1941 more and more divisions were transferred to the East. To hide this from the Russians, they deployed far from the border. Headquarters of new large formations in the East were created, staff exercises and tactical games were held. There was no longer any doubt about Hitler's decision to attack Russia, and the headquarters of all units and formations intensified their preparations for war.

A very strange atmosphere has been created during these months. First of all, we clearly imagined what a new war would entail. During the First World War, many of us fought in Russia as junior officers, and therefore we knew what awaited us. There was some unease and uncertainty among the officers. But the duty of service required careful, painstaking work. All maps and books relating to Russia soon disappeared from bookstores. I remember that on the desk of Field Marshal Kluge in Warsaw there was always a pile of such books. The Napoleonic campaign of 1812 became the subject of special study. With great attention, Kluge read the reports of General de Caulaincourt on this campaign. They revealed the difficulties of waging war and even life in Russia. The battlefields of Napoleon's Great Army were marked on our maps. We knew that we would soon follow in the footsteps of Napoleon.

We also studied the Russo-Polish war of 1920. As chief of staff of the 4th Army, I gave a number of lectures on this topic to the officers of our headquarters, illustrating the course of events with detailed diagrams and maps. The Pripyat marshes played an important role in this war. A huge region of swamps and forests, stretching from Brest to the Dnieper and almost equal in area to the whole of Bavaria. was not completely impassable, as before. During the First World War, we made our way through this territory and soon were going to go through it again.

Our preparations for Operation Barbarossa were partially interrupted in the spring in connection with the so-called Balkan Incident. Remembering Gallipoli, Hitler was afraid that the British would try again to commit sabotage in this corner of Europe. He took into account the possibility of an enemy landing in Greece, which could enable the British to advance through Bulgaria to the north and strike at the rear of Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Army Group South advancing to the East. To avoid this and ensure the security of Romanian oil, he sought to strengthen the political and military ties that bound the Balkan states to Germany.

As for Romania, General Antonescu fully approved of Hitler's plans. A German military mission was sent to Bucharest to reorganize the Romanian army. Antonescu was anxious to take back Bessarabia, which had been occupied by the Russians in 1940. He hoped to annex part of Ukraine to Romania as well. With all this in mind, Antonescu signed an alliance pact with Germany.

The attitude of the Bulgarians was more restrained, as they did not want to provoke the wrath of either England or Germany. As bait, Hitler offered Bulgaria Thessaloniki and its lost territories in Thrace. After long negotiations, the Bulgarians finally agreed to allow German troops to pass through their country's territory in order to strike at the British troops in Greece. In Albania, the Greco-Italian war reached a stalemate with an advantage, perhaps, for the Greek side. Yugoslavia caused Hitler a lot of unpleasant troubles. As early as 1939, the regent of Yugoslavia, Prince Paul, was received in Berlin with great honors. Hitler counted on Prince Paul to maintain neutrality. But unexpectedly, probably not without the intervention of London or Moscow, a revolutionary situation arose in Yugoslavia. The government of Prince Paul was overthrown, and the country ceased to be our potential ally. This situation immediately threatened the communications of the German armies in Romania and Bulgaria. Hitler acted without delay. German troops invaded Yugoslavia, and her brave army was soon defeated. This was largely facilitated by the national enmity between Serbs and Croats.

It is not my task to deal in detail with the brief Balkan campaign. Its significance is that it delayed our invasion of Russia to some extent. Since this campaign did not last very long and ended successfully, the divisions used in the Balkans again returned to their original areas. As for several armored divisions that made a long march through the mountains of Greece, their tank fleet needed a long repair and replenishment.

The start of Operation Barbarossa was tentatively scheduled for May 15. This was the earliest date, as we had to wait for the roads to dry after the spring thaw. Mechanized units would get stuck in April, when rivers and streams swell and the vast expanses of western Russia are covered with spring waters. The Balkan campaign delayed the start of the war with Russia by five to five and a half weeks.

But even if there had been no Balkan campaign, the start of the war with Russia would obviously have had to be postponed, since in 1941 the thaw came late and the Bug River in the sector of the 4th Army entered its banks only at the beginning of June. D-Day was finally set for June 22, which almost coincided with the start of Napoleon's campaign in 1812. .

In connection with the Balkan campaign and late spring, we lost many priceless weeks. Only a few months remained for the effective use of our motorized troops. From June to the end of September, conditions in Russia are exceptionally favorable for waging a moderate war. Thus, we had four months. In October, the autumn thaw begins and traffic is extremely difficult, as whole cars get stuck in the mud. The period of frost - from November to February - favors military operations, but only if the equipment, weapons and vehicles are adapted for warfare in cold weather, and the troops are dressed and prepared for combat operations like the Russian army. Despite careful study of Russian conditions, we were struck by the severity of two periods of mudslides in spring and autumn. In this case, the experience gained in the First World War not only did not benefit us, but even led us astray. Then we fought with the tsarist army mainly on the territory of Poland, and not in the depths of Russia, where the climate is much more severe.

Finally, about the morale of our troops. There is no doubt that our commanders and troops were worried about the prospect of a new campaign. Everyone had the impression that we were going to a mysteriously creepy country, a country without end and edge. However, this did not prevent us from preparing for war in the most thorough manner. Everything that could be done before the start of the campaign was done.

Evaluation of enemy forces should be approached very carefully. Better to overestimate them than underestimate them. We must assume that in fact the enemy may be much stronger than we imagined. Failure to correctly assess the enemy can lead to unpleasant surprises. The inhabitant of the East differs in many ways from the inhabitant of the West. He endures hardships better, and this humility gives an equally imperturbable attitude to both life and death.

His way of life is very simple, even primitive compared to our standards. Orientals attach little importance to what they eat and what they wear. It is simply amazing how long they can exist on what would mean starvation to a European. Russian is close to nature. Heat and cold have almost no effect on him. In winter, he protects himself from severe cold with everything that comes to hand. He is a master of imagination. To warm up, it does not need complex structures and equipment. Strong and healthy Russian women work just like men.

Close contact with nature allows Russians to move freely at night in the fog, through forests and swamps. They are not afraid of the dark, endless forests and cold. They are not unusual in winter, when the temperature drops to minus 45 o WITH.

The Siberian, who can be considered partially or even completely Asian, is even more enduring, even stronger and has a much greater resistance than his European compatriot. We already experienced this during the First World War, when we had to face the Siberian army corps. To a European from the West, accustomed to small territories, the distances in the East seem endless. A US citizen is used to thinking in terms of vast steppes and prairies, and therefore he will not share this feeling, close to horror. The horror is further enhanced by the melancholic, monotonous nature of the Russian landscape, which acts depressingly, especially in the gloomy autumn and languidly long winter.

The psychological influence of this country on the average German soldier was very strong. He felt insignificant, lost in these vast expanses. The natives of East Germany acclimatized much more easily to this strange new world, since East Germany is geographically the link between Russia and the West. Soldiers from other parts of Germany, like their fathers in the First World War, also learned to adapt to local conditions. Russia was a true test for our troops. It was a tough school. The person who survived after meeting the Russian soldier and the Russian climate knows what war is. After that, he has no need to learn to fight.

All the wars that Russia waged were cruel and bloody. During the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great learned to respect the fighting qualities of the Russian soldier. Napoleon considered the battle of Borodino the bloodiest of all his battles. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 was as brutal as the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the 20th century. In these two wars, the losses were enormous. During the First World War, we became intimately acquainted with the Russian tsarist army. I will cite a little-known but significant fact: our losses on the Eastern Front were much greater than the losses we suffered on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918. The Russian generals were then qualitatively inferior to the German ones, and the tactics of huge armies in the offensive were inflexible. But in defense, the Russian army was remarkable for its remarkable stamina. The Russians skillfully and very quickly built fortifications and equipped defensive positions. Their soldiers showed great skill in fighting at night and in the forest. The Russian soldier prefers hand-to-hand combat. His physical needs are not great, but his ability to endure hardship without flinching is truly amazing.

Such is the Russian soldier whom we recognized and respected a quarter of a century ago. Since then, the Bolsheviks have been systematically re-educating the youth of their country, and it would be logical to assume that the Red Army has become a tougher nut to crack than the tsarist army.

The Russians had carefully studied past campaigns, and we expected their top commanders to learn from past experience. But the middle and junior command staff, according to our observers, were poorly trained and had no combat experience.

It was very difficult for us to get a clear picture of the equipment of the Red Army. The Russians took careful and effective security measures. Hitler refused to believe that Soviet industrial production could be equal to German. We had little information about Russian tanks. We had no idea how many tanks a month the Russian industry was capable of producing.

It was difficult to even get the maps, as the Russians kept them under great secrecy. The maps we had were often wrong and misled us.

We also did not have accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army. Those of us who fought in Russia during the First World War thought she was great, and those who did not know the new enemy tended to underestimate her.

How the civilian population of Russia would react to us, we did not know. In 1914-1918. The Russian population treated us gently and loyally. However, no one could say how much it had changed over the years.

In 1941, the German army still consisted mainly of purely infantry divisions, which moved on foot, and horses were used in the wagon train. Only a small part of the army consisted of armored and motorized divisions. Therefore, we faced the problem: how to cover huge distances in the short time that remained at our disposal? The length of the front was also enormous - from the Carpathians to the Baltic coast near Memel. The configuration of the border completely ruled out the possibility of immediate envelopment or encirclement of the enemy. I had to deal only frontal strikes.

In June 1941, according to our data, the Russians had 160 rifle and 30 cavalry divisions and 35 motorized and tank brigades. Some of these forces were deployed along the Far Eastern border. The total number of human resources to be mobilized was 12 million. We assumed that the Russians had more tanks than we did, but that their tanks were qualitatively inferior to ours, although other types of equipment for the Russian troops were considered good. Neither the air force nor the Russian navy posed a great threat to us. We also knew little about the organization of the Red Army.

Our main strategic problem, as I said, was to crush the enemy in a huge theater of operations within the limited time available to us. We had only a few months to crush the huge Russian armies west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina. If they can escape untouched behind these water barriers, we will face the same problem that confronted Napoleon in 1812. In this case, it will be difficult to say when the war in the East will end.

Hitler approached the war from purely economic positions. He wanted to seize grain-rich Ukraine, the industrial Donetsk basin, and then Caucasian oil.

Brauchitsch and Halder looked at the war from a completely different point of view. They wanted to destroy the Red Army first, and then fight to achieve economic goals. However, both Hitler's plan and the plan of his closest military advisers required the concentration of the main forces of German troops north of the Pripyat marshes. It was planned to deploy two army groups there, and the army group operating on the right flank was supposed to be stronger. Their task was to strike the enemy on both flanks with tank formations, surround him to the west of the upper reaches of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina and prevent his withdrawal to the east. At the same time, other formations of Army Group North were to capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns, destroying all Russian troops in the Baltic Sea area. Only after this was the German offensive planned for Moscow from the west and north.

South of the Pripyat Marshes, Army Group South was to launch a frontal attack and advance eastward.

Further planning was useless, since the course of the campaign depends on the successes achieved at the beginning of hostilities. So, the differences between Hitler and the High Command regarding the plans for the war remained unresolved even after our troops crossed the Russian border.

Later, in the summer, these disagreements caused great friction and led to the most unfortunate consequences.

Before proceeding to a detailed examination of the troop grouping plan and our operational plans, it seems to be interesting to quote here the opinions of some of our senior officers expressed at that time.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who commanded Army Group South and, after Field Marshal von Manstein, our most talented commander during the Second World War, said in May 1941 the following about the approaching war:

“The war with Russia is a senseless undertaking, which, in my opinion, cannot have a happy ending. But if, for political reasons, war is inevitable, we must agree that it cannot be won in a single summer campaign. Just look at these huge spaces. We cannot defeat the enemy and occupy the entire western part of Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea in just a few months. We must prepare for a long war and gradually achieve our goals. First of all, a strong Army Group North must capture Leningrad. This will give us the opportunity to connect with the Finns, destroy the red Baltic fleet and increase our influence in the Scandinavian countries. Army Groups "South" and "Center" should advance so far only to the line Odessa - Kyiv - Orsha - Lake Ilmen. If it then turns out that we still have time this year, we will advance on Moscow: from the northwest - by Army Group North and from the east - by Army Group Center. All further operations can be postponed until 1942, when we can develop new plans based on the real situation.

My immediate superior in the 4th Army was Field Marshal von Kluge, who later commanded the 4th Panzer Army during its offensive against Moscow. He expressed his opinion in the following terms:

“Moscow is the head and heart of the Soviet system. It is not only the capital, but also an important center for the production of various types of weapons. In addition, Moscow is the most important junction of railways, which diverge in all directions, including to Siberia. The Russians will be forced to send large forces to defend the capital. Therefore, I believe that we should throw all our forces against Moscow, advancing through Minsk, Orsha and Smolensk. If we capture Moscow before the onset of cold weather, it will be possible to consider that we have achieved a lot in one year. Then it will be necessary to think about plans for 1942.”

Critical remarks made after 1945 by military leaders in other countries are also of some interest. One theory is that we should have focused on capturing the Black Sea and Baltic Sea basins with air and naval forces. Here the ground forces were to play a secondary role. Such actions would lead to the isolation of Russia. However, this plan was not feasible, since our Air Force and Navy were too weak. Further, it was considered necessary to quickly defeat Russia. Given the peculiarities of the geographical position of Germany, then a long war should have been fatal for her. Only the great maritime powers can afford to wage a protracted war, since they are impregnable and cannot be subjected to economic strangulation.

My personal point of view on this issue was as follows.

In 1941, we had to capture the areas of Moscow and Leningrad and hold the enemy's capital, its largest railway junction and two most important cities. This could be achieved by deploying the bulk of our forces in the areas of operations of Army Groups North and Center. The main task of Army Group South during the 1941 campaign would have been only to advance eastward south of the Pripyat marshes and to cover the right flank of Army Group Center. Therefore, there could be no question of trying to capture the southern part of Russia this year.

Each of these plans had its own advantages and disadvantages. Planning for military operations was difficult even at the best of times, and certainly not any easier now that political and economic factors influence military decisions.

My subject is the Battle of Moscow, and therefore I will confine myself to sketching portraits of the people who were made responsible for the capture of the Russian capital. Although the fighting of Army Group Center was closely connected with the actions of Army Groups North and South, here we will only touch on Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal von Bock.

Bock is one of the most outstanding military talents. Like Rundstedt and Manstein, he brilliantly directed operations on a large scale. During the First World War, for some time he was on the Western Front the chief of the operational department of the army headquarters, commanded by the German Crown Prince. Bock is a tall, slender man, a typical Prussian of the old school. Mobile and caustic, he expressed his thoughts clearly and clearly. Bock looked younger than his years - he could have been given no more than forty. However, his health was not in order (he suffered from a stomach ailment).

Field Marshal von Kluge is an energetic traditional stock officer. He was more of a talented tactician than an outstanding strategist. The field marshal did not smoke and hardly touched alcohol. No matter how disturbing the situation, he always went to bed early and got up early. Like Rommel, von Kluge felt happy being among the troops, on the front line. Sometimes he personally took over the leadership of the combat operations of individual units and formations, which made the work of his headquarters difficult. True, he always made sure that his chief of staff knew the orders that he gave on the spot. The field marshal had a passion for aviation and was proud of his wing patch, which he earned during the First World War. Jokingly, he often compared himself to the Napoleonic Marshal Ney. Like Ney, he was unaware of the feeling of fear. Without a shadow of hesitation, he flew and rode under enemy fire. When visiting his troops, he always took with him a tent, a stove, food and water, as well as an armored car, a car with a radio station, and one or two messengers - motorcyclists. Thus, he did not depend on his headquarters and spent the night where the night caught him. Von Kluge was wounded several times, repeatedly got into car and aviation accidents. He was a tireless and determined man.

Colonel General Guderian commanded the 2nd Panzer Group, which operated in close cooperation with von Kluge's 4th Army. Even before the war, he became one of the creators of the German armored forces and was considered a born tank commander. On all the tanks and vehicles of his group was the letter "G" - the first letter of his last name. As one of the commanders of the German armored forces in the Polish campaign and in France, he gained a flattering reputation. He was not easy to deal with, as at times the general was incredibly stubborn - apparently, this trait is not uncommon in prominent personalities. A brilliant commander, the general was very popular among the personnel of the armored forces.

Colonel General Strauss commanded the 9th Army, which operated north of von Kluge's 4th Army. He was a calm, cautious and experienced commander. The 3rd Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoth interacted with his army. Goth was also an outstanding tanker and a level-headed, pedantic person.

About the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, Colonel-General Gepner, we will speak ahead. His troops managed to come closest to Moscow. He, too, was considered an energetic military leader.

There is no need to say that in the course of the war various disagreements arose between individual generals. This, however, did not interfere with the coordinated work of their headquarters. To the extent of our strengths and abilities, we always helped each other without fail.

Army Group South. Under the command of Field Marshal von Rundstedt were four field armies and one tank group of General von Kleist. The German-Romanian 11th Army was located in the Jassy region, the Hungarian army was in the Carpathian mountains, the 17th army of General von Stulpnagel was north of the Carpathian mountains and the 6th army of General von Reichenau was between the 17th army and Lublin. Panzer Group Kleist was stationed in Galicia west of Tomaszow.

The task of the Army Group "South": to advance in an easterly direction south of the Pripyat marshes, concentrating its main efforts on the left flank and aiming to capture Kyiv.

Army Group Center. The composition and deployment of Field Marshal von Bock's Army Group will be discussed in detail below. It was located north of the Pripyat swamps and was supposed to advance on Moscow.

Army Group North. Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb had General Bush's 16th Army and General Küchler's 18th Army under his command, as well as General Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group. This army group was located between Suwalki and Memel. She was supposed to advance on Leningrad, and then turn south.

Air Force. Each army group was supported by one air fleet. The 4th Air Fleet, under the command of Colonel-General Lehr, supported Army Group South; Field Marshal Kesselring's 2nd Air Fleet, the strongest of the three air fleets, supported Army Group Center, and the 1st Air Fleet, under the command of Colonel General Koller, supported Army Group North.

Numerical composition. On June 21, 1941, the German high command had about 135 divisions at its disposal. Most of them, namely: 80 infantry, 15 motorized, 17 tank divisions and one cavalry division - were on the Eastern Front or on their way there. In addition to these troops, there were several more security divisions intended to carry out garrison service in the territory that we were supposed to occupy.

Army Group "South" consisted of 25 infantry, 4 motorized, 5 tank and 4 mountain rifle divisions. All these divisions were German. Army Group South also included a Hungarian corps, a Slovak division, and later an Italian corps. The Romanian army of Marshal Antonescu was operationally subordinate to Field Marshal Rundstedt. In front of the front of the Army Group "South" were superior Russian forces under the command of Marshal Budyonny.

Army Group Centre, the strongest of the three army groups, had 30 infantry, 15 panzer or motorized divisions, and one cavalry division. In front of the front of this army group were the Russian troops of Marshal Timoshchenko, who in their numbers had only a slight superiority over the Germans.

Army Group North consisted of 21 infantry and 6 tank or motorized divisions. In terms of the number of personnel, it was significantly inferior to the Russian troops commanded by Marshal Voroshilov.

Our three air fleets numbered about 1200 aircraft.

A few days before June 21, the commanders of the armies and the commanders of the formations took their places at the command posts. Army Group Center, which consisted of the 4th and 9th field armies, the 2nd and 3rd tank groups (a group - a unit larger than a corps, but smaller than an army), was to advance east with the task of capturing the Soviet capital. In the future, we will consider the actions of this group of the army, especially the 4th Army and two tank groups.

Hour "H" was scheduled for 3 hours 30 minutes on June 22. By this time, the commander of Army Group Center had moved with his headquarters to Warsaw. Kluge's headquarters left the former Polish capital and settled down to the west of Brest. The headquarters of Guderian and Hoth were near the demarcation line.

Assessing the deployment of our troops, Kluge remarked: “Our battle formations are not deep. We do not have such powerful reserves as during the war in the West. The farther we advance to the east, the wider will be our front and the thinner the line of our advancing troops. Therefore, it is very important that our troops act compactly and not disperse, even if gaps arise between us and neighboring armies.

It was an accurate assessment of the situation. The territory of European Russia had such a shape that we had to advance along a corridor, first squeezed on both sides by the Black and Baltic Seas, and then expanding all the time as we moved east. Our operational plan was as follows. Two tank groups were located on the flanks of the two field armies: Guderian's group on the right flank of the 4th Army, in the Brest area, Gotha's group on the left flank of the 9th Army, west of Suwalki. These tank groups were supposed to break through the enemy defenses and move at maximum speed to Minsk, where these giant pincers were supposed to close in, thus surrounding as many Russian troops as possible. The infantry corps of the 4th and 9th armies were to carry out more or less limited detour movements in order to destroy individual units and formations of the Red Army directly on the border or near it. The right flank, which was already reliably covered by the Pripyat swamps, was supposed to be covered by small forces. This was our basic plan of action.

The tension in the German troops was constantly growing. As we assumed, by the evening of June 21, the Russians should have understood what was happening, but on the other side of the Bug in front of the front of the 4th Army and the 2nd Panzer Group, that is, between Brest and Lomza, everything was quiet. The Russian border guard behaved as usual. Shortly after midnight, when all the artillery of the infantry divisions of the first and second echelons was ready to open fire, the international Moscow-Berlin train passed through Brest without hindrance. It was a fatal moment.

Three hours later, German warplanes took to the air, and soon only their sidelights were visible far to the east. Field Marshal von Kluge and his headquarters were located at the location of the 31st Infantry Division north of Brest. By 3 o'clock 30 minutes - it was the hour "H" - it began to get light, the sky became somehow surprisingly yellow. And the surroundings were still quiet. At 0330 hours all our artillery opened fire. And then what seemed like a miracle happened: the Russian artillery did not respond. Only occasionally did some coastal gun open fire. A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side. Tanks were crossed, pontoon bridges were built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy. There was no doubt that the 4th Army and the 2nd Panzer Group had taken the Russians by surprise.

The breakthrough was successful. Our tanks almost immediately broke through the line of Russian border fortifications and rushed to the east on level ground. Only in the Brest Fortress, where the GPU school was located, did the Russians put up fanatical resistance for several days.

In order to quickly move on to the description of the Moscow battle, I will dwell on the hostilities of the next month very briefly.

As I said, on the front of Army Group Center, the Russians were taken by surprise. When the hostilities began, our radio operators overheard the following conversation of the Russians on the radio: “They are shooting at us! What to do?" The senior boss to whom this question was addressed replied: “Yes, you are crazy! Also, why aren't you coding the conversation?"

On the other hand, Army Group South immediately ran into stubborn resistance, and heavy battles unfolded there.

And everything went according to plan. The two panzer groups advanced far to the east in a swift rush, and then turned towards each other. At the same time, part of the forces of Guderian's tank group continued to move forward, although a fierce battle was going on in the rear with the encircled Russian troops. Guderian sought to reach Minsk as soon as possible, since it was important to prevent the enemy from retreating to the east, beyond the Berezina, the Dnieper and the Western Dvina.

The infantry had to withstand the fast pace of the offensive. Crossing 40 kilometers a day was no exception, and on the most terrible roads. Before my eyes, I still have a vivid picture of the first weeks of the war: unbearable heat, huge clouds of yellow dust raised by columns of retreating Russian troops and trying to catch up with them by German infantry. Sometimes it rained unexpectedly, turning the dust on the roads into liquid mud. But as soon as the sun came out, the dirt turned to dust again.

By July 2, the first battle was won, 150 thousand prisoners were taken, about 1200 tanks and 600 guns were captured and destroyed. From our first impression, the Russian soldier was a tough fighter. However, Russian tanks were not perfect, and as for aviation, we almost did not see it at that time.

The behavior of the Russian troops, even in the first battles, was in striking contrast with the behavior of the Poles and Western allies in defeat. Even when surrounded, the Russians continued stubborn battles. The huge territory of the country with forests and swamps helped them. There were not enough German troops to create the same dense ring around the Russian troops everywhere as in the Bialystok-Slonim region. Our motorized troops fought along the roads or close to them. And where there were no roads, the Russians in most cases remained out of reach. That is why the Russians often got out of the encirclement. In whole columns, their troops moved through the forests to the east at night. They always tried to break through to the east, so the most combat-ready troops, usually tank ones, were usually sent to the eastern part of the encirclement. And yet, our circle of Russians has rarely been successful.

The high pace of our offensive can be judged at least by the fact that the headquarters of the 4th Army had to change its place of residence twice within four days in order to be close to the combat area. On June 24, our headquarters moved to Kamenetz-Podolsky, and on June 26 - to Pruzhany.

Before the battle of Minsk and the breakthrough of the Stalin Line, Army Group Center underwent a thorough reorganization.

As in the old days, when large masses of cavalry, building on their successes, moved far ahead, it was now decided to combine the panzer groups of Hoth and Guderian and send them as far as possible to the east. To manage this tank association, a headquarters was created, which received the name "4th Tank Army". Field Marshal von Kluge was appointed commander. He took with him the entire staff of the headquarters of the 4th field army, which from June 2 became known as the 2nd army. Colonel General Weikhs, whose headquarters was in Pruzhany, became the commander of the 2nd Army. We went to Minsk and, having arrived there on July 3, we began to perform new functions.

The fierce Minsk battle was in full swing. The liquidation of the encircled large enemy grouping was entrusted to the infantry, and we rushed to the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. It was during this advance between 2 and 11 July that the terrain first gave our tanks serious trouble. It was not easy to cross the Berezina with its swampy banks, since almost all the bridges were blown up. In this swampy area, the Russians offered stubborn resistance, and here we first began to stumble upon numerous mines. All this delayed the advance of the tanks and allowed the infantry to again catch up with the tank formations after the Battle of Minsk.

Goth and Guderian did not stay long in one place. Despite the difficulties listed above, Guderian quickly reached the Dnieper at Mogilev and Orsha. A little further north, Goth just as quickly reached the Western Dvina at Vitebsk and Polotsk. And now the tanks approached the so-called "Stalin Line" - the main defensive line of the Russians.

However, this line was not equally fortified along its entire length. In addition, the Russians did not have enough troops to defend it, despite reinforcements sent from the east. Guderian and Goth soon crossed the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. The way into the depths of Russia was open.

On July 8, the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army moved to Borisov (on the Berezina). Here we found traces of Napoleon's army. A few kilometers north of Borisov, Napoleon's Grand Army was forced in the winter of 1812 to force a frozen river and suffered terrible losses. When there is little water in the river, the supports of bridges once built by French sappers are still visible.

After the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper, and the 3rd - the Western Dvina, Russian resistance increased. The Soviet command transferred strong reinforcements from the east and tried to recapture the "Stalin Line". I won't go into details of these battles here. Suffice it to say that Russian tactics now consisted, as a rule, of striking at the flanks of our tank columns. This fighting lasted from 12 to 30 July, and even in August there were sporadic fights here.

The most significant of these was the battle in the Smolensk region, where a large grouping of Russian troops was surrounded. While the main body of the two panzer groups, repulsing the Russian attacks on the flanks, continued to move east, a small force was allocated to reinforce the eastern side of the Smolensk pocket. Two field armies, after an exhausting march, finally again caught up with the tank formations. They held three sides of the pocket, while our tanks blocked the exit from it near Yartsevo. Again, this operation was unsuccessful. At night, Russian troops broke out of the encirclement and went to the east. Tank troops were not suitable for such an operation, especially in the swampy area adjacent to the Dnieper.

On July 13, the headquarters of Field Marshal Kluge moved from Borisov to Tolochin. There we were visited by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima. We were ordered to take every precaution to keep him out of trouble. However, he insisted that he be shown the Dnieper near Orsha, where the ambassador came under heavy enemy artillery fire. But Oshima survived, and proud as Petrushka, returning to our headquarters, he showed Field Marshal von Kluge his samurai saber.

On July 10, the 29th Motorized Division captured Smolensk, the most important of the Russian cities so far in our hands. On July 24 we moved forward. Our headquarters were now camped in tents in the woods southwest of Smolensk, just a few kilometers from the front line. Not far from us was the old road along which Napoleon went to Moscow.

We lost precious weeks in late July and early August as our high command contemplated the best strategy for us. I have already said above that Hitler sought to achieve economic goals: he wanted to seize the Ukraine, the Donets Basin and, finally, the Caucasus. These areas were in the offensive zone of Army Group South. Hitler's secondary goal was the capture of Leningrad, which at that phase of the campaign seemed about to fall and which in all likelihood would have fallen if Hitler had not repeated the mistake of Dunkirk. He ordered Field Marshal von Leeb to stop the German tanks in front of Leningrad

Hitler was least interested in Moscow. According to his original plan, Army Group Center was to stop on the line of the river. Desna and to the north, to transfer most of their forces to Army Group South and this year to stop any offensive actions in the direction of Moscow. Therefore, the 4th Panzer Army was disbanded, and the headquarters of Field Marshal von Kluge was transferred to the reserve. The two tank groups now reported directly to the commander of Army Group Center. It was proposed that Guderian's tank group and the new field army be subordinated to Kluge. It was assumed that this association would advance in a southeasterly direction in the offensive zone of Army Group South in order to defeat the large enemy forces concentrated there.

The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch and his chief of staff, General Halder, did not approve of this plan. Brauchitsch insisted that Army Group Center move directly to Moscow, the capture of which he saw as the main goal of the entire campaign. Field Marshal von Bock and the headquarters of Army Group Center shared this view. Field Marshal von Kluge preferred to act in accordance with Hitler's strategic plan. These disagreements led to sharp clashes. That is why the final decision was delayed for several weeks.

Meanwhile, heavy fighting broke out between the Dnieper and the Desna, between the Western Dvina and the upper reaches of the Dnieper. Gradually, our troops entrenched themselves on a fairly solid defense line along the river. Desna east of Roslavl and Yelnya and west of Dorogobuzh. This line, which was a continuation of the line defended by the 9th Army located somewhat to the north, was held by the troops of the old 4th Army. The 4th Army was restored, and Field Marshal von Kluge again became its commander. Now we were responsible for holding the defense along the Desna.

During the second half of August and throughout September, the 4th Army fought on the line of the Desna, and the 9th Army defended itself on the right bank of the Dnieper north of Dorogobuzh. To the south of us, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group fought with the 2nd Army, while Gotha's 3rd Panzer Group acted in cooperation with the 9th Army. Lacking sufficient tank support, we were forced to switch to positional defense along the Desna, which required a large number of troops. The Russians launched furious counterattacks and increasingly broke through our thin line of defense. In a critical situation, only tank units saved us. During these battles, we became convinced that in modern warfare, the support of tanks is necessary for the infantry, not only in the offensive, but also in defense.

When I say that our line of defense was thin, I am by no means exaggerating. The divisions defended the strip along the front for about 30 kilometers. In addition, in the course of hostilities, especially in the Yelnya region, most of the divisions suffered heavy losses and were now incomplete. As for tactical reserves, they simply did not exist.

The disagreements between Hitler and his top military advisers were not only about strategy, but also about tactics. In combat operations designed to encircle large enemy forces, we captured many prisoners and large trophies. Still, the results were not as significant as it might seem at first glance. Firstly, to encircle large enemy formations, large tank forces were required; secondly, such an encirclement of the enemy rarely ended successfully, since large groups of Russians often slipped out of the boilers and went east. Therefore, Hitler insisted on encircling small groups of the enemy, believing that this tactic would be more successful.

In September, the question of a future strategy was finally decided. The option proposed by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was adopted. So, we are going to Moscow. The question now was whether we could, with our weak forces, capture the still distant capital before the harsh Russian winter set in. We had to pay dearly for the fruitless arguments that occupied several weeks of August and all of September.

Finally, the order was received. Army Group Center was to advance on Moscow. The start of the operation was scheduled for October 2. So the die is cast, the great battle is about to begin. The overture to it was to be the battle for Vyazma.

While the German high command was arguing about what to do, the Russians built a new defensive line along the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Desna, that is, just in front of the front of Army Group Center. This line was the outer ring of the defensive system that covered Moscow.

Our task is to break through this line of defense, carry out a double encirclement of the enemy, and enter Moscow before the onset of winter.

Our troops were deployed as follows. The 2nd Army, located in the Bryansk region and south of it, together with the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian attached to it, was supposed to strike in the direction of Orel and, having captured it, move north. On the left was Kluge's 4th Army with the Hoepner Panzer Group attached to it. The left flank of the 4th Army ran along the upper reaches of the Dnieper east of Smolensk. This army, reinforced with tanks, was supposed to deliver the main blow to Moscow. To the north of the upper reaches of the Dnieper was the 9th army of Strauss with the tank group Gotha attached to it. As in previous battles east of the Bug, the tank groups of Hoepner and Hoth were concentrated on the outer flanks of the field armies. These tank formations were to move first to the east, and then turn towards each other in order to encircle Vyazma. The field armies had to repeat their old tactics, which had always proved successful before. This tactic, as mentioned above, consisted of encircling small enemy groupings within a huge encirclement ring created by tank formations. As soon as the flares close, the tank groups, ignoring the battle with the surrounded enemy, which will certainly flare up in the cauldron in the Vyazma region, will have to continue moving towards Moscow at maximum speed.

The offensive began in the early morning of October 2. The armies of Kluge and Strauss, reinforced by panzer groups, attacked the enemy with truly remarkable accuracy. The troops acted exactly according to the plans developed by the General Staff. In this battle, conducted as a drill and taking place between 2 and 13 October, Army Group Center captured 650,000 prisoners, 5,000 guns and 1,200 tanks. Truly astronomical figures!

The same losses were suffered by the Russians in the sectors of Army Groups North and South. It is not surprising that Hitler, the high command and the troops believed that the material and human resources of the Red Army were coming to an end. As the prisoners informed us, this offensive, undertaken at such a late time of the year, was a complete surprise for the Russians. It seemed that Moscow was about to fall. Everyone in Army Group Center became big optimists. From Field Marshal von Bock to the soldier, everyone hoped that soon we would be marching through the streets of the Russian capital. Hitler even created a special sapper team that was supposed to destroy the Kremlin. And yet, one can only regret that the Minister of Propaganda found it appropriate to make a pompous statement that the war in the East, they say, was won, and the Red Army was actually destroyed.

In order to clearly imagine the dimensions of the impending catastrophe, it is necessary to outline what the mental state of our commanders and troops was at that moment. Starting from June 22, the German army went forward from victory to victory and, despite bad roads and bad weather, covered a huge distance from the Bug to the outskirts of Moscow. Since most of the army moved on foot with a horse-drawn convoy, one march of our troops can be considered a feat. And all this was done within a mere three and a half months, of which we sat idle for several weeks while the high command discussed questions of higher strategy. On October 12, when the battle for Vyazma was basically over (only scattered pockets of Russian resistance remained), we could look with pride at our past and with confidence - into the future.

In mid-October, all German armies launched an offensive against Moscow. Our headquarters, which was in Roslavl when the battle for Vyazma began, on October 6 was redeployed to Spas-Demensk, and on October 10 to Yukhnov. A few days later, the entire Army Group Center began to move east. Between us and the Russian capital was the so-called "Moscow defensive position." We had no reason to believe that this nut would be difficult to crack. If we manage to take these positions, the way to Moscow, as we believed, will be open.

When we came close to Moscow, the mood of our commanders and troops suddenly changed dramatically. It was with surprise and disappointment that we discovered in October and early November that the defeated Russians had by no means ceased to exist as a military force. In recent weeks, enemy resistance has intensified, and the tension of the fighting has increased every day. Command of the Russian troops covering Moscow was now taken over by Marshal Zhukov. In a few weeks, his troops created a defense in depth, which passed through the forest adjacent to the river. Nara, from Serpukhov in the south to Naro-Fominsk and further north. Carefully camouflaged strongholds, barbed wire and large minefields now filled the huge forest that covered the western approaches to the capital.

From the remnants of armies battered in heavy battles, as well as fresh units and formations, the Russian command formed new strong armies. Moscow workers were drafted into the army. New army corps arrived from Siberia. Most of the foreign embassies and missions, as well as part of the Russian government, were evacuated from Moscow to the east. But Stalin, with his small headquarters, remained in the capital, which he firmly decided not to surrender. All this was a complete surprise to us. We did not believe that the situation could change so much after our decisive victories, when the capital seemed to be almost in our hands. The troops now recalled with indignation the pompous statements of our Propaganda Ministry in October.

Sarcastic remarks began to be heard at the military leaders sitting in Berlin. The troops believed that it was time for political leaders to visit the front and see with their own eyes what was happening there. The soldiers were overworked, and the units, especially the infantry, were not fully manned. In most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people. The troops suffered heavy losses in the horse composition, and now it became difficult to transfer guns. In tank divisions, the number of combat-ready tanks was much less than the regular strength. Considering that the war with Russia was essentially over, Hitler ordered a reduction in the production of military materials by industry. At the front, in combat units, scanty replenishment now arrived. Winter was supposed to start soon, but we didn’t hear about winter uniforms.

Too stretched communication lines barely ensured the delivery of the necessary supplies to our troops. It was necessary to remake the gauges of the Russian railways, which were wider than the gauges of the railways in Western Europe. Deep in our rear, in vast forested and swampy areas, the first partisan detachments began to operate. We did not have sufficient forces and means to fight them. They attacked convoys and trains with supplies, forcing our troops at the front to endure great hardships.

The memory of Napoleon's Grand Army haunted us like a ghost. The book of memoirs of Napoleonic General Caulaincourt, which always lay on Field Marshal von Kluge's desk, became his bible. There were more and more coincidences with the events of 1812. But these elusive omens paled in comparison with the period of mud, or, as it is called in Russia, mudslides, which now followed us like a plague.

Of course, we knew that we were in for a thaw - we had to read about it in books. But the reality has surpassed the saddest fears. The mudslide began in mid-October, during the fighting in the Vyazma region, and continuously intensified until mid-November. What is the Russian thaw, it is impossible to tell a person who himself has never encountered it. There are only a few highways in this corner of the world. The entire territory of the country is covered with impassable sticky mud. An infantryman slips on roads soaked with water. Many horses must be harnessed to haul guns. All wheeled vehicles are deeply immersed in viscous mud. Even tractors move with great difficulty. Many heavy guns got stuck on the roads and therefore were not used in the Moscow battle. Tanks and other tracked vehicles were often sucked in with mud. Now it is not difficult to imagine what strain our already exhausted, exhausted troops were subjected to.

And suddenly a new, no less unpleasant surprise fell upon us. During the battle for Vyazma, the first Russian T-34 tanks appeared. In 1941, these tanks were the most powerful tanks in existence at that time. Only tanks and artillery could fight them. The 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns, which were then in service with our infantry, were helpless against the T-34 tanks. These guns could only hit old Russian tanks. Thus, the infantry divisions were faced with a serious problem, . As a result of the appearance of this new tank in the Russians, the infantrymen were completely defenseless. At least a 75 mm gun was required, but it had yet to be created. In the Vereya area, T-34 tanks passed through the battle formations of the 7th Infantry Division as if nothing had happened, reached the artillery positions and literally crushed the guns located there. It is clear what effect this fact had on the morale of the foot soldiers. The so-called "tank fear" began.

We already knew about the order of Marshal Timoshenko, given to encourage his troops after many defeats. This order listed the weaknesses of the German troops. Timoshenko explained that the main strength of the Germans was in their technical skills and weapons. One by one, the German soldier is weaker than the Russian, the marshal wrote, he gets nervous and becomes timid when he has to fight at night, in the forest or on swampy terrain. In these types of combat, the Russian soldier is much stronger than the German. All this, of course, is not entirely accurate. If it were so, we would not be standing at the gates of Moscow. Yet Tymoshenko's order contained a grain of truth. The civilized European is inferior in many respects to the stronger man of the East, tempered by close communion with nature.

Our aircraft performed excellently. However, now the number of combat-ready aircraft has decreased, and there were not enough landing sites near the front line, especially during the thaw. The number of accidents during landing and takeoff of aircraft has increased dramatically. And Russian aviation has so far almost never appeared in the air.

On October 26, Field Marshal von Kluge moved his headquarters from Yukhnov to the Maloyaroslavets area, closer to his troops. Later, during the great Russian counter-offensive, his staff was nearly taken prisoner. By the way, in 1812 Napoleon passed through Maloyaroslavets.

By the end of October, the weakened sector of our front ran along the Oka from Aleksin and to the north, then along the river. Nara to Naro-Fominsk, then turned to the north-west and crossed the highway leading to Moscow through Ruza and Volokolamsk. This front line, at least temporarily, represented the frontier of the greatest advance of the German troops, as our offensive capacity was exhausted. Our troops were weakened and tired. Russian armies occupied a defense in depth in the forests surrounding Moscow. Part of our artillery got stuck in the mud somewhere between Vyazma and p. Hapa. But Moscow was not far away. At night it was visible how the shells of Russian anti-aircraft artillery were exploding over the capital. What should have happened?

In November, the chief of the general staff convened for a meeting in Orsha the chiefs of staff of the three army groups, as well as all the armies that participated in the battles on the Eastern Front. The fateful question on the agenda was whether the German armies should dig in along the then-existing front line and wait until favorable weather arrived in the spring, or continue the offensive in the winter.

The representative of Army Group South (its commander was Field Marshal Rundstedt) opposed further offensive operations and insisted on going on the defensive. Army Group North was so weakened that there was nothing to think about carrying out offensive operations in its sector. Representatives of Army Group Center spoke out in favor of making a last attempt to capture Moscow. As soon as the Russian capital was in our hands, they said, individual tank divisions should be sent east of the city in order to cut off the main railways connecting Moscow with Siberia.

Opinions were divided. Of course, the prospect of entering the Kremlin could not fail to attract us, but many doubted the ability of our weakened troops to carry out a decisive blow.

After this meeting, the issue of an attack on Moscow was discussed in detail with the commanders of units and formations. Field Marshal von Kluge repeatedly visited his units at the forefront and was interested in the opinion of non-commissioned officers.

As for our manpower and military equipment, we continued to receive minor additions to personnel and weapons. But since October, the divisions have had a little rest in their positions, held in the vicinity of Moscow. Only the right flank of the army was subjected to continuous enemy attacks in the Serpukhov area and along the Podolsk-Maloyaroslavets road. There were few of our troops on this flank, and they hardly repelled enemy attacks. The army commanders discussed the situation for hours on end. And so the final decision was made - to make the last attempt to deliver a decisive blow to Moscow. The High Command considered it possible to start the operation only after it freezes.

The attack on Moscow was planned to be carried out by the troops of the 4th Army of von Kluge, which was strengthened in connection with this.

Our right flank, from the Oka to the Nara, was covered by weak forces. South of the Oka, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, attached to the 2nd Army, was to advance to Tula and further northeast. The main forces of the 4th Army were concentrated along the river. Nara, between the road Podolsk - Maloyaroslavets and the highway Moscow-Smolensk North of this highway and the river. Moscow, more precisely, between Ruza and Volokolamsk, concentrated the 4th Panzer Group of General Gepner attached to Kluge's 4th Army.

The experience of past combat operations showed that close interaction between tank and infantry formations gives a good result, and therefore several infantry corps were subordinated to the Gepner tank group.

The plan of the operation was as follows: the reinforced 4th Panzer Group was to strike in a northerly direction, to the left of the Moscow-Smolensk highway, then turn east and attack Moscow from the west and northwest. At this time, the 4th Army, having crossed the river. Nara, with its offensive actions, was supposed to tie down significant enemy forces on this sector of the front.

By mid-November, the period of mud was over, and the first frosts heralded the onset of winter. Now combat vehicles and vehicles of all kinds could move along roads and flat terrain. Far away in our rear, tractors pulled heavy guns out of the frozen mud, which were thrown one by one to the front line. However, it often happened that, pulling out tools from hardened mud, they were literally torn to pieces.

In the first days, the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group developed successfully. With heavy fighting, the enemy slowly retreated to the east. To the north, the 3rd Panzer Group of Colonel General Reinhardt was advancing. Both of these tank groups were subordinate to the commander of the 4th Army, Field Marshal von Kluge. Thus, under his command were 11 army corps, or 35 divisions, of which nine were armored. True, these were incomplete formations: there were not enough people and weapons.

Around November 20, the weather suddenly turned bad, and already through the night we experienced all the horrors of the Russian winter. The thermometer suddenly dropped to -30 o C. A sharp cold snap was accompanied by heavy snowfall. A few days later we were bitterly convinced that the Russian winter had begun. With increasing difficulties, the pace of advance of both tank groups slowed down, but still they continued to make their way to Moscow. Throwing their last reserves into battle, they captured Klin and went to the Moscow-Volga canal. In this area, their northern flank was suddenly attacked by fresh Russian units.

In the last days of November, our advanced units advancing on Moscow reached Ozeretskoye, and reconnaissance units of tank units penetrated even into the western outskirts of Moscow. This exhausted the offensive power of both our tank groups.

Such was the situation on the evening of November 28, when Colonel General Gepner asked Field Marshal von Kluge to order the advance of the troops of the 4th Army located along the river. Nara. This offensive, Hoepner believed, would ease the pressure exerted by the enemy on both tank groups and force the Russian command to transfer part of its forces from their sector to the area of ​​​​operations of the 4th Army. After discussing this request in detail with me as with his chief of staff, on November 29, the field marshal gave the order to go on the offensive. The attack began the next morning. The main blow was inflicted on Naro-Fominsk. The tank corps supported the southern wing of the advancing army. A few days after the start of the offensive, the infantry in several places broke through the enemy's defense in depth in the forest along the river. Nara. However, by December 2 it became clear that the troops at our disposal were clearly not enough to fulfill the task assigned to them. Only the reconnaissance battalion of the 258th Infantry Division managed to find a gap in the Russian defenses. He moved forward throughout the night and almost reached the southwestern outskirts of Moscow. However, early in the morning of December 3, it was attacked by Russian tanks and detachments of Moscow workers.

The field marshal decided to suspend the offensive, the prospects of which, in the current situation, became hopeless and which could only lead to unnecessary losses. The troops of the 4th Army, located south of the highway, were ordered to retreat to their previous positions located beyond the river. Nara. The withdrawal was successful. The enemy pursued our troops with great caution.

In that situation, the decision of Field Marshal von Kluge must be considered correct. A few days later, Marshal Zhukov threw the Russian troops into a powerful counteroffensive. Launched on December 6, it was directed against two tank groups located northeast of Moscow. This was the turning point of our Eastern campaign - hopes to get Russia out of the war in 1941 failed at the very last minute.

Now it was important for the political leaders of Germany to understand that the days of the blitzkrieg had sunk into the past. We were confronted by an army far superior in fighting qualities to any other armies we had ever encountered on the battlefield. But it should be said that the German army also demonstrated high moral stamina in overcoming all the disasters and dangers that befell it.

It was clear to every soldier of the German army that our life or death depended on the outcome of the battle for Moscow. If the Russians defeat us here, we will have no more hope. In 1812, Napoleon nevertheless managed to return to France with the miserable remnants of his defeated Grand Army. In 1941, the Germans had to either survive or be destroyed. At that time, Russian propaganda was reduced to dropping leaflets from airplanes with a boring, crudely executed image of the snow-covered Russian steppes littered with the corpses of German soldiers. This propaganda did not make the proper impression on our troops. The four battalions of French volunteers operating as part of the 4th Army proved to be less resilient. At Borodin, Field Marshal von Kluge addressed them with a speech, recalling how, in the time of Napoleon, the French and Germans fought here side by side against a common enemy. The next day, the French boldly went into battle, but, unfortunately, they could not withstand either the powerful attack of the enemy, or the severe frost and snowstorm. They had never had to endure such trials before. The French legion was defeated, having suffered heavy losses from enemy fire and frost. A few days later he was taken to the rear and sent to the West.

Before proceeding to consider further hostilities, it is necessary to talk about the German and Russian troops that participated in the battle near Moscow in 1941, as well as about the conditions in which the Moscow battle took place.

On our front, limited visibility was set for only a few hours a day. Until 9 o'clock in the morning, the surroundings were usually shrouded in thick fog. The sun gradually broke through, and only by 11 o'clock in the afternoon could something be seen. At 15 o'clock dusk set in, and an hour later it became dark again. In the Maloyaroslavets area, we had an airfield, where transport planes from Smolensk, Orsha and Warsaw occasionally arrived. They brought in reinforcements, but not enough to compensate for the daily losses. The soldiers arriving by plane were dressed in long trousers and lace-up boots. Often they did not have overcoats and blankets. Transport divisions were waiting for replenishment at the airfields and immediately transferred them to the front, where they were felt the most urgent need. Often they were at the front on the same night. Thus, people who only two days ago lived in the cozy barracks of Warsaw, after 48 hours, ended up on the Moscow front, which had already begun to disintegrate.

Even at the end of the summer, when Field Marshal von Brauchitsch realized that the war in the East would continue into the winter, he urged Hitler to prepare the necessary winter equipment for our troops in time. Hitler refused to take sound advice, as he was firmly convinced that the Russians could be defeated before the onset of cold weather. Now, even at Hitler's headquarters, they suddenly realized that the war in Russia, in fact, was just beginning and that, no matter how terrible it was, they would have to fight almost without winter clothes. Hitler began to give categorical orders for the urgent dispatch of warm clothing to the Eastern Front. In Germany, the collection of fur and other warm clothes was carried out everywhere. But it's too late! To deliver the collected clothes to the troops, it took not days or even weeks, but whole months. Thus, the soldiers were destined to spend their first winter in Russia in heavy fighting, having only summer uniforms, overcoats and blankets. Everything that was available in the occupied regions of Russia - felt boots, fur hats and woolen uniforms - was requisitioned, but turned out to be a drop in the ocean and almost did not alleviate the situation of the huge mass of our soldiers.

With the supply of troops, things were not very good. Only a few railways approached our area of ​​operations, and they were often cut by partisans. In the steam boilers of steam locomotives, not adapted to the conditions of the Russian climate, water froze. Each locomotive could only pull half the usual number of wagons. Many of them, covered with snow and ice, stood idle for days at dead ends of railway stations. Our huge need for artillery shells was met with difficulty. At the same time, to cheer up the soldiers, whole trains with red wine were delivered from France and Germany to the Eastern Front. Of course, you can imagine what a disgusting feeling arose among the soldiers and officers when, instead of shells, without which the troops literally suffocated, they were brought wine. However, wine often ended up at the front in an unusable form: during transportation it froze, the bottles burst, and only pieces of red ice remained from it.

Our defensive positions were almost devoid of cover. This affected the tactics of both sides, who fought stubborn battles for the capture of settlements, where one could find at least some shelter from the terrible cold. However, in the end, such tactics led to the fact that both sides subjected these villages to artillery fire and set fire to wooden houses and houses with thatched roofs, depriving the enemy of basic amenities. There was no point in digging into the ground and trying - the ground hardened like iron.

The harsh climate also had an effect on weapons. The lubricant on the weapon thickened so that it was often impossible to open the bolt, and we did not have glycerin or special oils that could be used in low temperatures. We had to maintain low fire under the tanks at night so that the engines would not freeze and fail. Often the tanks slid over the frozen ground and rolled downhill.

Probably, this brief description helped the reader to get an idea of ​​the conditions in which the German army had to fight in the winter of 1941/42.

The Russians were in better conditions. Most importantly, the intense cold was not new to them - they were used to it. In addition, Moscow was immediately behind them. Consequently, supply lines were short. The personnel of most Russian units were provided with fur coats, padded jackets, felt boots and fur hats with earflaps. The Russians had gloves, mittens and warm underwear. On the railways, the Russians ran steam locomotives designed to operate them in Siberia, at low temperatures. Russian trucks and tanks, like ours, were uncomfortable, but not to such an extent, they were better adapted to Russian conditions than ours. Until now, we have not yet seen much Russian aircraft, although at that time the front line passed only a few minutes of flight from Moscow airfields. Such were the conditions when, on December 6, Marshal Zhukov launched a powerful counteroffensive on the Moscow front, fatal to us.

Fierce fighting on the outskirts of Moscow, which almost led to the collapse of most of the German front, chronologically, in order to better understand the events that took place, can be combined into separate series of battles. To disassemble them in detail, it would be necessary to write a whole book. But in order to understand the battle for Moscow as a whole, they should be considered in general terms. Strictly speaking, the Moscow battle continued until mid-April 1942.

The Russian counter-offensive began with the fact that the superior forces of the Russians struck north of Moscow. They crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal from the east towards Klin and attacked the left flank of General Reinhardt's tank group in the area south of the Volga lakes. At the same time, they also attacked the 4th Panzer Group, located to the south. A particularly strong blow was delivered from the Moscow area in a western direction along the Moscow-Smolensk highway at the junction of the 4th Panzer Group and the 4th Army. In those bad conditions, the German armored forces could not withstand the overwhelming pressure of the Russians and were forced to slowly retreat, continuing to fight hard in deep snow and hoping to restore a united front further to the west. During the retreat, we left a lot of heavy weapons. Roads rare in these places, covered with a thick layer of snow, often turned out to be impassable for our guns and tanks. In battles with the enemy, we suffered heavy losses, but even more were the losses from the frost. Especially often, the soldiers frostbitten their feet, as uncomfortable, tight-fitting shoes made it impossible to wear more than one pair of socks. In the end, even Hitler was forced to agree to the withdrawal of two tank groups. In mid-December, the Russian offensive expanded to the south. New attacks were made against the 4th Army between Serpukhov and Tuchkovo. Here the enemy has so far managed to achieve only local successes, and the 4th Army has managed to hold the general front line.

A great threat loomed over the southern sector of the front of the 4th Army. Here, the 2nd Panzer Army of Guderian (the former 2nd Panzer Group), battered in previous battles, was attacked by superior enemy forces. The Russians launched a strong offensive in the Tula region, which the 2nd Panzer Army was unable to delay. One group of Russian troops continued to advance to the west, while the other turned to the northwest in the direction of Kaluga. Russian troops stationed in the Tarusa-Aleksin region also went on the offensive. Here again one of their groups rushed to the west, while the other turned to the north-west in the direction of Maloyaroslavets and Medyn.

The intentions of the Russians were clear. They planned a wide double encirclement of the 4th Army by striking in the north and south. Their ultimate goal was to encircle and destroy this army in its positions west of Moscow. The German command almost did not hope to avoid the encirclement and defeat of the huge southern group. The Russians slowly widened the gap between the 2nd Panzer and 4th Field Armies. Field Marshal von Kluge had no reserves to deal with the danger looming over his southern flank. Moreover, only one road connected the 4th Army with the rear. It passed through Yukhnov, Medyn, Maloyaroslavets and Podolsk. All other roads in the army area disappeared under a thick snow cover. If the Russians, advancing from the south, managed to capture our only vital artery, the 4th Army would be finished.

The situation was such that the command of Army Group Center had to think about organizing a systematic withdrawal of the entire reinforced 4th Army in a westerly direction. The need for this logically followed from the fact that the 2nd Panzer Army, located to the south, was forced to retreat behind the Oka in the Belev area. A line was drawn on the map, passing roughly from Belev through Yukhnov on the river. Ugra, to Gzhatsk and further north. The troops of the 4th Army were to withdraw to this line. An order was given to conduct a reconnaissance of the front line of defense. One motorized division has already set out for the Yukhnov area. Field Marshal von Kluge with his headquarters deliberately remained in Maloyaroslavets, although now the city was in serious danger. In mid-December, he summoned his corps commanders and their chiefs of staff to a meeting to discuss in detail the plan for the withdrawal of the 4th Army formations, which occupied the defense south of the Moscow-Smolensk highway. Everything seemed perfectly clear.

Suddenly, the Chief of Staff of Army Group Center, General von Greifenberg, my close friend, called. He wished to speak with the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. I went to the phone. Greifenberg said: “Better stay where you are now. A new order from Hitler has just been received. The 4th Army must not retreat a single step."

The reader will understand what impression this order made on us. According to all calculations, it could only mean the defeat of the 4th Army. And yet he had to obey. Units and formations that had already withdrawn to the west were returned back. The 4th Army was preparing for its last battles. Now only a miracle could save her.

However, that was not all. At the most critical moment there was a cardinal replacement of some commanders by others.

The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, had long suffered from a stomach ailment. Von Bock's physical condition had deteriorated sharply in connection with the defeat of his army group near Moscow, and now he had to at least temporarily transfer command of the army group to another person. Field Marshal von Kluge, a man of iron will, was appointed in his place. Leaving the 4th Army on December 18, he took command of the Army Group Center, whose headquarters was located in the forest west of Smolensk.

Thus, at the time of severe trials, the 4th Army was left without a commander. Kluge believed he could direct his old army by telephone and radio from Smolensk. Therefore, he sent me, as his former chief of staff, orders and instructions, for the implementation of which I was personally responsible. This situation continued until December 26, when the new commander, General of the Mountain Rifle Troops, Kübler, arrived at the headquarters of the 4th Army. For some time the commander of the army was General of the Panzer Troops Stumme.

It is not difficult to imagine how this change of commanders had a detrimental effect on the military operations of the army.

Even more significant changes took place in Berlin. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, had long been out of favor with Hitler. For several years he suffered from heart disease and could not stand the defeat of our troops near Moscow. Brauchitsch resigned, and Hitler became the absolute commander in chief of the ground forces. His only adviser, although without any rights, was the chief of the general staff, General Halder, who remained in his post after this purge.

Hitler believed that he alone could save his army from the catastrophe that was inevitably approaching near Moscow. And frankly speaking, he really achieved it.

His fanatical order, obliging the troops to hold fast in every position and in the most unfavorable conditions, was, of course, correct. Hitler instinctively realized that any retreat over snow and ice in a few days would lead to the collapse of the entire front, and then the German army would suffer the same fate as Napoleon's Grand Army. The division was not allowed to retreat more than 5-10 kilometers in one night. More could not be demanded from the troops and horse-drawn transport in those incredibly difficult conditions. Since all the roads were covered with snow, they had to retreat through open areas. After several nights of such a retreat, the soldiers were so exhausted that, stopping, they simply lay down on the snow and froze. In the rear there were no pre-prepared positions where the troops could withdraw, and there were no defensive lines to be held.

Thus, over the course of many weeks, the battlefield slowly moved westward. Stubbornly defending, our armies gradually retreated. The Russians broke through our defenses several times, but we always found the strength to restore the front line again. The number of company personnel in most cases was reduced to 40 people. We have suffered heavy losses in military equipment. Until the end of December, the threat looming over the left flank of the army was seen as the main danger.

But luck smiled at Hitler. Although the enemy was much stronger than us, the pace of his offensive began to slow down. Undoubtedly, the Russians were disappointed that they had not yet achieved the collapse of the German front west of Moscow. They were surprised by the resilience of the badly battered German divisions fighting in a harsh climate.

The Russian command ruthlessly sent its troops forward. In Maloyaroslavets, a few days before Christmas, we intercepted reports transmitted by radio, which it is not without interest to reproduce here. The Russian commander of the regiment reported on the radio: “Now it is impossible to continue the offensive. It is necessary to stay at the reached milestone for twelve hours. The response of the senior commander was: “Attack the enemy immediately. If you don't, blame yourself."

Something like a miracle happened on the southern flank of the 4th Army. It was not clear to us why the Russians, despite their advantage in this sector of the front, did not cut the Yukhyov-Maloyaroslavets road and did not deprive the 4th Army of its only supply route. At night, Belov's cavalry corps, which caused us so much trouble in the second half of December, advanced in our rear towards Yukhnov. This corps reached our vital communications, but fortunately did not cut it. He continued to move in a westerly direction and disappeared somewhere in the huge Bogoroditsky swamps.

At the end of December 1941, the headquarters of the 4th Army was still in Maloyaroslavets. On Christmas Eve, fighting went on all night near our headquarters. Between us and the Russians was only the 19th Panzer Division, called up from the front, in which there were only 50 tanks.

During these weeks, the air force could not provide us with such effective support as before. Back in November, the most combat-ready units of Kesselring's 2nd Air Fleet were transferred to North Africa, where Field Marshal Rommel's troops were defeated.

On December 25, the headquarters of the 4th Army moved to Yukhnov at the very last moment. By December 22, the 4th and 3rd Panzer Groups were withdrawn from the 4th Army. Now the 4th Army could only rely on its own forces.

Comparative data on the forces and means of the German and Russian troops as of the end of December are very instructive. The 4th Army, which occupied the defense between Kaluga and Tuchkovo, consisted of 13 infantry and one tank division. However, these formations had such a shortage of personnel that many divisions were, in fact, battle groups consisting of units of various branches of the armed forces. The following Russian formations were concentrated in front of the front of the 4th Army: 24 rifle divisions, three tank and two airborne brigades. The bulk of these forces operated on the southern flank of the 4th Army. South of Kaluga, six more rifle divisions, one tank brigade, and four cavalry divisions advanced westward. Three rifle, one motorized, two tank divisions and two tank brigades were concentrated in the Tula area.

These numbers speak for themselves. True, not all Russian divisions were staffed according to the states of wartime. Some of them were certainly very weak. They differed greatly both in organization and combat capability. The Russians were inexhaustible in various inventions. For example, cavalry divisions were often accompanied by infantry on sledges. Sledges were tied with ropes to the saddles of cavalrymen. It was strange to see how on a clear moonlit night long columns of horsemen moved across the snow, each of which was followed by an infantryman on a sledge.

Our losses in weapons and military equipment were as great as the losses in people, and perhaps even exceeded them. An example of this is the condition of the artillery of the 4th Army in early January 1942. In this case, we mean the artillery of army subordination. Before our retreat, it consisted of: 48 heavy howitzers, 36 mortars, 48 ​​100-mm and nine 150-mm guns, 84 assault guns and 252 heavy and light tractors. Now we have five heavy howitzers, eight mortars, 17 l00-mm and two 150-mm guns, 12 assault guns and 22 tractors.

Despite the huge superiority in forces, the Russians were unable to achieve the collapse of the German front west of Moscow by the end of 1941. But this in no way meant that the acute crisis had passed. During the first three months of 1942, serious danger repeatedly loomed over the 4th Army.

In January, the thermometer dropped to minus 42 Celsius. This only lasted a few days, then the temperature rose. Here I cannot describe in detail the battles that took place then, although in the aggregate they are part of the huge battle of Moscow. Those were terrible months. Later, Hitler ordered the casting of the "Eastern Medal", which was issued to everyone who took part in heavy fighting on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42. This medal was then considered and is now considered as a sign of high distinction.

On December 26, a staunch soldier, General of the Mountain Rifle Troops Kübler, became commander of the 4th Army. After a few weeks, he came to the conclusion that he was incapable of commanding an army in such a difficult environment. In the second half of January he was replaced by General Heinrici, who had been in command of the 4th Army for a long time.

The campaign in Russia, and especially its turning point - the Battle of Moscow, dealt the first strong blow to Germany both politically and militarily. In the West, that is, in our rear, there could no longer be any talk of the much-needed peace with England. As far as North Africa is concerned, here too we have failed. A tense situation has developed in the Mediterranean region. German troops were in Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Greece and the Balkans.

Even a glance at the map of the world, it was not difficult to understand that the small area in Central Europe, occupied by Germany, clearly could not put up forces capable of capturing and holding the entire European continent. Because of Hitler's policies, the German people and their armed forces were step by step getting further and further into a dead end.

It is appropriate to recall the last years of the reign of Alexander the Great, when his small army advanced into the depths of Asia until the situation forced the king to abandon his intentions. Or the Swedish king Charles XII, who in 1709 reached Poltava, where his small army was defeated by the Russians. Incidentally, Army Group South passed through Poltava in the summer of 1941.

But the closest parallel can be drawn with Emperor Napoleon. A child of the French Revolution, he believed he could conquer all of Europe. And here, in Russia, in the fire of burning Moscow, Nemesis overtook him. We will return to this parallel a bit later. It is often asked: could the Germans have won this war if they had succeeded in capturing Moscow? This is a purely academic question, and no one can answer it with complete certainty. I personally believe that even if we captured Moscow, the war would still be far from a successful conclusion. Russia is so vast, and the Russian government was so determined that the war, taking on new forms, would continue in the vast expanses of the country. The least evil that we could expect is the Guerrilla War, which is widely unfolded throughout European Russia. We should not forget about the vast expanses in Asia, which are also Russian territory.

One thing is absolutely indisputable: German military leaders and German troops have achieved almost the seemingly impossible. The war in the East was the last test of our soldiers. In two world wars, they demonstrated their iron will, steadfastly enduring the harsh Russian conditions.

Before closing, I would like to draw a parallel between Napoleon's campaign in 1812 and the campaign of 1941, although from a historical point of view this is difficult to do, since the causes and circumstances of these wars are completely different. And yet, in my opinion, it would be interesting to compare them.

Napoleon was not a Frenchman, but an Italian from Corsica, which became part of France. Hitler was not a pure German, but an Austrian. Napoleon used the striking force created by the French Revolution and relied on the might of France. Hitler used the power of Germany. Napoleon, a child of the revolution, fought many wars and conquered all the countries of Europe one by one. Hitler followed in his footsteps. England was Napoleon's main target, and he was ready to launch an invasion from Boulogne. Operation Sea Lion in 1940 was little more than a political threat. The French fleet was defeated by the English, and Napoleon's dream of conquering England became unrealistic, so the emperor decided to harm the island kingdom by creating a system of continental blockade. Most of the countries of Europe were compelled to carry out this measure of Napoleon, and only Russia hesitated. This was one of the main reasons that forced Napoleon to declare war on Russia. Hitler started a war with Russia, intending to win a living space for Germany, destroy Bolshevism and become the master of Europe.

Both Napoleon and Hitler believed that their wars in Russia would end as quickly and successfully as many others they had fought before. Both of them misunderstood the internal forces and dimensions of Russia. Both of them were insufficiently prepared for war and did not take into account the difficulties of supplying their armies in this vast country. Many of Napoleon's marshals and generals disapproved of his war plan in 1812. The same was true of Hitler's war plan in 1941.

In 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia with an army of over 600,000 men (among them over 200,000 Germans, Flemings, Poles, Swiss, Spaniards, and Portuguese), 1,400 cannons, and 180,000 horses. Napoleon led an army of all Europe against Russia. Hitler tried to do the same. Although he did not succeed in doing this to the fullest, nevertheless, among his soldiers were Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks, Finns, a Spanish division and a legion of French volunteers. On June 21, 1812, Napoleon addressed his troops with a pompous order. Before the start of the 1941 campaign, Hitler also gave a similar order. On the evening of June 22, 1812, the emperor watched the crossing of his soldiers across the river. Neman at Kovno. Hitler's armies crossed the Bug on the same day, exactly 129 years later. Napoleon began hostilities on 24 June. In both cases, the war in the East began too late.

As in 1812, so in 1941 the war was delayed by an unforeseen pause. The French emperor lost several precious weeks due to negotiations with the Russian tsar. Napoleon resumed his attack on Moscow at a relatively late time of the year, as did Hitler, on October 2, 1941. In 1812, the Russians retreated with stubborn, bloody battles, luring Napoleon into the depths of Russia and dragging out the war until winter. In 1812, the French emperor captured Moscow, but the war did not end there. On the contrary, from the Russian point of view, the war was just beginning. Hitler was unable to take Moscow, and only after that the enemy began to wage war for real. When Napoleon was forced to leave burning Moscow, he suffered his first major defeat. A similar situation developed in 1941. In both cases, at this stage, the Russians launched a powerful counteroffensive, and partisans played a large role in both wars.

In 1812, Napoleon believed that by retreating through the snow and ice, he could save his army. However, it turned out the other way around - the retreat led to the defeat of his Great Army. In December 1941, Hitler ordered not to retreat under any circumstances. With gigantic efforts, the front was held, and the crisis was eventually overcome. Other historical parallels can be found, but, as we noted above, they should be treated with great caution.

1812 and 1941 proved that using such an old-fashioned vehicle as a horse, it is impossible to conquer the vast expanses of Russia in a short time. Neither Napoleon's rather strong cavalry nor Hitler's motorized formations were large enough to seize and control vast Russian territory.

Before starting the war, Napoleon made one last attempt to convince the king to accept his demands. Count Narbonne was sent to Vilna to Tsar Alexander I. The king told the ambassador the following: “I am not blinded by dreams; I know to what extent the Emperor Napoleon is a great commander, but as you can see, space and time are on my side. In all this land hostile to you there is no such remote corner, wherever I retreat, there is no such point that I would not defend before agreeing to conclude a shameful peace. I will not start a war, but I will not lay down arms as long as at least one enemy soldier remains in Russia.

Stalin's determination in 1941 was not inferior to that of the Tsar in 1812. The big difference between the two wars is that the emperor personally led his army to Moscow and back, which Hitler did not.

At the military council of the Russians in 1812, the question of whether to leave or not leave Moscow was discussed. Prince Kutuzov then said: “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not lost. My first duty is to preserve the army and get closer to those troops that are coming to us for reinforcements. By the very concession of Moscow, we will prepare the death of the enemy. As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then there will be hope of a happy end to the war, but after the destruction of the army, both Moscow and Russia are lost. I order you to retreat."

One can definitely assume that if the Germans had taken Moscow, the Soviets would have acted in exactly the same way.

It is interesting to recall that on October 21, 1812, Marshal Mortier received an order from Napoleon to blow up the Kremlin before the French retreated from Moscow. Hitler intended to do the same if he succeeded in capturing Moscow.

The great difficulties in supplying the troops in 1812 and 1941 have already been pointed out above. In 1941, the main problem was to supply the troops with ammunition and fuel. In 1812, it was very difficult to provide horses with fodder. Napoleon's 180 thousand horses could not exist on the meager feed that the Cossack horses were accustomed to. The cavalry of the French emperor suffered heavy losses in battles, and the death of horses continuously increased on large crossings.

After the battle at Borodino, the famous cavalryman Murat said, reproaching his generals, that the cavalry attacks were not energetic enough. To this, the cavalry general Nansouty replied: “The horses are to blame for everything - they are not patriotic enough.

Our soldiers fight brilliantly if they don’t even have bread, but horses don’t move without hay.”

There is a famous painting that depicts a thoughtful Napoleon on horseback. On the sandy Russian road, he rides east ahead of the columns of his guard. Below the painting are the words: "They grumbled - and yet they followed him!" This is the best description not only of 1812 but also of 1941, for there is no doubt that the German troops also did their best.

Contrary to the guesses and assumptions of the German High Command, the Russians struck their first blow on the Karelian Isthmus. Their next blow fell on Army Group Center. The first signs of the deployment of enemy forces in front of the army group front appeared as early as early June, but the Supreme High Command, firmly convinced that the Russians would deliver the decisive blow in the South, attached almost no importance to this. Therefore, very few forces were allocated to Army Group Center. Almost all tank formations were located on the southern sector of the front, which was considered the most threatened. On the front of Army Group Center, the divisions were not fully equipped and defended strips up to 30 km wide on average each. In addition, they often occupied positions that were very unfavorable for defense, since Hitler forbade even partially withdrawing troops back. He also imposed a ban on the use of "elastic defense", thanks to which the Germans could, at the beginning of the Russian offensive, withdraw their divisions from the blow and thereby reduce losses in people and in territory.

Simultaneously with the sharp intensification of the activities of the partisans, who disabled almost all rear communications of the army group, on June 21, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts (on June 23 they were joined by the troops of the 1st Baltic Front) launched a general offensive in the directions to Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk, that is, where strong defensive battles were fought before. The offensive was preceded by an extremely powerful artillery and aviation preparation. Large Russian tank formations stood ready to move forward immediately as soon as the infantry managed to break through the German defenses.

On the Bobruisk and Vitebsk directions, the Russians began to carry out a wide enveloping maneuver. The remaining blows they sent against Orsha and Mogilev. Already in the first days of the fighting, the advancing Russian troops broke through the German defenses in the Bobruisk and Vitebsk directions, deeply wedged into their location and created a threat of encirclement not only to the key strongholds, but also to all the forces of the army group located on the ledge of the front east of the Bobruisk-Vitebsk railway.

The main forces of the 9th Army were surrounded in the Bobruisk area; however, after heavy fighting that lasted several weeks, in early July, one German tank grouping, thrown to liberate the encircled troops, managed for a short time to break the encirclement, slowly moving to the west, and withdraw from it about 20 thousand people who had lost all their heavy weapons and equipment.

Large forces of the 3rd Panzer Army, on the orders of the Headquarters, remained in Bobruisk, which they were supposed to defend as a "fortress". When these troops were finally given permission to break through, their forces were no longer enough to break the encirclement. Almost the entire 53rd Corps, which included up to 4 divisions, was captured.

In the interval between Bobruisk and Vitebsk, the 4th Army fought fierce battles, defending Mogilev and Orsha. But she couldn't keep them. With heavy losses, the army was thrown back to Borisov.

At this time, a new danger arose at the junction of Army Groups Center and North. The Russians managed to penetrate deeply the German defenses in the area south of Polotsk, as a result of which a threat was created to the right wing of Army Group North.

Within a few days, the Russians, having created a huge superiority in manpower and equipment, defeated the Army Group Center. The remnants of the army group barely managed to somewhat slow down the advance of the enemy. Building on the success achieved, the Russians soon approached the capital of Belarus, Minsk, the largest junction of highways and railways in the area.

Hitler placed the blame for the defeat of Army Group Center on its commander, Field Marshal Bush, and appointed Field Marshal Model, who simultaneously remained commander of Army Group Northern Ukraine, in his place. This situation gave the Model the opportunity to take forces from the composition, however, of the very modest reserves of this army group.

Having surrounded almost all the remnants of the 4th Army in the area east of Minsk and forcing them to capitulate, the Russians captured Minsk on July 4. The command of the Army Group "Center" in a written report indicated that on the 350-kilometer front of the breakthrough it was opposed by 126 rifle divisions, 17 motorized brigades, 6 cavalry divisions and 45 tank brigades of the enemy, while the army group had in its forces, numbering about 8 divisions.

Defeat of Army Group Center

On July 9, the enemy approached Vilnius. After many days of resistance from the bravely fighting German troops, the Russians took the city by storm. During the fighting in the Vilnius region, Army Group North, whose right wing was increasingly stretched, and meanwhile the troops of the left wing of Army Group Center failed to connect with it, found itself in a very critical situation, which became especially aggravated after large forces Russians went on the offensive from the Polotsk region in the direction of Daugavpils.

However, Hitler, based on political and military-economic considerations, decisively rejected the proposal to withdraw Army Group North to the Western Dvina-Riga line, which was vigorously supported by Field Marshal Model and the implementation of which would give the command the only opportunity to free up significant reserves to strengthen the group armies "Center". Hitler's main motives for this were probably the desire to influence Finland and the desire to continue importing iron and nickel from Scandinavia. A few days later, there was a serious danger that Army Group North would be cut off from East Prussia and surrounded. Only the withdrawal of Army Group North to the border of East Prussia could bring really tangible relief to the entire front.

In mid-July, the enemy, now resisted only by a few tank divisions carrying out mobile defense, reached the line of Volkovysk, Grodno, Alytus, Ukmerge, Daugavpils. Here the Russian offensive was temporarily stopped by the reserves that had come up here. During the fighting, which lasted almost 4 weeks, the Russians captured such a huge territory, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich is approximately equal to the area of ​​England. 38 German divisions were destroyed. The German Eastern Army, despite the stubborn resistance of its troops, suffered a major defeat, the culprit of which was entirely Hitler, who remained deaf to every reasonable and appropriate proposal. The defeat of Army Group Center put an end to the organized resistance of the Germans in the East.